A vindication of moral law as the foundation of ethics by Haezrahi-Brisker, Pepita
- ,  -.rn-s
’ >
Vt .
>  »  ■ -  I
A VINDICATION OP MORAL LAW 
AS THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS.








INFORMATION TO ALL USERS  
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, th ese  will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest.
ProQuest 10097970
Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
V-
. ///y 4C) y ^ u f o j  • ■ ( !  y)Jn yjj/f ■>//' ^ky'^  /j>
- j t f l . j \ j ^ y  j i  J^a I i (v /  /y ' V .\/i# ^//- " '/y/ V  " i /^ l t l  //',> ( ( f
o  . 'vfvV -V'/‘ -'/N/V ->2r'//( bf-'^iyf w >w4/’ /o//
 ^ VC,y P"A,y^  ^k>>^tjc)^ CA^v .,'41 J.^1 ^ 2/7/ . j /w ^ / ' / r  > S/>
^ . /hlS‘ . '>'■>.' ^/i/ _/\/4yT'-wx//
' c
1 / \ k / «: I ) / v C * -(7«/rotc Tw >fi/Ar uasAOtTo ht^v caé.^^^  61^  jyy /g  ^ 46j\ ie 6f ' f j  y ûf ^ f\Ù ^
ilûfTj. Jf -.7f~ - ' J '■ — ' - -  ^ i^ - . -gr€i^  ncAsujiA ifocy^ ot TfcUiji^Li '^ ti  oLS kZ 7& é t x ^ r ^  ‘
(tty-ol yufiij '^ J> ;5  y " ' "  ^ " 7  "^ '7  ^ '^<^ *5
/ZJT^Pur o , ;  7yKL,  ^ ot'r>o /y j , y ^ . > o ;
*o4t * /7i>AA^  ^ Mi.ir'tfj /cl/oTu»  ^  ^ t *  ^ ' *»“
/k'v' uj< i^ Oyy*o 3 Z  2r Jo7  ^ 7^ tfi( ftoirl-^ K£*y*-M /  t* /
^'f'^ !*.cr ty 0^ ‘Tks^ r • <,4, J r  A%vo\vTo na>6t  ^  ^ f ' <?/y 0
>w / Cf *' A I *  ^ '
X ^ T w V  ^ t T ^ o f t v  Y A A . L , V  T ^ / f a ? \ / *  .  t V l  V û y . 0  y  / 1 < ^  J
H *j ^ ^ ^ y ^ s J o \ r  *L iéi)0^  /<*M ^ ^ l i j i U u  /^T l(  y jç -e v  /% .
i)v'jii> o To^ •/“•<. 7g (WA>c7| K<^i
ot
u
Dass a lso  d ie se  U nterschiede (d ie , w ie eben g e z e ig t  
worden, n ich t so f e in  sin d  a ls  Hr. Garve m aint, sondem  mit 
der groebsten  imd le s e r lic h s te n  S c b r ift  in  der S e e le  des 
Menscben geschrieben  sind) s ic b , w ie er sa g t , ga en z licb  verli^ 
ren, wenn es aufs Handeln anko emmt : w id ersp rich t s e lb s t  der
eigenen Erfahrung.
Kant: Ueber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in
der Théorie r ic h t ig  s e in , tau gt aber nicht 
fu er d ie  P ra x is . 1793* VI. p. 370.
Lebt man denn, wenn André leb en .
I
Goethe: W est-o estlich er  Divan. Rensch Nain’
Buch des Unmutes. 2 . L ied , 2 . Strophe.
( i )
PREFACE.
Any enquiry in to  E th ics must presuppose a t  l e a s t  th re e  very 
im portan t and p o ss ib ly  awkward assum ptions, awkward from th e  p o in t of 
view of th e  m ethodological and even m etaphysical problems ra is e d . I t  
must presuppose th a t  i t  enqu ires in to  som ething, th a t  what i t  enqu ires 
in to  has a c e r ta in  d e f in i te  and circum scribed  meaning o f i t s  own and 
th a t  th i s  meaning th o u ^  n o t n e c e s sa r ily  d e fin ab le  in  exac t term s i s  
d e sc rib a b le  and communicable. *
The f i r s t  assum ption expanded p o s tu la te s  th a t  in  th e  course o f 
our general experience we come upon c e r ta in  p a r t ic u la r s  which may be 
term ed moral experience. That i s ,  some judgnents (which a t  l e a s t  a t  
f i r s t  b lush  and p r io r  to  any fu r th e r  a n a ly s is  which m ight reduce them 
to  o th e r c a te g o rie s )  appear to  be s p e c i f ic a l ly  moral a re  in  f a c t  and 
h a b itu a l ly  pronounced by men. The p ro to ty p e  o f th e se  judgments a re  
p ro p o s itio n s  of th e  ty p e : " th is  i s  good", " th is  i s  r i ^ t " ,  " th is  i s
bad", " th is  i s  wrong".
The second assum ption demands th a t  th e se  p ro p o s itio n s  a re  no t 
m eaningless, t h a t  in  pronouncing " th is  i s  r i ^ t " ,  " th is  i s  good" men 
do r e f e r  to  and t r y  to  imply som ething. The exact n a tu re  of t h i s  some­
th in g  and i t s  degree of r e a l i t y  and o b je c tiv i ty  a re  no t defined  by th e  
assum ption.
The th ird  assum ption demands th a t  such judgnents besides r e f e r r in g  
to  something be communicable. That i s ,  t h a t  one man may understand  in  
th e  most general way what ano ther man w ishes to  s ig n ify  when pronouncing 
" th is  i s  good", " th is  i s  r ig h t" ,  whether he agree to  i t  or n o t, whether
( i l )
he tak e  th i s  judgment to  imply th e  same p r in c ip le s ,  and whatever h is  
ju s t i f i c a t io n  o f or opp o sitio n  to  such judgments may be.
In  s p i te  o f th e se  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  i t  m igbt appear th a t  too  much 
has been assumed to  begin w ith , s in c e , when more f u l ly  expounded, th e  
th re e  p resu p p o sitio n s may be seen to  com prise th e  whole o f E th ics : 
determ ine i t s  su b je c t m a tte r , d e fin e  i t s  laws and p rovide th e  grounds 
of i t s  v a l id i ty .  On th e  o th e r  hand i t  seems to  me th a t  no E th ic a l 
enquiry would be p o ss ib le  a t  a l l  u n less  th e se  th re e  assum ptions were 
made. For i f  th e re  were no th ing  fo r  us to  examine, we would no t come 
up a g a in s t moral judgments a t  a l l ;  i f  they  defined  n o th ing , we should 
no t know th a t  they  were moral judgments; and i f  t h e i r  re fe ren c e  were 
no t understood a t  l e a s t  in  a general way and in  p r in c ip le  by o th e r  men, 
how could we t a lk  about them a t  a l l ,  l e t  alone enqu ire  in to  t h e i r  na ture?
So th a t  th e se  th re e  su p p o sitio n s appear to  form a s o r t  o f 
i r r e d u c ib le  minimum o f hypo thesis  which any enquiry in to  e th ic s  has to  
assume in  o rder to  be p o ss ib le  a t  a l l .  Again, though th ese  th re e  
su p p o sitio n s a re  made and used w ithout p ro o f, some subsequent d iscu ss io n  
on t h e i r  meaning and im p lic a tio n  may p o ss ib ly  be o f he lp  in  c la r i f y in g  
t h e i r  n a tu re , th e  ex te n t o f t h e i r  im port and th e  manner o f t h e i r  v a l id i ty .  
I t  may a lso  fu rn ish  us w ith  some reasons and grounds fo r  t h e i r  
v in d ic a tio n  in  re tro s p e c t .
I  sh a ll  t r y  no t to  make use  of any o th er unproved assum ption beyond 
th e se  th re e  and what may be d i r e c t ly  in fe r re d  from them as a b a s is  fo r  
th e  argument in  th i s  paper. Should any o th e r fundamental and a d d itio n a l 
assum ption have been employed, i t  was used unconsciously  and th e  v a l id i ty  
o f th e  argument w il l  be a ffe c te d  acco rd ing ly .
( i l l )
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PART I .
ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY THE NATURE OF "GOOD” AND THE 
FUNCTION OF "VALUE" IN ETHICS.
Some re f le c t io n s  on th e  n a tu re  o f *good*.
The concept re fe rre d  to  by th e  word ‘good* i s  too general in
d e n o ta tiv e  and too vague in  co n o ta tiv e  power, to  be considered  
s u f f ic ie n t ly  r e l i a b le  as a b a s is  fo r  th e  assessm ent and d e lim ita t io n  of 
e th ic a l  su b je c t-m a tte r  o r as a ground fo r  th e  pronouncement of moral 
judgnen ts. To prove th i s  f i r s t  co n ten tio n , i . e .  th e  doubtfu l t r u s t ­
w orth iness o f *good* in  i t s  double fu n c tio n  : a) o f an in d ic a t iv e  and
determ inant element o f e th ic a l  su b je c t-m a tte r , and b) o f a p r in c ip le  o f 
ev a lu a tio n  of moral judgnents, I  sh a ll  examine a very  famous and 
im pressive E th ica l theo ry  in  which 'good* has been made to  perform both
th ese  t a s k s Î G, E. M oore's "P rin c ip ia  E th ica".^^
2 )In  th e  p reface  to  P r in c ip ia  B thica Moore d iv id es  th e  p o ss ib le  aims 
o f E th ics in to  two main tre n d s . The one seeks an answer to  th e  question  : 
"What kind o f th in g s  ought to  e x is t  fo r  t h e i r  own sake?"; th e  o th e r to
th e  query : "What kinds o f a c tio n s  ought we to  perform?" For various
reasons , which s h a l l  be examined in  d e ta i l  as they a re  o f paramount 
im portance fo r  th e  general in te n t  o f M oore's e th ic a l  thought, ab so lu te
1) This p a r t  o f th e  Thesis has been pub lished  in  Mind, in  Ju ly  1948, 
pages 522-540, under th e  t i t l e :  "Some arguments a g a in s t G.E.Moore's 
view of th e  fu n c tio n  of 'good ' in  E th ic s . A few l a t e r  i n t e r ­
p o la tio n s  in to  th e  t e x t  a re  marked a t  t h e i r  p roper p lace .
2 ) E d ition  o f I 9O5 , p . v i i i ,  l in e s  4 ,  5 .
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primacy i s  given to  th e  f i r s t  query over th e  second. So much so th a t  
th e  answer to  th e  former i s  regarded by Moore as th e  so lu tio n  to  our 
e th ic a l  problem s, th e  answer to  th e  l a t t e r  fo llow ing  alm ost au to m atica lly  
and as a c o ro lla ry  from th e  m a te ria l c o n s t i tu t io n  o f th e  answer to  th e  
f i r s t .
As a l l  answers to  th e  f i r s t  questio n  a re  commonly (and very  ro u ^ ly )  
q u a lif ie d  by th e  a t t r ib u te  'good*, w h ils t  those  to  th e  second a re  as 
commonly (and as r o u ^ ly )  q u a lif ie d  by th e  a t t r ib u t e  * r i ^ t * , Moore makes 
h is  stand  on t h i s  m a tte r  even more e x p l i c i t ,  by d e fin in g  " ri^ t* *  as 
"good-as-anneans", Whether t h i s  a t t i tu d e  i s  w arranted by th e  f a c ts  o f 
moral experience, o r by s t r in g e n t  reason ing  from th e se  f a c t s ,  w i l l  be our 
f i r s t  p reoccupation .
In  ccxnpliance w ith  th e  demands of a l l  m ethodical enquiry  in to  E th ic s , 
Moore s t a r t s  h is  a n a ly s is  w ith  th e  i n i t i a l  datum o f a l l  such e n q u ir ie s ;  
th e  ex is ten ce  de fa c to  o f th e  a c t  of m oral judgement. • In  our experience, 
he say s , we cannot but come across such sen tences as "This i s  good",
"This i s  bad", e tc .  Most of th ese  a s s e r tio n s  a re  obviously concerned
w ith  human conduct even where human conduct i s  no t e x p l ic i t ly  s ta te d  to
be t h e i r  su b je c t. T herefore E th ics i s  undoubtedly concerned w ith  th e
q u estio n  o f what good conduct i s .  But, Moore co n tin u es , good conduct
(which we must remember i s  more c lo se ly  and immediately a sso c ia ted  w ith 
query number two : "What kind of ac tio n s  ought we to  perform?" than  w ith
query number one) i s  a complex n o tio n . I t  con ta in s th e  n o tion  o f "good" 
as w ell as th e  n o tio n  of "conduct". For (a) Conduct may be good, bad or 
in d if f e r e n t ,  and (b) Other th in g s  besides conduct may be good. Hence
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a l l  e th ic a l  enqu iry , whose preoccupation  i s  a f t e r  a l l  w ith  "good" and 
"bad" (which a re  i t s  own s p e c if ic  and c o n s t i tu t iv e  n o tio n s) r a th e r  than  
w ith  conduct, cannot l im it  i t s e l f  in to  an a n a ly s is  o f th e  judgment o f 
conduct. For, s in ce  "good denotes a p ro p erty  th a t  i s  common to  conduct 
and o th e r  th in g s " w e  m ight m istake th e  n a tu re  of t h i s  p roperty  by 
l im itin g  our enquiry  to  one in s tan c e  only (namely good conduct) o f a l l  
p o ss ib le  good th in g s . Thus we m i ^ t  tak e  fo r  th e  general n a tu re  of 
"good" something sp e c if ic  to  conduct, and no t shared by a l l  th o se  o th er 
th in g s  which m i ^ t  be c a lle d  good. M oreover, by th u s f a i l in g  to  grasp 
th e  n a tu re  o f good in  g e n e ra l, we a re  c e r ta in  to  m istake th e  n a tu re  o f 
i t s  p a r t ic u la r  : good conduct.
T herefore th e  f i r s t  ta s k  o f E th ics i s  to  in v e s tig a te  th e  n a tu re  of 
"good" in  g e n e ra l. This once grasped, th e  n a tu re  o f "good conduct" w il l  
au to m atica lly  follow  from i t ,  as a c b ro l la ry , im portan t only in  as much as 
i t  m ight fu rn ish  th e  means of a tta inm en t o f "THE GOOD". By t h i s  argument 
Moore takes th e  primacy o f query number one over query number two to  be 
e s ta b lish e d  irre v o c a b ly . Almost as a m a tte r  o f lo g ic a l  consequence, th e  
ta s k  of Eîthics i s  pronounced to  c o n s is t  in  th e  dete rm ina tion  and 
enuncia tion  o f th e  n a tu re  of " th e  Good" to  which we must a l l  a s p ir e ,  
r a th e r  than in  th e  d iscovery  and enuncia tion  of a supreme law, to  be 
followed and re a l is e d  in  our conduct.
"The p e c u l ia r i ty  o f E th ics  i s  no t th a t  i t  in v e s tig a te s  a s s e r tio n s  
about human conduct but th a t  i t  in v e s tig a te s  th a t  p ro p erty  of th in g s
1 ) p . 2 , 1 .7 , a . f .
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which i s  denoted by th e  term  good and th e  converse p roperty  denoted by 
th e  term  bad. I t  must in  o rd er to  e s ta b l is h  i t s  conclusions in v e s tig a te  
th e  t r u th  o f a l l  such a s s e r tio n s  except those  which a s s e r t  th e  r e la t io n  
o f t h i s  p roperty  only to  a s in g le  e x is te n t" .
Another a s s e r t io n  of M oore's th a t  o u ^ t  to  be mentioned a t  t h i s
p o in t occurs in  th e  p re fa c e , p . v i i i ,  1 . 6 , and runs "  ex ac tly  what i t
i s  th a t  we ask about a th in g  when we ask whether i t  o u ^ t  to  e x is t  fo r  
i t s  own sake, i s  good, or has i n t r i n s i c  v a lu e" .
At th is  p o in t,  sev era l questions may be ra ise d
(A) Whether th e  co n ten tio n  t h a t ,  o th e r  th in g s  besides
conduct may be good, i s  tru e?  I f  so
(a) Does th i s  imply th a t  a l l  in s tan c es  o f th e  a p p lic a tio n
of good have but one meaning : n o t in  th e  sense of
d e r iv a tiv e  o r prim ary meaning, but in  th e  sense th a t
they  a l l  possess moral s ig n if ic an c e?
(b) I f  a l l  in s ta n c e s  o f th e  a p p lic a tio n  o f "good" a re  no t
ip so  fa c to  possessed  of moral s ig n if ic a n c e , what 
ex ac tly  can t h e i r  meaning be, and in  what r e la t io n  do
they  stand to  th e  s p e c i f ic a l ly  moral meaning o f "good"?
(B) Whether th e  co n ten tio n  th a t ,  th e  p ro p erty , commonly 
denoted by "good" comes under th e  ju r is d ic t io n  o f E th ic s , 
in  a l l  i t s  a p p lic a tio n s , i s  t r u e ,  and w hether i t s  t r u th  
n e c e ssa r ily  fo llow s from th e  a ff irm a tio n  o f (A)? Ï
1) p .56 & 25, 1 .2 .
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E xplanation î The p ro p erty  "good" as i t  appears in  th e  complex 
n o tio n  "good conduct", possesses a s p e c i f ic a l ly  "moral" meaning, which i s  
drawn e i th e r  from i t s  i n t r i n s i c  n a tu re , o r from i t s  con junction  w ith  a 
c e r ta in  su b je c t, namely human conduct, i . e .  conduct which i s  m o tiva ted , 
w il le d , in tended , and, a t  l e a s t  fo r  our purposes under th e  c o n tro l o f a 
f re e  and in te l l i g e n t  agen t. I  suggest th a t  th e  moral s ig n if ic a n c e  o f 
"good" in  th e  complex n o tio n  "good conduct" i s  based on th e  l a t e r  p a r t  
(conduct) r a th e r  than  on th e  form er (good). For "conduct" even when
lack in g  a l l  f u r th e r  q u a l i f ic a t io n  but th a t  o f  being th e  m otivated  conduct 
of a f r e e  and ra t io n a l  ag en t, p reserves s t i l l  some moral conno ta tion , 
whereas fo r  "good" th i s  i s  an open q u e s tio n . To i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  p o in t : 
th e  moral s ig n if ic a n c e  o f sta tem ents l ik e  : "Art i s  good", "Modem
s a n ita ry  in s ta l l a t io n s  a re  good", i s  by no means s e lf -e v id e n t ,  u n le ss  we 
a re  c a r r ie d  away by th e  mere s im ila r i ty  o f exp ression . In  some c a se s , 
as fo r  example in  "a good h id in g " , "a good road", e t c . ,  t h i s  lack  o f 
obvious and s e lf -e v id e n t  moral im p lica tio n s  i s  even more e v id en t. On 
th e  o th e r  hand, th e se  sta tem en ts a re  n o t devoid o f sen se , nor do they  give 
th e  im pression of being m erely examples of the  m isuse o f th e  p ro p erty  
"good". Good, we might th e re fo re  conclude te n ta t iv e ly  fo r  th e  moment may 
be employed to  q u a lify  o th e r th in g s  besides conduct. But in  what sense, 
whether moral or o therw ise , i t  i s  so employed must f o r  th e  moment remain 
an open q u estio n .
In  any case , even g ran ted  th a t  (A) i s  t r u e ,  i t  i s  prem ature to  
conclude from th i s  one p rem iss, as Moore does, t h a t  (B) i s  t ru e  ( i . e . to  
conclude from th e  f a c t  th a t  o th e r th in g s  besides conduct may be good.
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t h a t  a l l  such a p p lic a tio n s  o f good f a l l  n e c e s sa r ily  under th e  j u r i s ­
d ic t io n  of E th ic s ) . Indeed, i t  seems to  me th a t  (B) does no t follow  
from (A) a t  a l l ,  as Moore would have i t ,  but r a th e r  from ( a ) .  That i s ,  
only i f  i t  be proven th a t  a l l  a p p lic a tio n s  o f th e  p roperty  "good" ip so  
nomine convey an e th ic a l  s ig n if ic a n c e , in  o th e r words, th a t  a l l  
a p p lic a tio n s  o f good have but one meaning and th a t  meaning e th ic a l ,  th e  
co n ten tio n  th a t  a l l  a p p lic a tio n s  o f th e  p ro p erty  "good" f a l l  under th e  
ju r is d ic t io n  o f E th ic s , w i l l  be t ru e  by im p lic a tio n . That i s ,  M oore's 
co n ten tio n  th a t  th e  p reoccupation  of E th ics i s  w ith  "good" and "bad" 
ra th e r  than  w ith  conduct w il l  be j u s t i f i e d .  But as (a ) seems a t  p re sen t 
to  be a t a c i t  and even unconscious assum ption, r a th e r  than  a s u f f ic ie n t ly  
proven a s s e r t io n , and as i t  i s  no t s e lf -e v id e n t enough to  be accepted 
w ithou t p roo f, (a ) seems hard ly  a s tro n g  e n o u ^  b a s is  fo r  an e d if ic e  as 
v a s t as th e  P r in c ip ia  E ^hica.
Moreover, th e  question  seems precluded  a lread y  in  th e  sentence 
quoted above from th e  p re fa c e , where fo r  a l l  purposes what ought to  e3d .s t 
f o r  i t s  own sake, i s  id e n t i f ie d  w ith i n t r i n s i c  va lue  and a lso  w ith  what 
i s  good in  i t s e l f .
Now th is  i s  by no means n e c e s sa r ily  o r even g e n e ra lly  t r u e ,  u n less  
we tak e  no th ing  to  have i n t r i n s i c  value except moral goodness. But th is  
i s  obviously no t what Moore means, whose general s t r iv in g  i s  to  widen the  
boundaries of E th ics r a th e r  than  to  a n n ih i la te  the  domain of A e s th e tic s . 
As an exp lanation  l e t  us tak e  " th e  B eau tifu l"  as an example of a th in g  
possessed o f i n t r i n s i c  v a lu e . I s  " th e  B eau tifu l"  always and a p r io r i  
id e n t ic a l  w ith th e  good? Or again , i f  we agree to  say th a t  "The
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b e a u tifu l  having in t r in s i c  va lue  i s  always good" -  i s  "good" in  th i s  
sense always and a p r io r i  id e n t ic a l  w ith  th e  good in  th e  moral sense 
which i s  th e  p re d ic a te  of human conduct? Suppose we had two in s tan c es  
o f in d isc r im in a te  and unm otivated bombing. In  one in s ta n c e  th e  old 
s ta in e d  g lass windows o f a fo u rte e n th -c e n tu ry  church were destroyed .
In  th e  second case  a house f u l l  o f th e  most w orth less p o ss ib le  o f human 
be in g s , say in cu ra b le  c rim ina l lu n a t ic s .  Which would be th e  m orally  
worse ac tion?  And which a c tio n  would dim inish  th e  sum to ta l  o f i n t r i n s i c  
value e x is te n t  in  th e  world to  a g re a te r  degree? Does no t th e  f a c t  th a t  
th e se  two questions a re  n o t id e n t ic a l ,  t h a t  indeed th e  answers to  them 
a re  o f n e c e ss ity  o p p o site , prove th a t  i n t r i n s i c  va lue  and moral goodness 
a re  n o t n e c e ssa r ily  one and th e  same th ing?  That th ey  might even c la sh  
w ith each o th er in  t h e i r  re s p e c tiv e  appeal and a t t r a c t io n  fo r  us?
Now, th e  sp e c ia l and s p e c if ic  p reoccupation  o f E th ics i t  seems to  
me should be w ith moral goodness r a th e r  than  w ith th e  b e a u t ifu l ,  which 
e ifte r a l l  comes m ainly under th e  ju r is d ic t io n  o f A e s th e tic s . Granted 
even th a t  moral goodness and th e  b e a u tifu l have th i s  in  common, th a t  th%r 
both possess i n t r i n s i c  value ( th e  problem o f i n t r i n s i c  value i s  f a r  too  
com plicated and c o n tro v e rs ia l  to  be pursued here ) does t h i s  e n t i t l e  th e  
sc ience  of e th ic s  to  extend i t s  boundaries in  o rder to  inc lude  a l l  th e  
domains of i n t r i n s i c  value and in co rp o ra te  them in to  i t s  own system?
Would t h i s  no t b rin g  about a b lu rr in g  o f th e  s p e c if ic  m ission  and 
c h a ra c te r  o f E th ic s , an in s e n s i t iv i ty  to  i t s  p a r t ic u la r  p r in c ip le s?
Should we n o t, on th e  c o n tra ry , t r y  to  d e fin e  th e  unique q u a li ty  o f 
E th ics as c le a r ly  as p o ss ib le , and draw i t s  boundaries as sharp ly  as
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p o ss ib le?  In  sh o r t ,  i s  i t  n o t ra th e r  th e  ta sk  of E th ics  to  uphold the  
moral claim s and safeguard i t s e l f  a g a in s t encroaching in flu en ces  of 
k indred  domains, ra th e r  than  to  seek to  absorb th ese  domains and lo se  
i t s  own soul?
X X X X X
However, befo re  we can s a t i s f a c to r i l y  answer th e  question  w hether 
"good" holds moral s ig n if ic a n c e  in  a l l  i t s  a p p lic a tio n s , we must d iscuss 
th e  n o tio n  of good as p resen ted  by Moore. We have seen th a t  th e  question
which Moore regards as th e  main aim of E th ics : "What kind o f th in g s
'
o u ^ t  to  e x is t  fo r  t h e i r  own sake?" may according to  h is  assum ptions be 
s im p lif ie d  to  th e  question  : "What i s  good?" There a re , says Moore,
th re e  p o ss ib le  answers to  t h i s  question  : (a) p a r t ic u la r  answers of th e
I
form "This p a in tin g  i s  good"; (b) genera l answers of the  form "Books a re
good", "P leasu re  i s  good"; and (c) d e f in i t io n s  as when we say "P leasure  
i s  good", no t l ik e  in  (b) meaning th a t  p lea su re  i s  one of many p o ss ib le  
good th in g s , o r even th a t  p lea su re  alone i s  a good th in g , i . e .  £  c £  or 
2  i s  comprised in  £ , but meaning th a t  2. ^  p lea su re  i s  id e n t ic a l  w ith  
good and good w ith  p le a su re . The p a r t ic u la r  answers, Moore a rgues, a re  
of no in te r e s t  to  th i s  enquiry . The d e f in i t io n  i s  u se le s s  s in ce  "good" 
taken  as a p re d ic a te  i s  a sim ple unique and undefinab le  no tion  in  th e  
sense in  which yellow i s  u n d e fin ab le . The general answers a re  our c lue  
to  a p o ss ib le  d e f in i t io n  o f what "the  good" (taken  as a su b s ta n tiv e , an 
embracing whole o f many and v a rieg a ted  p a r ts )  m i ^ t  be. Hence our main 
ta s k  should be to  examine a l l  such general answ ers, and sound them as to  
the  t r u th  o f t h e i r  co n ten tio n . In  M oore's case t h i s  meant a survey of
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Buch schools o f t h o u ^ t  as Hedonism, U ti l i ta r ia n is m , Evolutionism  and 
th e  E th ics of H. Sidgwick. During t h i s  exam ination t h e i r  so lu tio n s  
should be s tr ip p e d  o f th e  p re te n s io n  o f being d e f in i t io n s  o f "good".
They should be sub jec ted  to  a rigo rous exam ination as to  th e  t r u th  of 
t h e i r  c o n ten tio n , and when once found t r u e ,  th ese  va rio u s answers should 
be inco rpo ra ted  in to  th e  f in a l  id ea  of th e  good as i t s  c o n s t i tu t iv e  p a r ts .
Here, to o , sev era l p o in ts  may be ra is e d  in  argument
(A) I s  i t  r e a l ly  im possib le  to  d e fin e  "good"?
(B) What j u s t i f i c a t io n  i s  th e re  fo r  th e  assum ption of th e  
ex is ten ce  o f such a canprehensive whole as " the  good", 
whether i t  be de fined  as an organic u n ity  or not?
(A) In  so f a r  as "good" denotes a c e r ta in  sim ple and unique p ro p erty
of th in g s  i t  cannot be defined  in  th e  sense t h a t  i t  i s  ir re p la c e a b le  by
ano ther term , o r by a s t r in g  o f term s, o r by an enumeration o f i t s  
c o n s titu e n t  p a r t s ,  i . e .  a d e sc r ip tiv e  d e f in i t io n  o f th e  term i s  n o t 
p o ss ib le . But, on th e  o th e r hand, a d e f in i t io n  in  us&, in  th e  sense in  
which X i s  defined  in  th e  equation
Z  r a
2x 15 ~ 0
z - b
might be p o ss ib le . For example "yellow" th o u ^  in d e fin a b le  in  i t s e l f ,  
m ight be defined as " th a t co lou r which corresponds to  th e  wavelength ? 
or a l te rn a t iv e ly  as " th a t co lou r which occupies th e  in te rm ed ia te  p lace  
between red and g reen". This adm itted ly  does no t g ive  us an accu ra te  » 
d e sc r ip tio n  o f what th e  term con ta ins but fu rn ish es  us w ith a workable 
means of determ ining th e  p o s it io n  o f t h i s  term in  our general system o f
-1 0 -
knowledge. Indeed, in  many cases where th e  p ro p erty  i s  sim ple and 
unique and i t s  con ten t grasped imm ediately and d i r e c t ly  e i th e r  by th e  
senses or by in tu i t io n ,  i t  i s  found u se fu l in  s c i e n t i f i c  in v e s tig a tio n s  
to  ignore  th i s  and deal but w ith  i t s  d e f in i t io n  in  u su . Thus though 
th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f, say, th e  o rd in a l number 2 i s  grasped in tu i t iv e ly ,  
a n a ly tic a l  a rith m e tic s  f in d s  i t  u se fu l to  define  2 as th e  immediate 
successo r o f 1, o r th e  immediate p redecesso r o f 5* Now a c e r ta in  
d e f in i t io n  of good may be attem pted  on th e  same l in e s .  "Good", we m i ^ t  
say, " is  th e  opposite  of bad." This i s  no t so t r i v i a l  as i t  m ight 
seem. For although our i n tu i t iv e  concept of good may vary considerab ly  
from one age to  an o th er, from one country  to  an o th er, from one so c ia l  
c la ss  to  ano ther, from one in d iv id u a l to  ano ther, and even in  th e  same 
in d iv id u a l from one tim e to  an o th e r, one th in g  remains s ta b le  throughout 
th e se  changes : i t s  r e la t io n  to  "bad". In  o th er words, o f good
w hatever we might mean by i t ,  i . e . whatever i t s  m a te r ia l c o n ten t, we
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always approve; o f bad we disapproved;^ There seems to  be a c e r ta in  
r e f le x iv e  r e la t io n  between "good" and "approval", which e x is ts  o f 
n e c e s s ity  -  and in  a l l  c a se s . They correspond to  each o th er as "yellow" 
corresponds to  th e  "wavelength ^ ". Hence fo r  our purpose we m i^ it 
d e fin e  "good" as th a t  p ro p e rty  o f a th in g  which c a l ls  fo r th  our approval 
of t h a t  th in g . To avoid m isunderstanding i t  should be s ta te d  th a t  by 
th e  use  o f th e  term  " c a l ls  fo r th "  we do no t mean to  imply any causa l 
r e la t io n  between good (as th e  cause) and approval (as th e  e f f e c t ) .  We 
could have defined  good w ith  th e  same ju s t i f i c a t io n  as th a t  p re d ic a te  o f 
a th in g  which expresses our approval o f th a t  th in g , in  which case 
"approval" would have appeared to  be the  cause and "good" th e  e f f e c t .
l )  I  venture  to  s ta te  t h i s  c o r re la t io n  w ithout fu r th e r  a n a ly s is  s in ce  
in  my argument I  sh a ll  make use of th e  m ethodical fu n c tio n  of 
approval only . There i s  no c a l l  made on th e  f e e l in g  o f app roval, the  
genesis and n a tu re  o f t h i s  fe e lin g  o r th e  re sp e c tiv e  s u b je c t iv i ty  or 
g e n e ra li ty  o f i t .  Nor i s  th e re  any appeal made to  the  a c tu a l m a te ria l 
con ten ts o f th e  o b jec ts  o f  approval. The only q u a l i f ic a t io n  made i s  
t h a t  th e re  be grounds and reasons fo r  t h i s  approval, t h a t  i t  be no t a 
b lin d  in a r t ic u la te  sen tim en t, but a consciously  and co h eren tly  argued 
s tan d . In  t h i s  way a  c e r ta in  o b je c t iv i ty  i s  gained , inasmuch as 
th e se  grounds and reasons , th i s  coheren t and conscious argument i s  
communicable. In  no way has th e re  been assumed, th a t  i t s  
com m unicability involves th e  power o f c o n v ic tio n , or assu res th e  
s im ila r i ty  and id e n t i f ic a t io n  of th e  d if f e r e n t  con ten ts o f approval.
On th e  c o n tra ry , th e  very  d iffe re n c e  of th ese  c o n te n ts , th e  
d is s im i la r i ty ,  even th e  r e l a t i v i t y  o f what i s  approved, b rings out 
more c le a r ly  th e  constancy o f th e  s t ru c tu re  of th e  a c t o f approval, 
th e  id e n t i ty  o f r e la t io n ,  th e  ab so lu te  n a tu re  o f th e  A m otion.
As to  the  su b je c tiv e  f e e l in g  o f app roval, i t  m ight be described  as 
a more evolved r a t io n a l is e d  fe e l in g , inc lu d in g  both fe e lin g s  o f 
adm iration  and s a t is f a c t io n  in  a p le a su ra b le  way, a warm fe e l in g  th a t  
might reach th e  p itc h  o f enthusiasm  but does n o t u su a lly  do so . This 
fe e lin g  w hatever i t s  q u a li f ic a tio n s  does no t e n te r  in to  th e  consider­
a tio n  o f th e  formal im p lica tio n s  o f func tions o f approval a t  a l l ,  and 
an a n a ly tic a l  exam ination o f a l l  t h a t  i t  e n ta i l s  w il l  be o f i n te r e s t  
only in  connection w ith  th e  question  o f how th e  human w il l  can be 
in fluenced  and a c tiv a te d  by judgements of approval.
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But even as "yellow" can be sa id  to  be n e ith e r  th e  cause o f " ^ " nor 
"  ^ " th e  cause o f "yellow ", so n e ith e r  i s  good th e  cause o f approval, nor 
approval th e  cause of good, but each corresponds to  th e  o th er in  a 
c e r ta in  re f le x iv e  r e la t io n .  Again, as fo r  many s c i e n t i f i c  analyses i t  
i s  more u se fu l and more f r u i t f u l  to  examine th e  r e la t io n s  and 
im p lica tio n s  of th e  wavelength ^ , than  th o se  of "yellow ", so i t  m i ^ t  be 
more u se fu l and f r u i t f u l  in  our enquiry to  examine th e  im p lica tio n s  and 
r e la t io n s  of "approval" than  th o se  of “good". Before we go any fu r th e r  
th e re  a re  two p o in ts  which need c la r i f i c a t io n  : (a) What ex ac tly  do we
mean by "approval"? (b) What a re  th e  reasons which m i ^ t  be adduced in  
j u s t i f i c a t io n  fo r  our reducing th e  enquiry  in to  th e  n a tu re  of good to  an 
enquiry  in to  th e  im p lica tio n s  o f approval?
(a) To approve of something i s  to  th in k  i t  d e s ira b le  ( in  th e  sense 
th a t  i t  should be d e s ire d , n o t in  th e  sense th a t  i t  i s  d e s ired ) in  view 
o f a c e r ta in  o b jec t or end, o r to  th in k  i t  s u ita b le  and f i t t i n g  to  c e r ta in  
preconceived p r in c ip le s  or c r i t e r i a .
This d e f in i t io n  seems a t  f i r s t  s ig b t  to  c a l l  fo r th  a s e r ie s  ad 
in f in itu m , since  obviously befo re  we approve of anyth ing  we must f i r s t  
approve of th e  o b jec t or end fo r  which i t  i s  deemed d e s ira b le , and before 
we approve of those  o b jec ts  o r ends we must approve of o th er o b jec ts  and 
ends in  view of which th e  form er seem d e s ira b le , e tc .  I f  we want to  
avoid t h i s ,  we must assume th a t  th e re  a re  th in g s  we approve o f in  them­
se lv e s , w ithout re fe ren ce  to  any u l t e r io r  o b jec t. But in  th i s  case our 
approval w ill  be based on c e r ta in  p r in c ip le s  which we hold to  be t ru e , or 
on c e r ta in  c r i t e r i a  which we b ring  to  bear on th e  re sp e c tiv e  o b jec t o r end.
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These c r i t e r i a  and p r in c ip le s ,  which we have termed "preconceived" open 
up th e  v i s ta  o f y e t ano ther i n f in i t e  s e r ie s .  For obviously before  we 
examine id ietber a th in g  f i t s  c e r ta in  c r i t e r i a  and p r in c ip le s ,  we must 
f i r s t  examine th ese  c r i t e r i a  and p r in c ip le s  in  t h e i r  own r ig h t ,  in  view 
of h ig h e r c r i t e r i a  and p r in c ip le s ,  and th o se  again , and so on, ad 
in f in itu m . But t h i s  i s  no t n e c e s sa r ily  so . For in  our in v e s tig a tio n  
we m i ^ t  come upon a concept t h a t  i s  prim ary and s e lf -e v id e n t ,  or which 
cannot be reduced to  o th er concepts, and must e i th e r  be accepted or 
re je c te d  in tu i t iv e ly .  That th e re  i s  such a prim ary concept in  E th ic s , 
which i s  no t id e n t ic a l  w ith good, and th e re fo re  n o t dependent on approval 
I  s h a l l  t r y  to  prove in  ano ther connexion. For th e  moment I  should l ik e  
to  p o in t out te n ta t iv e ly  th a t  no t a l l  th e  c r i t e r i a  and p r in c ip le s  upon 
idiich approval i s  based a re  n e c e s sa r ily  o f a moral c h a ra c te r , and th a t  by 
examining th e  n a tu re  of th e se  c r i t e r i a  i t  m i ^ t  be p o ss ib le  to  prove th a t  
n o t a l l  in s tan ces  o f th e  a t t r ib u t e  good n e c e ssa r ily  rep re se n t instem ces 
of moral judgement.
(b) The reaso n s , th en , fo r  reducing th e  enquiry in to  th e  n a tu re  
of "good" to  an enquiry in to  th e  n a tu re  o f "approval" w ill  b e :-  
(*1) That by th i s  red u c tio n  th e  appearance of th e  a t t r ib u te
"good" in  an a s s e r t io n  w ill be seen to  be in s u f f ic ie n t  to  
e s ta b l is h  th is  a s s e r t io n  as a moral judgement.
(p,) That by th i s  red u c tio n  the  ex is ten ce  of ab so lu te  values 
independent o f our re a c tio n  to  them w ill  be seen to  be by 
no means so s tr in g e n tly  and conclusively  and rig o ro u sly  
proven as i t  would appear to  Moore by ta k in g  such sta tem ents
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as "This p ic tu re  i s  good but I do no t l ik e  i t "  a t  t h e i r  
face  va lue .
( p  That even th e  ex is ten ce  of v a lu e s , whether ab so lu te  or n o t,
w ill  no t have an autom atic bearing  on E th ic s , s ince  i t  w ill
be seen th a t  a l l  v a lu e s , even abso lu te  v a lu e s , a re  n o t 
n e c e s sa r ily  moral v a lu es .
(B) That th e re fo re  as a c o ro lla ry  to  u , and , no reasonab le  
purpose of E th ics w il l  be served by an enumeration of a l l  th in g s  (whether 
in  p a r t i c u la r ,  g e n e ra l, o r d e f in i t io n - l ik e  sta tem ents i s  of no im portance 
h e re ) th a t  have been or a re  pronounced good. Nor would an exam ination 
of them in  th e  l ig h t  o f what we ou rse lves hold to  be good serve such a
purpose. Nor would i t  make any d iffe re n c e  i f  we should fin d  a common
denominator and term i t  th e  h ig h es t good; or i f  we should combine 
sev era l o f those  th in g s  on an equal fo o tin g  and c a l l  i t  an organic whole, 
a process idiich, by th e  way, might y ie ld  many d if f e r e n t  and v a rie g a ted  
p a tte rn s  o f th e  "good l i f e " . . , .
(%0 Let us examine such d iv erse  sta tem ents as : "a good p a in tin g " ,
"good roads", "a good h id in g " , "a good s la u g h te r" , "a good tim e", "good 
conduct", "p leasu re  i s  good", " a r t  i s  good", "v ir tu e  i s  good", " ju s t ic e  
i s  good". On th e  assumption th a t  wherever terms l ik e  "good" and "bad" 
appear moral judgement i s  g iven , th ese  sta tem ents by inc lud ing  th e  term 
"good" have a spurious appearance of being moral judgements. That th i s  
appearance ^  spurious and e n t i r e ly  based on th e  ex te rn a l u n ifo rm ity  of 
th e  a t t r ib u te  good w il l  be seen upon c lo se r  in sp e c tio n . ^
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What do we mean by c a l l in g  a p a in tin g  good? Obviously th a t  t h i s  
p a r t ic u la r  p a in tin g  c a l ls  fo r th  a fe e lin g  o f approval in  u s . This 
approval i s  e a s i ly  seen to  be based on th e  f a c t  th a t  we consider th e  
p a in tin g , or t h a t  th e  p a in tin g  s t r ik e s  us as having a r t i s t i c  m erit fo r  
one reason or ano ther. ( I  have used both the  term "we consider" as w ell 
as th e  term " s t r ik e s  us" to  emphasise th e  r a t io n a l - r e f le c t iv e  as w ell as 
th e  spon taneous-reac tion  elem ents th a t  e n te r  in to  th e  com position o f 
"approval" .)  Our approval of th e  p a in tin g  i s  an in s tan c e  o f a e s th e tic  
judgnent based upon c e r ta in  a e s th e tic  p r in c ip le s  which we hold to  be 
v a l id ,  as w ell as on a c e r ta in  d i r e c t  appeal th a t  th e  p a in tin g  in  question  
e x e rc ises  over our a e s th e tic  s u s c e p t ib i l i ty .  This d i r e c t  appeal i s  in  
most cases expressed by th e  term " b e a u tifu l" . Even a moral a c tio n  can' 
be c a lle d  b e a u t ifu l ,  when considered  only in  so f a r  as i t  appeals d i r e c t ly  
to  our emotional s u s c e p t ib i l i t i e s .  Alexander in  h is  book. Beauty and 
o th e r forms of V alue, analyses th e  concept o f beauty even fu r th e r ,  and 
s ta te s  th a t  "nothing i s  b e a u t ifu l ,  whether in  i t s e l f  a t t r a c t iv e  o r 
u n a t t r a c t iv e ,  save in  so f a r  as i t  i s  a e s th e t ic a l ly  good, or 
a e s th e t ic a l ly  r i g h t " . S o  th a t  even th a t  d ire c t  appeal to  our 
s u s c e p t ib i l i ty  in  o rder to  be e f fe c t iv e  must accord w ith c e r ta in  
p r in c ip le s  and c r i t e r i a  which render i t  ( a e s th e t ic a l ly )  r ig h t .  By
c a l l in g  a p a in tin g  no t only b e a u tifu l but good, we g en era lly  wish to  
emphasise th a t  i t  so conforms to  c e r ta in  a e s th e tic  c r i t e r i a  which we 
regard  as having undoubted v a l id i ty ,  as to  make th a t  p a in tin g  worthy of 
our w ell-considered  approval over and above any d i r e c t  appeal i t  may 
have.
1 ) p . 166.
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H ow  ever we regard  such complex problems as those  of th e
o b je c tiv e  and general v a l id i ty  o f a e s th e tic  c r i t e r i a  and th e  adm ixture 
of su b je c tiv e  and o b jec tiv e  elements in  a e s th e tic  judgnents, one th in g  
i s  q u ite  c le a r :  In  no way d id  any moral co n sid era tio n s  e n te r  in to  th e
p ro cess . We n e ith e r  consider vdiether th e  p ic tu re  w il l  make us m orally  
b e t te r  men (which i s  no t th e  same as an a e s th e t ic a l ly  enriched one), nor 
i f  i t  w i l l  have any b en eficen t e f fe c t  on the  standard  o f pub lic  h e a lth , 
or f o s te r  a so c ia l  re v o lu tio n . A ll th ese  co n sid era tio n s might e n te r  th e  
mind o f a sp e c ta to r  but they  have no th ing  to  do w ith  h is  c a l l in g  th e  
p a in tin g  a good one in  th e  f i r s t  p la c e , i . e .  w ith  h is  approbation  or 
d isapprobation  o f th e  p ic tu re  as such. This so r t  o f approval m i ^ t  be 
termed a e s th e tic  approval, and th e  a t t r ib u t e  "good" th a t  corresponds to  
i t  i s  in  no way id e n t ic a l  w ith moral goodness.
But l e t  us regard th e  more general forms of t h i s  sta tem ent : "good
p a in tin g " , and "p a in tin g  i s  good". In  an a s s e r tio n  l ik e  "good p a in tin g "  
th e  c r i t e r i a  which determ ine our approval o f what c o n s titu te s  p a in tin g  
th a t  i s  good, a re  obviously again  o f a pu re ly  a e s th e tic  o rd er. Not so 
in  an a s s e r tio n  l ik e  "P a in tin g  i s  good". Here we alm ost au to m atica lly  
add in  our mind "good fo r  what?" In  t h i s  case , we do no t approve of 
p a in tin g  because o f i t s  in h e re n t q u a l i t ie s  as an a r t ,  but fo r  some 
u l t e r i o r  m otive. Thus th e  d iffe re n c e  between such sta tem ents as "a good 
pa in tin g "  and "p a in tin g  i s  good", i s  no t so much a d iffe ren c e  o f 
g e n e ra li ty  or p a r t i c u la r i ty  o f sta tem en t, but l i e s  in  th e  f a c t  th a t  in  
one case th e  approval denoted by th e  a t t r ib u t e  "good" was based on th e  
in h e re n t c r i t e r i a  o f th e  concept so q u a l i f ie d ,  in  th e  o th er on ex te rn a l
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c r i t e r i a ,  I t  does no t follow  th a t  such u l t e r io r  m otives or ex te rn a l 
c r i t e r i a  a re  n e c e ssa r ily  moral ones, as might be concluded from th e  
im pression th a t  M oore's d iscu ssio n  o f such in s tan ces  g iv es . "Pain ting" 
fo r  in s tan ce  may "be good" fo r  h id in g  th e  cracks in  our w a ll, which i s  
by no means a moral m otive. Or, "P ain ting" may "be good" fo r  d is t r a c t in g  
th e  a t te n t io n  o f a sovereign  from th e  so c ia l  in ju s t ic e  rampant in  h is  
domains, which m i ^ t  be a moral m otive th o u ^  no t e x ac tly  a good one.
Now th e  b e t te r  th e  p a in tin g , th e  b e t te r  i t  w il l  d i s t r a c t  th e  sovere ign : 
"Good p a in tin g "  w il l  be "bad" which proves th a t  th e  "good" in  "a good 
p a in tin g  i s  by no means id e n t ic a l  w ith th e  "good" in  "P a in ting  i s  good". 
And even i f  our former example might be taken  as a so p h is try , in  any case
th e  d iffe ren c e s  o f the  s e t  o f m otives (whether in h e re n t or u l t e r i o r )  in
t
th e se  d i f fe re n t  a s se r tio n s  may be c le a r ly  grasped fr<xn th e  f a c t  t h a t  such 
a statem ent as "Good p a in tin g  i s  good" i s  by no means a mere ta u to lo g y .
These in h e re n t or u l t e r i o r  m otives must no t be confused w ith  
good-as-a-m eans, and good-as-an-end. For, a l th o u ^  vdien we approve of 
something fo r  reasons o u tsid e  i t s  in h e re n t n a tu re , we g en era lly  approve 
o f i t  as a means, i . e .  we consider i t  good-as-a-m eans: idien we approve
of something fo r  in h eren t reasons th is  does no t mean th a t  we approve of 
i t  as an end, as something g o o d - in - i t s e l f . Sometimes we do n o t even 
consider i t  good a t  a l l .  Our approval in  th i s  case corresponds to  what 
we m i ^ t  r o u ^ ly  describe  as "a 'good' specimen o f i t s  k ind", o r th e
te c h n ic a lly  good".n 1)
Ï )  E .P .ô ô r r i t  considers th e se  as two d i f f e r e n t  kinds but i t  should not 
be too d i f f i c u l t  to  prove th a t  they  a re  red u c ib le  to  a common fa c to r .  
E .F .O g rrit:  "An ambiguity o f the  word good", from The Proceedings of 
The B r itish  Academy ; Vol.XXIII.
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To i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  p o in t l e t  us tak e  th e  example o f "a good road".
By a "good road" we mean a road th a t  i s  w e ll-k e p t, a sp h a lt-co v ered , 
smooth, s t r a ig h t .  Here again  th e  term good does n o t s ig n ify  moral 
app roval, though i t  c e r ta in ly  s ig n i f ie s  approval o f some s o r t .  For when 
we r e f l e c t  on th e  c r i t e r i a  and p r in c ip le s  on which we based our approval 
of th e  road, we see th a t  no moral c r i t e r i a  have en tered  our c o n s id e ra tio n , 
but only such p r in c ip le s  as were in h e ren t in  th e  concept of "a road", and 
our c r i t e r i a  o f what a road a t  i t s  b e s t ,  a t  the  maximum r e a l is a t io n  o f 
i t s  fu n c tio n  as a road would be l ik e .  Hence th e  "good" in  'good road* 
did  no t correspond to  any m oral approval, bu t to  a c e r ta in  o th e r kind of 
approval th a t  might be termed " tec h n ic a l approval" . In  o th er words, 
though th e  a t t r ib u t e  "good" in  "good roads" i s  no t devoid of meaning, i t  
has no moral s ig n if ic a n c e  w hatsoever.
That th e  kind o f approval s ig n if ie d  by "good" in  such complexes 
as "a g o o d .. . ."  i s  always determ ined by th e  p r in c ip le s  and c r i t e r i a  o f 
th e  domain o f which th e  concept so q u a lif ie d  i s  an element can be seen 
even more c le a r ly  in  such examples as : "a good p le a su re " , "a good h id in g " ,
"a good s l a u ^ t e r " .  In  th e  f i r s t  example we must tak e  "good" to  mean 
in te n se , und istu rbed  and o f long d u ra tio n , i . e .  we approve of t h i s  
p lea su re  because of c e r ta in  m o d ifica tio n s  which enhance i t s  innerm ost 
n a tu re , th e  n a tu re  of being p le a sa n t. Much in  th e  same manner "a good 
slau g h te r"  means a s la u g h te r which i s  b ig , ex tensive  in  scope and 
e f f ic ie n t  in  i t s  im plem entation, and th e re fo re  when judging o f s lau g h te rs  
in  general we f in d  th i s  one to  be a good example o f i t s  k ind . But no 
moral judgnent i s  im plied . The c r i t e r i a  we employed a re  th e  c r i t e r i a  o f
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th e  e ff ic ie n c y  o f th e  s la u g h te r , th e  maximum r e a l is a t io n  of th e  
p o te n t i a l i t i e s  im p lic i t  in  th e  concept o f th e  noun q u a lif ie d  by the  
a t t r ib u t e  good.
T herefore when th e  noun i s  an element o f , say , th e  a e s th e tic  domain, 
th e  term  "good" w il l  s ig n ify  an a e s th e tic  judgnent, fo r  i t  w ill  
correspond to  th e  kind o f approval th a t  i s  based on a e s th e tic  c r i t e r i a .  
When th e  noun i s  an element o f th e  domain o f sc ience  th e  a t t r ib u te  "good" 
when app lied  to  i t  w il l  s ig n ify  an ep istem olog ica l judgnent, fo r  i t  w ill  
correspond to  th e  kind of approval th a t  i s  based on th e  p r in c ip le s  and 
c r i t e r i a  of epistem ology. S im ila rly  when th e  noun q u a lif ie d  by th e  
a t t r ib u t e  "good" i s  an element of the  domain o f E th ic s , th e  term "good" 
when app lied  to  i t ,  and only in  th a t  case w ill  s ig n ify  a moral judgnent, 
fo r  i t  w ill  correspond to  t h a t  kind of approval which i s  based on moral 
c r i t e r i a  and p r in c ip le s .
In  o ther words, the  term "good" w i l l  have a moral s ig n if ic a n c e  ( in
such complex no tio n s as "a good ") only when ap p lied  to  concepts th a t
a re  elements of th e  e th ic a l  domain (necessary  c o n d itio n ). But i t  w ill  
no t have th is  s ig n if ic a n c e  whenever i t  i s  so ap p lied . (The con d itio n  i s  
no t s u f f i c i e n t . )  For in s ta n c e , th e re  a re  concepts which though elements 
of th e  e th ic a l  domain, may a lso  f u l f i l  c e r ta in  fu n c tio n s in  o th e r 
domains. "Conduct" may be sa id  to  be "good" in  th e  sense o f "po lished  
m anners"; or in  th e  sense o f e f f ic ie n t  conduct, o r o f s u ita b le  conduct, 
as we see i t  in  every example of h e ro ic  or brave conduct, no m a tte r  
whatever o th e r , e v il  or good q u a li f ic a tio n s  th e  a c tio n  may have. The 
conduct o f a bank-robber fac in g  the  combined fo rces o f th e  m etro p o litan
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p o lic e  and th e  te c h n ic a l gadgets which guard th e  s a fe s , i s  c e r ta in ly  
brave and courageous to  begin w ith . I f  he c a r r ie s  out h is  job 
e f f i c ie n t ly ,  q u ie t ly ,  e tc .  e tc .  he c e r ta in ly  conducts h im self w e ll, and 
under th e  circum stances a c e r t i f i c a t e  o f good conduct must be handed to  
him. But t h i s  does not n e c e s sa r ily  mean th a t  h is  conduct i s  m orally  
good, s ince  i t  was no t as an element o f th e  moral domain, th a t  conduct 
was considered h e re , but as an element o f a domain which fo r  want o f a 
b e t te r  a p p e lla tio n  may be termed th a t  o f " p ra c t ic a l  success" , and which 
i s  in  no way to  be id e n t i f ie d  w ith  th a t  o f e th ic s  sin ce  th e  determ ining  
and fundamental ru le s  o f th e  one ( fo r  in s ta n c e , th e  end ju s t i f i e s  th e  
means) i s  d ia m e tric a lly  opposed to  t h a t  o f th e  o th e r .
"Good" then  w ill have moral s ig n if ic a n c e  only when app lied  to  
concepts defined  in s id e  th e  e th ic a l  domain, and provided i t  was only in  
th i s  fu n c tio n  ( - o f  being elem ents o f an e th ic a l  domain -  to  th e  ab so lu te  
exclusion  of any o th er fu n c tio n  th is  concept may have in  any o th e r 
domains) th a t  th e  concept had been used .
On th e  o th er hand th e re  a re  concepts which, l ik e  " c ru e lty " , 
" ju s t ic e " ,  " v ir tu e " ,' "v ice " , a re  c e r ta in ly  moral concep ts, i . e .  defined  
in  th e  e th ic a l  domain. But i t  i s  p la in ly  im possible to  speak o f "a good 
• c ru e l ty " ,  "a good v ic e " , "a good v i r tu e " ,  or even "good ju s t ic e " .  For 
what reason? Because though a l l  o f th e se  may be c a rr ie d  to  the  h ig h e s t 
peak o f e f f ic ie n c y , i t  i s  no t under th e  c r i t e r i a  o f e ff ic ie n c y  th a t  we 
judge them but under those  of e th ic s .  And under th e  c r i t e r i a  o f 
m o ra lity  th e  is su e  has been decided a lread y  and i s  a lread y  embodied in  - 
th e  concept. Thus i t  i s  absurd to  say "a good v i r tu e " ,  fo r  v ir tu e
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i t s e l f  means "a m orally  good q u a li ty " .  Or to  say w ith moral 
s ig n if ic a n c e  "good c ru e lty "  fo r  c ru e lty  i s  a v ice  and v ice  i s  a m orally  
bad q u a li ty , and i t  i s  im possib le  to  c a l l  a m orally  bad q u a lity  m orally  
good. In  th e  same way i t  i s  absurd to  speak o f "good ju s t ic e " ,  fo r  
ju s t ic e  th a t  i s  bad i s  ip so  fa c to  ju s t ic e  no longer. But in  th e  moral 
domain th e re  a re  many concepts which do no t by d e f in i t io n  con ta in  th e  
r e s u l ts  of moral judgment, and which we might term "the  p la s t ic  m a te ria l"  
of e th ic s .  These a re  concepts l ik e  "conduct", " w il l" ,  "m otive", "deed", 
e tc .  whenever i t  i s  used as a term defined  in s id e  th e  moral domain. Let 
us consider "good conduct". Here th e  is su e  i s  n o t precluded s in ce  
conduct may be bad, good and in d if f e r e n t .  On th e  o th e r  hand, by "good 
conduct" we do no t mean conduct c a r r ie d  to  i t s  h ig h es t e f f ic ie n c y , fo r  
such conduct may be bad as w ell as h igh ly  evolved or re a lis e d  or
organised or p o lish ed , or w hatever i t  may be th a t  we regard  as th e
h ig h es t te c h n ic a l p o s s ib i l i ty  o f conduct. The "good" of "good conduct"
\ I
i s  then  s p e c if ic a l ly  d i f f e r e n t  from a l l  o ther forms of good, i t  i s  moral 
goodness. T herefore good conduct does no t share i t s  p roperty  w ith  o th er 
th in g s and an exam ination o f th is  p ro p e rty , denoted by good, in  o th er ,
th in g s  cannot he lp  us a t  a l l  to  understand  what good conduct i s .
The problem becomes more com plicated in  a s se r tio n s  of th e  form
" . . . . .  i s  good". For example, "P leasure  i s  good"; "P a in ting  i s  good";
"Roads a re  good"; " Ju s tic e  i s  good". In  th ese  cases th e  p re d ic a te
"good" corresponds to  th a t  kind of approval, which i s  no t based upon the
c r i t e r i a  th a t  govern th e  in n e r n a tu re  o f th e  concept sa id  to  be good, but 
i s  based on some u l t e r io r  end, o r u l t e r io r  reason no t in h e ren t in  th e
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concept i t s e l f .
In  th a t  case we have in s tan c es  o f what i s  c a lle d  good-as-a-m eans, ^ 3  
and we p la in ly  must f i r s t  examine th e  th in g s  fo r  which they a re  means,
(a ) as to  t h e i r  goodness, i . e .  we must ask ourse lves whether we approve 
of them, and (b) as to  t h e i r  moral goodness, i . e .  we must ask ou rse lves 
i f  we approve o f them on moral grounds. In  th i s  case , our p reoccupation  
w il l  be w ith those  th in g s , and w il l  fo llow  th e  same l in e s .  But in  some 
cases t h i s  end may be seen to  be not u l t e r i o r  to  the  concept but 
in h e re n t in  i t .  Then our approval assumes th e  c h a ra c te r  of an 
in tu i t iv e  acceptance o f th e  concept. Concepts so accepted a re  u su a lly  
termed u ltim a te  values or i n t r i n s i c  v a lu e s . But as t h e i r  accep tance, 
because of i t s  in stan taneous c h a ra c te r , was not based on moral c r i t e r i a , 
i t  i s  by no means a necessary  a t t r ib u te  of in t r i n s i c  values as such, to  
be moral va lu es. In  o th er words, i f  an in t r in s ic  value i s  a moral va lue , 
t h i s  i s  not an outcome o f i t s  formal n a tu re  as an i n t r i n s i c  v a lu e , but 
th e  r e s u l t  o f i t s  p a r t ic u la r ,  m a te ria l de te rm in a tio n s.
Let us tak e  "P a in ting  i s  good" as our f i r s t  example. In  t h i s  case 
we n a tu ra lly  ask "good fo r  what?" or "good because o f what?" The f i r s t  
ex tension  i s  of no fu r th e r  i n t e r e s t  to  us h e re , th e  second might evoke 
th e  answer, "P a in ting  i s  good because i t  i s  an a r t " .  This means th a t  we 
a s s e r t  "Art" to  be "good". On what grounds? Because i t  in c a rn a te s  th e
b e a u tifu l .  That means t h a t  we a s s e r t  " the  B eau tifu l"  to  be "good". On 
what grounds? Because i t  i s  b e a u tifu l .  That i s ,  th e  b e a u tifu l becomes 
th e  reason and th e  end fo r  our approval of i t .  Saying th a t  " the  
b e a u tifu l"  i s  "good", i s  r e a l ly  saying th a t  i t  i s  " b e a u tifu l" , i . e .  th a t
-25-
our approval of i t  has th e  c h a ra c te r  o f an in tu i t iv e  acceptance and 
a ff irm a tio n  of i t s  n a tu re  as th e  b e a u tifu l .  This means th a t  saying th a t  
th e  "b e a u tifu l i s  good" i s  a mere tau to lo g y  un less we specify  "good" to  
mean "m orally good", in  which case t h i s  a s s e r tio n  i s  p la in ly  f a l s e ,  since  
no t moral but a e s th e tic  c r i t e r i a  have en tered  in to  th e  c o n s titu t io n  o f the  
b e a u t ifu l .  Thus th e  view o f a town in  th e  a c t of being bombed i s  
m agn ificen tly  b e a u tifu l ,  I  have been to ld ,  and so no doubt were th e  
s i ^ t s  of Rome burning and o f C h ris tia n s  b laz ing  away l ik e  to rch es  to  
l ig h t  th e  p leasu re-gardens of th e  emperor Nero; s t i l l  being b e a u tifu l  
did no t make them m orally  good. The two may co incide  by chance, bu t a re  
n o t n e c e s sa r ily  id e n t ic a l .  As a m a tte r  o f f a c t  th ey  o ften  c la sh  in  
a c tu a l experience. '
Let us examine th e  more d i f f i c u l t  and problem atic a s s e r t io n :
"P leasu re  i s  good". Let us assume th a t  "P leasure  i s  good" r e a l ly  means 
something besides "P leasure  i s  good because i t  i s  p le a sa n t" , which would 
be only einother i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f the  case of in tu i t iv e  approval. L et us 
assume th a t  "P leasu re  i s  good" i s  a moral judgnent, i . e .  th a t  we judge 
"p leasure" to  be "m orally good". Then i t s  opposite  "padn" would be 
"m orally e v i l" .  I  suggest th a t  i t  i s  no t so , but th a t  pain  and p leasu re  
a re  m orally n e u tra l  concepts, and th a t  whenever they  e n te r  moral 
judgnents, they  do so , and a re  proclaim ed to  be m orally  bad o r good, in
l )  In  another connection the  b e a u tifu l and th e  good w il l  be seen to  
be no t merely d i f f e r e n t ,  in d if f e r e n t  and independent o f each o th e r , 
but p o s i t iv e ly  a n ta g o n is tic  in  t h e i r  r iv a l  claim s on th e  a lle g ia n c e  
of th e  w il ls  o f men.
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accordance w ith some o ther elem ent, moral by i t s  i n t r i n s i c  n a tu re , in  
combination w ith  which they  form th e  o b jec t of our moral judgnent. I  
suggest th i s  because I  see no v a lid  reason fo r  a t t r ib u t in g  to  p lea su re  
(as a g a in s t o th e r va lues) a sp e c ia l stand ing  as regards m o ra lity , and 
in s i s t in g  in  th e  face  of a l l  evidence to  th e  con tra ry  on i t s  being good; 
even in  th e  r e s t r i c te d  sense o f i t s  being prima fa c ie  good, i . e .  ho ld ing  
th a t  a complex s i tu a t io n  in  so f a r  as i t  includes p lea su re  i s  in  so f a r  
m orally  good. On the  c o n tra ry , c ru e lty  in  so f a r  as i t  holds p lea su re  
i s  in  so f a r  m orally  worse, fo r  example; w h ils t i f  an o pera tion  has to  
be undergone in  which some pa in  i s  unavoidable, th e  g re a te r  or le s s e r  
degree of pain  does no t change the  moral stand ing  of th e  whole s i tu a t io n  
a t  a l l .  I l lu s t r a t io n s  can be m u ltip lie d  ad l i b . They a l l  seem to  me 
to  p o in t to  one th in g  ; t h a t  since  (a) no such th in g  as pure (uncaused 
and unconditioned) p leasu re  ever e n te rs  our moral judgment, and (b) th e  
moral stand ing  o f such complex o b jec ts  of our moral judgment o f which 
p lea su re  or pa in  form p a r t  seem to  be determ ined n o t so much by th e  f a c t  
o f p lea su re  being p resen t as by th e  n a tu re  of i t s  cause, circum stances, 
and perhaps e f f e c t s ,  i t  would be more p la u s ib le  to  hold th a t  p lea su re  and 
pa in  a re  m orally  n e u tra l  and dependent in  t h e i r  moral worth upon th e  moral 
stand ing  of th e  th in g  or th e  a c t iv i ty  they  accompany. This seems to  me 
no t only a p la u s ib le , lo g ic a l and fa irly -w ellfo u n d ed  view to  ta k e , but " 
a lso  a very workable and u se fu l hypothesis to  hold when dealing  w ith 
moral problems. In to  what unnecessary m ental a c ro b a tic s  th e  con tra ry  
view leads us can be b e s t i l l u s t r a te d  by th ese  e x tr a c ts .  They a re  taken 
from Susan S teb b in g 's  Hobhouse Lecture (Dec. 1945) and propound a
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thoroughly  Moorian view of E th ics
"Moral ev a lu a tio n  i s  no t confined to  th e  ev a lu a tio n  and c r i t ic is m  
of conduct, i t  i s  concerned w ith  good and e v il  wherever they  may be 
found . , . "Consi der ,  fo r  example, th e  p a ir  o f e th ic a l  judgments : 
"Pain i s  e v i l" ,  "C ruelty  i s  e v i l" .  These a re  d iv e rse  ty p es . "Pain i s  
e v il"  I  sh a ll  c a l l  a sim ple, or basic  e th ic a l  judgment in  th e  q u ite  
p re c ise  sense th a t  th e  t r u th  o f th e  judgment i s  no t based upon any o ther 
e th ic a l  judgment th a t  i s  more lo g ic a l ly  sim ple, but i s  i t s e l f  a b a s is  fo r  
o th e r e th ic a l  judgments. "C ruelty  i s  e v il"  i s  no t thus sim ple and b a s ic , 
i t s  t r u th  i s  based upon th e  judgment "Pain i s  ev il"  and follow s from th is  
judgment, to g e th e r  w ith th e  i n t r i n s i c  n a tu re  o f c ru e lty  as being enjoyment 
in  w itnessing  or in f l i c t i n g  p a in  upon o th e r s e n t ie n t  be ings. I  should 
m yself say t h a t  i t  follow s from th e  judgment " c ru e lty  i s  e v il"  th a t  under 
a l l  circum stances and in  a l l  cond itions to  a c t c ru e lly  i s  e v i l .  This 
fo llo w s, however, from th e  t o t a l  judgment, no t m erely from th e  f a c t  th a t  
Kdiat i s  p red ica ted  of something i s  th a t  i t  i s  e v i l .  I t  does n o t fo llow  ' 
from th e  judgment "Pain i s  e v il"  th a t  d e lib e ra te ly  to  i n f l i c t  pa in  i s  to  
a c t e v i l ly ,  nor th a t  a s i tu a t io n  in  which pa in  i s  p re sen t i s  n a tu ra lly  
e v il  on th e  whole. The p a ir s  of judgments I have c ite d  as examples a re  
c le a r ly  d iverse  in  lo g ic a l ty p e .
"A judgment of a th i r d  type  has been mentioned in  what I  have ju s t  
s a id :  To a c t c ru e lly  i s  e v i l .  This judgment could no t be t ru e  un less
1) P .12.
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th e  judgment "C ruelty  i s  e v il"  were t r u e .  And c ru e lty  could no t be
e v il  u n less  i t  were t ru e  th a t  "Pain i s  e v i l " ' . l )
Now severa l f a l la c ie s  may be po in ted  out in  t h i s  argument: F i r s t ,
though "Pain i s  e v il"  i s  a lo g ic a l ly  basic  judgment, in  th e  sense th a t
i t  i s  not based on o ther judgments, bu t as I  have put i t ,  i s  in tu i t iv e ly
accep ted , i t  i s  overhasty , and a g a in s t th e  evidence adduced by h e r s e l f  
( " I t  does, however, no t fo llow  from th e  judgment "Pain i s  e v il* , th a t  
d e lib e ra te ly  to  i n f l i c t  pain  i s  to  a c t e v i l ly ,  e t c . . . . "  Susan 
S tebbing , quoted above) to  in f e r  th a t  i t  i s  a lso  an e th ic a l  judgment, 
basic  or o therw ise. For, as we have seen , "pain" m i ^ t  e n te r in to  moral 
s i tu a t io n s  w ithout p rejudging  th e i r  e th ic a l  stand ing  in  one way or another, 
This could no t be so i f  "pain" in  i t s  i n t r i n s i c  n a tu re  would hold an 
e th ic a l  meaning, an e th ic a l  v a lu e . W itness th e  case of " c ru e lty " . 
"C ruelty" i s  a moral concept, though no t a sim ple or a basic  one. But 
in  so f a r  as i t  i s  a moral concept, ho ld ing  i t s  moral value and worth in  
i t s e l f ,  th e  judgment "C ruelty  i s  m orally  ev il"  i s  t ru e  in  a l l  c ase s , o r 
whenever "c ru e lty "  en te rs  a moral s i tu a t io n ,  th a t  s i tu a t io n  i s  
n e c e s s a r ily , irrev o cab ly  and unredeemably e v i l .  But i t  would be hard to  
exp la in  how, i f  "C ruelty  i s  e v il"  i s  based and derived from "Pain i s  
e v i l " , th e  derived  judgment had more moral v a l id i ty  and fo rce  than  th e  
judgment from which i t  i s  d e riv ed . T herefore we must conclude th a t  
"C ruelty  i s  e v il"  as a moral judgment i s  not based upon "Pain i s  e v il"  
but draws i t s  moral v a l id i ty  from some o th er elem ent, o r p r in c ip le  th a t  
e n te rs  i t s  form ation .
1) p . 15.
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What are  th e  elements th a t  make up th e  concept of c ru e lty ?  There 
i s  : P a in . The in f l i c t i o n  o f pa in . The d e lib e ra te  i n f l i c t i o n  of pa in .
The d e lib e ra te  in f l i c t i o n  of pa in  upon a s e n tie n t  being to  h is  de trim en t. 
The enjoyment, o r p lea su re  taken  a t  th e  d e lib e ra te  i n f l i c t i o n  of pain  
upon a se n tie n t being to  h is  de trim en t. E xplanation : The presence o f
pain  though in  i t s e l f  u np leasan t (bad) i s  no t enough to  c o n s t itu te  a moral 
e v i l ,  s ince  th e  i n f l i c t i o n  of i t  may be invo lun ta ry  and th e re fo re  no t 
m orally  bad. The d e lib e ra te  i n f l i c t i o n  o f i t  upon a s e n tie n t  being may 
be fo r  h is  own good ( l ik e  an opera tion ) and th e re fo re  m orally  good. Only 
when th e  i n f l i c t i o n  o f pa in  i s  d e lib e ra te  and to  th e  detrim ent o f  a 
s e n t ie n t  being we have a s i tu a t io n  of u n ad u lte ra ted  moral e v i l .  When 
enjoyment, i . e .  p leasu re  in  t h i s ,  i s  added, th e  e v il of th e  s i tu a t io n
in c re a se s  or in  any case does no t decrease .
Hence we a re  forced to  conclude th a t  th e  b a sis  o f what i s  m orally  
e v il in  th e  complex s i tu a t io n  "c ru e lty "  i s  not th e  pa in  involved but th e  
"harming of a s e n tie n t  being" and th e  enjoyment of t h i s  harm. "C ruelty  
i s  e v il"  as a moral judgment i s ,  th e re fo re , no t based upon th e  judgment 
"Pain i s  e v i l" ,  but on th e  co n tra ry , in  so f a r  as p a in  may be sa id  to  be
m orally  e v il  i t  i s  so as a p o ss ib le  in g re d ie n t of " c ru e lty " .
Another co n sid era tio n  which seems to  s tren g th en  our argument i s  th e V
fo llo w in g : Take th e  s i tu a t io n  described  above and termed " c ru e lty " :  th e
d e lib e ra te  i n f l i c t i o n  o f pa in  upon a s e n t ie n t  being to  h is  d e trim en t.
Now l e t  t h i s  s i tu a t io n  be viewed with p a in , ra th e r  than  with p le a su re , and 
th e  outcome i s  p i ty .  That i s ,  in  th is  case th e  a d d itio n  of pa in  to  a 
c e r ta in  s i tu a t io n  has caused th i s  s i tu a t io n  to  change i t s  moral sign  from
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n eg a tiv e  to  p o s i t iv e .  Does i t  follow  th a t  pain  i s  a m orally  good th ing?I 
Only i f  we take  "pain" to  have p o s it iv e  moral s ig n if ic a n c e  which i s  
denied by those  who would consider p lea su re  and pain  as basic  moral 
concepts.
Consider another example : t h i s  tim e l e t  th e  basic  no tion  p leasu re
("P leasu re  i s  good" (Susan S tab b in g )). Add th e  i n f l i c t  or causing o f i t .  
The d e lib e ra te  in f l i c t i o n  of i t .  The d e lib e ra te  i n f l i c t i o n  of i t  on a
s e n t ie n t  being. The d e lib e ra te  i n f l i c t i o n  o f i t  on a s e n tie n t  being to
h is  d e trim en t. (This i s  p o ss ib le , v iz . Dorian Gray, Faust, e t c . )  And 
th e  outcome i s  " c ru e lty " . Only th is  tim e i t  i s  sa ta n ic  c ru e lty  r a th e r  
than  human. For i s n ' t  i t  S a tan a s" fu n c tio n  on e a r th  to  i n f l i c t  p leasu re  
on us to  our detrim ent? I s n ' t  th e  i n f l i c t i o n  of p leasu re  to  o n e 's  
detrim en t the  very  d e f in i t io n  of tem p ta tio n , and th e  f a c t  th a t  i t  i s  
through p leasu re  th a t  we f a l l ,  an added degree of c ru e lty ?
Now add to  t h i s  p le a su re , i .e . '  a p lea su rab le  contem plation of th i s
s t a te  o f a f f a i r s ,  and th e  c ru e l ty  o f i t  becomes in su p p o rtab le . But pain  
added to  i t ,  i . e .  the  same s i tu a t io n  viewed w ith p a in , would fu rn ish  us 
w ith  another example o f p i ty  (even l ik e  th e  p i ty  o f the  b lessed  and th e  
angels when they  look down upon th e  poor s in n e rs  f a l l in g  in to  th e  snares 
of the  tem p ter).
There i s  ano ther drawback in  th i s  theory  which must be considered 
h ere . By assuming p leasu re  and pain  to  be possessed of i n t r in s i c  moral • 
va lue  (p o s itiv e  or n eg a tiv e ) i t  i s  im possib le  to  exp la in  th e  changes of 
sign  from p o s it iv e  to  neg a tiv e  and v ice  v e rsa  which we have found to  
occur in  th e  above examples :
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In  th e  fo llow ing  diagram I sh a ll  use  th e  signs 
m orally  good r+ 4- good
" bad ----- bad
" n e u tra l  0 0
( i . e .  possessed of value)
( ) 
(and approved of but n o t)
( ) 
n e u tra l  (n e c e s s a r ily  on moral )
( grounds. )
■w :.i
Our problem i s  : l )  I s  "Pain i s  bad" eq u iv a len t to  — , or to  -
2 ) I s  "P leasure  i s  good" eq u iv a len t to  or ?
Pain
I n f l i c t i o n  of
d e lib e ra te  i n f l i c t i o n  o f
d e lib e ra te  i n f l i c t i o n  
upon a s e n t ie n t  being
d e lib e ra te  i n f l i c t i o n  
upon a s e n t ie n t  being 
to  h is  de trim en t
va lue  ; moral 
value
value  ;moral 
value
? P leasu re  y-
00 I n f l i c t io n  of 




d e lib e ra te  i n f l i c t i o n  
-00 upon a s e n t ie n t  being -f
d e lib e ra te  i n f l i c t i o n  
upon I a s e n t ie n t  being 
to  h is  de trim en t i
t h i s  s i tu a t io n
value  ; moral value ;moral
value va lue
l )  viewed w ith  p le a s u re : -  — l )  viewed w ith  p lea su re  -y- ; + ; —
th e  minus fo r  th e  
p a in  in h eren t in  th e  
s i tu a t io n  th e  p lus fo r  
th e  p lea su re .
2) viewed w ith p a in :
f i r s t  minus fo r  th e  
i n i t i a l  pa in  in h e re n t 
in  th e  s i tu a t io n ,  th e  
second fo r  th e  pain  
of th e  sp e c ta to r .
-  ; -  ; ; 't-'f 2) viewed w ith  pa in
. th e  f i r s t  p lu s fo r  
th e  p lea su re  in h e re n t 
in  th e  s i tu a t io n ,  th e  
second fo r  th e  pain  
f e l t  by th e  
sp e c ta to r .
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This seems to  me to  p rove, t h a t  i f  th e  moral va lues of p lea su re  
and pa in  a re  to  be exp la ined , as well as th e  ru le s  according  to  which 
they  change th e i r  s igns (from n eg a tiv e  to  p o s i t iv e ) ,  they  must be reduced 
to  t h e i r  a t t i tu d e  towards th e  concept o f "harming ano ther human being".
Any a ff irm a tiv e  a t t i tu d e  to  t h i s  w ill  have a n e g a tiv e  moral va lue  (be i t s  
va lue  as a p le a su re , o r i t s  a r t i s t i c  e tc .  va lues whatever they  m i ^ t  b e ).
On th e  o th er hand any n eg a tiv e  a t t i tu d e  to  th e  concept o f "harming ano ther 
human be ing"w ill have a p o s i t iv e  moral v a lu e . I t  now seems to  me 
co n clu siv e ly  proven t h a t ,  "Pain" and "P leasure" have no i n t r i n s i c  moral 
v a lu e s , in  them selves, but draw whatever moral s ig n if ic a n c e  th ey  m i ^ t  
have from th e  s i tu a t io n  in  which they  a re  in h e re n t o r which th ey  accompany. 
From th i s  i t  fo llow s th a t  judgments l ik e  "P leasure  i s  good", "Pain i s  
e v i l " , have no moral s ig n if ic a n c e , and th e re fo re  cannot be regarded as 
th e  b a s ic  judgnent from which o th e r more complex moral judgnents l ik e  
" c ru e lty  i s  e v il"  draw t h e i r  v a l id i ty .  This b rings us to  our second 
p o in t : i t  seems then  th a t  " to  h is  de trim ent" i s  th e  ftindamental no tion
idiich gives th e  whole complex i t s  moral s ta tu s .  Now befo re  our 
conclusions above w ill  r e a l ly  become fo o l-p ro o f , i t  must be shown th a t  
" to  h is  detrim ent" cannot be reduced o r expressed in  term s o f "p leasure" 
and "p a in " , i . e .  a fu tu re  s t a te  in  idiich as an outcome o f  th e  p re se n t 
s ta te  th e  balance of p lea su re  w il l  be n eg a tiv e  ( fo r  example punishment in  
H ell fo r  y ie ld in g  to  th e  tem p ta tio n  of p lea su re  on e a r th ) .  That i s ,  
our main o b jec t now should be to  prove th a t  " to  h is  detrim ent" or 
"harming a human being" does no t e s s a i t i a l l y  r e fe r  to  th e  no tions of 
p le a su re  and p a in  (although i t  might and probably w i l l  be accompanied in
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a l l  Cases by one or th e  o th e r)  but to  a concept th a t  i s  d i f f e r e n t  
a lto g e th e r  and roo ted  in  a d i f f e r e n t  domain, th e  concept o f human w orth, 
or th e  d ig n ity  o f man. . . For o therw ise  p lea su re  and pa in  which we have 
expelled  through th e  door as th e  fundamental n o tio n s o f e th ic s ,  would 
e n te r  t h r o u ^  th e  window (e x p e lla s  fu rc a  tamen usque re c u r re t l  ) .  In  o rder 
to  le sse n  th i s  danger, l e t  us remember th e  very s ig n i f ic a n t  f a c t ,  t h a t  
"harming another s e n t ie n t  being" may r e f e r  to  and in c lu d e  th e  i n f l i c t i o n  
o f too  much, too o ften  experienced and too  in d isc r im in a te  p le a su re .
That a re fe ren c e  to  th e  p lea su re s  o f a f t e r  l i f e  as a compensation 
fo r  th e  pa in  and d ep riv a tio n s  o f t h i s  l i f e ,  cannot be considered  an 
a lto g e th e r  s a t is f a c to ry  argument must be adm itted by anyone who pauses to  
r e f l e c t  th a t  the  moral p r in c ip le s  cannot p o ss ib ly  be d i f f e r e n t  in  a f t e r ­
l i f e  w ithout making ab so lu te  nonsense of a l l  our s t r iv in g s  h e re . I f  th e  
whole p o in t o f being moral on e a r th , and d isd a in fu l o f p lea su re s  i s  to  
ensure an u n lim ited  wallowing in  th e  p lea su re s  o f P a rad ise  then  we m ust, 
reasonab ly , choose e a r th ly  p le a su re s . I f  th e  whole problem i s  a m a tte r  
o f c a lc u la tio n  and scheming then  th e  p lea su re s  o f th e  e a r th  have th e  
advantage : o f a p la u s ib le  degree o f c e r ta in ty ,  o f immediacy in  tim e and
of known q u a li ty .  B esides, i t  i s  always p o ss ib le  t h a t  we might f in d  our­
se lv es  deprived o f a f t e r - l i f e  p le a su re s , as a punishment fo r  having 
schemed fo r  them . . .
However th e re  i s  ano ther p o in t Wiich must be ra is e d  h e re : Every
s i tu a t io n  in to  which th e  "harming o f  a s e n t ie n t  being" e n te rs  must be 
viewed from th re e  d i f f e r e n t  ang les : t h a t  o f  th e  s u f f e r e r ,  th a t  o f  th e
ex ecu to r, th a t  o f th e  s p e c ta to r . A ll th re e  fu n c tio n s  may be cen tred  in
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one person . Or two persons may f u l f i l  th e  th ree  fu n c tio n s  in  d if f e r e n t
com bination: fo r  in s ta n c e  John being th e  s u f f e re r ,  and George both 
execu to r and s p e c ta to r ,  or John s u f fe re r  and ex ecu to r, George sp e c ta to r  
e tc .  Three o r more persons may d iv id e  t h i s  fu n c tio n  amongst them in  
d i f f e r e n t  ways. These s i tu a t io n s  a re  r e a l ly  q u ite  commonplace, and o f 
d a ily  occurrence.
Now assuming "pain" to  be th e  determ in ing  and c o n s t i tu t iv e  f a c to r  
of "harming a s e n tie n t"  be ing , what p o ss ib le  moral d if fe re n c e  can th e re  
be between case a ) in  which a leg  has to  be amputated w ithout a n a e s th e t ic s ,  
and case  b) wljich i s  the  same as case a) w ith th e  a d d itio n a l q u a l i f ic a t io n  
th a t  a m istake in  d iagnosis  has been made by th e  re sp o n sib le  p h y s ic ia n , ,
and i t  was l a t e r  d iscovered  th a t  th e  o p e ra tio n  was unnecessary? Since 
th e  amount of p a in  was th e  same in  both c a se s , th e re  should r e a l ly  be no 
moral d if fe re n c e . But, as a m a tte r  o f f a c t  th e re  i s .  Assuming th a t  th e  
do c to r in  both cases operated  w ith  th e  sm a lle s t amount o f p a in  p o s s ib le , 
and in  both cases was in d if f e r e n t  or d e te s te d  such p a in  as he could n o t 
avoid i n f l i c t i n g ,  y e t  in  th e  f i r s t  case he did no t harm h is  p a t ie n t  and in  
th e  second he d id . For he had broken a promise which he had made to  a l l  
men and everyone to  cure them o f t h e i r  i l l s  and to  do so w ith  th e  g re a te s t  
c au tio n  and re sp e c t fo r  t h e i r  persons. But o f t h i s  l a t e r .  For th e  
moment i t  may s u f f ic e  i f  i t  were shown th a t  i t  was n o t th e  pa in  involved 
which c o n s titu te d  th e  "harming o f a s e n t ie n t  be ing".
Now i f  th e  docto r (as a sp e c ta to r)  had taken  p le a su re  in  any pa in  
he in f l i c t e d  on th e  p a t ie n t  ( in  th e  f i r s t  case) but had re f ra in e d  from 
in c re a s in g  th e  amount o f p a in  (he had no t crossed  th e  border from
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sp e c ta to r  to  execu to r) he would no t have “harmed" th e  p a t ie n t  in  any way.
His "enjoyment o f pain" as f a r  as th e  s u f fe re r  i s  concerned would 
have no moral im p lic a tio n s . The reason  why we n e v e rth e le s s  term such 
in s ta n c e s  "c ru e lty "  and condemn them m o ra lly , i s  n o t because "pain  and 
p leasu re"  per se  a re  in v o lv ed . We do n o t, fo r  in s ta n c e , condemn envy, 
because "pain in  a n o th e r 's  p leasu re"  i s  invo lved , s in ce  th e  same s i tu a t io n  
"pain  a t  ano ther m an's p leasu re"  can be termed p i ty  and become m orally  
good. The reason  seems to  be th a t  th e  tak in g  of "p leasu re  in  ano ther - 
'  m an's pain" even i f  i t  were fo r  th e  good of t h a t  o th e r  man, i s  to  th e  
m oral de trim ent o f th e  s p e c ta to r . There may a lso  be a re fe ren ce  in  th i s  
judgment to  th e  p ro b a b il i ty  o f passiv e  and occasional enjoyment tu rn in g ' 
in to  an a c tiv e  c re a tio n  o f occasions fo r  enjoyment : i . e .  in  th e  course of
tim e th e  doctor who tak es  p lea su re  in  th e  pa in  he cannot avoid i n f l i c t i n g ,  
w i l l  s t a r t  i n f l i c t i n g  u n ca lled  fo r  pa in  so th a t  he may enjoy i t .
The sp e c ta to r  w il l  have become ex ecu to r, o r r a th e r  specta to r-cum - 
execu to r. The u ltim a te  ground o f th e  "harming o f a s e n t ie n t  being" seems 
then  to  l i e  n o t in  th e  amount o r n a tu re  o f th e  p a in  in f l i c t e d  but in  th e  ' 
d eg radation  o f  one s e n t ie n t  being in to  a means of p rocu ring  p le a su re  or 
p r o f i t  fo r  ano ther s e n t ie n t  being . This holds good ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f 
whether th e  "degradation" in  question  im p lies p a in fu l o r p le a su ra b le  
sen sa tio n s  fo r  th e  s u f f e r e r ,  th e  person degraded. Once again  th en , 
p lea su re  and pa in  have been found to  be in te rch an g eab le  w ithou t a f fe c t in g  
th e  moral s tan d in g  o f a s i tu a t io n .
"Pain" and "p leasure" th e n , harbouring  no moral elements in  t h e i r  
i n t r i n s i c  n a tu re , a re  not moral v a lu e s , and th e re fo re  th e  judgnents
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"Pain i s  e v i l " ,  "P leasure  i s  good" being in tu i t iv e  judgments cannot be 
e th ic a l  ones.
On th e  o th e r  hand, " J u s tic e  i s  good" i s  a moral judgment. " Ju s tic e  
i s  good" because i t  i s  i n tu i t iv e ly  approved, i t  i s  m orally  good because 
i t s  m a te r ia l p a r t i c u la r  co n ten t i s  in  accordance w ith  c e r ta in  b a sic  moral 
c r i t e r i a ,  i . e .  our approval o f i t  i s  m orally  determ ined and r e fe r s  to  a 
moral co n ten t.
We may now conclude and say th a t  th e  answer to  th e  query "What i s  
good?" i s  so f a r  from fu rn ish in g  us w ith  a so lu tio n  o f our e th ic a l  
problem th a t  th e  a t t r ib u te s  "good" and "bad" in  genera l do no t even 
fu rn ish  us w ith th e  s u b j e c t ^ a t t e r  o f e th ic a l  enqu iry . At most they  
m ight seem to  serve as in d ic a to r s ,  p o in tin g  th e  way to  where in  some cases 
e th ic a l  su b je c t-m a tte r  may be found, depending on whether th e  approval to  
which "good" corresponds in  each case , i s  based on moral c r i t e r i a ,  o r 
invo lves an in tu i t iv e  accep tance o f a m oral concept. Hence, in  our 
op in ion , th e  p e c u l ia r i ty  o f e th ic s  most c e r ta in ly  i s  i t s  p reoccupation  
w ith  a s s e r tio n s  about human conduct, and w ith th e  p ro p erty  o f "good" or 
"bad" not wherever they may be found bu t only in  so f a r  as th e se  term s 
a re  app lied  to  human conduct.
{p)  In  o rd er to  prove th a t  "good" i s  no t dependent on our approval 
(an a s so c ia t io n  which we do no t uphold in  i t s  causa l but only in  i t s  
c o r r e la t iv e  meaning, i . e .  t h a t  where "good" appears th e re  i s  a lso  
app rova l, and v ice  v e rsa ) bu t i s  th e  exp ression  o f an o b je c tiv e  v a lu e , 
independent of our su b je c tiv e  re a c tio n  to  i t ,  Moore c i t e s  a s s e r t io n  o f th e  
form: "This . . .  i s  good but I  do no t l ik e  i t . "  He tak es  t h i s  to  mean.
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th a t  though s u b je c tiv e ly  we do n o t a p p re c ia te  a p a in tin g  -  fo r  example -  
y e t we must bow to  th e  o b je c tiv e  m a n ife s ta tio n  of th e  i n t r i n s i c  value of 
( in  t h i s  case) beauty and c a l l  i t  "good". But we have seen t h a t  to  c a l l  
a p a in tin g  "good", means to  a s s e r t  t h a t  i t  complies w ith  c e r ta in  
a e s th e t ic  p r in c ip le s  and r u le s ,  >rtiich we suppose to  govern th e  a r t  of 
p a in tin g , and to  possess c e r ta in  q u a l i t ie s  t h a t  c o n s t i tu te  th e  a r t i s t i c  
m e rit o f a p a in tin g . On th e  o th e r  hand, th e  a s s e r t io n  o f such a r e la t io n  
between th e  p a r t i c u la r  p a in tin g  and c e r ta in  a e s th e t ic  p r in c ip le s ,  we have 
c a lle d  " the  exp ression  o f app roval" . For i t  would m an ife s tly  be absurd 
to  c a l l  a p a in tin g  good, when i t  n e ith e r  appeals d i r e c t ly  to  our 
a e s th e t ic  s u s c e p t ib i l i ty  ("we do not l ik e  i t " )  nor conforms to  our 
conception of what a p ic tu re  should be, even th o u ^  t h i s  conception came 
to  us second-hand. On th e  o th e r  hand, vhat i s  th e  meaning o f  " lik e "  
in  t h i s  a sse r tio n ?  There a re  two p o s s ib i l i t i e s  : E ith e r  i t  means th a t  I
approve of th e  p ic tu re  fo r  c e r ta in  reasons and on c e r ta in  p r in c ip le s  which 
I y e t do n o t regard  as accepted and venerab le  enough in  th e  h ie ra rc h y  of 
a e s th e t ic  ru le s  to  w arrant th e  decree o f "good"; o r i t  means th a t  I  have
I
no b e t te r  reason  to  approve o f  th e  p ic tu re  than a sen tim en ta l attachm ent 
invo lv ing  an em otional re a c tio n  th a t  I  choose to  express by " l ik e " .
For example, i f  we say : "This i s  a very  bad p a in tin g  but I  l ik e  i t
because I in h e r i te d  i t  from my great-grandm other or because I  have seen 
i t  hanging over th e  m an telp iece  ever s in c e  I was a c h ild " , we do no t 
make an a e s th e tic  a s s e r t io n , l e t  alone a moral judgment, but recoun t a 
p iece  of biography fo r  what i t  may be w orth . T herefore th is  second 
meaning o f " lik e"  i s  o f no in t e r e s t  to  u s , and i t  was c e r ta in ly  n o t in
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th is  second meaning th a t  Moore wanted i t  to  be understood .
On th e  o th e r  hand, i f  we accep t " lik e "  in  i t s  f i r s t  meaning, th e re  
i s  no e s s e n t ia l  d iffe re n c e  between th e  grounds of i t s  a s s e r t io n  and th e  
grounds and s t ru c tu re  of th e  judgment expressed by "good".
The reason fo r  t h i s  d if fe re n c e  l i e s  r a th e r  in  th e  d if f e r e n t  amount 
o f o b je c tiv e  fo rce  and v a l id i ty  which we a t t r ib u te  to  th e  two re sp e c tiv e  
s e ts  o f c r i t e r i a .  This amount i s  no t n e c e s s a r ily  f ix e d , or unchangeable, 
and th e  p ro p o rtio n a l s tre n g th  o f th e  s e ts  a re  v a r ia b le  in  tim e so th a t  " 
what we m i ^ t  pronounce to -d ay  "Good but no t to  our lik in g "  we m ight 
to-morrow pronounce to  be " to  our l ik in g  but bad". In  o th e r words what 
may be to -day  th e  prim ary p r in c ip le s  and c r i t e r i a  of a e s th e tic  judgment 
may to-morrow become secondary. For example, we view a c e r ta in  
s u r r e a l i s t  p a in tin g . I t  does n o t conform to  our main preconceived ideas 
and c r i t e r i a  o f what a good p a in tin g  should be; on th e  o ther hand, some­
th in g  about i t  may s t r ik e  us as being "a good sense o f co lo u r" , which a lso  
i s  regarded as one o f th e  c r i t e r i a  o f a good p a in tin g . We should then  
pronounce judgment and say : " I t  i s  n o t a good p ic tu re  but th e re  i s  some­
th in g  about i t  which I l ik e " .  Now suppose th e  same p ic tu re  viewed by a 
second s u r r e a l i s t  p a in te r .  He w il l  in  th e  main agree w ith  th e  
a e s th e t ic  p r in c ip le s  of h is  r i v a l 's  work, but s in ce  h is  idea  o f 
im plem entation o f th ese  p r in c ip le s  w il l  n e c e s sa r ily  be d i f f e r e n t ,  he w ill  
pronounce th e  p ic tu r e , to  be "good" (because o f i t s  accordance w ith h is  
main a r t i s t i c  p r in c ip le s ) ,  but no t to  h is  l ik in g  (because o f i t s  
d e fic ie n cy  in  view o f some o th e r a e s th e t ic  c r i te r io n  of secondary 
im portance). In  both cases judgment w i l l  be given in  accordance w i ^  th e
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same two se ts  o f p r in c ip le s '. The d if fe re n c e  being th a t  in  th e  f i r s t  
case g re a te r  im portance i s  a sc rib ed  to  one s e t  (what we might c a l l  th e  
c la s s ic a l  p r in c ip le  in  p a in t in g ) ; in  th e  second case g re a te r  im portance 
i s  g iven to  th e  second s e t  o f p r in c ip le s  (what we m i ^ t  term th e  
s u r r e a l i s t  p r in c ip le  o f p a in t in g ) .  Hence, as f a r  as th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  
grounds and th e  lo g ic a l  s t r u c tu r e  of th e  judgment i s  concerned, th e re  i s  
no e s s e n t ia l  d iffe re n c e  between th e  a s s e r t io n  " th is  i s  good" and "I l ik e  
t h i s " .  In  th e  same way in  which th e  "good" corresponds to  "approval" , 
" l ik e " ,  to o , corresponds to  app roval. I t  seems a lso  probable th a t  th e re  
a re  ju s t  as many kinds of " lik in g "  as th e re  a re  k inds of "good", and kinds 
of "approval" . I f  so , " lik e "  and "good" s ig n i :^  th e  d if fe re n c e  o f  degree 
in  th e  assurance o f approval ( th e  degree o f assu rance  being dependent on 
th e  prim ary o r secondary im portance a t t r ib u te d  to  th e  grounds on which i t  
i s  based ). T h o u ^  th e  r e la t io n  between "good" and " lik e "  i s  th ereb y  
irre v o c a b ly  s ta te d ,  th e  m a te r ia l  con ten ts o f what we c a l l  "good" o r 
" lik ed "  a re  v a r ia b le  in  d i r e c t  p ro p o rtio n  to  th e  v a r ia b le  s tan d ard s of 
d i f f e r e n t  p e rio d s .
In  th e  main, th e  same argument w il l  apply to  sta tem ents l ik e  "The 
U seful i s  good but I  do no t l ik e  i t " ,  where th e  "Useful" w ill  be seen to  
be "good" because o f our approval o f , say , th e  p r in c ip le s  o f genera l 
p ro s p e r ity , but w il l  be seen to  be no t " to  our l ik in g "  because of our 
approval o f th e  a e s th e t ic  p r in c ip le s  o f a r t ,  w ith  which th e  u se fu l does 
“n o t always comply. Sometimes moral p r in c ip le s  may o r may no t form one 
o f th e  s e t s ;  and th o u ^  i t  i s  never on moral grounds t h a t  one s e t  i s  
regarded as more im portan t than  th e  o th e r , i t  i s  an open question  whether
-5 8 -
in  th e  case mentioned above (when moral p r in c ip le s  form one of th e  s e ts )  
preponderance i s  always given to  th i s  s e t .  For example: "C ruelty  i s
bad but I l ik e  i t "  seems to  imply t h i s ,  and so does " J u s tic e  and Equity 
a re  good but I  do n o t l ik e  them ". In  o th e r words, i t  i s  an open question  
w hether th e  appearance o f a "good" which i s  "m orally good" a u to m atica lly  
degrades o th er k inds of good to  " l ik e " ,  i . e .  whether ab so lu te  primacy 
should be given to  moral approval over any o th e r k inds o f app roval.
P e rso n a lly  I am in c lin e d  to  th in k  so , and p roof fo r  th is  co n ten tio n  
might be found in  an exam ination of our everyday moral experience.
(ÿ5 As to  th e  e x is te n ce  o f e te rn a l i n t r i n s i c  v a lu e s , independent
N
of our app roval, a l l  th a t  can be proven i s  th a t  th e re  a re  th in g s  o f which 
we approve fo r  no u l t e r i o r  reason  but t h e i r  in h e re n t n a tu re , bu t which not 
only a re  n o t independent o f our app roval, but whose only p o ss ib le  
d e f in i t io n  con ta ins th e  concept o f app roval. We d e fin e  v a lu e , o r 
i n t r i n s i c  value th en , as th a t  concept which g en e ra lly  corresponds to  what 
we have termed " in tu i t iv e  ap p ro v a l" . This r e la t io n  between " in t r i n s i c  
value" and " in tu i t iv e  approval" i s  no t causal in  any re sp e c t bu t 
c o r r e la t iv e ,  as we have seen th e  r e la t io n  between "yellow" and "wave­
len g th  " t o  be. But then  " in t r in s i c  value" w ill  have no meaning out­
s id e  t h i s  d e f in i t io n ,  and fo r  our purpose, in  an e th ic a l  enqu iry , we 
m ight f in d  i t  u se fu l to  in v e s tig a te  th e  n a tu re  and p e c u l ia r i t i e s  of 
" in tu i t iv e  approval" r a th e r  than  those  of " in t r in s i c  v a lu e" . I t  w i l l  
a lso  be understood th a t  " in t r i n s i c  va lues" a re  not n e c e s s a r ily  moral 
v a lu e s , as th e  concept o f " in tu i t iv e  approval" does no t con ta in  any 
re fe ren c e  to  moral c r i t e r i a .  There m ight be a moral concept, which i s
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a lao  an in t r i n s i c  v a lu e /  but t h i s  w ill  be grasped d i r e c t ly  in  i t s  
m a te r ia l  c o n ten ts . I t  m ight a lso  be t h a t  in  any c la sh  of v a lu e s , th e  • 
moral w il l  prove th e  s tro n g e r, and a sp ire  to  primacy over a l l  o th e r  
v a lu e s . But t h i s  a lso  cannot be proven by an enum eration and survey of 
va lues in  t h e i r  fu n c tio n  o f c o r re la te s  o f app roval, t h e i r  exam ination, 
c la s s i f i c a t io n  and arrangem ent in to  p a t te r n s ,  but by an a n a ly s is  o f our 
m oral experience , our a c tu a l moral judgnen ts, t h e i r  grounds, laws and 
v a l id i ty .
Some r e f le c t io n s  on th e  tw ofold  fu n c tio n  o f values in  E th ic s .
"Probably th e  only u n iv e rs a l p reco n d itio n  fo r  u sin g  th e  word 'good*," 
w rite s  S ir  D. Ross^^ " is  th e  ex is ten ce  o f a favourab le  a t t i tu d e  in  our­
se lv es  towards th e  o b je c t."  In  o th e r words, of 'good* w hatever we may 
term  so , whatever i t s  concrete  c o n te n t, we approve; o f 'b a d ',  we 
d isapprove. The concrete  con ten t o f what i s  c a lle d  good may change from 
one country to  an o th e r, from one period  to  an o th e r, from one c la s s  to  
a n o th e r, from one man to  an o th e r , o r even in  one man from one day to  
a n o th e r. The only constan t f a c to r  in  t h i s  continuous change i s  th e  
unvarying r e la t io n  to  app roval. The r e l a t i v i t y  of ' w hat* i s  'good* does 
no t im pair th e  s t a b i l i t y  o f th e  r e la t io n  between approval and good.
Indeed approval and 'good* may be defined  as th e  c o r re la te s  o f a c o n stan t, 
n ecessary  and re f le x iv e  r e la t io n .  S ince n e ith e r  th e  concrete  
d e te rm ina tions of what i s  approved or c a lle d  good, no r th e  grounds.
l )  "Foundations of E th ics" page 254.
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reasons and c r i t e r i a  in  accordance w ith  which i t  has been approved and 
termed 'good* e n te r  in to  th e  d e f in i t io n  o f  th i s  r e l a t io n ,  i t  cannot be 
s ta te d  off-hand whether th e  'good* so defined  i s  id e n t ic a l  w ith  th e  
'm oral good' o r i f  i t  po ssesses any moral s ig n if ic a n c e  a t  a l l .  Thus, 
th e  'good ' in  'a  good hiding* though i t  corresponds to  an approval of 
the  s tre n g th  and th e  e f f i c ie n t  a d m in is tra tio n  o f th e  'h id in g ' in  q u estio n , 
i . e .  an approval o f t h i s  p a r t i c u la r  'h id ing*  as a sp lend id  specimen o f 
i t s  k in d , does n o t amount ip so  nomine (o f  good) or ip so  fac to  (by v i r tu e  
of th e  constan t c o r re la t io n  between approval and good) to  a moral judgment. 
In  o rd er th a t  th i s  a c t  o f approval be eq u iv a len t to  a moral judgment, i t  
must f i r s t  be a sc e r ta in e d  e i th e r  -  th a t  we approved of th e  'h id ing*  fo r  
reasons of m o ra lity , or t h a t  a 'h id ing* in  i t s e l f  i s  a moral concept, 
i . e .  a concept whose n a tu re  con ta ins elem ents o f m oral im port, and th a t  
th e re fo re  a good specimen o f 'h id ing* w i l l  n e c e s s a r ily  imply a g re a t 
exce llence  in  w hatever th e  moral im port o f i t s  elem ents may c o n s is t .
This a c tu a l ly  happens when we t a lk  of 'v ir tu e *  or ' ju s t ic e * , where th e  
n o tio n  of moral exce llence  i s  contained in  th e  n a tu re  o f th e  concept and 
where, in  consequence, approval o f th e se  concepts im p lies  moral approval. 
But th e re  a re  concepts which, th o u ^  defined  in s id e  th e  moral domain, do 
n o t co n ta in  a re fe ren c e  to  m oral exce llence  in  t h e i r  very  n a tu re  : th ese
a re  th e  basic  moral concep ts: w i l l ,  conduct, a c t io n . Approval o f  such
concepts can be taken  to  possess moral s ig n if ic a n c e  o ^ g  vdien i t  i s  based 
on c r i t e r i a ,  grounds and reasons which them selves have moral im port and 
a re  defined  in s id e  th e  e th ic a l  domain. Thus th e  'good* in  'good conduct'
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in  th e  sense o f 'b e a u t i fu l  manners* does no t correspond to  any approval 
based on moral grounds (one can be in s u l t in g ,  u n ju s t and c ru e l in  th e  
most 'b e a u t i f u l ly  mannered' way) and, th e re fo re , does n o t determ ine a 
m oral judgment o r d e fine  a va lue  of m oral im port.
Thus, th e re  seem to  be two n ecessa ry  co n d itio n s , which must be 
f u l f i l l e d  by any judgment of approval before  i t  can be regarded as a 
moral judgment : i t  must be based on, and given fo r  moral reasons ; i t
must be d ire c te d  to  concepts which a re  defined  in s id e  th e  moral domain. 
Yet th e re  seem to  e x is t  some moral judgments which seem to  bear upon 
•goods' o r va lues defined  in  o th e r  domains, as fo r  in s ta n c e , when 
'p leasu re*  i s  judged to  be 'm o ra lly  bad*, i . e .  p lea su re  which i s  'good in  
i t s e l f *  i s  d ec la red  'm orally  b a d '.  The p o s s ib i l i ty  of such judgments 
d e riv e s  from th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  'goods' judged a re  deprived o f any 
i n t r i n s i c  and autonomous value  they  migjbt have enjoyed in  t h e i r  own 
domains and reduced to  th e  s ta tu s  o f means, q u a l i f ic a t io n s  and 
m o d ifica tio n s  o f conduct, w i l l  and a c t io n . Now conduct, w i l l ,  and 
a c t io n , a re  th e  most fundam ental and im portan t elem ents of th e  e th ic a l  
domain, th e  p l a s t i c  m a te r ia l and su b je c t m a tte r  o f  a l l  e th ic a l  
d e lib e ra t io n . Therefore any th ing  th a t  d e te m in e s  t h e i r  n a tu re , inform s 
t h e i r  d i r e c t io n , or in flu e n ce s  t h e i r  purpose, must c e r ta in ly  be o f 
p a r t i c u la r  i n t e r e s t  to  any th eo ry  o f E th ic s . Roughly i t  may be s ta te d  
t h a t  m ost, and perhaps a l l ,  'goods ' defined  in  t h e i r  r e f le c t iv e  r e la t io n  
to  app roval, e n te r  in to  an o th e r , no t le s s  constan t re la tio n sh ip  to  w i l l ,  
conduct and a c tio n , in  which they  appear to  determ ine th e se  l a t t e r .  I t  
i s  in  t h i s  second fu n c tio n , th a t  a l l  'g o o d s ' and va lues inasmuch as they
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determ ine and in flu e n ce  w il l  and conduct and taken  in  th e  whole o f t h e i r  
r e la t io n  to  w i l l  and conduct, a re  considered f i t  and le g itim a te  o b jec ts  
o f e th ic a l  judgments. As o b je c ts  o f e th ic a l  judgnents th e se  wholes are  
n a tu ra l ly  judged under e th ic a l  c r i t e r i a  and w ithout re fe ren ce  to  any 
i n t r i n s i c  exce llence  th e  v a lu e  which forms p a r t  o f  t h i s  whole m ight have 
possessed  in  i t s  own domain. A b s trac tio n  i s  made from th e  grounds on 
which approval o f a value fo r  in s ta n c e , 'p le a su re * , has been based in  th e  
f i r s t  p lac e . Nor i s  th e  value  considered in  i t s  own r ig h t  ( 'p le a s u r e  
pe r s e ' ) .  Account i s  taken  o f i t  only as an element determ ining  a whole 
o f which conduct or w il l  i s  th e  predom inant and absorbing f a c to r .  This 
whole i s  then  judged under moral c r i t e r i a  ( i . e .  c r i t e r i a  d i f f e r e n t  and 
independent o f th o se  th a t  c o n s titu te d  p lea su re  as a va lu e  in  s e ) .
Thus when P la to  decided to  ban the  p lay ing  o f th e  f l u te  from h is  
id e a l  S ta te ,  he did  so no t because he t h o u ^ t  f lu te -so n g  n o t-b e a u ti fu l -  
enough in  i t s e l f ,  i . e .  lack in g  in  a e s th e t ic  ex ce llen c e . On th e  co n tra ry  
he thought th e  very  f a c t  o f  i t s  being so b e a u tifu l and s o u l - s t i r r in g  made 
i t  m orally  su spec t as a dangerous r iv a l  c laim ant on human w il l  and purpose. 
The i n t r i n s i c  exce llence  o f a value l ik e  Beauty i s  then  an added danger, 
a n eg a tiv e  p ro p e rty , as f a r  as th e  je a lo u s ly  guarded claim o f th e  m orally  
good fo r  th e  f i r s t  p lace  in  in flu e n c in g  w i l l  and conduct i s  concerned.
The primacy which th e  m orally  good claim s in  t h i s  example from P la to 's  
and in  our everyday moral experience, over and above a l l  o th e r 'goods ' 
seems then  to  r e f e r  to  a jus primae d e te rm in a tio n is , i f  I  may say so , 
a r ig h t  o f precedence in  in flu e n c e  over w il l  and conduct r a th e r  than  to  a 
claim  of s u p e r io r i ty  o f s ta tu s  among va lues as such, considered  in  and
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fo r  them selves.^^
I t  i s  no t claimed th a t  'Moral Goodness* i s  b e t te r  than 'B e a u ty ', 
b u t t h a t ,  when a man i s  faced  w ith  a choice between th e  two i t  i s  m orally  
incumbent upon him to  choose moral goodness. I  say m orally  incumbent 
because, though in  th e  moral domain i t  i s  always incumbent upon him to  
choose Moral Goodness, in  th e  a e s th e t ic  domain i t  may be incumbent upon 
him to  choose Beauty. In s id e  th e  a e s th e t ic  domain, fo r  in s ta n c e , th e  
work o f g re a te r  moral m e rit  i s  no t n e c e s s a r ily  considered th e  b e t te r  work 
( th in k  but o f C a tu llu s , P ro p e rtiu s  and P e tro n iu s ) . In  f a c t  i t  has a l l  
th e  chances of being th e  w orse, inasmuch as i t  i s  a p t to  d i s t r a c t  our 
a t te n t io n  from th e  c r i t e r i a  o f poetry  and elegance indigenous and 
le g it im a te  in  th e  a e s th e t ic  sphere to  those  o f moral im port which a re , 
h e re , extraneous and i r r e le v a n t .
In  o th er words, the  f a c ts  o f moral experience , i . e .  c e r ta in  moral 
judgments, seem to  demand th a t  precedence be given to  moral v a lu e  over 
a l l  o th e r  va lues in  re sp e c t o f  i t s  claim  on th e  a lle g ia n c e  o f w il l  and
l )  Nor can we assume th a t  th e  one i s  th e  r e s u l t  o f th e  o th e r , s in ce  
th e  i n t r i n s i c  s u p e r io r i ty  of th e  'm orally  good* over th e  
'a e s th e t ic a l ly  good* i s  an unwarranted h y p o th es is , which cannot 
be proved e i th e r  by re fe ren c e  to  th e  d i f f e r e n t  c r i t e r i a  and grounds 
o f approval o r to  th e  d i f f e r e n t  in tu i t io n s  to  which they correspond. 
Moral c r i t e r i a  a re  d i f f e r e n t  but n o t su p e rio r to  a e s th e tic  c r i t e r i a ,  
indeed they  are  n e ith e r  comparable nor commensurable. Nor i s  th e  
in tu i t io n  which rev e a ls  to  us th e  i n t r i n s i c  va lue  o f th e  B e a u tifu l, 
in  any way comparable o r commensurable w ith th e  in tu i t io n  which 
rev e a ls  th e  i n t r i n s i c  va lue  o f th e  M orally good. Indeed we would 
need ano ther in tu i t io n  over and above th ese  to  rev ea l to  us th e  
h ie ra rc h ic a l  s ta tu s  of th e  v a lu es . The d iscu ss io n  of th e  
p o s s ib i l i ty  and p l a u s ib i l i t y  of such an a d d itio n a l in tu i t io n  must 
be l e f t  to  a l a t e r  occasion .
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conduct. I t  i s  asked th a t  w i l l  and conduct, regarded as elem ents o f th e  
m oral domain, should always be determ ined by moral va lues ra th e r  than  by 
o th e r  v a lu es. In  accordance w ith  t h i s ,  th e  good w il l  i s  defined  as th e  
w i l l  which h a b itu a l ly  chooses to  be so determ ined.
Our problem may now be s ta te d  in  t h i s  form : 
a) Can th e  claim  fo r  supremacy of th e  moral value over a l l  o th e r 
va lues be su b s ta n tia te d  by means of an a n a ly s is  of th e  system 
o f values considered in  t h e i r  r e la t io n  to  w i l l  and conduct?
B) Can any ju s t i f i c a t io n  fo r  th is  claim  be in fe r re d  or deduced 
from such an an a ly sis?
To sum up : 'Goods' o r 'v a lu e s ' f u l f i l  a double fu n c tio n  in  E th ic s ,
depending on whether t h e i r  s t a t i c  a sp ec t as th e  c o r re la te s  o f app roval, 
or t h e i r  dynamic a sp ec t as th e  c o r re la te s  o f w il l  and conduct, i s  brought 
in to  th e  foreground.
In  t h e i r  f i r s t  fu n c tio n  only th e  moral values a re  defined  in s id e  
th e  moral domain and th e re  i s  no p r in c ip le  to  be found in s id e  t h a t  domain 
accord ing  to  which th e  su p e rio r  o r in f e r io r  s ta tu s  o f values defined  in  
o th er domains can be ev a lu a ted . The c r i t e r i a ,  grounds, reasons and 
in tu i t io n s  in  re sp e c t o f which d if f e r e n t  values have been determ ined a re  
d i f f e r e n t ,  independent, incom parable and incommensurable. Hence th e  
s u p e r io r i ty  o f th e  moral value over a l l  o th e r va lues cannot be deduced 
from an a n a ly s is  o f a system o f va lues considered in  t h e i r  f i r s t  a sp ec t. 
Indeed th e  very  no tion  of s u p e r io r i ty  in  th is  con tex t i s  m eaningless as 
th e re  i s  no standard  o f comparison between d i f f e r e n t  domains.
In  t h e i r  second fu n c tio n  a l l  va lues a re  defined  in s id e  th e  e th ic a l
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domain, no t indeed as they  stand  fo r  them selves, bu t in  t h e i r  con junction  
w ith  w ill  and conduct which th ey  in flu e n ce  and determ ine. Our problem 
can now be defined  as fo llow s : W ill an a n a ly s is  o f a system of va lues in
re sp e c t o f t h e i r  second fu n c tio n  y ie ld  us a p r in c ip le  of ev a lu a tio n  by 
which we may determ ine th e  su p e rio r  o r i n f e r io r  s ta tu s  o f d i f f e r e n t  
v a lu e s , and p a r t i c u la r ly ,  e s ta b l is h  th e  primacy of moral value? That 
i s  : can th e  claim  fo r  supremacy o f  th e  moral value over o th e r v a lu es  in
re sp e c t o f t h e i r  r e la t io n  to  w il l  and conduct, and in s id e  i t s  own domain, 
be su b s ta n tia te d  and ju s t i f i e d  by in fe re n ce s  drawn, and conclusions 
deduced from an a n a ly s is  o f va lues in  t h e i r  second function?
X S  X X X
I sh a ll  from now on, fo r  s im p lic i ty ’ s sake, r e f e r  to  va lues in  t h e i r  
f i r s t  fu n c tio n  o f c o r re la te s  to  approval as ’good* and to  th e  r e la t io n  
between ’good’ and ’ap p ro v a l’ as R%; in  t h e i r  second fu n c tio n  o f 
c o r r e la te s  to  w i l l  and conduct as ’v a lu e s ’ , and to  th e  r e la t io n  between 
value and w ill  or conduct as R2; to  m oral value in  i t s  f i r s t  a sp ec t as 
’m orally  good’ and in  i t s  second as ’m oral w orth ’ .
I  s h a l l  a lso  use w i l l , d e s ire  and in tended  a c tio n  to  stand  equally  fo r  
a l l  human co n ativ e  ten d en cies  or in te n t s ,  as w ell as fo r  a c tio n  ( th e  
concre te  r e a l is a t io n  o f th e  w i l l  inform ing i t ) ;  and fo r  conduct 
(perseverance in  a c e r ta in  mode of a c t io n ) .  I  perm it m yself t h i s  freedom 
sin ce  fo r  th e  purpose of t h i s  enquiry n e ith e r  th e  concrete  r e a l is a t io n  
o f an in tended a c t io n , nor i t s  unique occurrence o r r e p e t i t io n ,  nor th e  
le s s e r  or g re a te r  degree o f r a t io n a l i s a t io n  and coherence between i t  and 
o th e rs  o f i t s  k in d , u su a lly  d isc rim in a ted  in  th e  n o tio n s  o f i n s t i n c t .
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d e s i r e ,  need and w i l l ,  a f f e c t  th e  n a tu re  o f R2 ( th e  r e la t io n  between 
value and w i l l )  in  any way.
X X X X X
(a ) Roughly va lues can be sa id  to  e n te r  in to  fo u r k inds o f r e la t io n s h ip  
w ith  w ill  :
a They may be lo ca ted  in  th e  ends, purposes, o r o b jec ts  o f 
w i l l .
b They m ight lodge in  th e  m otive o r i n i t i a t i v e  urge behind 
th e  w i l l .
£  They might serve as a re g u la tiv e  p r in c ip le  o r law to  which 
th e  w il l  seeks to  conform and adap t i t s e l f .
d They m ight be th e  a c c id e n ta l r e s u l ts  o f w i l l ,  i . e .  th e
necessary  outcome o f a c e r ta in  con junction  between w i l l ,  end, 
and m otive, but n o t envisaged or in tended  in  i t s e l f ,  and in  
th i s  sense a cc id e n ta l to  w i l l .^ )
In  th e  f i r s t  case value i s  th e  purposed consequence o f a c t io n ;  in  
th e  second th e  chosen m otive; in  th e  th i r d  th e  revered  law; in  th e  
fo u rth  th e  (m orally) a cc id e n ta l by-product of a c tio n . Thus to  ta k e  th e  
example o f Beauty a man may make i t  th e  end o f h is  a c tio n s  ( th e  Maecenas) 
o r th e  motive fo r  h is  a c tio n  ( th e  A esthete) th e  law re g u la tin g  h is  a c tio n  
( th e  C r i t ic )  or i t  may sim ply be th e  by-product of h is  a c tio n  ( th e  A r t i s t ) .  
Lorenzo de M edici fo r  in s ta n c e  made th e  b e a u t if ic a t io n  o f F lo rence , i . e .
1) L ike in  Hume's example o f a man who throw ing a coin  to  a beggar h i t  
th e  b eg g ar 's  eye and caused him grave in ju ry .
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th e  r e a l is a t io n  of Beauty, h is  o b je c t. His m otive in  doing so may have 
been a love o f Beauty ( in  which case he would a lso  have been an A esthete) 
or am bition to  ou tsh ine  a l l  o th e r  I t a l i a n  p r in c e s , th e  d e s ire  of g lo ry , 
o r a wish to  in v e s t  money in  a c e r ta in  way and r a is e  th e  c re d i t  o f 
F lo re n tin e  Banks. The p r in c ip le s  on which he reg u la ted  h is  a c tio n  in  
o rder to  achieve th i s  end m ight w ell have been th o se  o f expediency, greed, 
and e x p lo i ta t io n . The r e s u l t in g  by-product of h is  a c tio n  were h is  own 
and h is  c o m p a tr io t 's  p overty , d e l i c t ,  and e d if ic a t io n ,  and p o s t e r i t y 's  
d e lig h t  and e d if ic a t io n .  On th e  o th e r hand M ichelangelo 's  a c tio n  in  
fash io n in g  some o f those  in c a rn a tio n s  o f Beauty which rep resen ted  ends 
fo r  Lorenzo m ight be described  as having th e  execu tion  o f an o rd er as 
i t s  end. (The Moses, as w ell as many o th e r m u sica l, p i c to r ia l  and 
s c u lp tu ra l  m asterp ieces were made to  o rd e r .)  His m otive m i ^ t  have been 
an u rg en t need o f funds, o r a need to  fa sh io n  something and q u ie ten  h is  
c rav ing  fo r  c re a tio n . The re g u la tiv e  p r in c ip le  o f h is  a c tio n  m ight have 
been th e  ru le s  o f s c u lp tin g - t e chnique he had le a m t  in  h is  t e a c h e r 's  
s tu d io , or had acqu ired  by h is  own experience . Only as an a c c id e n ta l 
by-product o f h is  a c tio n  can Beauty be named.
This p rocess i s  even c le a re r  when T ru th  i s  s u b s ti tu te d  fo r  Beauty.
The end o f a c re a t iv e  s c i e n t i s t 's  a c tio n  i s  th e  so lu tio n  o f a problem .
His m otive may be an urge to  experim ent, a d is c ip lin e d  c u r io s i ty .  His
re g u la tiv e  p r in c ip le s  th e  techn ique o f whatever branch o f sc ience  he i s
d ea lin g  w ith . Only as th e  a c c id e n ta l by-product can T ruth be quoted.
Not only T ruth  in  general bu t even th a t  p a r t ic u la r  t r u th  which he looks
fo r  i s  n o t th e  end o f h is  a c t io n . Consider th e  case o f a s c i e n t i s t ,  only
—4-8—
I  would ra th e r  c a l l  him a p h ilo so p h er, who searches fo r  t r u th .  Surely 
he w il l  look i t  up in  o th e r  p e o p le 's  books and experim ents, where i t  i s  
to  be found, ju s t  as th e  man who d e s ire s  Beauty w il l  look fo r  i t  in  th e  
P ic tu re -G a lle r ie s ,  C o n cert-H a lls , and Beauty-Spots o f th e  w orld , r a th e r  
than  labour to  fash io n  something h im self o f which he can have no 
assurance th a t  i t  w il l  indeed tu rn  out to  be t r u e ,  o r b e a u t ifu l .
Now of th e  fo u r p o ss ib le  forms o f R2 mentioned : value as an end, a 
m otive, a re g u la tiv e  p r in c ip le ,  o r a by-product of a c tio n , only th e  f i r s t  
two cases appear to  be in s ta n c e s  of immediate and concre te  de te rm ina tion  
o f th e  con ten ts o f th e  two fa c to r s  o f th e  r e la t io n  (v a lu e , and w i l l )  by 
each o th e r . In  th e  th i r d  case th e  de te rm ina tion  of w il l  by value  seems 
to  be lim itin g  and re g u la tiv e  r a th e r  than  c o n s t i tu t iv e .  In  th e  fo u rth  
i t  can hard ly  be regarded as d e te rm in a tiv e  a t  a l l ,  s in c e  though th e  
r e s u l t  or by-product o f an a c tio n  m ight have been, under c e r ta in  circum­
s ta n c e s , fo re se e a b le , i t  c e r ta in ly  was no t d i r e c t ly  and im m ediately
1) We a re  faced  here  fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e by one o f th e  paradoxes o f v a lu e ; 
namely th a t  a value can only be r e a l is e d  ( i . e .  c re a te d , in co rp o ra te d , 
m a te r ia lis e d  no t enjoyed or contem plated) when i t  i s  n e ith e r  th e  end 
nor th e  m otive o f a c tio n . Beauty i s  n e ith e r  an end nor a moving power 
f o r  th e  c re a tiv e  a r t i s t ,  as Truth i s  n e i th e r  an end nor a moving power 
fo r  th e  s c i e n t i s t .  Both a re  th e  m o ra lly -acc id e n ta l by-products of w e ll-  
executed work. Happiness cannot be achieved by s t r iv in g  a f t e r  i t  or 
making i t  th e  ground o f o n e 's  a c tio n ; i t  i s ,  as A r is to t le  p u t i t ,  only 
th e  accompaniment of a w ell-o rdered  ( in  re sp ec t o f o th er va lues w e ll-  
ordered) l i f e .  No a c tio n  can be m orally  good, as Hume had i t ,  which has 
no th ing  but i t s  m o ra lity  fo r  end or m otive. The a r t i s t  vdio s t r iv e s  
a f t e r  Beauty i s  no t a c re a to r  but a c r i t i c ,  a p h ilo so p h er, o r an 
a e s th e te , i . e .  Beauty i s  only an end o r a motive power f o r  those  whose 
re a l  end i s  no t i t s  c re a tio n  but i t s  enjoyment, and th e re fo re , 
u l t im a te ly , t h e i r  own s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n .  By making Beauty, Goodness or 
T ruth  one 's  end one u lt im a te ly  reduces i t  to  th e  s ta tu s  of a means.
This b rings us face  to  face  w ith a second paradox of v a lu e , whose 
d iscu ss io n  however must be postponed fo r  a l a t e r  occasion .
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in ten d ed .
Taking th e  f i r s t  two cases of R2 : value as th e  end, and value as
th e  m otive o f w i l l ,  i t  must f i r s t  be noted th a t  a c e r ta in  d ia le c t ic a l  
p rocess e x is tin g  between th e  two appears a t  tim es to  l iq u i f y  th e  r ig id  
d if fe re n c e  between them. Thus in  c e r ta in  in s ta n c e s , e sp e c ia lly  when 
th e  'e n d s ' in  q u estio n  a re  u ltim a te  ends, th ey  appear a t  th e  same tim e 
in co rp o ra ted  in  th e  m otives o f w i l l .  Hence, though i t  i s  n o t m eaningless 
to  speak o f th e  ends o f w il l  as opposed to  th e  m otive (as i t  happens when 
we say th a t  h is  end was good but h is  m otive bad, or h is  end bad b u t h is  
m otive good) we must bear in  mind th e  f l u id i t y  o f th e se  concepts. I f  I ,  
fo r  example, d e s ire  o r w il l  a good th in g  l ik e  e q u a lity  (assuming th a t  
e q u a lity  i s  a good th in g ) because I am envious o f th o se  more fo r tu n a te  
than  m yself, my m otive i s  as bad and p e t ty  as any m otive can be. But th e  
p o in t i s ,  th a t  in  r e a l i t y  I  do no t d e s ire  e q u a lity  fo r  i t s e l f ,  I  d e s ire  
i t  as a means to  p u ll  c e r ta in  people down, and th e re fo re  my r e a l  end i s  
th e  b e li t t le m e n t of th o se  peop le . The m otive of my w i l l  (envy) i s  
in co rp o ra ted  in  a c e r ta in  manner in  my end. On th e  o th e r hand assuming 
th a t  e q u a lity  i s  a bad th in g  in  i t s e l f ,  i f  I  d e s ire  i t  because I  p i ty  
those  le s s  fo r tu n a te  than o th e rs  and wish to  r a is e  them to  a c e r ta in  le v e l ,  
what I r e a l ly  d e s ire  i s  n o t e q u a lity  but th e  improvement o f c e r ta in  
u n fo rtu n a te s . My m otive, as w ell as my end, u l tim a te ly  anchors in  th e  
value  o f benevolence. But i f  I  d e s ire  e q u a lity  because I approve of th e  
p r in c ip le s  in co rpo ra ted  in  th e  concept o f e q u a lity , i . e .  fo r  i t s e l f ,  and 
as an u ltim a te  end, th a i  th e  end has in  a c e r ta in  majiner been 
in co rp o ra ted  in  my m otive. Whenever I  d e s ire  something as a means to  an
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end, my motive fo r  d e s ir in g  i t  i s  my d e s ire  fo r  th a t  end, so th a t  th e  
u ltim a te  'end* e n te rs  in to  th e  com position o f my m otive; and whenever I 
d e s ire  something fo r  i t s e l f ,  as an 'u l t im a te  e n d ', my m otive fo r  eo 
d e s ir in g  i t  e n te rs  in to  th e  com position o f my 'e n d '.
Now m otives o f w ill  o r d e s ire  seem to  have a common c h a r a c te r is t ic  
in  th a t  they p o in t to  a c e r ta in  fundamental lack  or d iscom fort and a need 
to  s a t i s f y  th is  la c k . This seems very  p la in  in  cases o f th e  sim pler 
m otives l ik e  hunger, f e a r ,  am bition . But what o f th e  more complex, and 
s u b t le r  values l ik e  Beauty, T ru th , e tc .?  I t  seems th a t  in  t h i s  case , i t  
i s  E duca tion 's  ta s k  to  c re a te  new needs, make us aware o f 'l a c k s ' we did 
n o t fe e l  b e fo re , and make our d iscom fort acu te  : in  sh o r t  -  to  c re a te  new
m otives of d e s ire .  Thus fo r  a m u sica lly  educated man th e  lack  o f 
o p p o rtu n itie s  to  hear good music w il l  become an acu te  d iscom fo rt, w hile 
th e  le s s  w ell-educated  w ill  only fe e l  th e  lack  o f food very a c u te ly . So 
th a t  when values l ik e  Beauty, T ru th , e tc .  a re  c i te d , as ends f o r  d e s i r e ,  
and idien they a re  desired  fo r  t h e i r  own sakes and w ithout any u l t e r i o r  
m otive, they them selves have in  a way become th e  m otive of th e  d e s ire  
d ire c te d  towards them. They a re  in co rp o ra ted  in  th e  m otive in  such a 
way as to  form th e  va luab le  p a r t  o f i t ;  but o f t h i s  l a t e r .  For th e  
moment i t  i s  enough i f  we bear th i s  f a c t  (o f th e  p e c u lia r  f l u id i ty  o f 
th e  two concepts : end and m otive) in  mind, w h ils t  examining th e  d i f f e r e n t
m o d ifica tio n s o f R2.
R2 i s  th e  r e la t io n  between value and w ill  o r d e s ire . In  th e  f i r s t  
c a se : a ) ,  value lodges in  th e  end of d e s ire .  In  th e  second case , b)
value  lodges in  th e  motive o f d e s ire . These r e la t io n s  a re  capable o f
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th re e  d i f f e r e n t  d e f in i t io n s  and assume th e  m odified forms
1) j)]  ^ i s  a form al c o r r e la t io n  between value and d e s ire .
2 ) j  2 a causal r e l a t io n  in  which d e s ire  i s  th e  cause o f v a lu e .
5 ) j  ^ i s  a causal r e l a t io n  in  which value i s  th e  cause o f d e s ire .
E xplanation :
la )  Value i s  assumed to  lodge in  th e  end or o b jec t o f d e s ir e .  
j>l i s  defined  as a formal c o r re la t io n  between value and d e s ir e .  j> i  i s  
defined  in  such a way as to  make a l l  th a t  i s  d esired  possessed of v a lu e . 
In v e rse ly  a l l  t h a t  possesses v a lu e , i s  by d e f in i t io n ,  d e s ire d . In  f a c t  
va lues which a re  no t d e s ired  a re  m eaningless concepts in  th i s  co n te x t. 
S im ila rly  th e  q u e s tio n : “Are values d e s ire d  because they  a re  good", or
“Are they  good because they  a re  desired" lo se s  i t s  sen se . By v ir tu e  
of 8. one-to-one c o -o rd in a tio n  i s  e s ta b lish e d  between value and d e s ire . 
This enables us to  s u b s t i tu te  th e  enquiry  in to  th e  n a tu re  and system of 
v a lu e s , fo r  th a t  in to  the  n a tu re  and systems of d e s ir e s ,  or v ic e -v e rsa . 
Conclusions reached in  one enquiry  w il l  be v a lid  fo r  th e  o th e r , s in c e , by 
d e f in i t io n ,  va lues and d e s ire s  have been declared  to  be co -e x ten s iv e , and 
n e ith e r  has meaning or s ig n if ic a n c e  o u ts id e  th e  defined  r e la t io n .
There i s  no d iscoverab le  connection between th e  c la ss  o f 'goods ' 
defined  by t h e i r  c o -re la t io n  to  approval in  6 Rj A, and the  c la s s  of 
'v a lu e s ' defined  by t h e i r  c o - re la t io n  to  d e s ire  in  V R2 D. No common 
stan d ard  of ev a lu a tio n  i s  defined  between R  ^ and R2. They fu n c tio n  
independently  o f each o th e r .
l b )  When v a l u e  i s  a s s u m e d  t o  l o d g e  i n  t h e  m o t i v e  o f  d e s i r e  i t  i s  
i m p o s s i b l e  t o  d e f i n e  T h e r e  a r e  o n l y  tw o  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  v a l u e
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lodging  in  th e  m otive. E ith e r  a l l  m otives o f d e s ire  a re  declared  
v a lu ab le  by v i r tu e  o f c e r ta in  hypotheses. In  t h i s  case what i s  
fundam entally  p o s tu la te d  i s  th e  ab so lu te  value o f ' l i f e * ,  o f 'n a tu r e ' ,  of 
'd e s i r e s ' o r o f th e  e lan  v i t a l .  Or we d e c la re  some m otives v a lu a b le , 
t h a t  i s ,  we t r e a t  m otives as ends. This happens when we say fo r
!
in s ta n c e  : I  d e s ire  to  be c h a r i ta b le  r a th e r  than  v en g efu l, benevolent
ra th e r  than c ru e l ,  i . e .  I  d e s ire  to  have a  c e r ta in  m otive r a th e r  than 
an o th e r. Here th e  value o f benevolence i s  defined  in  r e la t io n  to  my 
d e s ire  to  be so , as an o b jec t o r end o f d e s ire . In  both c a se s j^ i  has 
proved incapab le  o f being defined  between value as m otive and d e s ire .
For in  th e  f i r s t  case we overstepped th e  boundaries o f formal r e la t io n s h ip ,  
and indeed made ^  a causal r e la t io n s h ip . In  th e  second we re v e r te d  to  
in s ta n c e s  of type  la )  considered  above.
2a) Value i s  assumed to  lodge in  th e  end or o b je c t of d e s i r e .  
j>2 i s  then  defined  as a causal re la t io n s h ip  in  which d e s ire  tak es  th e  p lace  
o f th e  m a te r ia l ,  e f fe c t iv e  cause of value : "Values a re  va luab le  because
they  a re  d e s ire d ."  F i r s t ,  by h y p o th es is , th e re  i s  d e s ire .  Then, what 
i s  d e s ired  i s  declared  v a lu a b le . D esire  in  th is  con tex t i s  th e  causa 
e x is te n t ia e  o f v a lu e . I t  i s  th e  ground o f th e  va luab leness o f va lue .
I t  i s  th e  determ ining f a c to r  o f th e  concre te  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  o f what i s  
considered  a v a lu e . I t  i s  th e  p r in c ip le  o f e v a lu a tio n . Thus defined  
j>2 allow s fo r  th e  fo rm ula tion  of th e  q u e s tio n : " is  every th ing  th a t  i s
d e s ire d , good?" In  o th er words, does being d esired  imply being "approved 
o f" , or a re  th e re  some 'v a lu e s ' defined  by t h e i r  re la tio n j»  2 to  d e s ire s  
which cannot be brought in to  any c o r re la t io n  w ith approval?
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2b) Values a re  assumed to  lodge in  th e  m otives of d e s i re .  By th e  
b asic  hypo thesis o f t h i s  p a r t i c u la r  causal r e l a t i o n 2 I t  i s  assumed th a t  
a) d e s ire s  e x is t ,  and b) they  have th e  power to  con fer value on t h e i r  
o b je c ts . Now th i s  power to  confer v a lu e , d e s ire s  u lt im a te ly  must draw 
from t h e i r  sou rce, th e  prim ary d e s ire  fo r  l i f e ,  th e  e lan  v i t a l  o r whatever 
i t  may be th a t  s p l i t s  i t s e l f  up in to  th e  innumerable forms o f d e s ire  which 
we study . The ground fo r  th e  va luab leness of m otives l i e s  in  th e  
a ff irm a tio n  of l i f e  and v i t a l i t y ,  im plied in  th e  s tim u la tio n  o f d e s ire .  
Sometimes in  th e  harm onisation  o f th e  d if f e r e n t  d e s i r e s .  But in  t h i s  
case we have overstepped th e  boundaries o f th e  d e f in i t io n  ofj^ 2* We have 
en tered  th e  domain o f j>^.
5a) Value i s  assumed to  lodge in  th e  end or o b jec t o f d e s ire .  
j>5 i s  defined  as a causal re la tio n sh ip  in  udiich values a re  the  e f f e c t iv e  
m a te r ia l  cause o f d e s ire . "Values a re  d esired  because they  a re  good." 
F i r s t  by h y p o th esis , th e re  e x is t  'good* o b je c ts . Then th ese  good o b jec ts  
a re  d e s ire d . The 'good ' i s  th e  cause o f which 'd e s i r e ' i s  th e  r e s u l t .  
'Good' i s  th e  causa e x is te n t ia e  o f d e s i re ,  th e  determ ining f a c to r  o f i t s  
concrete  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  ( in te n s i ty ,  d u ra tio n , u b iq u ity ) . 'Good' i s  
th e  ground o f d e s i r e 's  being s e t  in to  m otion, and i t s  p r in c ip le  o f 
ev a lu a tio n . The d e s ire  fo r  Beauty fo r  in s tan c e  w il l  be su p e rio r  to  th a t  
fo r  Warmth, i f  Beauty as a value i s  su p e rio r  to  Warmth as a v a lu e .
The r e l a t i o n j  ^ thus defined  allow s fo r  th e  fo rm ula tion  o f th e  
q u e s tio n : " Is  every th ing  th a t  i s  good a lso  a value?" In  o th e r words,
does every th ing  by v ir tu e  o f i t s  c o r re la t io n  to  approval e n te r  in to  a
-5 4 -
causa l re la tio n s h ip  w ith d e s ire ?  That i s ,  does every th ing  'good* 
a c tu a l ly  evoke d esire?
5b) Values when lodged in  th e  m otives o f d e s ire  a re  c le a r ly  defined 
in  t h i s  th i r d  r e la t io n s h ip , where they  appear inco rpo ra ted  in to  th e  m otive 
of d e s ire  before  rev ea lin g  them selves as th e  end o f i t .  Thus i f  I  d e s ire  
Beauty fo r  i t s e l f  I  do so e i th e r  because I  approve of i t  and th i s  approval 
i t s e l f  beccxnes th e  m otive o f my d e s ir in g  i t ,  o r because I  f e e l  a d i s t in c t  
lack  and an acu te  need of i t ,  which i s  only p o ss ib le  i f  th e  e x is te n ce  of 
Beauty in  i t s e l f  were assumed, and i t s  re v e la t io n  became th e  cause o f  my 
wanting and d e s ir in g  i t .  In  both cases Beauty in  some form i s  
in co rpo ra ted  in to  th e  complex whole o f th e  motive o f my d e s ire  fo r  Beauty.
X X X X X
Our main problem i s  now capable o f a more s t r in g e n t  fo rm ula tion  :
Can the s u p e r io r i ty  o r primacy which moral worth claim s over a l l  
o th e r values in  th e  r e la t io n  Rg in s id e  th e  e th ic a l  domain, be deduced or 
in fe r re d  from an a n a ly s is  o f t h i s  r e la t io n  in  i t s  forms a , and b , (value
as end, value as m otive) and defined  in  i t s  th re e  d i f f e r e n t  m o d ifica tio n s
^ 1 ,  andj5?
In  o th er words, w ill  an a n a ly s is  of R2 in  a l l  i t s  forms and 
m o d ifica tio n s  fu rn ish  us w ith  s u f f ic ie n t  grounds and ample ju s t i f i c a t io n s  
fo r  upholding th e  primacy o f moral worth over a l l  o th er values?
This prim acy, i t  must be remembered, i s  th e  b a sic  assum ption of a l l  » 
fa c tu a l  moral judgments. T herefore we may a lso  p u t our qu estio n  in  th is  
form : Can th e  f a c ts  of moral experience be explained by re fe ren ce  to  an
a n a ly s is  o f a system o f va lues considered  as fa c to rs  o f th e  r e la t io n  R2?
X X X X X
—55—
What ex ac tly  does th e  d e f in i t io n  of R2 as a form al r e la t io n  
imply w ith regard  to  th e  q u estio n  o f th e  s u p e r io r i ty  o f one value  to  
a n o th e r, and e s p e c ia l ly  th e  supremacy of moral worth over a l l  o th e r 
values?
Values as ends o f w ill  o r d e s ire , a re  in  th i s  con tex t de fined  as 
vdiat i s  d e s ire d . D esired , in  th i s  con tex t and by d e f in i t io n ,  i s  
eq u iv a le n t to  va lued . What i s  in  no way d esired  by anybody, what i s  
valued by nobody in  anyway, cannot be considered  a v a lu e . I t  cannot be a 
value because i t  i s  n o t recognised  as such by any conative  ag en t, and 
hence possesses v a l id i ty  fo r  no one; and because, by d e f in i t io n ,  th e  
n a tu re  o f a va lue  c o n s is ts  in  being d e s ire d , i . e .  va lued , th a t  i s ,  in  
possessin g  v a l id i ty .  W ill and d e s ire  in  t h i s  r e la t io n s h ip ,  f u l f i l  th e  
ro le  o f d e te c to rs  o f v a lu e . They a re  th e  occasion a t  which va lues become 
v a l id ,  th e  agent through which values a t t a i n  v a l id i ty .  But d e s ire  and 
w i l l  do no t c o n s t i tu te  th e  ground fo r  va lues being v a lu e s , nor do they  
determ ine th e  concre te  in n e r n a tu re s  o f d i f f e r e n t  v a lu e s . The only 
p r in c ip le  they  a ffo rd  fo r  m easuring d iffe re n c e s  o f s u p e r io r i ty  or 
i n f e r i o r i t y  in  va lues i s  th e  in te n s i ty  o f th e  corresponding d e s i r e .  As 
f a r  as th i s  d e f in i t io n  goes no th ing  th a t  i s  d e s ired  by any a g en t, 
in  any way w hatsoever, i s  devoid of v a lu e , be i t s  in n e r n a tu re  whatever 
i t  be. Pain may become d e s ira b le  and th e re fo re  v a lu ab le  to  th e  Spartan 
youth who d e s ire s  i t  as a means o f p u ttin g  h is  courage to  th e  t e s t ,  or 
to  th e  m artyr who e x u lts  in  i t  fo r  i t s  own sake. C rue lty  may be h igh ly  
d e s ira b le  and v a lu ab le  to  a man who bent upon s e l f - r e a l i s a t io n  by en large­
ment o f experience, d e s ire s  i t  as an item  of experience per se . C ruelty
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may even be d e s ired  fo r  i t s  own sake and th e  p lea su re  in h e re n t in  i t .
But inasmuch as i t  i s  d e s ired  i t  has v a lu e , and in s id e  th e  domain defined  
by j>i, the  form al form of R2, th e re  i s  no means o f branding i t  as a 
n eg a tiv e  or even an in f e r io r  v a lu e . The conclusions reached in  R  ^ do no t 
a f f e c t  R2 (^1) in  any way. What i s  dec la red  'bad* in  r e la t io n  to  
d isapproval can s t i l l  be counted a m ajor value in  i f  th e  c o rre la te d
d e s ire  be but in te n se  enough. Indeed, i f  th e  q u a l i f ic a t io n  d e s ired  . . . 
in  any way w hatsoever were examined more c lo s e ly , i t  would be found to  
b lu r  and o b l i te r a te  such im portan t d iffe re n c e s  as : 0^) d es ired  as a means 
and d esired  as an end; p) d e s ired  su b je c tiv e ly  or d e s ired  o b je c tiv e ly ;
d esired  de fa c to  and d esired  by p o s tu la te ,  i . e .  th e  famous d iffe re n c e  
between d esired  and d e s ira b le , between what i s  a c tu a l ly  d esired  and what 
ought to  be d e s ire d . The d e f in i t io n  o f R2 as fo rm al, d isso lv e s  a l l  th e  
mentioned d if fe re n c e  and ren d ers  them m eaningless. E ith e r  o f th e
p o s s ib i l i t i e s  envisaged under oL, fi, and ^ e q u a lly  s a t i s f i e s  th e  r e la t io n
j> l, and produces eq u iv a len t in s tan c es  of
oi) Thus i t  makes no d iffe re n c e  t o t h e  form al c o r r e la t io n  between 
d e s ire  and value  i f  something i s  d e s ired  as an end o r as a means. For 
example, i f  I d e s ire  to  read  a c e r ta in  book and i f  I d e s ire  to  buy i t  in
o rder to  read i t ,  th e re  i s  no p e rc e p tib le  d if fe re n c e  in  th e  n a tu re  o f my
d e s ire  fo r  th e  one and fo r  th e  o th e r . As long as my d e s ire  i s  d ire c te d  
towards th e  read ing  o f th e  book, i t  i s  th e  read ing  o f  i t  th a t  possesses 
v a lue  fo r  me, but as soon as my d e s ire  i s  d ire c te d  towards the  
a c q u is i t io n  o f th e  book i t  i s  th e  a c q u is i t io n  and n o t th e  read ing  th a t  has 
v a lue  fo r  me, though th e  moment I  had acquired  i t  th e  reading  may o r may
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n o t again  become th e  so le  o b je c t o f my d e s ire .  As long as my d e s ire  
i s  a l iv e  th e  same s o r t  o f va lue  i s  con fe rred  upon a l l  th in g s  t h a t  a re  
i t s  o b je c ts , w hether they be ends or means to  ends. I f  th e re  e x is ts  any 
e s s e n t ia l  d iffe re n c e  o f g rad a tio n  on th e  h ie ra rc h ic a l  sca le  o f va lues in  
accordance w ith  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  means and ends, t h i s  d iffe re n c e  does no t 
correspond to  any d iffe re n c e s  in  th e  n a tu re  of th e  d e s ire s  to  which they  
a re  c o rre la te d ;  nor i s  i t  in  any way dependent on th e  in n er n a tu re  of 
d e s i r e s .  R ather does i t  seem to  be determ ined by th e  in n e r n a tu re  o f 
each value  and i t s  o b je c tiv e  re la tio n s h ip  to  o th er v a lu e s . But th ese  
o b je c tiv e  r e la t io n s h ip s  between values (and among them a r e la t io n  o f 
means to  ends) stand  in  no d isco v erab le  p ro p o rtio n  or r a t io  nor do they  
seem to  have th e  s l ig h te s t  b ea rin g , on what may be d e s ire d  as means and 
as ends.
Thus th e  l is te n in g  to  good music w ill  s t i l l  be a means fo r  s e l f ­
development, whether one l i s t e n s  to  i t  because one d e s ire s  to  improve 
o n e 's  s e l f ,  o r whether one l i s t e n  to  i t  fo r  i t s  own sake, fo r  th e  
p le a su re  of i t ,  o r in  o rder to  be seen in  th e  c o n c e r t -h a ll . What one 
man d e s ire s  as an end, and even as an u ltim a te  end, ano ther may d e s ire  as 
a means to  an a b so lu te ly  d i f f e r e n t  end. But th ese  d iffe re n c e s  have no 
meaning and no v a l id i ty  in s id e  th e  domain defined  by ^2* the  form al 
r e la t io n s h ip ,  because values have no being th e re  o u tsid e  t h e i r  r e la t io n  
to  d e s ire ,  and th e re fo re  no g rad a tio n .
|3 ) In  th e  same way, i t  makes no d iffe re n c e  to  th e  n a tu re  o f t h e  
form al c o - re la t io n  between d e s ire  and v a lu e , i f  something i s  d e s ired  
su b je c tiv e ly ; fo r  b io g ra p h ic a lly  unique reasons, o r o b je c tiv e ly  : on
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gene r a l l y  accep tab le  grounds. For example, i f  I  d e s ire  a hideous 
p ic tu re  because o f th e  sen tim en ta l reason  th a t  i t  p o rtray s  my grandmother 
in  h e r  youth or i f  I d e s ire  Leonardo's Madonna of th e  G rotto  (which i s  I 
th in k  a f a i r  example o f a p a in tin g  which anyone would d e s ire  to  possess) 
th e re  i s  no p e rc e p tib le  d if fe re n c e  in  my way of d e s ir in g  the  one o r th e  
o th e r . As long as my d e s ire  i s  a liv e  and d ire c te d  w ith equal in te n s i ty  
tow ards both th e se  o b jec ts  they  both possess th e  same s o r t  o f va lue  fo r  
me. But, s in ce  value has been defined  as th e  c o r re la te  of d e s ire  and, 
s in ce  i t  i s  a f a c t  th a t  my grandm other's p ic tu re  i s  so re la te d  to  my 
d e s i r e ,  th e  f a c t  o f i t s  having value conferred  upon i t  by i t s  r e la t io n  to  
my d e s ire  i s  an o b jec tiv e  f a c t  which must be acknowledged o b je c tiv e ly . 
According to  th e  d e f in i t io n ,  my grandm other's p ic tu re  must be regarded as 
a value (by v i r tu e  o f i t s  being d esired  by me) by everybody, t h o u ^  i t  may 
h o t be d esired  by everybody. But then  i t  would n o t be d i f f e r e n t ly  
d e s ire d  by me i f  eveiybody e ls e  were to  d e s ire  i t  to o . The degree of 
va lue  conferred  upon an o b je c t by v ir tu e  o f i t s  r e la t io n  to  d e s ire  does 
no t vary  wilii th e  degree o f any o b je c tiv e  va luab leness i t  may^possess. 
There i s  no d iscoverab le  r a t i o  between th e  n a tu re  o f d e s ire  and th e  
s u b je c t iv i ty  or o b je c t iv i ty  o f th e  values to  which i t  corresponds. I f  
th e re  e x is t  any e s s e n t ia l  d iffe re n c e  o f g rad a tio n  on th e  h ie ra rc h ic a l  
sc a le  o f  v a lu es , t h i s  d if fe re n c e  does n o t correspond to  any d iffe re n c e  in  
th e  n a tu re  o f th e  d e s ire  to  which i t  i s  c o -re la te d , nor i s  i t  in  any way 
dependent on th e  inner n a tu re  o f th is  d e s ire .  I f  t h i s  d is t in c t io n  i s  
made a t  a l l  i t  i s  made in s id e  another system in  which values a re  
determ ined by o th e r d e f in i t io n s  -  ( fo r  example by th e i r  r e la t io n  to
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ap p ro v a l) , and then  t r a n s fe r re d  to  d e s ire .  But s in ce  i  i s  defined  to  
be p u re ly  form al, such a t r a n s f e r  i s  n o t p o ss ib le  in  t h i s  c o n tex t, and 
th e  d is t in c t io n  between o b je c tiv e  and su b je c tiv e  values w il l  be seen to  
have no s ig n if ic a n c e  o r meaning, indeed w i l l  no t be d e fin ab le  a t  a l l ,  in  
t h i s  domain.
H') I t  makes no d iffe re n c e  to  th e  n a tu re  of y i ,  th e  formal 
c o r r e la t io n  o f d e s ire  and v a lu e , i f  I  d e s ire  scmething as a m a tte r  o f 
f a c t ,  or i f  I  d e s ire  something in  p o te n t ia ,  i . e .  i f  I  a c tu a lly  d e s ire  
som ething or i f  I  o u ^ t  to  d e s ire  som ething. This can be proved by
showing th a t  in  re sp e c t o f va lues defined  fo rm ally  as th e  c o r re la t iv e s  of
d e s ir e ,  th e re  i s  no e s s e n t ia l  d iffe re n c e  between th e  d esired  and th e  
d e s ira b le  ( in  th e  sense o f what o u ^ t  to  be d e s ire d ) .
What do we mean by d e s ira b le ?  We may mean something which i s
d e s ired  in  a c e r ta in  way, o r something which i s  d e sired  fo r  c e r ta in  
reaso n s . We may even r e fe r  to  something which i s  n o t a c tu a l ly  d e sired  
a t  a l l  but o f whose valuab leness and goodness we know and have become 
convinced in  ano ther c o n tex t. For example, we may know about a c e r ta in  
th in g  t h a t  i t  i s  good no t by v i r tu e  o f i t s  being d e s ire d , but by v i r tu e  
of i t s  being approved. We know th a t  i t  i s  good because we have found i t  
to  be th e  c o r re la te  o f a judgment o f approval.
To i l l u s t r a t e  th is  p o in t l e t  us imagine a value ^ i c h  has been 
defined  as a va lue  so le ly  by i t s  c o r re la t io n  to  an a c t  o f approval. For 
example a c e r ta in  p iece  o f modem m usic. Now we approve o f t h i s  c e r ta in  
p iece  in so fa r  as i t  s a t i s f i e s  our c r i t e r i a ,  ru le s  and p r in c ip le s  o f what
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good music should be. But assume th a t  i t s  harmonies do n o t p le a se , and 
i t s  m elodies do no t seem to  s a t i s f y  any o f th e  d e s ire s  th a t  a re  u su a lly  
s a t i s f ie d  by l is te n in g  to  c la s s ic a l  m usic. For th e  sake o f th e  argument 
l e t  us a lso  assume th a t  t h i s  p a r t ic u la r  p iece  of music f a i l s  to  s a t i s f y  
any d e s ire  we may have fo r  se lf-im provem ent, or fo r  a d d itio n a l 
experiences , or fo r  se lf-pun ishm ent (some people f in d  a s tran g e  
s a t i s f a c t io n  in  l is te n in g  to  h o rr id  m usic, and seem to  pu t a c e r ta in  value 
on t h i s  self-im posed  to rm en t). In  s h o r t ,  we approve o f  th i s  music 
because i t  ' comes up to  standard* but we do no t a c tu a l ly  d e s ire  i t  fo r  
any reason  w hatsoever. This d e s ira b le  -  because good p iece  o f music -  
would then  no t be d esired  a t  a l l ,  and th e  case would seem to  be proven 
fo r  an e s s e n t ia l  and unbridgeab le  d if fe re n c e  between th e  d e s ira b le  eind 
th e  d e s ire d . But th e  very  f a c t  o f a judgment of approval i f  th e re  were 
no reasons a g a in s t i t  and no s tro n g e r d e s ire s  to  d i s t r a c t  u s , would tend  
to  move our d e s i re .  No judgment o f approval can be so pu re ly  r a t io n a l  
as to  forego a l l  p o ss ib le  e f f e c t  on w i l l .  * Good * does n o t s u f f ic e  unto 
i t s e l f  but s t r iv e s  to  became v a lid  fo r  u s ,  to  become a v a lu e . The very 
n o tio n  o f good being ipso  fa c to  d e s ira b le  seems to  p o in t to  t h i s .  For 
does n o t d e s ira b le  imply th a t  we ought to  d e s ire  i t  o r in  o th e r words 
t h a t  somebody d e s ire s  us to  d e s ire  i t ? The example o f th e  p iece  o f music 
was very  a b s t r a c t ,  but i f  considered  a g a in s t i t s  concrete  background i t  
would su re ly  be c le a r  th a t  a t  l e a s t  one person d esired  i t  very  much 
indeed and presumably found i t  h i ^ l y  s a t is f a c to r y  -  namely th e  person 
who composed i t .  The d iffe re n c e  between d e s ira b le  and d esired  in  th i s
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example seems n o t so much a d iffe re n c e  of k ind , as one o f degree, of 
d i s t r ib u t io n  o f g e n e ra li ty  -  in  sh o r t ,  a q u a n ti ta t iv e  d if fe re n c e .
I cannot a t  th i s  moment th in k  o f a s in g le  example of a th in g  which 
has been thought to  be d e s ira b le  w ithout having been a c tu a lly  d e s ired  a t  
l e a s t  by one p erson : th e  person who discovered  i t  to  be so . Thus a 
s o c ia l  reform er who propagates th e  id ea  o f ab so lu te  e q u a lity  fo r  in s ta n c e , 
d e s ire s  people to  d e s ire  ab so lu te  e q u a lity . He th in k s  they  ought to  
d e s ire  i t .  He r a is e s  a b so lu te  e q u a lity  to  th e  s ta tu s  of a d e s ira b le  
v a lu e . He h im se lf approves o f i t  and d e s ire s  i t  in  a c tu a l f a c t .  And 
a lthough  a l l  men or even th e  m a jo rity  o f men do n o t as y e t  a c tu a l ly  d e s ire  
i t ,  he does h is  b e s t to  make them d e s ire  i t .  In  t h i s  case too  th e  
d if fe re n c e  between th e  value d esired  and th e  value d e s ira b le  i s  no t one 
of essence but o f g e n e ra li ty  o f im plem entation, or v a l id i ty .  This 
g e n e ra li ty  o f im plem entation does n o t in d ic a te  th e  in n e r  n a tu re  o f a 
v a lu e , and fu rn ish e s  no gauge fo r  i t s  s ta tu s  in  th e  h ie ra rch y  o f v a lu e s . 
Many values o f supreme im portance, i t  i s  t r u e ,  have become v a lid  under 
s im ila r  circum stances (being  values f o r ,  i . e .  being d e s ire d , f i r s t  by one 
man and then  by a m ino rity  o f men). But some va lues o f in f e r io r  q u a li ty  
o r even neg ativ e  values l ik e  g ra tu ito u s  c ru e lty  or t o t a l i t a r i a n  S ta te -  
p o l i t i c s  show th e  same c h a r a c te r i s t ic  o f being a c tu a l ly  d esired  by only 
one man or a m in o rity  o f men who seek to  make i t  d e s ire d , or th in k  i t  
ought to  be d e s ire d , i . e .  th a t  i t  i s  d e s ira b le  fo r  th e  m a jo rity . The ; 
c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f being a va lue  in  p o te n t ia ,  a va lue  as y e t la rg e ly  more 
d e s ira b le  than d esired  ( in  i t s  q u a n ti ta t iv e  and d is t r ib u t iv e  im p lica tio n )
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i s  th e re fo re  n o t s u f f ic ie n t  to  determ ine by i t s e l f  th e  s ta tu s  o f th e  value 
concerned.
Another d i s t in c t io n  to  which d e s ira b le  and d esired  i s  u su a lly  taken  
to  r e f e r  (and t h i s  i s  th e  one most obvious to  th e  layman), i s  t h a t  
expressed by th e  Roman poet : video m elio ra  proboque d é té r io ra  sequor..
By 'm eliora* Ovid w ishes to  in d ic a te  th e  s o r t  of p r iv a te  and p o l i t i c a l  
l i f e  her f a th e r ,  th e  King, and C olchiz, her country , expected and d esired  
Medea to  lead  ( th e  d e s ir a b le ) .  By 'd é té r io ra *  Ovid re fe r s  to  th e  love 
o f Jason  so fe rv e n tly  d esired  and so r e le n t le s s ly  pursued by Medea as 
to  cause th e  n e g le c t of h e r f i l i a l  and p a t r i o t i c  d u t ie s .  Here th e  
o p p o sitio n  of d e s ira b le  and d esired  i s  made to  correspond to  th a t  between 
a f a in t e r  and a s tro n g e r d e s i r e ,  th e  f a in t e r  being coupled w ith th e  over­
r id in g  judgment o f  approval, th e  s tro n g e r w ith th e  overridden . Thus, 
f o r  in s ta n c e . Beauty i s  considered  of g re a te r  i n t r i n s i c  value than  food 
though th e  d e s ire  fo r  food under c e r ta in  circum stances (when we a re  
hungry) can become so acu te  as to  e c lip s e  com pletely any d e s ire  we might 
have cherished  fo r  Beauty. B reh ier ho lds th a t  in  general and a t  a l l  
tim es and by t h e i r  very  n a tu re  th e  h ig h er va lues a re  only m ild ly
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d e s ire d .^ ^  The p ro p o rtio n  between va lues as approved and values as 
desired  according to  B reh ier v a r ie s  in v e rs e ly . But t h i s  i s  n o t 
n e c e s s a r ily  so . We can m ention q u ite  a few values o f low s ta tu s  on the  
sc a le  o f approval which a re  n o t in  g en era l g re a tly  d e sired  ( l ik e  a low 
handicap a t  g o lf ,  which though in te n se ly  d esired  by some i s  only m ild ly  
d e s ired  by m ost). Again we must bear in  mind th a t  whatever th e  sc a le  
o f va lues accord ing  to  approval may be, we can tak e  no n o tic e  o f i t ,  and 
allow  i t s  in flu e n ce  in s id e  th e  domain defined  by j  th e  form al 
c o r r e la t io n  between d e s ire  and v a lu e , u n less  i t  were found to  fo llow  a 
d i s t i n c t  and w ell defined p a t te rn .  But we have seen th a t  th e  
d is t in c t io n  between d esired  and d e s ira b le  (both  taken  in  t h e i r  form al 
c o r re la t io n  to  va lue) fo llow s no such d i s t in c t  and w ell defined  p a t te r n .  
I t  has been found to  depend more on th e  in c id e n ta l  ( su b je c t to  no 
d iscoverab le  law )-degree of in te n s i ty  and g e n e ra li ty  o f d e s ire s  than  on 
any in h e re n t q u a li ty  o f th e  va lues towards which they  were d ire c te d .
Hence when i s  defined  as a form al c o r re la t io n  between d e s ire  and . 
va lue  (and a f o r t i o r i  idien in  j>2 d e s ire  i s  assumed to  be th e  m a te r ia l  and 
e f f e c t iv e  cause of value) th e  d is t in c t io n  o f values in  re sp e c t o f g re a te r  
and le s s e r  d e s i r a b i l i ty  has no meaning. S im ila rly  th e  d is t in c t io n  - 
between "what i s  desired" and "idiat should be desired" becomes meaning­
l e s s ,  s in ce  no fix ed  r a t io  o f v a r ia t io n  whether d i r e c t  o r in v e rs e , can be 
discovered to  ho ld  between d e s ire s  and t h e i r  corresponding o b je c ts .
Given as our basic  prem isses th e  e x is ten ce  o f d e s ir e s ,  t h e i r
l )  By th e  m a jo rity  th a t  i s .  There may always be a few people who d e s ire  
a su p e rio r value l ik e  t r u th  or ju s t ic e  o r th e  sa lv a tio n  o f t h e i r  
sou ls more than  food and warmth.
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q u a l i f ic a t io n s ,  and th e i r  corresponding o b jec ts  o f s a t i s f a c t io n ,  any 
norm to  be deduced from th ese  prem isses would have to  be based on the  
vary ing  degrees o f in te n s i ty  or g e n e ra li ty  in  d e s ire s .  Such a norm 
would a ssig n  degrees o f s u p e r io r i ty  and i n f e r i o r i t y  to  v a lu e s , according  
to  th e  degrees of in te n s i ty  and g e n e ra li ty  in  th e  corresponding d e s ire s .  
But such an a s s ig n a tio n  o f va lue  degrees would go counter to  th e  f a c ts  
of v a lu a tio n a l experience. I t  would a lso  vary  w ith circum stances to  
such an ex ten t th a t  no s a t i s f a c to r y  degree of constancy could be 
o b ta in ed . But a c e r ta in  degree of constancy, and were i t  only a f a i r l y  
co n s tan t form ula to  re g u la te  th e  flow of v a r ia t io n s ,  i s  a b so lu te ly  
necessa ry  i f  a p r in c ip le  fo r  th e  e v a lu a tio n  o f values i s  to  be 
e s ta b lis h e d . Since no such p r in c ip le  can be e s ta b lish e d  on th e  given 
p rem isses , no c le a r  formula fo r  th e  d is t in c t io n  and o rd erin g  o f va lues 
accord ing  to  s u p e r io r i ty  and in f e r i o r i t y  can be defined  in  th e  domain 
circum scribed by j   ^» Again, i f  no d is t in c t io n  can be made among values ; 
no o rder o f precedence proved; and no h ie ra rc h ic a l  s c a le  f ix e d , no 
conceivable p roo f can be adduced to  e s ta b l is h  th e  supreme s ta tu s  o f moral 
worth and i t s  ab so lu te  ascendancy over a l l  o th er values in  t h i s  co n tex t.
In  o ther words, th e  ju s t i f i c a t io n  fo r  th e  supremacy o f moral worth 
over a l l  o ther values cannot be v in d ica ted  w ith  th e  help o f an 
exam ination of a system o f v a lu e , in  which values a re  defined  by th e i r  
form al c o r r e la t io n J  % to  d e s ire .  \
Can th i s  primacy o f moral worth be ju s t i f i e d  i f  we assume th a t  th e  
r e la t io n  between w ill  and value i s  a causal r e la t io n  of th e  type P2?
In  j>2> i t  should be borne in  mind, d e s ire  i s  defined as th e  m a te r ia l
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e f f e c t iv e  cause of which va lue  i s  th e  r e s u l t .  We a re  fo r tu n a te  enough
to  possess an ou tstand ing  example of t h i s  approach, in  S. A lexander's
1)"Beauty and o th e r  forms of V alue". A sc ru tin y  of A lexander's views as 
pu t forward in  t h i s  book and in  re sp ec t o f th e  way he develops h is  basic  
assum ptions, and th e  conclusion  he draws fo r  h is  m oral th eo ry , should do 
much to  c la r i f y  th e  in e v ita b le  r e s u l ts  o f such an approach, as w ell as 
th e  unavoidable consequences i t  e n ta i l s  fo r  any th eo ry  of E th ic s . I t  ' 
may a lso  be o f help  in  p rov id ing  a p o ss ib le  answer to  our q u estio n .
According to  th e  b asic  assum ption o f ' Beauty and o th e r forms o f 
v a lu e ' value i s  th e  r e s u l t  o f 'n a tu ra l  e le c t io n '.  The prim ary cause, 
prim ary both tem porally  and lo g ic a l ly ,  i s  to  be found in  th e  'n a tu r a l ' 
d e s i r e s ,  needs and im pulses o f man (anim al or even m in e ra l, as th e  
n a tu ra l  p re d i le c t io n  o f one chemical fo r  ano ther, o f th e  magnet fo r  th e  
f i l i n g  seems to  show). Value i s ,  what s a t i s f i e s  th e se  n a tu ra l im pulses. 
Nothing which does no t s a t i s f y  an im pulse has v a lu e . Value has no being 
or meaning in  i t s e l f .  I t s  r e a l i t y  i s  c o n s titu te d  by a r e la t io n  to  d e s ire . 
This assumption i s  s e lf -e v id e n t  in  th e  case of th e  lower or animal v a lu e s . 
Thus hunger, and th e  v i t a l  need fo r  th e  replenishm ent o f th e  organism 
gives food i t s  v a lu e . Food, though i t  were p le a sa n t (b e a u tifu l  round 
a p p le s , fo r  in s ta n c e )  would have no value  and would no t s a t i s f y  our 
hunger were i t  n o t a lso  n u t r i t io u s .  But even i f  th e  h i ^ e r  va lues l ik e  
Beauty, Truth and Goodness a re  pronounced v a luab le  "we may fe e l  su re  in  
advance , . . th e re  i s  some sp e c ia l im pulse in  ou rse lves or some
1) London, 19) 5 .
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q u a li f ic a tio n s  of an im pulse in  ou rse lves which makes us do i t" ^ ^  I f  /
we wish to  analyse  th e  concepts o f th e se  h i ^ e r  va lues we must f i r s t
2 )make i t  our business " to  id e n t i fy  th e se  im pu lses". Since no va lue  has 
a being in  i t s e l f  independent o f  i t s  r e la t io n  to  im pulse, Beauty, to o , 
cannot be regarded as a q u a l i ty  o f th in g s  which we d iscover as we 
d isco v er th e  o th e r  q u a l i t ie s  o f th in g s , fo r  in s tan ce  th e  p lea san tn ess  o f 
a p p le s . (But only th is  p lea sa n tn e ss , no t t h e i r  n u t r i t io u s  v a lu e , can 
be discovered  in  t h i s  way.) "The c h a ra c te r  o f th e  B eau tifu l cannot be 
found in  an a n a ly s is  o f th e  b e a u tifu l  o b jec ts  but in  th a t  o f th e  
s a t i s f i e d  impulse"
B rie f ly  th en , Alexander s in g le s  out th e  th re e  im pulses o f 
c o n s tru c tio n , c u r io s i ty ,  and g regariousness which a re  shared by man and 
anim al (as a re  many o th er im pulses) fo r  sp e c ia l c o n s id e ra tio n . They 
a re  s in g led  ou t fo r  becoming fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e purposefu l in  man where 
they  had been b lin d  in  th e  animal : a b ird  bu ild s  i t s  n e s t because i t  i s
prompted by an obscure c o n s tru c tiv e  im pulse to  do so , but man b u ild s  h is  
c h a ir  fo r  th e  purpose of s i t t i n g  down on i t .  Secondly they  may become , 
d is in te re s te d  in  th e  im nediate p r a c t ic a l  use  to  which they  have been p u t, 
as when a man making a c h a ir  d isreg a rd s  th e  p r a c t ic a l  d e s t in a tio n  o f th is  
c h a ir ,  and becomes in te re s te d  in  th e  making o f i t  f o r  i t s  own sake.
Some im pulses then  from being b lin d  may become f i r s t  p u rp o se fu l, then  
d is in te re s te d  and con tem pla tive. What s a t i s f i e s  them in  t h e i r  l a t e s t
1) Page 14, B and o th er forms of V.
2) Page 14, idem.
5) Page ) 5 , idem.
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form does no longer simply s a t i s f y  but s a t i s f i e s  in  a c e r ta in  manner; in  
a d is in te r e s te d ,  o b je c tiv e , and contem plative manner. What s a t i s f i e s  
our im pulses in  th e  manner so described  a re  termed h i ^ e r  v a lu e s . Thus 
th e  c o rre la te d  s tag es of s a t i s f a c t io n  fo r  th e  c o n s tru c tiv e  im pulse a re  
c o n s tru c tio n , c ra ftsm ansh ip , a r t .  For th e  in q u is i t iv e  impulse they  
a re  experience, u se fu l experience, sc ie n c e ; and fo r  th e  g regarious impulse 
th ey  a re  companionship, o rgan ised  s o c ie t ie s ,  v i r tu e .  But every impulse 
has to  c re a te  i t s  s a t i s f a c t io n  from given m a te r ia ls .  J u s t  as s to n e , 
c o lo u rs , words, no tes  o f music a re  th e  m a te r ia l of Beauty, and sense da ta  
th e  m a te r ia l o f T ru th , so th e  n a tu ra l im pulses a re  th e  m a te ria l o f V irtu e . 
In, m o ra lity  we a re  concerned w ith  th e  p assions o f man, w ith  t h e i r  d e s ire s  
f o r  m a te ria l and im m aterial o b jec ts  and th e  f i t t i n g  s a t i s f a c t io n  o f th e se  
p a ss io n s . I t  i s  n o t th e  good th in g s  we m ight g e t, no t ex te rn a l n a tu re  
as mere fo re ig n  m a te r ia l ,  we a re  concerned w ith  but th e  good d ire c tio n s  
o f our w i l l ,  th e  n a tu re  o f man. V irtue  i s  no t so much an adjustm ent to  
our n a tu ra l  surroundings as an adjustm ent to  one ano ther in  th e  face  of 
th e se  surroundings. Goodness i s  what e f f e c ts  harmony between in d iv id u a l 
w i l l s ,  and i s  no th ing  e lse  but i t s e l f  a n a tu ra l im pulse, th e  g regarious 
im pulse, bee one d is in te r e s te d ,  o b je c tiv e  and contem plative. The ought 
o f m orals i s  a new s o r t  o f r e a l i t y  fash ioned  c re a t iv e ly  out of n a tu ra l  
im pulses by th e  in tro d u c tio n  amongst them o f ano ther n a tu ra l im pulse 
which re g u la te s , dom inates, and harm onises them, ju s t  as Beauty i s  a new 
r e a l i t y  made by th e  in tro d u c tio n  in to  th e  m a te ria l o f a r t  o f th e  c re a tiv e  
im pulse which blends mind w ith m a te r ia l ,  in fu se s  i t  w ith l i f e  and 
transfo rm s i t .  M o ra lity , in  sh o r t , i s  t h a t  system of w ills  which
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s a t i s f i e s  and s a t i s f i e s  o b je c tiv e ly  th e  impulse of m o ra lity . In  th i s  
re sp e c t o b lig a tio n  may be sa id  to  be th e  r e la t io n  o f any s in g le  e lanen t 
to  th e  whole system . We ought to  be v ir tu o u s  because each s in g le  a c t 
of v i r tu e  i s  needed to  m ain ta in  th e  system of s o c ia l ly  ad ju sted  w i l ls .
S ince th e se  values have been taken to  s a t i s f y  d is in te r e s te d ly  th e  
n a tu ra l  impulse tu rned  con tem pla tive , t h i s  very d is in te re s te d n e s s ,  i t  i s  
a rgued , i s  a w arrant fo r  i t s  o b je c t iv i ty .  S t i l l ,  one might argue , i f  X 
th in k s  a p ic tu re  b e a u tifu l th o u ^  i t  be in  f a c t  h ideous, th e  very  f a c t  o f 
h is  being d is in te re s te d  in  th e  m a tte r  (he n e ith e r  wishes to  buy no r to  
s e l l  i t )  does no t ensure th e  o b je c t iv i ty  of th e  b e a u tifu l  c h a ra c te r  o f 
th e  p ic tu re .  To circumvent t h i s  argument Alexander hastens to  d e fin e
th e  o b je c tiv e ly  v a lu a b le , as th a t  which n o t only d is in te r e s te d ly  s a t i s f i e s
an im pulse, bu t a lso  s a t i s f i e s  a standard  im pulse. The standard  he 
ho lds i s  determ ined in  A e s th e tic s  by a "tyranny o f th e  q u a lif ie d "  
m in o rity ; in  Science by "a conspiracy  o f s c i e n t i s t s " ;  and in  M orals by ' 
" th e  ty ranny  o f th e  many who want to  be good over th e  m inority  which 
d e s ire s  courses o f a c tio n  th a t  cannot be ad justed  to  th e  so c ia l id io le" .
As long as a man " f i t s "  in to  h is  so c ie ty  he i s  v ir tu o u s , and th e re
can be no d iffe re n c e  between a man v ir tu o u s  as a savage among savages,
or as a C h ris tia n  among C h r is t ia n s . Changes in  th e  code o f m orals o f a 
so c ie ty  are  only ju s t i f i e d  when th e  sympathy of th e  m a jo rity  has been 
won fo r  whatever s a t i s f i e s  th e  impulse of th e  reform er. And always one 
w ill  have to  e n te r ta in  a j u s t i f i a b le  p re ju d ic e  in  favour of what i s  
a lread y  accepted . There i s  no r i ^ t  and no p r iv ile g e , no t even th a t  to  
l i f e  and l ib e r ty ,  un less i t  has been recognised in  a so c ie ty  by th e
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adjustm ent of th e  m ajo rity  o f w i l l s .  But though th e re  a re  no degrees 
in  v irtu o u sn ess  (accord ing  to  t h i s  theo ry  I am ju s t  as v irtu o u s  i f  I 
th in k  th a t  a m urderer should be hanged in  a so c ie ty  in  which c a p i ta l  
punishment i s  accep ted , as when I  th in k  i t  a crime in  a so c ie ty  which 
does n o t admit o f c a p i ta l  punishm ent), Alexander claim s th a t  th e  sca le  
o f v i r tu e  may d i f f e r ,  thus safeguard ing  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f p ro g re ss . 
W ithin v irtu o u s  a c tio n  i t s e l f  th e re  may be a v a r ia t io n  in  re sp e c t of i t s  
g rea tn ess  o r sm allness ju s t  as th e re  m ight be such a v a r ia t io n  in  Beauty: 
th e  Beauty o f a Tanagra f ig u r in e  fo r  example i s  ju s t  as p e rfe c t  as th a t  
of th e  Moses of M ichelangelo, but i t s  g re a tn e ss , s ig n if ic a n c e , im port 
v a r ie s  in  d i r e c t  p ro p o rtio n  to  th e  g rea tn ess  o f i t s  su b je c t-m a tte r .
So too th e  sc a le  of th e  v ir tu o u s  a c tio n  may vary . The a c tio n  invo lv ing  
more men, more v a lu e s , more and w e i ^ t i e r  d ec is io n s must be acknowledged 
su p e r io r . "The widow's m ite  i s  ju s t  as generous as th e  m i l l io n a i r e 's  
endowment o f a h o s p i ta l ,  i t  may even have more m erit bu t i t  i s  n o t so 
la rg e  nor so m ag n ificen t" .^^  Hence, in  a way, th e  h i s to r ic a l  g rea tness 
of an a c tio n  becomes th e  measure o f i t s  moral v a lu e , and th e  h i s to r ic a l  
p rog ress o f th e  world becomes in  a c e r ta in  sense id e n t i f ie d  w ith i t s  
moral p ro g ress . But Alexander i s  n a tu ra l ly  r e lu c ta n t  to  accep t t h i s  
in e v ita b le  and s tr in g e n tly  reasoned outcome o f h is  basic  assum ptions.
For in  s p i te  of being s t r in g e n t ly  reasoned in  i t s e l f ,  i t  stands in  
b la ta n t  c o n tra d ic tio n  to  th e  f a c ts  o f moral experience. Alexander 
th e re fo re  t r i e s  h is  b e s t to  q u a lify  th e  s ta rk  r e s u l t .  He adm its t h a t  a
1) Page 142.
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g re a t d i f f i c u l ty  and a s tro n g  argument a g a in s t h im self stems from th e  
e x is te n t  e s s e n t ia l  d iffe re n c e  between h i s to r ic a l  g rea tn ess  and moral 
v a lu e . Even th e  example brought and chosen by h im se lf  o f th e  widow's 
m ite  does more to  weaken h is  argument than  to  s tren g th en  i t .  For th e  
widow's m ite  possesses a moral grandeur and m agnificence which th e  
m i l l io n a i r e 's  h o s p i ta l ,  and a l l  th e  h o s p ita ls  endowed by a l l  th e  
m il l io n a ire s  in  th e  w orld ,«can never hope to  r i v a l .  For t h e i r  magni­
f ic e n c e  i s  n o t moral but p h y s ic a l and th e  two cannot be compared. 
Alexander a lso  adm its th e  d i f f i c u l ty  in h e re n t in  d e fin in g  "m ora lity  as a 
mannnade c re a tio n  of th e  s o c ia l  im pulse". The so c ia l  impulse by i t s e l f  
can never be a s u f f ic ie n t  w arran t fo r  th e  assum ption th a t  th e  " d ire c tio n  
of i t s  evolu tion" w il l  indeed l i e  in  t h a t  o f th e  "w o rld 's  (m oral) 
advance". To secure  t h i s  u ltim a te  convergence of th e  two d ire c tio n s  
of development Alexander i s  fo rced  to  re c u r  to  r e l ig io u s  f a i t h  in  th e  
e x is te n ce  and th e  providence o f God. He concludes by c i t in g  H 8 ffd in g 's  : 
"R elig ion  i s  th e  F a ith  we have in  th e  conservation  o f V alues". Thus
and th u s  only can Alexander a ssu re  us t h a t  th e  man-made values o f th e
so c ia l  impulse a re  r e a l  va lues indeed.
S everal p o in ts  must be ra is e d  a g a in s t A lexander's theory  :
a) This th eo ry  uses concepts l ik e  x_) su p e rio r v a lu e s , a rb i te r s  
o f va lue , and p ro g re s s , nAiich a re  n o t defined  in s id e  th a t  
system , and can only be defined  by d is ru p tin g  th e  system.
B) The su p e r io r i ty  o f th e  so c ia l  im pulse over o th e r impulses 
cannot be defined  in s id e  t h i s  system in  a way t h a t  would 
include  th e  n o tio n  of moral m erit in  i t s  d e f in i t io n .
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A o() In  A lexander's system im pulses a re  n a tu ra l and what s a t i s f i e s  them 
a re  v a lu e s . There i s  no way of s in g lin g  out the  su p e rio r va lues un less  
one r e l i e s  on th e  n a tu re  o f th e  im pulses them selves. These one can do 
in  two d if f e r e n t  ways : a) by d is tin g u ish in g  th e  b lin d , purposive ,
d is in te re s te d  and contem plative stages o f an im pulse. b) by v i r tu e  of 
d if fe re n c e s  o f in te n s i ty  and /o r g e n e ra li ty  o f im pulses : quod semper,
quod ub ique, quod ab omnibus.
a) Alexander has s in g led  out th e  im pulses o f c o n s tru c tio n  o f c u r io s i ty  
and o f g regariousness fo r  c o n s id e ra tio n . They c re a te  th e  "su p e rio r 
va lues" o f Beauty, Truth and V irtu e , as they  g rad u a lly  pass from a b lin d  
in to  a purposive , from a purposive to  a d is in te r e s te d ,  and f i n a l ly  in to  a 
contem plative s t a t e .  But why s in g le  out th e se  im pulses? The im pulse 
t h a t  i s  s a t i s f ie d  by food can a lso  become d is in te r e s te d  and con tem pla tive . 
Yet Alexander does no t regard  Gastronomy as q u ite  so su p e rio r a va lue  as 
Beauty. As a m a tte r  o f f a c t  most n a tu ra l  im pulses can pass through 
those  stages u n t i l  they  become contem plative. Yet Alexander adm its only
th re e  su p e rio r v a lu e s . We must th e re fo re  conclude th a t  th e  form which✓
an im pulse assumes ( i . e .  fo r  in s tan c e  th e  contem plative form) i s  no t a 
s u f f ic ie n t  cond ition  fo r  e s ta b lis h in g  and a ssu rin g  th e  correspondingly  
s a t is fy in g  value of a su p e rio r  s ta tu s .
b) I f  th e  n a tu ra l im pulses which a re  s tro n g e s t , most general and most 
p e rsev e rin g  were always s a t i s f ie d  by su p e rio r  values ; i f  th o se  le s s  
in te n s e , le s s  general and le s s  o ften  met w ith  were always s a t i s f i e d  by ' 
i n f e r io r  v a lu es , a s ta b le  and w e ll-d e fin ed  r e la t io n  could be sa id  to  
e x is t  between th e  n a tu re  of th e  impulse and th e  va lue  by which i t  i s
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s a t i s f i e d .  In  t h i s  sense i t  would have been p o ss ib le  to  define  th e
concept of " su p e rio r  values" in s id e  A lexander's  system . But as a m atter
of f a c t  Alexander does no t so d e fin e  th e  su p e r io r i ty  of v a lu e s . He 
considers  Beauty though i t  be s a t is f a c to r y  only to  few, or Truth which i s  
s a t is f a c to ry  only to  th e  s c i e n t i s t  as v a s t ly  su p e rio r to  th e  value  o f food 
which i s  in te n s e ly  s a t is f a c to r y  to  a l l .  Nor would i t  be q u ite  accu ra te
to  in f e r  th a t  s u p e r io r i ty  o f  value can be defined  in  in v e rse  p ro p o rtio n
\
to  th e  s tre n g th  and th e  u b iq u ity  o f th e  im pulse i t  s a t i s f i e s .  Undoubtedly 
th e  h ig h er va lues a re  u su a lly  le s s  a rd e n tly  d e sired  than  th e  lower ones. 
Food i s  d es ired  even in  i t s  absence w ith g re a t in te n s ity ',  v d iils t Beauty to
be s a t is fy in g  must fin d  us in  a re c e p tiv e  frame o f mind : th e  Beauty of a
Beethoven q u a r te t  w ill  h a rd ly  be s a t is fy in g  when one i s  hungry. Never­
th e le s s  were ju s t ic e  fo r  in s ta n c e  d esired  by a l l  men, a l l  o f th e  tim e most 
in te n s e ly , w h ils t t i t l e s  and o th er honours were but f a i n t ly  d esired  by a 
few, Alexander would s t i l l  ho ld  ju s t ic e  to  be th e  su p e rio r  v a lu e .
In  sh o rt th e  s u p e r io r i ty  and i n f e r i o r i t y  o f va lues cannot be defined 
in s id e  A lexander's  system. The concepts o f s u p e r io r i ty  and i n f e r i o r i t y  
used by Alexander a re  a l ie n  to  h is  system and no t to  be deduced from h is  
basic  p rem isses. They a re  based on wholly d if f e r e n t  assum ptions, on 
assum ptions which c o n tra d ic t th e  very b a s is  o f A lexander's th eo ry . To 
sum up : In  a d d itio n  to  h is  b a s ic  assum ption : ( th a t  values a re  only th e
r e s u l ts  of n a tu ra l  im pulses) and in  c o n tra d ic tio n  to  h is  d e f in i t io n  
(values have no being in  them selves besides th e  r e a l i t y  o f t h e i r  r e la t io n  
to  im pulse) A lexander has assumed, probably  in  unconscious accordance w ith 
th e  evidence o f everyday v a lu a tio n a l experience, th a t  th e re  e x is t  some
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values which a re  su p e rio r in  them selves, w ithout any re fe ren ce  to  th e i r  
r e la t io n  to  im pulse. Thesp a re ,  p r im a r ily , th e  va lues o f T ru th , Beauty, 
and M o ra lity .
Only in  t h i s  way can we understand  how Alexander came to  s in g le  out 
th e  im pulses o f c o n s tru c tio n , c u r io s i ty  and g regariousness fo r  specia l- 
t re a tm e n t.
/
A 0 The no tio n  o f an " a r b i te r  o f value" i s  not homogeneous to  A lexander's  
system . No p r in c ip le  o f ev a lu a tio n  i s  defined  in  th a t  system , which 
would help  us to  d isc rim in a te  th e  q u a l i t ie s  of s e v e ra lly  d ire c te d  d e s ire s ,  
u n le ss  i t  be th e  q u a li ty  o f  th e  o b jec ts  a t  vdiich th e  d e s ire s  a re  d ire c te d . 
(This p o s s ib i l i ty  i s  precluded by A lexander's  assum ption th a t  va lue  has 
no being in  i t s e l f . )  Thus i f  I  d e s ire  an ug ly  p ic tu re  as s a t is f a c to ry  
to  my need o f Beauty, my d e s ire  i s  in  no way d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  of a 
man who d e s ire s  a b e a u tifu l p ic tu re .  D esire  cannot draw i t s  q u a l i f ic a t io n  
and ju s t i f i c a t io n  frcmi th e  th in g  th a t  s a t i s f i e s  s in c e , by d e f in i t io n ,  
d e s ire  determ ines what s a t i s f i e s  i t ,  and c a l l s  t h i s  s a t is f a c to ry  th in g  
in to  being , but i s  not in  tu rn  determ ined or c a lle d  in to  being by i t .
What i s  and what i s  no t b e a u tifu l  can th e re fo re ,  in  s tr in g e n t  
consequence frcxn th e  p rem isses , only be determ ined by th e  consensus o f a 
m a jo r ity  o f d e s ir e s .  But t h i s  again  would c o n tra d ic t  th e  f a c ts  of every­
day v a lu a tio n a l experience. T herefore Alexander i s  forced  to  assume 
th a t  what i s  and what i s  n o t b e a u t ifu l ,  i s  decided by a m ino rity  o f people 
who s e t t in g  them selves up as q u a lif ie d  though se lf-ap p o in ted  judges 
ty ra n n ise  th e  r e s t  in to  subm ission and acceptance.
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N o w ,  as a m atte r of h i s to r ic a l  f a c t ,  such con tingencies have o ften  
a r is e n  in  th e  h is to ry  o f a r t .  The im p re ss io n is ts , th e  e x p re s s io n is ts ,  
th e  "fauves" , th e  f u tu r i s t s  and th e  s u r r e a l i s t s  have c e r ta in ly  conquered 
t h e i r  p u b lic  in  t h i s  way. But th en , i t  was a lso  in  th i s  way th a t  in  
H i t le r  Germany th e  most h id eo u s-n eo -c la ssic ism  conquered i t s  p u b lic , and 
h a lf  a century  e a r l i e r  th e  p re - ra p h a e l i te s  conquered England. Now, 
though i t  be a m a tte r  fo r  d iscu ss io n  whether su rrea lism  or p re - ra p h a e lit ism , 
n eo -c lass ic ism  or p la in  academicism be th e  more o ffen s iv e  manner o f 
p a in tin g , th e  very  f a c t  th a t  such a d iscu ss io n  i s  p o ss ib le  seems to  prove 
th a t  we have an o u ts id e  p r in c ip le  o f e v a lu a tio n , w ith  which we measure 
th e  a r b i t r a t io n s  o f those  who c a l l  them selves q u a l i f ie d .  In  o th e r words 
th e  v e rd ic t  of th e  a rb i te r s  o f beauty does n o t re p re se n t a p r in c ip le  o f 
e v a lu a tio n . I t  does no t c o n s t i tu te  a norm o f beau ty , but i t s e l f  i s  
su b je c t to  such a norm, i t s e l f  i s  judged by a p r in c ip le  o f e v a lu a tio n , in  
no way derived  from, and independent o f , d e s ire . The g e n e ra l i ty , th e  
p e n e tra t io n , th e  fe rvou r w ith  which a form of beauty i s  accepted 
h i s t o r i c a l l y  i s  but a c c id e n ta l to  i t s  in n e r  s ta tu s .  The same holds fo r  
m o ra lity . Even i f  th e  whole world accepted  s la v e ry  as th e  norm o f 
v ir tu o u s  l i f e ,  even i f  " th e  m a jo rity  o f good-w illed men" ( i . e .  so c ia l  
" f i t s "  in  A lexander) a ccep ted 'say  c a p i ta l  punishment fo r  th e f t  as th e  
r ig h t f u l  law of th e  land (as happened in  England u n t i l  th e  beginning o f 
th e  19th c e n tu ry ) , we could s t i l l  ask w hether th is  was m orally  r ig h t .
Our questio n  would have a meaning and s ig n if ic a n c e  in  th e  e th ic a l  domain 
fo r  which A lexander's  theo ry  does no t o f fe r  any ex p lan a tio n . A lexander's 
th eo ry  th e re fo re  we must conclude does n o t account fo r  a l l  th e  f a c ts  of
—75—
our everyday e v a lu a tio n a l experience.
A A g a i n  th e  word "progress" has no defined  meaning in s id e  A lexander's 
system . The assum ption o f b a sic  n a tu ra l impulses and th e i r  
q u a li f ic a tio n s  only w arran ts th a t  changing circum stances w ill  a f f e c t  th e  
im pulses in  vary ing  ways, so th a t  d i f f e r e n t  th in g s  w il l  s a t i s f y  them a t  
d i f f e r e n t  pe riods in  h is to r y .  There i s  no assurance th a t  t h i s  change 
w il l  be fo r  th e  b e t te r  sim ply because i t  i s  l a t e r  in  tim e. Indeed th e  
concept o f 'b e t t e r '  i t s e l f  has no meaning in  th i s  con tex t since  we 
possess no p r in c ip le  ty  means o f vdiich we might a sse ss  what i s  b e t te r  and 
what i s  worse. Moreover, any change must f i r s t  overcome th e  j u s t i f i e d  
re s is ta n c e  o f a so c ie ty  which has a lread y  found a c e r ta in  equ ilib rium  in  
th e  adjustm ents o f th e  in d iv id u a l w il ls  to  each o th e r , and were i t  only 
th e  Hobbesian equ ilib rium  o f one man, o r body o f men, having a b so lu te  
power over a l l  o th e r men. This equ ilib rium  can be overturned (and i t s  
overtu rn  can in  i t s  tim e win th e  acquiescence of th e  la rg e r  number and 
e s ta b l is h  a new equ ilib rium  on a d i f f e r e n t  le v e l)  only by a f e a t  o f fo rce  
-  s p i r i tu a l  o r co rpo ra l -  by a f e a t  o f h i s to r ic a l  g re a tn e ss , be th e  
executor a s in g le  man or a body of men. But then  " h is to r ic a l  g rea tn ess  
i s  no t always id e n t ic a l  w ith moral su p e r io r ity "  as Alexander adm its.
A f a i t h  in  God's providence watching over human d e s t in ie s  i s  needed to  
a ssu re  us th a t  h i s to r ic a l  change i s  indeed eq u iv a len t to  'p r o g r e s s '.
But in  o rder to  be t ru e  to  A lexander's  th eo ry , t h i s  ' f a i t h '  too  
must be regarded simply as th e  s a t i s f a c t io n  o f our impulse fo r  s e c u r i ty . 
I t  w i l l  be a su b je c t to  th e  same o b jec tio n s  as any o th e r value which has
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no being  in  i t s e l f  and i s  but th e  r e s u l t  o f an im pulse. I t  w il l  th e re ­
fo re  be no s u f f ic ie n t  safeguard  fo r  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o r ex is ten ce  o f 
"p ro g ress" . "Progress" ( in  th e  sense o f moral p rog ress n o t in  th a t  of . 
tem poral change) i s  a concept th a t  d e f ie s  both d e f in i t io n  and 
ju s t i f i c a t io n  in s id e  o f A lexander's  th eo ry . Any use  Alexander makes of 
i t  i s  th e re fo re  unwarranted and amounts to  a d is ru p tio n  o f h is  system .
B) Much in  th e  same way i t  can be shown th a t  th e  s u p e r io r i ty  o f th e  
s o c ia l  impulse over a l l  o th e r  im pulses cannot be ju s t i f i e d  in s id e  
A lexander's  system . The so c ia l  impulse may dominate o ther im pulses as 
a m a tte r  of f a c t ,  by sheer a c tu a l s u p e r io r i ty  o f s tre n g th . But i t  has 
been shown above (A(b) th a t  s u p e r io r i ty  of s tre n g th  in  th e  im pulse does 
n o t imply fo r  Alexander s u p e r io r i ty  o f value in  th e  th in g  th a t  s a t i s f i e s  
i t .  T herefore th e  s u p e r io r i ty  o f th e  so c ia l  im pulse cannot be v in d ica ted  
on th e  ground o f i t s  s tre n g th .
On the  o th e r  hand, though th e  s o c ia l  impulse may n o t a c tu a l ly  dominate 
a l l  o th e r  im pulses, we may d e s ire  i t  to  do so . That means th a t  th e re  
e x is ts  an impulse which w il l  be s a t i s f ie d  by th e  s u p e r io r i ty  o f th e  so c ia l 
im pulse over o th e r  im pulses. In  o th e r words an im pulse fo r  so c ie ty  as 
such. This i s  th e  so c ia l im pulse. But then we must take th e  s o c ia l  
im pulse to  be s a t i s f ie d  by th e  s u p e r io r i ty  o f i t s e l f .  In o th e r words 
th e  so le  reason why we a tta c h  im portance to  so c ie ty  i s  so c ie ty . T hou^ 
in  a very com plicated way t h i s  may be a q u ite  accu ra te  d e sc r ip tio n  of th e  
manner in  which each one o f us i s  p sy ch o lo g ica lly  determ ined in  our 
a t t i tu d e  to  so c ie ty  i t  cannot ju s t i f y  th e  a t t r ib u t io n  o f moral value to  
any one f a c to r  in  t h i s  p rocess (as A lexander does). The moral value of
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th e  so c ia l  impulse s t i l l  s tands to  q u e s tio n . I t  cannot be proven or 
ju s t i f i e d  in s id e  A lexander's th eo ry , and th e re fo re  th e  s u p e r io r i ty  o f 
th e  so c ia l  im pulse cannot be shown to  be a moral p o s tu la te  ( in  co n tra ­
d i s t in c t io n  from so c ia l  p o s tu la te ) .  S t r i c t l y  speaking th e  q u estio n  of 
th e  moral value of th e  s o c ia l impulse can n e ith e r  be ra is e d  nor answered 
in s id e  A lexander's  system. A f o r t i o r i ,  th e  s u p e r io r i ty  o f th e  so c ia l  
im pulse in  th is  sense cannot be d iscussed  in  terms o f th i s  system .
To sum up : an approach which d e fin es  th e  r e la t io n  between value
and d e s i r e ^2> i .e *  assumes d e s ire  to  be th e  m a te r ia l e f fe c t iv e  cause as 
w ell as th e  only de te rm ina to r o f value cannot y ie ld  any p r in c ip le  by 
which values them selves may be eva lua ted . A ll i t  y ie ld s  i s  an 
enum eration o f th e  d if f e r e n t  im pulses to g e th e r  w ith an enumeration of 
th e  th in g s  th a t  s a t i s f y  them. In  t h i s  con tex t push -p in  i s  as good as 
p o e try  and an apple as good as courage or fame. T h is , though a p o ss ib ly  
t r u th f u l  d e sc r ip tio n  of an a c tu a l s t a te  o f a f f a i r s  viewed from a c e r ta in  
an g le , does no t so lve  our q u estio n . For i f  we ask : Can an a n a ly s is  o f
^2 in  a l l  i t s  im p lica tio n s  y ie ld  a v in d ic a tio n  of th e  claim  pu t forward by 
moral worth to  s u p e r io r i ty  over a l l  o th e r values? -  th e  answer i s  p la in ly  : 
no. In  o th e r words, an a n a ly s is  and exam ination of theo ry  o f va lue  based 
on ^2 ^8 i t s  prim ary assum ption, w ill  f a i l  to  account fo r  the  f a c ts  o f 
everyday moral experience.
^) Let us examine the  th i r d  p o ss ib le  r e la t io n  between value and d e s ire  
In  values a re  defined  as th e  e f f e c t iv e  cause o f d e s ire . Values
a re  assumed to  possess a being in  them selves and fo r  th an se lv es , an inner 
n a tu re  preceding  and independent of t h e i r  subsequent causal r e la t io n  to
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d e s ire .  The i n t r i n s i c  n a tu re  o f th e  value i s  th e  e f fe c t iv e  cause of 
d e s ire  and th e  determ inant f a c to r  o f th e  q u a li ty  o f th e  d e s ire  i t  has 
caused. I t  i s  a lso  th e  ground o f th e  d e s i r a b i l i ty  o f  th e  v a lu e . I f  
we a b s t r a c t  fo r  th e  moment from th e  r e la t io n  to  d e s ir e ,  and examine th e  
va lues fo r  them selves, we f in d  th a t  th e re  a re  fo u r d i f f e r e n t  ways in  
which values can be re la te d  to  each o th e r .
1 ) Values can be s e p a ra te , each contained in  i t s e l f ,  
d isconnected  and incommensurable.
2 ) Values can be each contained  in  i t s e l f ,  incommensurable, 
but connected in to  ordered systems which tak e  t h e i r  u n i ty  
but n o t t h e i r  value from th e  u n ity  o f human consciousness.
5 ) Values can be connected w ith each o th e r in  a system o f 
ends and means and con ta in ing  th e  sca le  o f  t h e i r  value in  
th e  very  d e te m in a tio n s  of t h e i r  in n e r n a tu re  f ix e d , as i t  
were, immutably, by God.
4 ) Values could be d isconnected  and sep a ra te  bu t commensurable 
according  to  a c e r ta in  sc a le  determ ined by an in tu i t io n  
superimposed on th e  prim ary in tu i t io n  in  which th e  in n e r  
n a tu re  o f  values i s  recogn ised ,
l )  In  th e  f i r s t  case , th e  case propounded by Hartmann and S c h e le r, 
we have a system o f ab so lu te  v a lu e s , each value claim ing th e  complete 
a lle g ia n c e  of our w i l l .  The s in g le  va lues a l te rn a te ly  appear and 
d isappear from our s p i r i tu a l  horizon  as we become conscious o f , and pay 
obeisance to ,  now th e  one, now th e  o th e r . I t  i s  im possib le fo r  us to  pay 
obeisance to  a l l  of them a t  once, fo r  t h e i r  im perious demands a re  heavy.
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and sometimes c o n tra d ic t  and c la sh  w ith each o th e r . S ing le  values 
re v e a l t h e i r  fo rc e  and v a l id i ty  a t  one tim e , in  one period  o f h is to ry ,  
only to  d isappear and be fo rg o tte n  in  an o th e r.
They u su a lly  rev ea l them selves through th e  agency of a refo rm er, a 
p ro p h e t, a M essiah. T heir claim s on our a lle g ia n c e  a re  pu t forward w ith 
a c e r ta in  high-handed v io le n ce . T heir appearances a t  c e r ta in  s tag es  
o f h is to ry  have an a i r  o f a rb i t r a r in e s s  and be tray  a dependence on th e  
a cc id e n ta l circum stances o f  h is to ry .  This dependence however does n o t 
d e tr a c t  from th e  i n t r i n s i c  ab so lu te  essence o f th e  v a lu e . This 
i n t r i n s i c  essence remains fo r  ever in ta c t  and in v io la te .  Whether moral 
worth o verrides o th e r va lues in  th i s  c o n te x t, w il l  th e re fo re  be e n t i r e ly  
dependent on a c c id e n ta l h i s t o r i c a l  c ircum stances. Considered in  and by 
i t s e l f  moral worth possesses no reason , ground or ju s t i f i c a t io n  fo r  
assuming supremacy over o th e r v a lu es .
2) In  th e  second case values a re  considered  to  be ab so lu te  in  them­
s e lv e s , incommensurable w ith each o th e r , y e t connected eind ordered in to
c e r ta in  u n if ie d  systems by v ir tu e  o f th e  u n ity  of consciousness of human
be ings . Such systems of va lues a re  examples of what Lamont c a l l s  th e  
" to ta l  good"^) and what many o th e rs , in c lu d in g  Green and B radley, c a lle d  
s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n .  S e l f - r e a l i s a t io n ,  th e  u n if ie d  o rder o f many v a lu e s , 
claim s th e  a lle g ia n c e  o f our w i l l s .  S ince th e re  a re  many human beings, 
and many p o s s ib i l i t i e s  o f d i f f e r e n t  combinations of v a lu e s , th e re  a re  
many d if f e r e n t  u n i t ie s  o f " s e l f - r e a l i s a t io n " .  S t i l l  th e  fonna tion  o f
l )  In  P r in c ip le s  o f Moral Judgment, page 121.
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such a u n ity  i s  su b je c t to  c e r ta in  ru le s  and p r in c ip le s .  Thus the
va lues included must be com patible and capable of a c e r ta in  harmonious
in te r lo c k in g . The system must show a c e r ta in  coherence and r e s i l ie n c e ,
and should be as v a rie g a ted  as p o ss ib le . Since i t  cannot in c lu d e  a l l
va lues (human beings a re  f i n i t e ,  th e re fo re  t h e i r  s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n  i s
f i n i t e )  i t  must s t r iv e  to  embrace th e  g re a te s t  p o ss ib le  number o f v a lu es .
Now as values a re  ab so lu te  and incommensurable, in  them selves, th e
a b so lu te  value o f each u n ity  (as  long as i t  conforms to  th e  standards
m entioned) i s  n o t comparable to  t h a t  o f  any o th er u n i ty .  I t  can be
n e i th e r  su p e rio r nor in f e r io r  to  ano ther u n ity  but only more o r le s s
p e r fe c t  in  i t s e l f .  The p e r fe c t  s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n  o f th e  s c i e n t i s t  as a
s c i e n t i s t  i s  n e i th e r  b e t te r  nor worse than  th a t  o f th e  a r t i s t  as a r t i s t
or t h a t  o f th e  s a in t  as a s a in t .  I f  s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n  as a harmonious
system or an organ ic  system o f v a lu es , be th e  id e a l o f e th ic s ,  th e
su p e rio r  claim of moral worth i s  in a c p lic a b le .
Why does a man fe e l  i t  incumbent upon him to  in te r ru p t  a l i f e  of
a e s th e t ic  a p p re c ia tio n  and personal a f fe c t io n  (G.E. M oore's d e sc r ip tio n
1 )of th e  h i p e s t  id e a l)  in  o rder to  perform  th e  s im p lest and low est
\
d u tie s  o f d a ily  l i f e ?  Why did  any Frenchman or Englishman in te r r u p t
t h e i r  a e s th e tic  ap p re c ia tio n s  and o th er s e l f -p e r fe c t io n s  in  o rder to  f ig h t
2)
in  th e  la te  war? Why does P la to  ( in  th e  parab le  of th e  cave) make h is  
ph ilo sopher in te r ru p t  h is  contem plation of th e  'Sun'-, in  o rder to  re tu rn
1) P r in c ip ia  E th ica , page I88 .
2) R epublic, Book IX.
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to  th o se  chained in s id e , and t e l l  them about what he has seen beyond th e  
cave? Surely  i f  be th e  higjaest good, then man, in  o rder to  a t t a in
to  i t ,  has a r ig h t  to  n e g le c t h is  d u tie s  towards h is  fe llo w  men? But 
i f  t h i s  were n o t so , i f  moral d u tie s  have a s tro n g e r claim than  any s e l f -  
p e rfe c tio n  and s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n ,  as th e  f a c ts  of our eveiyday moral 
experience seem to  p o in t o u t, then  th e  reason fo r  th e  s tre n g th  o f th e  
m oral claim  cannot be found in  th e  p r in c ip le  o f s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n .
5) In  th e  th i r d  case values a re  assumed to  be commensurable. They a re  
g radated  in  v i r tu e  o f t h e i r  in n e r  n a tu re  from lower to  higjher in  an 
ascending s c a le . Sometimes they  a re  so ordered in  re sp e c t o f th e  
r e la t io n s h ip  of ends to  means as A r is to t le  ordered them. Sometimes 
va lues a re  ordered in  re sp e c t of p a r ts  and wholes. Thus p lea su re  i s  
considered  of g re a te r  value when combined w ith beau ty , than when combined 
w ith food (Moore). The p r in c ip le  by which th e  o rder o f precedence i s  
determ ined in  t h i s  co n tex t, i s  assumed to  be immutably fix ed  by an 
" e te rn a l o rder o f nature" or by th e  w il l  o f God in  accordance w ith  th e  
t ru e  in n e r n a tu re  o f each v a lu e . A thorough understand ing  of th e  
i n t r i n s i c  n a tu re  of a value and i t s  r e la t io n s  w ith  o th e r  values would 
then  e n ta i l  an exact knowledge o f th e  p o s it io n  o f th e  value in  question  
on th e  h ie ra rc h ic a l  s c a le .
But th e  in n e r n a tu re  o f a value and i t s  r e la t io n  w ith o th e r values 
appear so ambiguous and d ia le c t ic a l ly  b iv a le n t as we approach than  now 
from th e  c re a tiv e  and now from th e  contem plative angle  th a t  we fin d  i t  
q u ite  im possible  to  decide by deductive  reasoning from th e  f a c ts  o f 
v a lu a tio n a l experience on t h e i r  t ru e  o rd er o f  precedence. Who should
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know more about beauty  th an  th e  a r t i s t  who c re a te s  i t  and th e  conno isseur 
who a p p re c ia te s  i t ?  Yet from an a n a ly s is  o f t h e i r  a t t i t u d e  to  beauty  
i t  w i l l  be im possib le  to  decide  w hether beauty  i s  a means to  s e l f -  
r e a l i s a t i o n  o r s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n  a means to  beau ty , and th e re fo re  im possib le  
to  decide  t h e i r  t r u e  o rd er o f precedence on th e  sc a le  o f  v a lu e s . For 
th e  conno isseur who tak es beau ty  as an a b so lu te  va lue  and makes th e  
con tem plation  o f  i t  h is  i d e a l ,  u l t im a te ly  beauty becomes a means o f 
enjoyment o r a way o f s e l f - p e r f e c t io n .  For th e  a r t i s t  who s t a r t s  by 
co n sid e rin g  s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n  as an a b so lu te  v a lu e , and makes th e  c re a t iv e  
a c t i v i t y  th e  id e a l  o f h is  l i f e ,  beauty  u l t im a te ly  becomes th e  a b so lu te  
v a lu e , to  which h i s  s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n  and enjoyment i s  bu t a means and a 
way o f a tta in m e n t. The same d ia l e c t i c a l  r e l a t io n  can be observed to  
ho ld  between th e  gentleman fo r  whom sc ien c e  i s  but a means to  e n la rg e  th e  
f i e l d  o f h is  s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n ,  and th e  s c i e n t i s t  f o r  whom i t  i s  an 
a b so lu te  v a lu e , re g a rd le ss  o f  th e  im p lic a tio n s  which i t s  p u rs u i t  m ight 
have f o r  h is  se lf-developm en t o r h is  enjoyment of th e  a c t i v i t i e s  involved  
in  t h i s  p u r s u i t .  Yet when faced  by th e  famous L e s s in g -q u e s tio n : God
o f fe r in g  p e r f e c t  knowledge in  one hand, and th e  p u r s u i t  o f  i t  in  th e  
o th e r ,  th e  gentlem an w ith  th e  con tem pla tive  approach would choose p e r f e c t  
knowledge, but th e  s c i e n t i s t  would choose w ith  L essing  th e  p u r s u i t  o f i t ,  
i . e .  h is  s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n .  In  th e  same way, i t  w i l l  be im possib le  to  
determ ine w hether m oral worth i s  a means to  s e l f -p e r f e c t io n  or whether 
s e l f - p e r f e c t io n  i s  but th e  p u r s u i t  o f  m oral worth; In  o th e r  words i t  
w i l l  be im possib le  to  decide w hether m oral worth o r s e l f -p e r f e c t io n  
occupy th e  h i ^ e r  p o s i t io n  on th e  sc a le  o f  v a lu e s . A f o r t i o r i  i t  w il l
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be im p o ssib le  to  prove t h a t  m oral worth i s  th e  supreme v a lu e .
4 ) S ince  th e  t r u e  grade o f  v a lu es  cannot be decided  by d ed u ctiv e  
re a so n in g  from th e  f a c t s  o f  v a lu a t io n a l  ex p e rien c e , th e  fo u r th  case  
assumes t h a t  we p o ssess  an i n tu i t i o n  which re v e a ls  to  u s im m ediately  and 
d i r e c t l y  th e  t r u e  s ta tu s  o f  a  v a lu e . Thus in  a d d it io n  to  th e  i n t u i t i o n  
which d is c lo s e s  to  u s th e  i n t r i n s i c  n a tu re  o f a v a lu e , we p o ssess  an 
i n t u i t i o n  which d is c lo s e s  to  u s th e  r e l a t i v e  m e r it  o f  a  v a lu e . Hence 
th e  supremacy o f  m oral w orth over a l l  o th e r  v a lu es  i s  e s ta b l is h e d  by an 
a c t  o f i n t u i t i o n . Furtherm ore on th e  s t r e n g th  o f  t h i s  i n tu i t i o n  a 
p o s tu la te  to  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  m oral w orth has a  r ig h t  to  o v e rr id e  th e  
c la im s o f  a l l  o th e r  v a lu es  on our a l le g ia n c e ,  i s  fo rm u la te d . T his 
p o s tu la te  bases i t s  v a l i d i t y  s o le ly  on t h a t  a c t  o f  i n t u i t i o n .  I t  f a l l s  
and s ta n d s  w ith  i t .  C onsequently , i t  would a p p ea r, t h a t  vdioever la c k s  
o r d en ies  th e  i n tu i t i o n  which e s ta b l is h e s  th e  prim acy o f  m oral w orth  over 
a l l  o th e r  v a lu e s , i s  n o t s u b je c t  to  and bound by th e  claim  o f m oral du ty .
This i s  a v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  problem which we m ust r e f e r  to  a l a t e r  
o c ca s io n . For th e  p re s e n t  i t  w i l l  s u f f i c e  i f  i t  were co g en tly  shown 
t h a t  an exam ination  oT ( th e  cau sa l r e l a t i o n  between v a lu e  and d e s i r e  in  
which v a lu e  i s  th e  e f f e c t iv e  cause o f  d e s i r e )  does n o t  y ie ld  a j u s t i ­
f i c a t i o n ,  ground or reason  f o r  th e  cla im  o f  moral w orth  fo r  supremacy 
over a l l  o th e r  v a lu e s . In  o th e r  w ords, t h i s  supremacy can be n e i th e r  
in f e r r e d  n o r deduced from such an a n a ly s is  o f a sy s ta n  o f v a lu es  and 
u n le s s  an i n tu i t i o n  were c a l le d  in  fo r  th e  s p e c ia l  purpose o f  e s ta b l is h in g , 
t h a t  supremacy.
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To sum up : Values perform  two d i f f e r e n t  fu n c t io n s , co rrespond ing  to
th e  two d i f f e r e n t  ways in  which th ey  can be d e fin e d . F i r s t  v a lu e s  can 
be d e fin e d  as c o r r e la te s  o f judgments o f a p p ro v a l. Secondly th e y  can be
d e fin e d  as c o r r e la te s  o f d e s i r e ,  w i l l ,  and a c t io n . In  t h e i r  second
fu n c tio n  th ey  come under th e  j u r i s d ic t io n  o f E th ic s  inasmuch as th e y  e x e r t  
an in f lu e n c e  over d e s i r e s ,  w i l l  and a c t io n ,  and, h en ce , over human conduct. 
There a re  fo u r p o s s ib le  r e l a t i o n s  between conduct and v a lu e . Value can 
be th e  end o r o b je c t ,  th e  m o tiv e , th e  r e g u la t iv e  p r in c ip le  or th e  
a c c id e n ta l  b y -p roduct o f  conduct. Only in  th e  f i r s t  two cases can 
conduct be regarded  as a c tu a l ly  and d i r e c t l y  determ ined  by v a lu e . In  
th e  t h i r d  case  th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  v a lu e  on conduct i s  l im i t in g  r a th e r  th an  
c o n s t i t u t iv e ,  and in  th e  f o u r th  t h i s  r e l a t i o n  i s  in c id e n ta l .
The r e l a t i o n  Rg between conduct and v a lu e  as i t  appears in  th e  f i r s t  
two cases  (v a lu e  as th e  end, v a lu e  as th e  m otive o f  conduct) can be 
d e fin e d  in  th re e  d i f f e r e n t  ways. F i r s t  as a form al c o r r e la t io n  o f 
d e s ir e  ( th e  sp r in g  o f  w i l l ,  a c t io n ,  conduct) and v a lu e . Secondly a s j>2f 
a c au sa l r e l a t i o n  w ith  d e s i r e  th e  e f f e c t iv e  cause o f v a lu e . T h ird ly  as 
j> j, a cau sa l r e l a t i o n  in  which v a lu e  i s  th e  e f f e c t iv e  cause o f d e s i r e .
» t
I t  has been shown t h a t  no p ro o f f o r  th e  supremacy o f m oral w orth over 
a l l  o th e r  v a lu e s  in  c la im in g  our a l le g ia n c e ,  can be deduced from an a ly ses  
o f th e  th re e  d i f f e r e n t  system s o f  v a lu e s  (which correspond  to  th e  th re e  
d i f f e r e n t  d e f in i t io n s  o f R2 : 1» • The supremacy o f  m oral w orth
i s  n o t w a rran ted , n o r j u s t i f i e d  by th e  r e s u l t s  o f  th e s e  an a ly se s  and i t  
can on ly  be e s ta b l is h e d  by means o f  an i n tu i t i o n  appea led  to  fo r  t h a t
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v e ry  pu rpose .
In  sh o r t  th e  r e s u l t s  o f  an exam ination  o f th e  system  o f  v a lu e s  in  
t h e i r  second fu n c tio n  does n o t e x p la in  o r w arran t th e  prim acy o f  m oral 
w orth , which we see  req u ested  in  everyday m oral e x p e rien c e , any more th an  
th e  r e s u l t s  o f an exam ination  o f  v a lu es  in  re s p e c t  o f  t h e i r  f i r s t  fu n c tio n  
d id .
Some a d d it io n a l  r e f l e c t io n s  on th e  n a tu re  o f  v a lu e .
Values f u l f i l l i n g  th e  fu n c tio n  o f ends o r o b je c ts  o f  conduct w i l l  
p a r ta k e  to  a c e r ta in  e x te n t o f  th e  q u a l i t i e s  o f 'ends* as such . These 
q u a l i t i e s ,  in  t h e i r  tu r n ,  w i l l ,  to  a c e r t a in  e x te n t ,  be co loured  by th e  
q u a l i t i e s  p ro p er to  'v a lues*  as such.
"Ends" co n sid ered  in  th em se lv es , have f o r  in s ta n c e  a tendency  to  
obscu re  th e  ways and manner i n  which th e y  have been reached  and d e t r a c t  
from th e  l e t t e r ' s  im portance . "Ends" tend  to  swallow-up t h e i r  "means" 
and to  absorb them so com plete ly  as to  o b l i t e r a t e  a l to g e th e r  any q u a l i t i e s  
th e  'm eans' m ight have had in  th em se lv es. Thus, i t  i s  th e  same as f a r  as 
th e  ' end ' o f  p roducing  th e  ' D ivina Comedia' i s  concerned , w hether i t  were 
c re a te d  by Dante h a rn e ss in g  a l l  h i s  gen ius to  th e  making o f  i t ,  o r w hether 
i t  were a c c id e n ta l ly  produced by th e  monkeys ty p in g  away a t  t h e i r  ty p e ­
w r i te r s  th rough  e te r n i ty .  The 'e n d ' accom plished t e l l s  n o th in g , ca res  
n o th in g , and does n o t accoun t f o r  th e  way in  which i t  has been ach ieved .
I t  s ta n d s  on i t s  own. I t  speaks only  f o r  i t s e l f .  "The p e r f e c t  h e a l th
o f a l l  mankind" , would, as an ' end' accom plished r e p re s e n t  ju s t  th e  same 
v a lu e  were i t  ach ieved  by k i l l i n g  o f f  th e  d iseased  and weak (a s  th ey  d id
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in  S p a rta )  as i t  r e p re s e n ts  when ach ieved  by th e  c u rin g  and s tre n g th e n in g  
o f th e  d iseased  (a s  we t r y  to  do nowadays). I t  would p o ssess  th e  same 
v a lu e  were i t  ach ieved  because o f our love  f o r  mankind and our re lu c ta n c e  
to  see  i t  s u f f e r ,  as i t  would were i t  ach ieved  because we reg a rd  mankind 
as s la v e s  and s e r f s  and seek  to  g e t th e  g r e a te s t  amount o f la b o u r ou t o f 
them . The end does n o t ta k e  any accoun t o f means o r  m o tiv es. I t  i s  
independen t o f  them and in d i f f e r e n t .  But in s id e  th e  m oral domain, means 
and m otive a re  sometimes more im p o rtan t th an  th e  end ach ieved . C onsider 
" p e r f e c t  h e a l th " ,  f o r  exam ple. L e t u s assume t h a t  " p e r f e c t  h e a lth "  has 
been approved on m oral g rounds, and consequen tly  has been d e fin ed  as a 
d e s i r a b le  v a lu e  in s id e  th e  m oral dctoain. Now l e t  th e  one way o f 
a c h ie v in g  i t  be th e  k i l l i n g  o f th e  d ise a se d  and weak, and l e t  t h i s  a c t io n  
be q u a l i f ie d  a s  'bad* in  i t s e l f  in s id e  th e  m oral domain. Then i t  would 
s t i l l  be considered  a m o ra lly  bad a c t io n ,  even though i t  were th e  so le  
means o f  ach iev in g  a "good" end. ‘ Again l e t  th e  m otive fo r  d e s i r in g  
" p e r f e c t  h e a lth "  f o r  a l l  be th e  s e l f i s h  one o f  w ish ing  to  e x p lo i t  t h a t  
h e a l th  f o r  our b e n e f i t .  T his m otive to o  w il l  n o t be redeemed by th e  
goodness o f th e  end ach iev ed . In s id e  th e  moral domain a 'good* and 
even i f  i t  i s  "m orally" good, i . e .  adm itted  to  p o ssess  m oral w orth , does 
n o t fu rn is h  th e  m oral j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  i t s  means, n o r does i t  c o n fe r m oral 
s a n c tio n  on i t s  m o tiv es . "The g r e a te s t  happ iness o f  th e  g r e a te s t  number" 
though i t  were considered  th e  supreme m oral v a lu e , th e  very  ground o f a l l  
m o ra l i ty ,  can n e i th e r  make th e  enforcem ent o f  i t  on th o se  u n w illin g  to  
a cc ep t i t  a m o ra lly  good a c t ,  n o r should  a man d e s ir in g  i t  be a c tu a te d  by 
m otives o f envy and h a tre d  o f  th o se  more fo r tu n a te  th an  h im s e lf , ren d e r
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h i s  m otive good.
Not only can an 'end* n o t j u s t i f y  (m o ra lly I)  i t s  means o r sa n c tify , 
i t s  m o tiv e , i t s  v e ry  fu n c tio n  as  an end appears to  re n d e r i t  m o ra lly  
q u e s tio n a b le  and d i s q u a l i f i e s  i t  as a p r in c ip le  o f  m oral e v a lu a tio n .
By v i r tu e  o f i t s  n a tu re  o f  'e n d ' i t  p o ssesse s  th e  fo llo w in g  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  :
a ) A c e r ta in  r e l a t i o n  to  m eans;
b) a tendency  to  c laim  a b so lu te  a l le g ia n c e  to  th e  e x c lu s io n
of a l l  o th e r  v a lu e s  ;
c) a  tendency  to  s e t  i t s e l f  up as an a b so lu te  s tan d ard  and
p r in c ip le ,  in  excess o f a l l  l im i ta t io n .
a ) In  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  o f  end to  means i t  i s  th e  end a lone  which 
c o n fe rs  a  r e l a t i v e  va lu e  on i t s  means, a f t e r  hav ing  dep rived  them o f  any 
v a lu e  th ey  may have p o ssessed  in  t h e i r  own r ig h t  p rev io u s  to  e n te r in g  
in to  t h i s  r e la t io n s h ip .  In  t h i s  e f f e c t  i t  o ffends a g a in s t  t h a t  
p r in c ip le  o f  m oral e v a lu a tio n  which demands t h a t  every  a c tio n  be judged 
f o r ,  by, and in  i t s e l f ,  i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f  i t s  consequences. Only th u s  
can th e  u n o b s tru c te d  a p p lic a t io n  o f  m oral e v a lu a tio n  be sa feg u a rd ed , i . e .  
th e  n e ce ssa ry  b asic  c o n d itio n  o f  m oral e v a lu a tio n  be f u l f i l l e d .  In  t h i s  
sense  i t  may be sa id  th a t  th e  tendency  o f  a l l  ends to  j u s t i f y  t h e i r  means 
m ust go c o n tra ry  to  th e  v e ry  c o n d itio n s  under which th e  working o f  m oral 
e v a lu a tio n  becomes p o s s ib le  a t  a l l .  T h is o b je c tio n  h o ld s good even i f  
th e  " e n d " re fe rre d  to  were th e  very  p r in c ip le  o f  m o ra lity  i t s e l f .
In  a d d it io n  th e re  seems to  be som ething repugnant to  th e  m oral 
p r in c ip le ,  in  th e  though t o f  p u t t in g  i t s e l f  up as an end o f  human
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co n d u ct. The reason  fo r  t h i s  may p o s s ib ly  be found in  th e  two o th e r  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  th e  n o tio n  o f  end : i t s  tendency  to  make i t s e l f  th e
so le  a b so lu te  to  th e  e x c lu s io n  and d e n ia l o f  a l l  o th e r  ends, and i t s  
tendency  to  make i t s e l f  a b s o lu te  in  th e  sense  o f u n lim ite d  and i n f i n i t e  
v a l i d i t y .  .
b) The f i r s t  tendency g iv es  r i s e  to  a phenomenon which fo r  want o f  a 
b e t t e r  name we m ight c a l l  "S acro -ego ism o". This *sacro-egoism o* can 
ta k e  th r e e  form s, an in d iv id u a l ,  a s o c ia l  and an o b je c tiv e  form . By 
in d iv id u a l  "sacro-egoism o" we d e s ig n a te  some p e rso n a l good which l ik e  th e  
Vewgid o f  A r i s t o t l e ,  th e  S e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n  o f Green and B radley o r th e  
Sain thood  o f  th e  r e l ig io u s  person  i s  d e c la re d  th e  supreme i d e a l . By 
s o c ia l  sacro-egoism o we r e f e r  to  such supreme id e a ls  as th e  u t i l i t a r i a n  
p a ra d is e ,  R o u sseau 's , H e g e l 's  and H. C ohen 's S ta te ,  K a n t 's  Kingdom o f 
Ends, Democracy, T o ta l i ta r ia n is m  e tc .  By o b je c tiv e  sacro-egoism o we 
r e f e r  to  S c ien ce , A r t , P h ilo so p h y , e t c . when s e t  up as th e  id e a l  end fo r  
human a c t io n .
*
In  th e  f i r s t  c a se , when th e  sacro-egoism o a p p lie s  to  a p e rso n a l id e a l  
th e  problem i s  r e l a t i v e ly  s im p le . No p e rso n a l i d e a l ,  no end fo rm u la ted  
in  r e l a t i o n  to  a s in g le  in d iv id u a l ,  be i t  th e  sav ing  o f  h is  im m ortal sou l 
o r th e  p e r f e c t io n  o f  h is  m oral c h a ra c te r  i s  g re a t  enough to  w ith s tan d  th e  
claim  of th e  m ost commonplace and in s ig n i f i c a n t  duty  as between p erso n  
and p e rso n . A man who in  o rd e r to  sp a re  h im se lf  a n x ie ty  re fu s e s  to  l i e  
to  an i l l  f r ie n d  because he does n o t w ish  to  t a i n t  h i s  own m oral 
p e r f e c t io n ,  i s  in  a way n o t l e s s  blameworthy th an  one who l i e s  f o r  h is  
p e rso n a l advantage ( in  money m a tte rs  f o r  exam ple). I t  i s  sim ply t h a t
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th e  one reg a rd s  h is  main advantage to  lodge in  h is  p ro p e r ty , th e  o th e r  
in  th e  m o ra lity  o f h is  c h a r a c te r .  But bo th  in  some way appear e q u a lly  
e g o is t i c  and m o ra lly  blameworthy in  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e  to  t h e i r  ne ig h b o u r.
La S a in te té  chez c e r ta in s  r i g o r i s t e s  c h ré t ie n s ,  chez un K ierkegaard  p a r 
exam ple, comme l a  p a r f a i t e  harm onie i n t é r i e u r e  dans l e  sage a n t iq u e , 
f i n i s s e n t . . .  p a r  se  d is t in g u e r  mal de je  ne s a i s  quel egoisme r a f f i n é .
Again we must m ention  th e  p a ra b le  o f th e  cave in  P l a t o 's  R epub lic , where 
s e rv ic e  to  fe llo w  p r is o n e rs  chained in  th e  darkness i s  p u t h ig h e r th a n  
th e  con tem p la tion  o f th e  "Sun" i t s e l f .  The a t t i t u d e  expressed  in  th e  
m oral e v a lu a tio n s  m entioned may p o s s ib ly  be due to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  in  a 
c e r ta in  way m o ra l ity  can be s a id  to  be d e fin ed  only between person  and 
p e rso n  in  th e  in t r a - s u b je c t iv e  domain b u t n o t in  th e  in te r n a l  s u b je c t iv e  
domain o f  one p e rso n , where o th e r  id e a ls  may re ig n  supreme. To avoid  t h i s  
o b je c tio n  l e t  us c o n s id e r th e  sacro-egoism o in  i t s  s o c ia l  form . To 
c ircum vent th e  f i r s t  obvious c r i t ic i s m  l e t  us say a t  once t h a t  we w i l l  
c o n s id e r  i t  in  i t s  most g e n e ra l form , i . e .  as em bracing a l l  m ankind. To 
circum vent th e  second obvious c r i t ic i s m  which i s  u s u a l ly  ra is e d  a g a in s t  
any s o c ia l  i d e a l ,  i . e .  th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  fo rc in g  r e c a l c i t r a n t  in d iv id u a ls  
to  a cc ep t i t ,  l e t  us p o in t ou t a t  once t h a t  we would educate  everybody so 
t h a t  by t h e i r  own f r e e  w i l l  th e y  would become happy members in  th e  b e s t 
o f a l l  p o s s ib le  human s o c i e t i e s .  Even th en  a vague f e e l in g  o f  m oral 
m a la ise  warns us t h a t  a l l  i s  n o t w e ll .  That n o t a l l  our m oral a s p i r a t io n s
1 ) D, P arod i quoted by Renée B ertrand  in  th e  Revue de M etaphysique e t  
de M orale, J u ly  1941> page l6 5 .
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would be f u l f i l l e d  in  t h i s  id e a l  s t a t e ,  t h a t  most o f them would be 
deadened and d e s tro y e d . C onsider b u t f o r  a moment a world in  which 
nobody ever loved o r p a in te d , o r  made m usic , o r e rre d  u n le s s  i t  were fo r  
th e  g en e ra l good. A w orld in  which everybody went around ed u ca tin g  
everybody e ls e  and p e r f e c t in g  t h e i r  m oral c h a ra c te r s .  S u re ly  such a 
w orld has som ething inhuman about i t ,  a n ig h tm a rish  m echanical q u a l i ty  
which we dimly f e e l  to  be unsym pathe tic  to  m o ra l i ty , m o ra lly  n o t q u i te  
r i g h t .
c) The reaso n s f o r  t h i s  i n d i s t i n c t  f e e l in g  m ight become a l i t t l e  c le a r e r  
i f  we co n sid ered  th e  th i r d  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  q u a l i ty  o f  "ends" ; t h e i r  
tendency  to  c o n s t i tu te  them selves as a b so lu te  id e a l s .  There i s  som ething 
a lm ost s a c r i le g io u s  in  th e  id e a  o f  any s in g le  id e a l  a r ro g a t in g  to  i t s e l f  
th e  l im i t l e s s  power o f  an a b s o lu te .  Ordered system s o f v a lu e s , be th%r 
even th e  p e r f e c t  s o c ia l  id e a l  appear to  s u f f e r  th e  same f a t e .  For has 
n o t  God h im se lf  renounced th e  a b so lu te  p e r f e c t io n  and m oral goodness i t  
was in  h is  power to  bestow on h is  c r e a t io n ,  in  o rd e r  to  make p la c e  in  i t  
f o r  th e  freedom o f  man? And i s  n o t every  s o c ia l  id e a l  th a t  would make 
i t s e l f  a b so lu te  (by th e  v e ry  f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t s u b je c t  to  th e  same 
l im i ta t io n  as a p e rso n a l id e a l  made a b s o lu te ,  i . e .  th e  concern and 
r e s p e c t  f o r  o th e r  men) open to  th e  o b je c tio n  th a t  i t  would im p a ir our 
m oral freedom , and make nonsense o f  m oral m e r it  and e v a lu a tio n . In  
o th e r  words th e re  i s  som ething immoral in  th e  very  n o tio n  o f an a b so lu te  
v a lu e  or end, an a b so lu te  i d e a l ,  inasmuch as i t  u l t im a te ly  d en ies  our 
freedom o f  ch o ice . No v a lu e  can be a b s o lu te  as an end, fo r  man i s  above
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v a lu e . Not even m oral freedom  i t s e l f  can be made in to  an a b so lu te  end 
u n le s s  i t  d e s tro y  i t s e l f .  Value as an a b so lu te  id e a l  by i t s  v e ry  
a b so lu te n e ss  d en ies  th e  c la im  o f  m oral w orth  fo r  prim acy over a l l  o th e r  
v a lu e s .
Values f u l f i l l i n g  th e  fu n c tio n  o f  ends or o b je c ts  o f conduct can 
th e r e fo re  n o t se rv e  as a s ta n d a rd  of m oral e v a lu a tio n  : a) because o f
t h e i r  i r r e le v a n c y  to  th e  m oral s ta tu s  o f  a g iven  a c t io n  o f  which th e y  
a re  th e  ends, and b) because th e  e s s e n t ia l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f t h e i r  
n a tu re  as ends run  coun te r and o b s tru c t  th e  course  o f unhampered m oral 
e v a lu a t io n .
V alues f u l f i l l i n g  th e  fu n c tio n  o f  m otives to  a c t io n s  w i l l  be our 
n ex t concern . Our f i r s t  query : I s  th e  m oral s t a tu s  o f  an a c t io n  
determ ined by th e  m oral v a lu e  o f  i t s  m otive? Our second query : In  what 
way i s  i t  so determ ined? Our t h i r d  query  : To what e x te n t i s  th e  m oral
e v a lu a tio n  o f  an a c t io n  determ ined by th e  m oral v a lu e  o f  i t s  m otive?
I t  i s  g e n e ra lly  b e lie v e d  t h a t  th e  m oral goodness o f  an a c tio n  l i e s  in  th e  
goodness o f i t s  m o tive . An a c t io n  no m a tte r  how good i t s  consequences 
and i t s  a c c id e n ta l  ty -p ro d u c ts  w i l l  n o t be considered  m o ra lly  good u n le s s  
done f o r  a 'g o o d ' m otive.
Now th e  m otives o f a c t io n  can rough ly  be d iv id ed  in to  two main 
c la s s e s  : m otives which s p r in g  from th e  n a tu ra l  in c l in a t io n s  o f a man, and
th o se  bom  out o f  a c e r t a in  d e f ic ie n c y , o r la c k . T his lack ' o r  d e f ic ie n c y  
may be th e  la c k  o f  a m a te r ia l ,  o r an im m ate ria l s p i r i t u a l  o b je c t  ( la c k  o f  
food f o r  in s ta n c e , and la c k  o f  g lo ry ) .  T his lack  may be brough t to  our 
a t t e n t io n  by th e  very  absence o f th e  o b je c t  (such  i s  th e  case  when we a re
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h u n g ry ) . I t  may a ls o  be brought' to  our a t t e n t io n  by an a c c id e n ta l  
m eeting  w ith  th e  o b je c t  m a te r ia l  ( l ik e  unknown and e x o tic  k ind  o f foods 
o r p le a s u re  which we crave on ly  a f t e r  hav ing  experienced  them a t  l e a s t  
once) o r im m ateria l ( th e  beau ty  o f  a Beethoven q u a r te t  o r a C hinese poem!) 
which f i l l s  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  la c k .
As f a r  as th e  m otives which sp r in g  from our n a tu r a l  in c l in a t io n s  
a re  concerned we cannot be h e ld  re sp o n s ib le  f o r  them s in c e  th e y  a re  n o t 
o f our choosing . I f  a man be k in d h ea rte d  and g ive  a beggar a  c o in  th e re  
i s  no more m oral m e r it  in  i t  th a n  i f  he were by n a tu re  i r r a s c i b l e  and 
shouted  a t  a s e rv a n t ,
" P ity  though i t  i s  th e  m ost g e n tle  and th e  l e a s t  m isch ievous o f  a l l  
our p a ss io n s  i s  y e t  as much a f r a i l t y  o f our n a tu re  as a n g e r, p r id e  and 
f e a r . . .
"There i s  no m e rit  in  sav in g  an in n o cen t babe read y  to  drop in to  th e  
f i r e ;  th e  a c t io n  i s  n e i th e r  good n o r bad and what b e n e f i t  so ev er th e  
in f a n t  rece iv ed  we only  o b lig e  o u rse lv e s ;  f o r  to  have seen i t  f a l l ,  and 
n o t have s t r iv e n  to  h in d e r  i t ,  would have caused us p a in ;  which s e l f -  
p re s e rv a tio n  com pelled us to  p re v e n t,
"But such men, as w ith o u t complying w ith  any weakness o f t h e i r  own 
can p a r t  from w hat th ey  v a lu e  them selves and from no o th e r  m otive bu t 
t h e i r  love  o f goodness perform  a worthy a c t io n  in  s i l e n c e ;  such men, I 
con fess have acq u ired  more r e f in e d  n o tio n s  o f  v i r tu e  th an  th o se  I  have 
h i th e r to  spoke o f ;  y e t  even in  th e s e  (w ith  which th e  w orld has y e t
l )  Bernard de M andeville  : An Enquiry in to  th e  o r ig in  o f  Moral V ir tu e ,
quoted from S elby-B igge, & 1011.
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never swarmed) we may d isc o v e r  no sm all symptoms o f  p r id e  and th e  
hum blest man a l iv e  m ust co n fess  t h a t  th e  reward o f  a  v ir tu o u s  a c t io n ,  
which i s  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  t h a t  ensues upon i t ,  c o n s is ts  in  a c e r t a in  
p le a s u re  he p ro cu re s  to  h im s e lf  by con tem p la ting  on h is  own w orth  ; which 
p le a s u re  to g e th e r  w ith  th e  o ccasio n  o f  i t  a re  as c e r t a in  s ig n s  o f  p r id e ,  
as lo ok ing  p a le  and trem b lin g  a t  any imminent danger a re  th e  symptoms o f
On th e  o th e r  hand, though a man canno t a t  a c e r ta in  moment choose 
what m otive to  have and what m otive n o t to  have, he  i s  f r e e  n o t to  a c t  
upon a m o tive . He i s  a ls o  a b le  though t h i s  be a slow p ro cess  to  t r a i n  
h im s e lf  to  a c q u ire  c e r ta in  m otives in  f u tu r e .  T his he i s  a b le  to  
accom plish  by making use  o f  th e  second sp r in g  o f  m o tiv e , th e  la c k  o f  some 
m a te r ia l  o r im m ate ria l o b je c t .  Some o f th e s e  la c k s  ( l ik e  hunger) he 
f e e l s  by v i r tu e  o f  h is  be ing  a man, some ( l ik e  am b ition ) he f e e l s  by 
v i r tu e  o f  being  a c e r ta in  k ind  o f  man, b u t th e  la c k  and need f o r  some 
th in g s  he does n o t d isc o v e r f o r  h im se lf  u n le s s  th e y  be fo rced  on h i s  
a t t e n t io n  by o th e r s .  C ig a re tte s  fo r  in s ta n c e ,  and many s o r t s  o f 
p le a s u re ,  and f o r  some men th e  enjoyment o f  beau ty  and fo r  o th e rs  th e  
human sym path ies, a re  a cq u ired  m o tiv es. In  a way th e  f a c u l ty  o f  men fo r  
a c q u ir in g  new m otives o f  a c t io n  i s  th e  rea so n  and th e  e x p la n a tio n  o f  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f ed u ca tio n . But i t  must be p o in ted  o u t, t h a t  th e  f a c t  o f  
a m o tiv e 's  be ing  acq u ired  and secondary does n o t ip so  fa c to  ren d e r i t  
m o ra lly  good. The low est o f  d e p ra v i t ie s  and th e  h ig h e s t  o f m oral v i r tu e
1 ) 1012. idem.
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a re  a l ik e  th e  a cq u ired  h a b i t s  o f man in  s o c ie ty  and become genuine 
m otives o f  h is  conduct on ly  a f t e r  a c e r ta in  tim e o f t r a in in g  has e la p se d . 
Hence, an a cq u ired  m otive must be good in  i t s e l f  b e fo re  m oral m e r i t  can 
be a t t r ib u t e d  to  i t .
I t  i s  one o f  th e  m ost in t r ig u in g  paradoxes o f  m o ra lity  t h a t  a  m otive 
which i s  both good and acq u ired  seems to  possess  m oral m e r i t  only as long 
as a c e r ta in  te n s io n  between i t  and th e  p rim ary  n a tu r a l  in c l in a t io n  e x i s t s ;  
bu t lo s e s  i t s  c la im  to  m oral m e r i t  th e  moment i t  has been so w e ll 
a s s im ila te d  as to  become second n a tu re ,  • I t  i s  i r r e l e v a n t  to  th e  m oral 
w orth  o f  my a c t io n  i f  I  succour th e  poor because I  am n a tu r a l ly  s o f t ­
h e a r te d  o r i f  I  succour them because I  have so long been t r a in e d  to  do so 
t h a t  I  am no lo n g e r  cap ab le  to  r e f r a in  from i t .  The c e r ta in  degree  o f 
com pulsoriness which c lin g s  to  m otives o f  n a tu ra l  in c l in a t io n s  and th o se  
which have become second n a tu r e ,  d ep riv es  them o f t h e i r  claim  to  m oral 
m e r i t .  Thus th e  a c t io n s  o f  a n g e ls , vdiose every  m otive i s  good by v i r tu e  
o f  t h e i r  a n g e lic  n a tu re  can h a rd ly  be s a id  to  p o ssess  m oral m e r i t .  He 
who i s  n o t a b le  to  s in  cannot be v ir tu o u s  in  th e  m oral sen se , t h o u ^  he 
may be termed so by analogy . What we r e a l ly  w ish to  express when 
a l lu d in g  to  th e  m oral p e r f e c t io n  o f a n g e ls  i s  t h a t ,  were any man to  a c t  
in  a l ik e  manner r i s i n g  above th e  im p e rfe c tio n s  o f  h is  human n a tu r e ,  such 
a man would be m o ra lly  p e r f e c t .  . .
These r e f le c t io n s  seem to  le a d  to  a very  d is tu rb in g  co n c lu s io n , 
namely t h a t  m oral m e r it  may be a t t r ib u te d  to  th e  m otives o f  any man only 
in  th e  in te r im  between t h e i r  a c q u is i t io n  and t h e i r  com plete a s s im ila t io n  
in to  h i s  n a tu re ,  A n a tu r a l ly  good man w i l l  be deb arred  fo r  ever from
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perfo rm ing  a  good a c t io n . Even Kant * s a u th o r i ty  can be claim ed in  
su p p o rt. For d id  he n o t  make th e  famous d i s t in c t io n  between p a th o ­
lo g ic a l  love  and p r a c t i c a l  love^^ when d is c u s s in g  th e  in ju n c t io n  : Love
th y  n e i^ b o u r  as th y s e lf?  Did he n o t d e c la re  t h a t  th e r e  was no m e r i t  
in  th e  a c t io n s ,  th e  s e l f - s a c r i f i c e s ,  a m other brought t o  h e r  c h ild ?
And d id  S c h i i l e r  n o t fathom K an t' s t r u e  meaning when he w rote th e  famous 
d y s t i c h a :
Gewissens Gem d ien  ic h  den Freund en , doch tu  ic h  es 
s k ru p e l%
l e id e r  m it Keigung
Und so wurmt es m ir o f t ,  dass ic h  n ic h t  
tu g en d h a ft b in  
Decisum : Da i s t  k e in  a n d e re r  R a t, du m usst suchen
s ie  zu v e ra c h te n
Und m it Abscheu a lsd a n n , tu n ,  w ie d ie  
P ^ l ic h t  d i r  gebeu t.^^
Must we th en  assume t h a t  i t  would be a m o ra lly  bad th in g  f o r  a  man to  
a s p i r e  to  m oral p e r f e c t io n ,  s in c e  such p e r f e c t io n  a t ta in e d  would debar 
him from ever perfo rm ing  a m oral a c t io n  again?  Does th e  c o n te n tio n  
a g a in s t  m otive h o ld  good even when th e  m otive in  q u e s tio n  i s  th e  
p r in c ip le  o f m o ra lity  i t s e l f  as in  Hume's dictum  : No a c tio n  can be
v ir tu o u s  or m o ra lly  good u n le s s  th e re  i s  in  human n a tu re  some m otive to
1) Xenien aus dem Musenalmanach 1792, Horenausgabe im Prophyla  en 
V erlag , B e r lin  1926; page 245.
2) Kant a t  t h i s  p o in t  as in  many o th e r  m a tte rs  fo llo w s P a u lin e  d o c tr in e ;  
compare th e  n o tio n s  : ^ j u ^ and .
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produce i t  d i s t i n c t  from th e  sense  o f  i t s  m o ra lity ?  In  o th e r  w ords, i f  
th e  m otive o f an a c t io n  be th e  sense  o f  m o ra lity  would th e re  be no m oral 
m e r it  in  t h i s  a c tio n ?  Thus i f  I  g ive  alms to  a beggar because a sense  of 
m oral d u t ie s  has been im plan ted  in to  my h e a r t ,  th e r e  i s  no m oral m e r i t  in  
t h i s  a c t io n  th an  i f  I  le a rn  to  p la y  th e  p iano  because I  have been ta u g h t 
to  v a lu e  such a cco m p lish n en ts . I f  I  d e d ic a te  a l l  my l i f e  to  th e  w e lfa re  
o f mankind because a love o f  ju s t ic e  i s  my prim e m o tiv e , th e r e  i s  no more 
m e r i t  in  my conduct th an  i f  I  spend my l i f e  t r y in g  to  so lv e  m athem atica l 
problem s because m athem atica l problem s happen to  be o f th e  g r e a te s t  
i n t e r e s t  to  me. In  s h o r t ,  i t  seems t h a t  an a c t io n  cannot draw i t s  m oral 
m e r i t  from th e  m oral va lue  of i t s  m otive e i t h e r .
To sum up : We have seen t h a t  an a c t io n  cannot be sa id  to  be m o ra lly
good in  view o f i t s  'end* . Indeed "ends ' even "m orally  good ends" have 
been found to  be d is q u a l i f ie d  as p r in c ip le s  and grounds o f m oral 
e v a lu a tio n  by th e  v ery  q u a l i t i e s  o f t h e i r  i n t r i n s i c  n a tu re  as "en d s" .
Now i t  seems p o s s ib le  t h a t  'm o t iv e s ',  o r v a lu es  in  t h e i r  fu n c tio n  o f 
m otives o f a c t io n ,  w i l l  have to  sh a re  th e  same f a t e .  For t h o u ^  th e  
m oral m e rit  o f an a c t  in  a c e r ta in  way depends upon i t s  m otive an
a c t  cannot be co n sid ered  m o ra lly  good when i t s  m otive i s  o f i n f e r i o r  o r 
n e g a tiv e  m oral v a lu e  '  i t  now seems ex trem ely  d o u b tfu l w hether an a c t  can 
be d e c la red  'm o ra lly  good' i n  consequence o f th e  s u p e r io r  m oral v a lu e  o f
1 ) The m oral m e r it  o f  an a c t  does n o t depend a t  a l l  upon th e  m oral va lue
o f i t s  end. An a c t  though i t s  end were m o ra lly  bad could s t i l l  be
considered  good because o f  i t s  m o tive .
2 ) i . e .  goodness of m otive i s  a n ecessa ry  c o n d itio n  fo r  th e  goodness
o f an a c t .
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i t s  m o tiv e .^ )
An a ttem p t has been made to  make th e  m oral m e r i t  o f an a c t io n  depend 
on th e  co n traven ing  o f  i t s  n a tu r a l  m o tiv e . An a c t io n  would th e n  be 
m o ra lly  good only  i f  i t  went a g a in s t  i t s  m o tive . Thus 'h e lp in g  a f r ie n d  
in  n eed ' would be a m o ra lly  good a c t  only  a f t e r  a l l  n a tu ra l  sympathy 
tow ards t h i s  f r ie n d  has been e lim in a te d  and a thorough  h a tre d  o f him and 
h i s  p l ig h t  wrought up in s te a d .  M. S a r t r e  in  h is  approach to  m oral 
problem s seems to  concur f u l l y  w ith  t h i s  view . In  h is  example o f  men 
c o n fro n ted  by th e  tw in  d u tie s  o f  jo in in g  th e  Maquis o r  look ing  a f t e r  an 
aged and h e lp le s s  m other, he c o n sid e rs  i t  th e  r i g h t  m oral a c t  f o r  men o f  
w a r-lo v in g , sangu ine  and courageous n a tu re s  to  s ta y  w ith  t h e i r  m others ; 
f o r  men o f  weak, tim id  and f e a r  A il c h a ra c te r  to  jo in  th e  M aquis.
But i t  seems to  me t h a t  t h i s  view i s  s u b je c t  to  th e  same o b je c tio n s
as th e  one considered  b e fo re . T his a t t i t u d e  makes th e  moral m e r i t  o f  an 
a c t io n  no le s s  dependent on m otive (though on th e  in v e rs io n  o f  i t )  th a n  
th e  more s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  one which made th e  moral m e r i t  o f  an a c t io n  
d i r e c t l y  dependent on th e  m oral m e r it  i t s  m o tive . A man i s  no more 
blam e- o r p ra isew o rth y  fo r  th e  m oral v a lu e  o f  h is  m otive in v e r te d ,  th an  
fo r  th e  m oral v a lu e  o f h is  m otive d i r e c t .  Both, th e  one and th e  o th e r , 
a re  beyond h is  power to  choose o r change.
The only co n c lu sio n  l e f t  to  us i s  t h a t  th e  m oral m e r it  o f  an a c tio n  
l i e s  in  th e  r i s i n g  above m o tiv e , in  th e  independence from m o tive . In
th e  l i b e r ty  o f  man, to  check h i s  own m o tiv e s ; l im i t  t h e i r  reinge; choose
l )  i . e .  th e  goodness o f m otive does n o t seem to  be a s u f f i c i e n t  
c o n d itio n  f o r  th e  goodness o f an a c t .
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which o f  them to  implement in  a c t io n ,  in  what way, and to  what e x te n t ;  
which to  d is re g a rd  a l to g e th e r  and su p re s s . In  th e  l i b e r t y  o f  man to  
r i s e  above h is  m otives and above th e  v a lu e s  in c o rp o ra te d  in  m otives as 
he ro se  above v a lu e s  in c o rp o ra te d  in  end, l i e s  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  m oral 
m e r i t .  "H elping a f r ie n d  in  need" w i l l  n o t become a m o ra lly  good a c t  
by fo rc in g  o u rse lv es  to  h a te  t h i s  f r ie n d  f i r s t ,  b u t d is re g a rd in g  and 
d is c a rd in g  both  m otives o f h a te  and o f  lo v e , by r i s i n g  above them and th en  
a c t i n g . . .how? in  accordance w ith  what?
F i r s t  we m ust make i t  c le a r  t h a t  t h i s  r i s i n g  above v a lu e , t h i s  f r e e  
S o v e re ig n ty  o f  man face  to  fa c e  w ith  h i s  m otives and h is  ends, i s  n o t to  
be considered  an a r b i t r a r y  a c t ,  an a c t  ex n ih i lo  on every  new o ccasio n  as 
M. S a r t r e  would have i t .  An a c t  whose s o le  q u a l i f ic a t io n  i s  t h a t  i t  
goes a g a in s t  every  n a tu ra l  m otive we ev er harbou red . The a c t  m ust r i s e  
above v a lu e  b u t n o t  a g a in s t  i t ,  and i t s  r i s i n g  must n o t be haphazard  but 
conform to  a c e r ta in  law . Thus, fo r  a man to  drown th e  c a ts  he loves 
( th e  example i s  tak en  from M. S a r t r e 's  Age o f Reason) w ith  th e  s o le  
m otive o f a s s e r t in g  h is  independence and s u p e r io r i ty  over any n a tu ra l  
m o tiv e s , cannot be considered  an a c t  o f  m oral m e r i t .  The a c t  m ust in  
i t s e l f  ho ld  some m oral m e r i t .  Now i t  has been shown t h a t  th e  m e r i t  o f  
an a c t  can n e i th e r  sp rin g  from th e  value  of i t s  end o r consequences, nor 
from th e  va lu e  o f i t s  m o tive . On th e  o th e r  hand end and m otive a re  th e  
so le  c o n c re te , m a te r ia l ,  and d i r e c t  d e te rm in in g  f a c to r s  o f  a c t s .  The 
only  v a lu es which c o n s t i tu te  th e  c o n te n ts  o f  an a c t .
How then  can an a c t io n  a c q u ire  m oral m erit?
L et us c o n s id e r  th e  two rem aining r e la t io n s h ip s  in to  which v a lu e  and
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a c t io n  can e n te r .  F i r s t  v a lu e  can be th e  law to  which an a c t io n  
conform s. Secondly i t  can be th e  a c c id e n ta l  r e s u l t ,  th e  by -p ro d u ct o f 
a c t io n .  In  th e  f i r s t  case  v a lu e  i s  d e fin ed  to  lodge n e i th e r  in  th e  
m otive o f  an a c t io n  ( fo r  example th e  u rg e  to  c re a te )  nor in  i t s  end ( th e  
s ta tu e )  but in  th e  laws o f a r t i s t i c  tech n iq u e  on which th e  a c t io n  o f  
making th a t  s ta tu e  has m odelled i t s e l f .  T his c o n s ta n t checking  o f  
i t s e l f  in  re s p e c t  o f  th e  law , t h i s  c o n s ta n t a d a p ta tio n  o f  i t s e l f  to  th e  
law , may, i t  i s  p roposed , be what u l t im a te ly  co n fe rs  v a lu e  on th e  a c tio n s  
o f  a e s th e t ic  c r e a t io n ,  s c i e n t i f i c  re s e a rc h , m oral r ig h te o u sn e s s . Value 
in  t h i s  sense i s  n o t th e  m a te r ia l  c o n c re te  c o n s t i tu e n t  o f  a c t io n  bu t i t s  
norm. I t s  manner o f  becoming e f f e c t iv e ,  o f in f lu e n c in g  and d e te rm in ing  
a c t io n ,  i s  s o le ly  n e g a tiv e . I t  r e g u la te s  and l im i ts  th e  g iven  m a te r ia l  
o f  a c t io n  bu t m ust n o t t r y  to  c re a te  t h i s  m a te r ia l .
Thus th e  power o f m oral w orth to  co n fe r m oral m e r i t  on a c tio n s  
conform ing to  i t  depends w holly  on i t s  p e rse v e rin g  in  t h i s  a u s te re  
n e g a t iv i ty  in  i t s  manner o f  becoming e f f e c t iv e .  Thus f o r  example th e  
moment th e  b asic  m oral law ceases  to  e x e r t  i t s  in f lu e n c e  in  th e  a b s t r a c t  
m anner, becomes an e n d - i n - i t s e l f  (w hether i t  be in  th e  g u ise  o f  l i b e r t y ,  
s a in t l i n e s s  o r democracy : th e  g r e a te s t  happ iness f o r  th e  g r e a te s t
number) and e n te rs  in to  th e  v a lu a tio n  r e l a t i o n  w ith  d e s i r e ,  i t  becomes 
s u b je c t  to  th e  same o b je c tio n s  and c r i t ic i s m s  as any o th e r  id e a l  and 
lo se s  i t s  claim  to  m oral w orth . That i s  why we cannot make " r ig h t  ac tio n "  
our end w ith o u t d e p riv in g  i t  o f  i t s  n a tu re  as r ig h t  a c t io n ,  no r can we 
make i t  th e  m otive o f  our a c t io n  w ithou t d e p riv in g  i t  o f i t s  m oral w orth . 
The n e g a tiv e  fo rm u la tio n  o f  many m oral laws may perhaps n o t be an
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a c c id e n t o f language , bu t th e  ex p re ss io n  o f an e s s e n t ia l  q u a l i ty  o f th e  
manner in  which th e  m oral law becomes e f f e c t iv e .  However p ro o f  f o r  
t h i s  c o n te n tio n  canno t be advanced from an a n a ly s is  o f  v a lu es  in  t h e i r  
r e l a t i o n  to  d e s i r e ,  bu t m ust be l e f t  to  an a n a ly s is  o f m oral ex p erien ce  
in  a l l  i t s  im p lic a tio n s .
A l a s t  word on v a lu es  as b y -p roducts  o f a c t io n .  Here v a lu e s  a re  
n e i th e r  th e  end ( s ta tu e )  n o r th e  m otive ( c r e a t iv e  u rg e) nor th e  law o f 
a c t io n  ( ru le s  o f  te ch n iq u e ) b u t as f a r  as th e  d e s i r e  and in te n t io n  a re  
c o n sid ered  th e  a c c id e n ta l  by -p roduct o f  th e  a c t io n  (B eau ty ). T h ere fo re  
th e y  do n o t ,  and cannot e n te r  th e  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  m oral d e l ib e r a t io n s  
and judgments which a re  made i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f  them. I t  i s  an o th e r 
paradox o f  m oral th e o ry , t h a t  th e  s u p e r io r  v a lu es  i f  r e a l i s e d  a t  a l l  a re  
r e a l i s e d  in  t h i s  m anner. I t  i s  in  t h i s  manner t h a t  acco rd ing  to  
A r i s to t l e  happ iness i s  a ch iev ed ; acco rd in g  to  A lexander, B eauty; 
acco rd in g  to  r e l ig io u s  d o c tr in e ,  th e  q u a l i t i e s  o f sa in th o o d , h u m ili ty  and 
g ra c e . There i s  som ething e lu s iv e  and unapproachable  about th e  su p e r io r  
v a lu e s . We cannot fo rc e  them in to  th e  h a rn e ss  o f our d e s i r e s .  The 
moment we t r y  to  tu rn  them in to  m otives o r co n sc io u s ly  s o u ^ t  id e a ls  th ey  
seem to  f l y  us and keep ou t o f  rea ch . We can n ev er ach ieve  happ iness 
by lo o k in g  fo r  i t ,  o r m oral w orth by la b o u rin g  a t  our m oral p e r f e c t io n ,  
o r th e  g race  o f  God by c o n tin u o u s ly  c a l l i n g  upon i t .  We may le a m  to  
know them as th e  c o r r e la te s  o f app roval a t  our l e i s u r e ,  bu t when we t r y  
to  make u se  o f  them as th e  c o r r e la te s  o f w i l l  and conduct, th ey  v a n ish .
— l O l —
PART I I .
ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY THE NATURE OF "RIGHT" AND 
DETERMINE ITS FUNCTION IN ETHICS.
Some R e f le c tio n s  on th e  fu n c tio n  o f " r i g h t " 
in  E th ic s . '
' The n o tio n s  o f 'good* and 'v a l u e ',  w hether used  in  t h e i r  s t a t i c  
m eaning, i . e .  as c o r r e la te s  o f  judgments o f  a p p ro v a l, o r  in  t h e i r  dynamic 
a s p e c t  i . e .  as c o r r e la te s  o f human d e s i r e s ,  i n t e r e s t ,  w i l l  and a c t io n ,  
a re  (and to  show t h i s  has been th e  o b je c t  o f P a r t  I )  in ca p ab le  o f 
su p p ly in g  a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  and secu re  b a s is  fo r  a system  o f E th ic s .
T hat th e  n o tio n s  of "good" and "value" a re  so o f te n  taken  to  own t h i s  
c a p a b i l i ty  i s  p r im a r ily  due to  th e  u n q u e s tio n in g  accep tance  by some 
E th ic a l  T hinkers o f  two tem p tin g ly  conven ien t and p la u s ib le ,  and y e t  by 
no means n ecessa ry  o r u n iv e r s a l ly  t r u e  maxims. The f i r s t  maxim confirm s 
th e  commonly made o v e rh asty  eq u a tio n  'g o o d '^  "m orally  good* and i n s i s t s  
on m a in ta in in g  i t s  unim paired  v a l i d i t y  on h ig h e r  le v e ls  o f a n a ly s i s .
The second maxim s t a te s  t h a t  a l l  s t r i v in g  a f t e r  v a lu e s , and th e  u rg e  to
1 ) 2)r e a l i s e  ' v a lu es  i s  in  i t s e l f  good. And, on th e  s tr e n g th  o f th e  f i r s t
1 ) i . e .  l ik e  th e  French r é a l i s e r , to  b r in g  in to  b e in g , embody, 
a c tu a l iz e .
2)  "The word "good* covers much, i t  i s  common to  th e  a e s th e t ic  and th e  
m oral sp h e re . What i s  good a e s th e t i c a l ly ,  what i s  s k i l f u l l y  done 
and p e r f e c t  must n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  be good from a m oral p o in t  o f view , 
b u t th e  i n f i n i t e  e f f o r t  f o r  what i s  good a r t i s t i c a l l y  has th e  same 
ro o t  as th e  endeavour f o r  what r e l ig io n  and m o ra lity  c a l l  good." (How 
To Win th e  P eace , A t la n t ic  M onthly, February 1942). Thus Thomas 
Mann, av o id in g  th e  f i r s t  p i t - f a l l  i s  trap p ed  in  th e  second. There 
e x is ts  no doubt a  very  s tro n g  s im i l a r i t y  o f  s t r u c tu r e  between what 
makes f o r  e x c e lle n c e  in  m orals and w hat makes f o r  e x ce llen c e  in  a r t .  
Both depend upon a s e l f - e le v a t io n  above m otive and end, and a s tro n g  
s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e  r ig o ro u s ly  re g u la te d  in  accordance w ith  th e
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maxim, m ora lly  good. T his i s  p a r t i c u l a r ly  meant to  ho ld  when th e  v a lu es 
in  q u e s tio n  a re  th e  so c a l le d  h ig h e r  v a lu e s  o f  Goodness, T ru th  and Beauty, 
w ith  s p e c ia l  emphasis on th e  f i r s t .  Now, I  have t r i e d  to  show in  th e  
f i r s t  p a r t  o f  my argument on th e  n a tu re  o f  good t h a t  th e  eq u a tio n  * good* 
"m orally  good* may be t r u e  in  some in s ta n c e s ,  i f  and when d e f in i t e  and 
ve ry  s p e c ia l  c o n d it io n s '^  h o ld ; bu t i s  n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  t r u e ,  as i t  w ere, 
by v i r tu e  o f  th e  very  n a tu re  o f  th e  term s in v o lv e d ; and th e r e fo re  must
fo rm ula ted  laws and ru le s  (o f  te c h n iq u e , o r o f m orals) to  ach iev e  as 
a b y -p ro d u c t. Beauty in  A rt and R igh teousness in  Moral L if e .  (Compare 
pages 100-105). But h e re  th e  s i m i l a r i t y  ends. For a p a r t  from t h i s .  
M o ra lity  cla im s th e  r i ^ t  to  d i c t a t e  i t s  l im i ts  even to  th e  m ost s e l f -  
d i s c ip l in e d ,  r ig o ro u s  and devoted o f a e s th e t ic  p u r s u i t s .  L a te r  in
* D r. F a u s tu s , th e  s to ry  o f  a German m usician" ,(  1949) Mann has reco g n ised  
th e  m o ra lly  dangerous im p lic a tio n s  o f th e  second maxim. Indeed  th e  
r e f u ta t io n  o f  t h i s  maxim p ro v id es th e  main theme f o r  D r.F au s tu s , 
i l l u s t r a t i n g  as i t  does th e  u n avo idab le  deadly  c la s h  between th e  
p e r f e c t in g  o f  a v a lu e , r ig o ro u s ly  pu rsu ed , th e  " i n f i n i t e  e f f o r t  f o r  
what i s  good a e s t h e t i c a l l y " ; and th e  "m orally good*. I t  m ight n o t  
be am iss to  r e c a l l ,  in  c o n firm a tio n , T .H .G reen 's a t t i t u d e  to  what he 
term s " th e  excesses p o s s ib le  in  reg a rd  to  a e s th e t ic  p u r s u i t " ,  which no 
le s s  th an  th e  "mere anim al a p p e t i te s "  need to  be r e s t r a in e d  by a "due 
reg a rd  o f our f r ie n d s  and o f  s o c ie ty " ,  " in  a community where m oral 
e n e rg ie s  a re  debased, e x c e lle n c e  in  music could h a rd ly  be accounted  
o f  a c tu a l  and p re s e n t v a lu e  a t  a l l "  (Prolegcm ena to  E th ic s , p .2 7 0 ): 
indeed  i t  m ight imply in d if f e re n c e  and c o m p lic ity . F u rtherm ore , t h i s  
c la sh  between " th e  p e r f e c t in g  o f  a v a lu e"  and th e  m o ra lly  good, i s  
n o t s o le ly  due to  th e  he te rogenous n a tu re  o f th e  v a lu e  concerned .
I t  cannot be avoided even when th e  v a lu e  i s  i t s e l f  a m oral v a lu e .
"No purpose must be allow ed to  become dom inant, n o t even th e  purpose 
o f m o ra l ity " . ( J .L .S to c k s . The L im its  o f  P u rpose, The H ib b e rt 
J o u rn a l ,  O ctober, 1927). T his in  r e c a p i tu la t io n  ; th e  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  
o f what e x a c tly  i s  m eant, im p lied  and demanded by th e  " t ru e  re g a rd  o f 
our f r ie n d s  and o f s o c ie ty " ,  i . e .  th e  demand to  r e s t r a in  even our 
m oral purposes o u t o f a r e s p e c t  f o r  th e  freedom and autonomy o f 
o th e rs  we m ust leav e  f o r  a l a t e r  o ccasio n .
l )  i . e .  when i t s  f i r s t  member i s  a lre a d y  d e fin ed  in s id e  th e  m oral domain, ; 
and c h a ra c te r is e d  by a judgment o f  a p p ro v a l, based on c r i t e r i a ,  
p r in c ip le s  and grounds, which them selves a re  fo rm ula ted  in  th e  m oral 
domain."
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n o t be made to  c a r ry  th e  w eigh t o f  an e la b o ra te  E th ic a l  Theory. In  th e
second p a r t  o f  my argument I have t r i e d  to  show, t h a t  th e  p u r s u i t  o f 
v a lu e s ,  be th ey  even m oral v a lu e s , i s  n o t eo ip so  a m o ra lly  p o s i t iv e  
a c t io n .  On th e  c o n tra ry , th e  more in te n s e ,  c o n c e n tra te d , uncompromising 
and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  th a t  p u r s u i t ,  th e  more i t  s tan d s  in  danger o f 
a c q u ir in g  a m o ra lly  equ ivocal c h a ra c te r .  To s u b s ta n t ia te  t h i s  seem ingly 
p a ra d o x ic a l view , I have t r i e d  to  show th a t  a c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  th e  n a tu re  
o f v a lu es  and t h e i r  p ro p e r t ie s ^ )  must needs lead  to  th e  c o n v ic tio n  t h a t  
by i t s  very  essence  a v a lu a t io n a l  a t t i t u d e  to  human problem s runs co u n te r 
to  th e  very  f i r s t  req u ire m e n ts , nay even to  th e  v e ry  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  f r e e  
and unhampered m oral judgm ents. Hence I  have concluded th a t  th e  n o tio n s  
of 'good* and "value* a re  in  them selves and by th a a se lv e s  in ca p ab le  and - 
i n s u f f i c i e n t  to  d e f in e , e s t a b l i s h  and v in d ic a te  th e  domain o f m oral judg­
m ents. A lso , t h a t  no m a tte r  how we combine them w ith  each o th e r ,  and 
in to  what complex system we may fo rc e  them th e  fo rm al s t r u c tu r e  o f such 
sy stem s, and th e  p r in c ip le s  and laws o f  t h e i r  arrangem ent, w i l l  n o t 
y ie ld  a b a s is  fo r  E th ic s . In  re s p e c t  o f  "good* and "value* th e n , we 
seem to  have come to  th e  end o f what has always been a b lin d  a l l e y ,  and 
an a ttem p t a t  some d i f f e r e n t  approach to  our problem seems in d ic a te d .  
F o r tu n a te ly , in  E th ic a l  T h eo ries  we come a c ro ss  a n o th e r  n o tio n , u s u a l ly  
m entioned in  connec tion  w ith  good, th e  n o tio n  o f  " r ig h t" .  At tim es th i s  
n o tio n  i s  n o t c le a r ly  se p a ra ted  from th e  n o tio n  o f  good, o r r e s t l e s s l y
l )  i . e .  th e  e s s e n t ia l  tendency o f every v a lu e  as such to  seek
ascendancy over a l l  o th e r  v a lu e s , s e l f - s u f f i c iency  to  th e  ex c lu s io n  
o f  a l l  o th e r  v a lu e s ; and a b so lu te  s t a tu s  t h r o u ^  th e  a n n ih i la t io n  
o f  a l l  o th e r  v a lu e s .
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id  e n t i f i e d  w ith  i t .  Thus, im p l i c i t ly ,  when Samuel C larke g ives th e
a l t e r n a t iv e  l i s t s  J u s t i c e ,  E q u ity , Goodness, T ru th  and J u s t i c e ,  E qu ity ,
1 ) 2 )R ig h teo u sn ess , T ru th  '  and Ralph Oudworth '  speaks o f  th e  " r ig h t  and
good", " th e  wrong and e v i l " ,  o r e x p l i c i t l y  when W illiam  W ollaston^) s t a te s  
"For t h a t  cannot be good which i s  wrong, nor t h a t  e v i l  which i s  r i g h t " .
I t  sh o u ld , however, be no ted  t h a t  a l l  th e s e  M o ra lis ts  had p r e ju d ic i a l  
m e ta p h y s ic a l, o r r a th e r ,  r e l i g io u s ,  reaso n s f o r  h o ld in g  th e  'r ig h t*  to  
be id e n t i c a l  w ith  th e  "good*; th u s  G.E. Moore, fo r  in s ta n c e , d e f in e s  th e  
" rig h t*  as what i s  "good-as-a-m eans" . Sometimes i t  i s  used in  con­
ju n c tio n  w ith  th e  n o tio n  o f  "good* and in  a d d it io n  to  i t  as by S i r  David 
W. Ross. Some o th e r  tim e i t  i s  allow ed to  dom inate th e  n o tio n  o f "good* 
as in  c e r ta in  passages by K ant. On th e  w hole, two main approaches to  
th e  q u e s tio n  o f  th e  r e l a t io n  between th e  "good* and th e  *r i ^ t * can be 
d is t in g u is h e d . The one t r i e s  to  reduce one n o tio n  to  th e  o th e r ,  (w hether 
i t  be th e  good to  th e  r i g h t ,  o r th e  r i g h t  to  th e  good), in  an a ttem p t to  
p re s e rv e  a m o n is tic , homogenous and s e l f - c o n s i s t e n t  b a s is  fo r  E th ic s .
The o th e r  acknowledges th e  i r r e d u c ib le  e s s e n t ia l  d i f f e re n c e  between th e  
two n o tio n s , and making no a tte m p t to  coerce  an uneasy  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
a cq u ie sce s  in  a p l u r a l i s t i c ,  complex, in se c u re  b a s is  f o r  E th ic s , 
i n t e r n a l ly  d iv id ed  by th e  s t r i f e  and em ulation  of i t s  two c o n s t i tu e n t
1) S .C la rk e : On N a tu ra l R e lig io n , ( I 7O6 ) .  In  Selby-B igge*s B r i t i s h
M o ra lis ts  o f th e  E ig h teen th  C entury ; & 4 8 9 .
2 ) R .Cudworth: A t r e a t i s e  concern ing  E te rn a l and Immutable M o ra lity
( 1688) ,  idem.
5 ) W illiam  W o llas to n : The R e lig io n  o f N atu re  d e lin e a te d , (1724),
& 1047 idem.
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n o t io n s .  Remembering t h a t  "good* by i t s e l f  cannot p ro v id e  a s u f f i c i e n t  
b a s is  f o r  E th ic s , and t h a t  th e r e f o re  an appeal fo r  h e lp  to  th e  "rig h t*  i s  
u n a v o id a b le , our problem can now be reduced to  two main q u e s tio n s  :
A. Can system s combining th e  two n o t io n s , surmount t h e i r  in n e r  
d is c re p a n c ie s ,  and can th e y  be exempt from th e  a cc u sa tio n s  o f 
in c o n s is te n c y  and redundancy? In  o th e r  w ords. I s  a P l u r a l i s t i c  
System o f  E th ic s  r e a l ly  n ecessa ry ?
B, I f  n o t ,  can th e  n o tio n  o f r ig h t  a lo n e , and by i t s e l f  fu rn is h
th e  b a s is  fo r  a s a t i s f a c to r y  system  o f m orals?
X X X X X
The most famous a ttem p t to  combine th e  two n o tio n s  o f "good* and o f
" r ig h t" ,  and u se  them e q u ita b ly , w ith o u t denying t h e i r  d iv e rse  n a tu r e s ,  
in  one system  was made by S i r  David W. Ross, in  "The R ight and th e  "Good", 
and "The Foundations o f  E th ic s"  and c lo s e ly  fo llow ed by E .F. C a r r i t t  in  
"The Theory o f  M orals" and " E th ic a l and P o l i t i c a l  T h ink ing". Ross ta k e s  
a s  h i s  s t a r t i n g  p o in t  two hy p o th eses^ ) (a )  t h a t  th e r e  e x is ts  som ething 
which may be term ed "moral experience* end th a t  t h i s  experience  c o n s is ts  
in  coming, in  our d a ily  l i f e ,  a c ro ss  such judgnents a s ,  " th is  i s  good", 
" th is  i s  bad", " th is  i s  r i g h t " ,  " th is  i s  wrong"; (b ) t h a t  t h i s  experience
l )  C overing most o f th e  ground o f th e  th r e e  hypo theses m entioned in  th e  
p re fa c e , Ross* second be ing  e q u iv a le n t to  my second and t h i r d .  How 
im p o rtan t t h i s  p o in t  i s  w i l l  be seen , when h is  l a t e r  c o n te n tio n  t h a t  
th e  "w ell-educa ted  man* i s  th e  only p o s s ib le  a r b i t e r  m o ra lis  i s  faced 
w ith  th e  second h y p o th es is  and t h e i r  f u l l  m easure o f in c o m p a tib il i ty  
and c o n tr a d ic t io n  i s  b rough t o u t.
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i s  open and a c c e s s ib le  every  man-qua-man. ^^ This i s  one o f  th e  main
su p p o s itio n s  o f  t h i s  th e o ry . The second contends t h a t  m oral problem s
a re  d e fin ed  only  in  p a r t i c u l a r  co n c re te  g iven  s i t u a t io n s ,  t h a t  i s ,  in
re fe re n c e  to  un ique  n o n -re c u rr in g  s e ts  o f  c irc u m sta n ce s , and ought to  be
so lved  in  t h e i r  g iven  c o n te x t. T h ere fo re  p a r t i c u l a r  d e c is io n s  and
judgnen ts ought to  be made as  th e  occasion  a r i s e s  and as th e  occasio n
w a rra n ts , n o t by an appeal to  g en era l r u l e s .  "For a ru le  can only  be
g e n e ra l but an a c t  m ust be p a r t i c u l a r  so i t  w i l l  be always n e c e ssa ry  to
s a t i s f y  o u rse lv es  t h a t  an a c t  comes under th é  ru le  and fo r  t h i s  no ru le  
1,2 )can be g iven . I  have term ed th i s  school o f  E th ic a l  Thought,
O c c a s io n a lis t^ )  fro n  i t s  in s i s te n c e  on th e  im portance o f  th e  s in g u la r i ty
1) I  do n o t know i f  t h i s  assum ption  i s  capab le  o f  p ro o f , and I  am 
in c l in e d  to  th in k  i t  i s  n o t .  But I  th in k  t h a t  anybody who read s 
and u n d ers tan d s i t ,  n a tu r a l ly  acc ep ts  i t .  Indeed we have come to  
look  upon i t  as one o f  th e  main d e te rm in in g  f a c to r s  o f  our concept 
o f  a "human b e in g " . Ross on page 5 o f  th e  "Foundation  o f  E th ic s  
q uo tes th e  a p p ro p r ia te  p assages from A r i s to t le  (E th . N ic .)  and Kant 
(Grundlegung e in e r  M ethaphysik d e r S i t t e n ) ,  in  su p p o rt o f  t h i s  
c o n te n tio n . I 'd  l ik e  to  add th e  b e a u t i f u l  passage  from th e  myth
o f  P l a to 's  P y thagoras quoted a t  th e  b eg inn ing . I  should a ls o  l i k e   ^
to  add t h a t  any d e v ia tio n , t r a n s g re s s io n ,  o r  impingement o f t h i s  
assum ption f o r  reasons to  be ex p la in ed  l a t e r ,  i s  l ik e ly  s e r io u s ly  to  
endanger th e  v a l id i ty  o f  our en q u iry , e s p e c ia l ly  in  i t s  c h a ra c te r  o f 
m oral en q u iry . The rea so n s  fo r  and consequences o f such d e v ia tio n s  
should  th e re fo re  be s u b je c t  to  th e  most c a re fu l  s c ru t in y ,  and a t  
f i r s t  b lu sh  we should be a g a in s t  any such d e v ia tio n  u n le s s  very  good 
reason  be shown fo r  i t .
2 ) E .F .C a r r i t t : The Theory o f  M orals ; (1928); p . 114.
5) In  my paper "E th ic s  w ith o u t Law?" th e  H ib b e rt Jo u rn a l (O c t.1949).
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o f each occasion  on which a m oral d e c is io n  has to  be made. But to  go 
back to  Ross* f i r s t  assum ption . He p o in ts  ou t t h a t  in  t h i s  ex p erien ce  
we f in d  t h a t  th e  judgment ' t h i s  i s  r i g h t ' does n o t always c o in c id e  n o r 
i s  i t  n e c e s s a r i ly  c o -e x te n s iv e  w ith  th e  n o tio n  o f 'good*; "good* being  
d e fin e d  in  i t s  u su a l h e d o n is t ic  and a g a th i s t i c  se n se . Thus, a t  tim e s , 
we come a c ro ss  m oral judgm ents, which seem to  go c o u n te r a l l  u t i l i t a r i a n  
c o n s id e ra tio n s ,  o r even c o n s id e ra tio n s  concerned w ith  th e  p e r f e c t io n  and 
s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  human b e in g s , and which p rocla im  an a c t  r i g h t ,  t h a t  
m ight endanger o r com pletely  in v a l id a te  th e  prem ise o f  good consequences 
co n ta in ed  in  a  g iven  s i t u a t i o n .  Examples a re  e a s i ly  found, thougji 
c o n t r o v e r s ia l .  Thus, acco rd in g  to  R oss, th e  t e l l i n g  o f  t r u th  when i t  
m ight endanger th e  l i f e  o f  a t h i r d  person  i s  n o t th e  a c t  one m ight choose 
o r a d v ise  anybody to  do in  c e r t a in  c ircu m stan ces , ( f o r  in s ta n c e , th o se  
endangering  th e  l i f e  o f a t h i r d  p e rso n ) . N e v e r th e le s s , i f  th e  t r u th  
were to ld  a t  t h a t  moment, i t  would be to ld  in  obedience to  a need to  
f u l f i l l  a c e r ta in  o b l ig a t io n  and in s o f a r  i t  would be ' r i g h t ' ,  and th e  
t e l l i n g  o f i t  m o ra lly  d e fe n s ib le  a g a in s t  any and a l l  o th e r  c o n s id e ra tio n s . 
Hence, i t  must be in fe r r e d  t h a t  o b l ig a t io n s  o f  t h i s  ty p e  draw t h e i r  
v a l i d i t y  from no o th e r  source  than  th e  n a tu re  o f th e  o b l ig a t io n  i t s e l f ,  
i . e .  each o b lig a t io n  ou t o f i t s  own n a tu re . We have no reason  to  th in k  
t h a t  th e r e  e x is t s  one common ground o f  v a l i d i t y  f o r  them a l l .^ ^  A ll we 
know i s  t h a t  they  undoubted ly  e x i s t ,  f o r  we cannot bu t come a c ro ss  them
l )  " In  p r in c ip le  th e re  i s  no reason  to  a n t ic ip a te  t h a t  every a c t  t h a t  
i s  our duty  i s  so fo r  one and th e  same rea so n " . (D.W.Ross: The R ight
and th e  Good; p .2 4 .)
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in  our d a i ly  ex p e rien c e ; and t h a t ,  s in c e  th ey  a re  n o t re d u c ib le  to  
u l t e r i o r  c o n s id e ra tio n s  and n o t to  be ex p la in ed  away, we must f in d  an 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  our m oral l i f e  which ta k e s  f u l l  account o f  them . I t  
i s  th e s e  o b l ig a t io n s  we w ish  to  in d ic a te  when u s in g  " r i ^ t "  in  
d i s t i n c t io n  from 'good*. On th e  o th e r  hand, as we have seen , th o u ^ i 
th e s e  o b l ig a t io n s  form p a r t  o f a g iven m oral s i t u a t io n ,  th e s e  s i tu a t io n s  
a re  complex, and u s u a l ly  make a d d it io n a l  demands on our c o n s id e ra tio n , 
demands which a re  b e t t e r  c h a ra c te r is e d  by th e  term  'good*. Thus, pro 
bono p u b lic o , o r  ju s t  f o r  th e  sake o f  th e  man h im s e lf ,  we m ight p r e f e r  to  
burden our so u ls  w ith  a l i e  r a th e r  th an  r i s k  th e  consequences and 
u n d e s ira b le  outcome o f t e l l i n g  th e  t r u th  ab o u t, f o r  example, th e  where­
abou ts o f  a f u g i t iv e .  T h e re fo re  o b l ig a t io n s  o f th e  f i r s t  ty p e , which 
com prise th e  u su a l commands o f "thou s h a l t  n o t l i e "  e t c . ,  a re  f i r s t  b lu sh  
r a th e r  th an  a b so lu te  o b l ig a t io n s ;  in  th e  R ossian  te rm ino logy  : prim a
f a c ie  d u t ie s .  They have a  s o r t  o f  r i g h t  to  a f i r s t - c l a i m  on our 
a t t e n t i o n ,  always provided  th ey  do n o t endanger any d e s ir a b le  and 
acknowledged 'good e n d '.^ )  Which a c ts  p a r ta k e  o f  t h i s  n a tu re  o f
l )  A tte n tio n  should be p a id  to  th e  very  s ig n i f ic a n t  d if f e re n c e  between 
th e  U t i l i t a r i a n  op in ion  and th e  O c c a s io n a lis t  approach on t h i s  p o in t .  
Whereas th e  U t i l i t a r i a n  op in ion  i s  t h a t  p recedence should a lm ost
• always be g iven  to  th e  prim a f a c ie  d u t ie s  over o th e r  c o n s id e ra tio n s , 
because o f  th e  u l t im a te ly  p e rn ic io u s  outcome fo r  so c ie ty  a d is re g a rd  
f o r  th e se  d u t ie s  would have, th u s  reduc ing  th e  v a l i d i ty  o f th e s e  
o b l ig a t io n s  to  a u t i l i t a r i a n  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  outcome and con­
sequences, and denying th e  independen t n a tu re  and source o f t h e i r  
o b l ig a to r in e s s ,  Ross would have th e  prim a f a c ie  d u tie s  alm ost always 
g ive  way b e fo re  h e d o n is tic  and a g a th i s t i c  c o n s id e ra tio n s , e x a c tly  
because he reco g n ise s  t h e i r  independence, and w i l l  n o t have them 
reduced to  'good* and in  f a c t  den ied  and because such i s  th e  choice a 
sa g ac io u s , sc rupu lous and w ise  man would norm ally  make. Whether th i s  
a c tu a l  cho ice  w i l l  a ls o  embody th e  u tm ost in  m oral v a l i d i ty  and w orth , 
and whether i t  can always be sa id  to  have been reached fo r  m oral 
reasons and c o n s id e ra tio n s  i s  a p o in t  to  which we s h a l l  r e tu rn  l a t e r .
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u n c o n d itio n a l o b lig a tio n s   ^ and th a t  th ey  do so p a r ta k e , i s  s e l f - e v id e n t ;
knowledge o f i t ,  im m ediate, i n t u i t i v e .  But, fo r  an a c t  to  be an
u n c o n d itio n a l ( in  th e  f i r s t  sense) o b l ig a t io n ,  and i n tu i t i v e l y  and
im m ediately a cc ep ted , does n o t as y e t c o n fe r  on i t  th e  s ta tu s  o f th e  r e a l
and o b je c tiv e  du ty  determ ined by a g iven  s e t  o f  c ircu m stan ces , i . e .  th e
a c t io n  we a re  m o ra lly  and f i n a l l y  bound to  ta k e . This u l t im a te ly  and
f i n a l l y  r ig h t  a c t io n ,  i s  decided  upon by a jo in t  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f th e
prim a f a c ie  d u t ie s  in v o lv ed , and th e  'good ' ( i . e .  h e d o n is tic  and
a g a t h i s t i c ,  o r f e l i c i f i c  and o p tim if ic )  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  contained  in  a
2 )s i t u a t io n  whose r e a l i s a t i o n  i s  a ls o  h e ld  to  be our m oral du ty . Now
1 ) Again i t  must be s ta te d  t h a t  'u n c o n d itio n a l*  h e re  means "no t re d u c ib le  
to  u t i l i t a r i a n  c o n s id e ra tio n s " , "no t to  be ex p la in ed  away"; n o t as 
one m ight th in k  n e c e s s a r i ly  p re v a le n t  and u l t im a te ly  v ic to r io u s  over 
a l l  u t i l i t a r i a n  c o n s id e ra tio n s . Now t h i s  n e c e s s i ty  may be understood  
in  two ways : As a f a c tu a l  n e c e s s i ty  n o t to  be escaped in  a c tu a l
d e c is io n s , which obv iously  i s  f a l s e ,  s in c e  no such n e c e s s i ty  e x i s t s ,  
no r can e x i s t  i f  moral o b l ig a t io n s  a re  to  have any s ig n if ic a n c e  a t  
a l l .  Or as a m oral n e c e s s i ty ,  in  th e  sense  t h a t  we m ight th in k  i t  
m o ra lly  incum bent on us always to  g ive  u n c o n d itio n a l p rev a len ce  to  
th e  prima f a c ie  o b l ig a t io n s ,  though in  a c tu a l  f a c t  we m ight and 
norm ally  ^  decide  on d i f f e r e n t  cou rses o f a c t io n .  Now th e  
O c c a s io n a lis ts  g ive t h e i r  b le s s in g  to  such a c tu a l  and normal d e c is io n s  
by c la im ing  th a t  n o t even m orally  can we be sa id  to  be bound always to  
decide  in  favou r o f  th e  prim a f a c ie  o b lig a tio n s  i f  o th e r  c o n s id e ra tio n s  
be s tro n g  enough to  p r e v a i l  over them , i . e .  i f  th e  duty to  seek  'good* 
consequences seems to  p o ssess  th e  s tro n g e r  c la im . Here we come a c ro ss  
th e  d if fe re n c e  between m oral p r in c ip le s  and m oral ( i . e .  in  m oral 
m a tte rs )  d e c is io n s . A d isc u ss io n  o f th e  exac t s ig n if ic a n c e  o f t h i s  
d if fe re n c e  and i t s  f a r - re a c h in g  im p lic a tio n s  must be l e f t  fo r  a  l a t e r  
o ccasion .
2 ) Whether t h i s ,  one o f  th e  b asic  assum ptions of th e  O c c a s io n a lis t  , 
sch o o l, can be v in d ic a te d  w i l l  be d iscu ssed  a t  a l a t e r  p o in t .
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th e se  m ight a l l  ag ree  and harm oniously jo in  to g e th e r  to  p o in t ou t one 
a l l - s a t i s f a c t o r y  course  o f a c t io n ,  which we then  can fo llow  whole­
h e a r te d ly ,  Such a fo r tu n a te  c o n s te l la t io n  o f  c ircum stances however i s
a m a tte r  o f a c c id e n t and very  r a r e .  Because o f th e  complex and
d iv e r s i f i e d  n a tu re  o f our l i v e s ,  s o c ie ty ,  p reo c cu p a tio n s , e tc ,  i t  i s  
more u su a l fo r  th e  demands o f prima f a c ie  d u tie s  to  c la sh  w ith  th o se  
a r i s in g  from o p tim if ic  and f e l i c i f i c  c o n s id e ra tio n s  ( i . e .  from th e  
p u r s u i t ,  even th e  j u s t i f i e d  p u r s u i t  o f  v a lu e s ) .  M oreover, th e  demands 
o f  prim a f a c ie  d u tie s  m ight c la sh  amongst them selves i f  more th an  one a re  
invo lved  in  a s i t u a t io n ,  as m i ^ t  th o se  a r i s in g  from o p tim if ic  w ith  th o se  
a r i s in g  frcm f e l i c i f i c  c o n s id e ra tio n s . T h ere fo re , acco rd ing  to  Ross and 
C a r r i t t ,  our m oral d e l ib e ra t io n s  a re  s u b je c t  to  a l l  th o se  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
commonly encountered  in  an U t i l i t a r i a n  System o f E th ic s ,  ( i . e .  th e  
w eighing of a l t e r n a t iv e  'g o o d s ',  th e  need to  fo re se e  r e s u l t s  o f  a c tio n s  
ad i n f . ,  and ta k e  in to  account innum erable com binations and p erm u ta tio n s 
o f c ircum stances e t c . )  w h i ls t  in  a d d it io n  we have to  c o n s id e r th e
o b lig a t io n s  embodied in  prima f a c ie  d u t ie s  and t h e i r  demands in  t h e i r  own
r i g h t .  These added c d u p lic a tio n s  ren d er a humanly in so lu b le  problem even 
more h ope less ( f o r  no f i n i t e  being  can know th e  outcome of an i n f i n i t e  
s e r ie s  o f consequences, no r can a f i n i t e  being  surmount th e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  
having  to  tak e  in to  c o n s id e ra tio n  an in d e f in i t e  number o f p e r t in e n t  
c ircu m stan ces , even assuming t h a t  such a be ing  i s  a t  a l l  aware o f  a l l  such 
p e r t in e n t  c irc u m sta n ce s) . T herefo re  we must d e sp a ir  o f  ever knowing th e
r ig h t  s o lu t io n , and re s ig n  o u rse lv es  to  a p la u s ib le  and g o o d -in ten tio n ed
;
op in io n  about i t .  In  o th e r  w ords, though a given s i tu a t io n ,  a g iven
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m oral problem , always in  i t s e l f  d e fin e s  i t s  r ig h t  s o lu t io n ,  and hence th e
o b je c t iv e ly  r ig h t  a c t  which embodies and a c tu a l i s e s  t h a t  s o lu t io n ,  a l l  
«
we can a s p ire  to  i s  t h e m o ra lly  good a c t , i . e .  th e  a c t  which seems to  us 
r i g h t ,  though we may be m istaken  in  th e  f a c t s  o f  th e  s i tu a t io n  (b o th  by 
m is ta k in g  th e  a c tu a l  n a tu re  o f  th o se  we ta k e  in to  c o n s id e ra tio n , and by 
overlook ing  some a lto g e th e r )  and in  our p rognosis  o f th e  p o s s ib le  
consequences. A gain, because o f th e  c la s h  o f  v a lu es  amongst th em se lv es, 
and t h e i r  c la s h  w ith  prim a f a c ie  d u tie s  and o b l ig a t io n s ,  c la sh e s  which 
cannot be re so lv ed  by p r in c ip le s  a p p lic a b le  in  a l l  s i t u a t i o n s b e c a u s e  
every  moral s i tu a t io n  i s  d i f f e r e n t  frcm a n o th e r , and i t s  s o lu t io n  to  be 
adequate  must be in d iv id u a l n o t t r a n s c r ib e d  in  any way from o th e r  
s o lu t io n s ;  and because we have n o t an in d e f in i t e  tim e  a t  our d is p o s a l ,  
we a re  fo rced  to  u se  our i n tu i t i o n  in  d ec id in g  what our u l t im a te  duty  i s  
in  any given s i t u a t io n .  By a lucky f lu k e  we m ight h i t  on th e  
o b je c tiv e ly  r ig h t  s o lu tio n  and we a re  th e  more l ik e ly  to  do t h i s  th e  ' 
b e t t e r  we a re  acq u a in ted  w ith  th e  f a c ts  and th e  b e t te r -b re d  and educated 
we a r e .  We m ight s t i l l  f u r th e r  reduce th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f m is tak es  o f 
f a c t ,  and m is tak es o f  c a lc u la t io n  by ta k in g  counsel and seek ing  th e  adv ice  
o f such o f our f r ie n d s  whcm we th in k  * th o u g h tfu l and educated m en '.
These 'K a lo i k ' A ga tho i' however t h o u ^  th ey  maj»’ have a c le a re r  g rasp  o f  
p r in c ip le s  and v a lu es  in v o lv ed , and a w ider and more a c c u ra te  knowledge 
o f f a c t s ,  i . e .  ex p erien ce , a re  a lso  u l t im a te ly  dependent on t h e i r
1) S ince  Ross and C a r r i t t  deny th e  e x is te n c e  o f such p r in c ip le s  and, 
should they  e x i s t ,  doubt w hether they  a re  a p p lic a b le .
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i n t u i t i o n s . Now th e se  i n tu i t io n s  s in c e  th ey  a re  c a l le d  upon in  every
s in g le  in s ta n c e  when a m oral problem a r i s e s ,  and s in c e  th ey  have to  tak e  
in to  account th e  co n cre te  and th e re fo re  u n iq u e , n e v e r-a g a in -re p e a te d , 
d e t a i l s  o f  every such in s ta n c e , cannot have a uniform  c o n te n t, nor a 
re p e a ta b le  s t r u c tu r e .  They have to  be ex e rc ised  every  tim e anew, and 
cannot be checked. The only w arran t we have fo r  t h e i r  moral goodness i s  
th e  u p rig h tn e ss  and s in c e r i ty  o f  th e  ag en t o r th e  a d v is e r .  The only hope 
f o r  t h e i r  o b je c tiv e  r ig h tn e s s  i s  th e  s u b t le ty  o f  i n s t i n c t ,  th e  re finem en t 
o f b reed ing  and th e  h igh  le v e l  o f ed u ca tio n  in  both ag en t and a d v is e r .
The s i tu a t io n  i s  summed up by Ross in  th e  fo llo w in g  manner, and th e  
fo llo w in g  in fe re n c e s  drawn : " In  th e  complex f a b r ic  o f common op in ions
about m oral q u e s tio n s  two main s tra n d s  may be d isc o v e re d . On-the one 
hand th e re  i s  a group o f op in io n  in v o lv in g  th e  c lo s e ly  connected id e a s  o f 
d u ty , o f  r i ^ t  and wrong, o f  m oral law o r law s, o f im p e ra tiv e s . On th e  
o th e r  hand th e re  a re  op in ions in v o lv in g  th e  id ea  o f good or ends to  be 
aimed a t .  In  th e  one case human l i f e  i s  envisaged as obedience to  law s, 
in  th e  o th e r  as th e  p ro g re s s iv e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  d e s i r e  and a tta in m e n t o f 
ends. " ^ ) N e ith e r  system has been ever a b le  to  account fo r  a l l  th e  f a c ts  
im p lied  and con ta ined  in  our m oral e x p erien c e . Nor has e i th e r  ever been 
a b le  to  s tand  a lo n e , and, as a m a tte r  o f f a c t ,  even th e  most r ig o ro u s  
u t i l i t a r i a n  system shows t r a c e s  o f  a b so lu te  law in  i t  and even th e  m o st' 
im p lacab le  d e o n to lo g ic a l system  tak es  accoun t o f some h e d o n is tic  o r
l )  D.W. Ross. Foundations o f E th ic s , page 5 .
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a g a th i s t i c  c o n s id e ra tio n  in  i t s  d e l ib e r a t io n s .  T hat being  so , we a re  
d r iv en  to  th e  conclusion  t h a t  n e i th e r  system i s  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t ,  t h a t  
each needs th e  o th e r  as a complement; and t h a t  th e r e fo re  a t r u e  and 
com prehensive E th ic a l  Theory w il l  needs ta k e  both s id e s  in to  a cco u n t, 
and i n s i s t  t h a t  t h e i r  s e v e ra l  demands be n ic e ly  weighed a g a in s t  each 
o th e r  in  every  s in g le  c a se , and leav e  th e  f i n a l  d e c is io n  to  th e  ' in tu i t io n *  
o f th e  * w e ll-educa ted  * man, i . e .  th e  man q u a l i f ie d  to  a c t  as an a r b i t e r  
m o ra l is .
Now sane very  d i f f i c u l t  problem s a re  ra is e d  by t h i s  e x p o s itio n  and 
th e  co n c lu sio n s drawn from i t .  We can roughly l i s t  them as fo llo w s :
(a )  The problem o f th e  double fu n c tio n  in  \diich th e  n o tio n  o f * r ig h t*  
i s  made to  s e rv e : once as th e  c h a r a c te r i s t  o f  'p rim a f a c ie
o b l ig a t io n s ' as d i s t i n c t  from ' p ro d u c tiv en ess  o f g o o d '; th e  
second tim e on a d i a l e c t i c a l l y  h ig h e r  le v e l ,  as th e  e s s e n t ia l  
q u a l i ty  o f th e  u l t im a te  o b je c tiv e  s o lu t io n ,  th e  f i n a l  du ty , 
defined  by a m oral problem , in  a g iven  co n cre te  s i tu a t io n ,  which 
ta k e s  both  'p rim a f a c ie  d u t ie s ' and ' p ro d u c tiv en ess  o f good' 
in to  acco u n t. And th e  re la te d  p rob lon  o f th e  concom itant double 
ro le  ' i n t u i t i o n '  i s  made to  p la y , once as i t  i s  ex e rc ised  in  
d e te c tin g  and rec o g n is in g  th e  prima f a c ie  d u t ie s ;  th e  second 
tim e , a t  th e  co rrespond ing  h ig h e r  d i a l e c t i c a l  l e v e l ,  as i t  i s  
req u ired  to  d isc e rn  and decide th e  unique o b je c t iv e ly  and 
m orally  r ig h t  a c t ,  which i s  th e  s o lu t io n  o f th e  given unique 
and moral problem .
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(b) The problem s a r i s in g  from th e  un ique and th e re fo re  ad-hoc 
n a tu re  of a l l  such s o lu t io n s ;  th e  r e s u l ta n t  im p o s s ib i l i ty  to  
fo rm u la te  any o b je c tiv e ly  and u n iv e r s a l ly  v a lid  m oral law or 
p r in c ip le ,  and th e  subsequent need fo r  a q u a l i f ie d  a r b i t e r  
m o ra lis .
(c )  The problem o f th e  i n t r i n s i c  d i f f e re n c e  between m oral a n a ly s is  
and p r in c ip le s ,  and m oral d e l ib e r a t io n s  and d e c is io n s .
(d ) The problem o f  th e  eq u iv a len ce  and equ i-im portance  o f th e  id e a s
o f 'good* and o f 'r ig h t*  considered  as th e  c o n s t i tu e n t  e l aments
1 )o f an E th ic a l  System. ' 
a) In  our d a i ly  moral ex p erien ce  we encoun ter th e  n o tio n  o f 'r ig h t*
2 )in  i t s  f i r s t  m ost e lem entary  form. ' That i s  we a re  brought fa c e  to  fa c e  
w ith  c e r ta in  a c t s ,  o r  o b l ig a t io n s  to  a c t  in  a c e r ta in  way, which we 
re c o g n ise  and judge to  be what th ey  a r e ,  namely r i ^ t  and o b lig a to ry  ways 
of a c t io n ,  by v i r tu e  o f  t h e i r  own i n t r i n s i c  n a tu re  and s t r u c tu r e ,  and 
re g a rd le s s  o f w hether they  a re  a lso  'p ro d u c iv e  o f good* o r ' conducive to  
good*. Thus we judge th e  k e e p in g -o f-a -p romise, f o r  in s ta n c e , as in
2 )i t s e l f  r ig h t  and p ra isew orthy  and in s o fa r  o b l ig a to ry . That i s ,  th e
T) Because o f  th e  m utual in te rdependence  o f th e s e  problem s i t  m ight n o t 
prove p r a c t ic a b le  in  th e  course  o f th e  argument to  p rese rv e  t h e i r  
se p a ra te n e ss  b u t fo r  th e  sake o f c l a r i t y  and com pleteness I  s h a l l  t r y  
to  keep as f a r  as p o s s ib le  to  th e  o rd e r in  which th e y  were l i s t e d  in  
s p i t e  o f th e ,  in  t h i s  c a se , unavo idab le  r e p e t i t i o n s .
2 ) And, as we s h a l l  have occasion  to  argue l a t e r ,  i t s  only m o ra lly  v a lid  
form .
2) According to  Ross t h i s  i s  a s e l f - e v id e n t  and n o t f u r th e r  a n a ly sa b le  
o r re d u c ib le  p ro p o s i t io n . And he quotes s ix  such s e l f - e v id e n t  un - \ 
a n a ly sa b le  i r r e d u c ib le  p ro p o s i t io n s , which he term s p r im a -fa c ie  d u tie s . 
Now though th e se  p ro p o s itio n s  a re  n o t a n a ly sa b le  in  U t i l i t a r i a n  term s 
o r red u c ib le  to  term s "o f conductiveness to  good" (and th u s  f a r  we 
fo llo w  th e  R ossian le a d ) ,  th ey  a re ,  as we s h a l l  s e e , a n a ly sa b le  and 
f u r th e r  r e d u c ib le , namely to  one u n d e rly in g  p r in c ip le  o f a m oral and 
u n iv e r s a l ly  b ind ing  c h a ra c te r ,  thus r e fu t in g  th e  O c c a s io n a lis t  con­
te n t io n  t h a t  such a p r in c ip le  does n o t e x is t .
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k e e p in g -o f -p romise i s  o b l ig a to ry  because i t  i s  th e  keep in g -o f-a -p ro m ise , 
and n o t  as th e  U t i l i t a r i a n s  would have i t  because n o t  to  regard  i t  as 
o b l ig a to ry  would induce more and more people  to  d is re g a rd  t h i s  o b l ig a t io n ,  
and th u s  d i s r u p t  th e  p a t t e r n  o f  s o c ia l  l i f e .  In  th e  U t i l i t a r i a n  view 
what makes th e  keep ing -o f-p rom ises u l t im a te ly  d e s i r a b le  i s  t h a t  i t  lead s  
to  more keep ing-of-p rom ises  and th e reb y  h e lp s  s o c ia l  l i f e  to  go on.
Leaving a s id e  th e  obvious r e t o r t  about th e  dubious v a lu e  o f  ^ o c i a l  l i f e  
and th e  by no means ev id en t e v i l  o f  i t s  d i s r u p t io n  ( a t  l e a s t  both  th e  
p o s i t i v e  va lue  o f  th e  one, and th e  n e g a t iv e  va lue  o f  th e  o th e r  need to  be 
p roved , they  cannot j u s t  be assumed and made a s t a r t i n g  p o in t  f o r  an 
argum ent), th e  a b su rd i ty  o f  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  U t i l i t a r i a n  c o n te n tio n  
becomes app aren t when we pause to  r e f l e c t  t h a t  what we a re  asked to  do i s  
' t o  a t t a c h  moral va lue  to  th e  p ro p ag a tion  o f  prom ise-keeping  w h i l s t  we 
deny i t  to  prom ise-keeping i t s e l f . For i f  " th e  a c t  which has no 
i n t r i n s i c  goodness i s  he ld  r i g h t  because o f  i t s  consequences", . .  and i f  
th e s e  consequences "a re  a c t s  l i k e  i t ,  they  can have no i n t r i n s i c  goodness 
e i t h e r ,  and th e r e f o r e  cannot j u s t i f y  th e  a c t io n  whose consequences thgy 
a r e .  I f  r a b b i t s  a re  them selves w o rth le ss  th ey  cannot be of v a lu e  as 
p roducing  r a b b i t s " ) In  o th e r  words, th e  p ropaga tio n  of prom ise-keeping 
can only  be o f  v a lu e ,  and more p a r t i c u l a r l y  moral v a lu e ,  i f  th e  
in d iv id u a l  a c t  o f  prom ise-keeping a lre a d y  p o ssesses  t h i s  va lue  i n  i t s e l f ,  
i . e .  i f  prom ise-keeping  i s  r i g h t ,  i n ,  by and f o r  i t s e l f ,  and r e g a rd le s s  
o f  consequences. Hence, i f  th e r e  be any r i g h t  a c t io n  a t  a l l ,  and
l )  H.W,B.Joseph; Some Problems in  E th ic s ,  p . 100.
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judging  from th e  f a c t s  fu rn is h e d  by our u su a l  moral ex p eriences  th e r e  
seems good reason  to  assume t h a t  th e r e  i s ,  i t  must be * r i g h t '  i n  i t s e l f , 
even i f  th e  ' r i g h t 'n e s s  in  q u e s t io n  prove only a p r im a - fa c ie  r i g h tn e s s ,  
i . e .  be overthrown i n  th e  co u rse  o f  a more e la b o ra te  moral d e l i b e r a t i o n  
in  favour o f  some o th e r  more comprehensive c o n s id e r a t io n s .  " I t  remains a
f a c t  t h a t  an a c t  o f  promise b reak ing  i s  m ora lly  u n s u i t a b le  i n s o f a r  as i t
i s  an a c t  o f  prom ise b rea k in g ,  even when we decide  t h a t  i n  s p i t e  o f t h i s
i t  i s  th e  a c t  we ought to  d o " . Thi s  r ig h tn e s s  o f  th e  a c t ,  and be i t
only a p r im a - fa c ie  r i g h tn e s s ,  i s  s e l f - e v i d e n t .  The n a tu re  o f  t h i s  s e l f ­
ev idence  i s  e lu c id a te d  by Ross i n  th e  fo l lo w in g  p assages  "That an a c t  i s  
prim a f a c i e  r i g h t  i s  s e l f - e v i d e n t  no t i n  th e  sense  t h a t  i t  i s  e v id e n t  
from th e  beg inn ing  o f  our l i v e s  o r as soon as we a t t e n d  to  i t  f o r  th e  
f i r s t  t im e b u t  i n  th e  sense  t h a t  when we have reached  s u f f i c i e n t  m ental 
m a tu r i ty  and have g iven  s u f f i c i e n t  a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  p ro p o s i t io n  i t  i s  
e v id e n t  w ith o u t  any need o f  p ro o f ,  o r  o f  evidence beyond i t s e l f .  I t  i s
s e l f - e v i d e n t  j u s t  as a m athem atica l axiom, or th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  a form o f
2)
in f e re n c e  i s  e v id e n t" .  ‘Now to  c laim  w ith  however many r e s e r v a t io n s  as  
t o  th e  exac t n a tu re  o f  th e  s e l f -e v id e n c e  in  q u e s t io n ,  t h a t  an a c t  i s  r i g h t  
" independen t o f th e  tendency o f  th e  a c t  to  b r in g  abou t a  maximum o f  good, 
. . . .  i s  to  ho ld  an i n t u i t i o n i s t i c  view o f  a k i n d . T h i s  i n t u i t i o n
1 ) D.W.Ross: Foundations o f  E th ic s ,  page 85. We w i l l  have occasion  to  
quote  t h i s  passage  ag a in  when c o n s id e r in g  i t s  second im p l ic a t io n ,  
namely t h a t  an a c t  done in  s p i t e  o f  and in  f l a g r a n t  d e n ia l  o f  th e  
o b l ig a t io n s  in h e re n t  i n  prima f a c ie  d u t ie s  s t i l l  ought to  be done, and 
t h a t  moral s ig n i f ic a n c e  can be a t t r i b u t e d  to  t h i s  ' o u ^ t ' , i . e .  t h a t  
t h i s  ought p a r ta k e s  o f th e  n a tu re  o f  a moral i n ju n c t io n .
2 ) D.W.Ross s The R ight and th e  Good, p . 2 ) .
5) D.W.Ross: idem, p . 82.
-1 1 7 -
which i s  s u s c e p t ib le  and re sp o n s iv e  t o  th e  s e l f - e v i d e n t  n a tu re  o f 
independ en tly  r i g h t  a c t s ,  has  been evoked by Ross f o r  t h e  very  purpose 
o f  v in d ic a t in g  h i s  th eo ry  o f  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  prima f a c i e  d u t i e s ,  and in  
o rd e r  t o  s u b s t a n t i a t e  th e  autonomous n a tu r e  o f  th e  grounds on which they  
c laim  moral v a l i d i t y .  Ross rec o g n ise s  about s ix  such i n t u i t i v e l y  
accep ted  c la s s e s  o f  prima f a c i e  d u t i e s ,  i . e .  a c t s  r i g h t  i n  them se lves ,  
r e g a r d le s s  o f t h e i r  consequences; th e  c o n tex t  i n  which, and th e  
accompanying c ircum stances under which th e y  appear;  and o f  w hether in  
th e  end they  p r e v a i l  over o r  a re  p re v a i le d  over by o th e r  c o n s id e ra t io n s .  
These he l i s t s  as f i d e l i t y  ( th e  keep ing  o f  p ro m ises ) ,  r e p a r a t io n ,  
g r a t i t u d e ,  j u s t i c e ,  b e n e f ice n ce ,  th e  n o t  harming o f  o th e r s .  Now t h i s  
l i s t  o f  prima f a c i e  d u t ie s  has a somewhat haphazard and u n s y s t m a t i c  a i r ,  
and c e r t a i n l y  a ro uses  grave doubts as t o  i t s  supposed i r r e d u c i b i l i t y .
Nor does i t  seem p o s s ib le  o r p la u s ib le  t h a t  n o t  on ly  t h e  s in g le  r i g h t  
a c t s  b u t  a ls o  th e  exac t  number o f  a l l  e x i s t i n g  r i g h t  a c t s  should be 
re v e a le d  by i n t u i t i o n .  An a ttem p t t o  show t h a t  th e  s ix  prima f a c i e  
d u t ie s  c i te d  by Ross a re  based on and developed from one b asic  p r i n c i p l e  
which they  a l l  ho ld  in  common, and to  which an a n a ly s i s  o f  t h e i r  n a tu re  
and s t r u c tu r e  w i l l  needs reduce  then  should  th e r e f o r e  n o t  be wholly ou t 
o f  p l a c e .  Nor would an a t tem p t to  show t h a t  th e  i n t u i t i o n  invo lved  i s  
a ve ry  e lem en ta l ,  sim ple one d i r e c te d  towards t h i s  one p r i n c i p l e . ^ )
1 ) T his w i l l  i n  a d d i t io n  prove more in  accordance w ith  one o f  th e
accep ted  fundamental h y p o th eses ,  ( i . e .  th e  one t h a t  claim s t h a t  every 
man qua man i s  s u s c e p t ib le  o f  moral e x p e r ien ce , and a n a tu r a l  judge 
o f  moral m a t t e r s , ) th an  th e  assum ption o f  a s ix f o ld  i n t u i t i o n  
d i r e c te d  towards s ix  b a s i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  * r i g h t s  *.
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»
L et us c o n s id e r  each item  o f  th e  l i s t  s e p a r a te ly  and ask  o u rse lv es  
what makes i t  an a c t  " in  i t s e l f  ' r i ^ t  ' " .
l )  Promise k eep in g :  I  ought t o  keep a once given prom ise, because ly
h av ing  promised somebody som ething in  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  I  aroused c e r t a i n  
e x p e c ta t io n s  i n  th e  prom isee. The prom isee has been induced, by my own 
adm iss ion , to  b e l ie v e  t h a t  I  am ready to  f u l f i l  th e s e  e x p e c ta t io n s .  Hé 
t h e r e f o r e  has a c e r t a i n  r i g h t  n o t  to  have t h i s ' j u s t i f i e d  b e l i e f  s e t  a t  
nough t;  a p a r t  from th e  c la im s a r i s i n g  frcm a l l  o b l ig a t io n s  he m ight have 
undergone, or t h e  th in g s  he m ight have l e f t  undone, because o f  h i s  
r e l i a n c e  on th e  g iven  prom ise . The b reak in g  o f  my promise would mean 
t h a t  I  have co n sc io u s ly  and d e l i b e r a t e l y  misused a m an 's  con fid en ce . I t  
would mean a complete d is re g a rd  o f  th e  promisee as a pe rson , whose hopes 
and i n t e r e s t s  I  am bound to  r e s p e c t  because they  a re  h i s  hopes and 
i n t e r e s t s ,  and r e g a rd le s s  o f  whether I  approve o f  them fo r  t h e i r  own sake . 
I t  would mean th e  d e n ia l  o f  th e  p ro m is se e 's  s t a tu s  as my eq u a l,  whan I  
must n o t  use  as a to o l  e i t h e r  f o r  my own advantage o r  f o r  what I  co n s id er  
h i s .  Nor can my e s t im a te  o f  th e  c ircu m stan ces ,  i . e .  what would seem t o  
me c ircum stances  f r e e in g  me from my prom ise , r e a l l y  f r e e  me from my promise 
( though th e  i n i t i a l  c o n d it io n s  under which th e  prom ise was made may have 
a l t e r e d  com plete ly , even to  making a f u l f i lm e n t  o f  t h e  promise s e n s e le s s )  
w ith ou t th e  t a c i t  o r  e x p l i c i t  consent o f  th e  prom isee . The b reak in g  o f  
a prom ise in  a l l  c a se s ,  and in  th e  most a l l e v i a t i n g  c irc u m s ta n c e s ,^ )  would
l )  Even in  cases  when we can say to  o u r s e lv e s :  "He w i l l  u nd e rs tan d  and
n o t  mind" we a re  r e a l l y  making use  of th e  prom isee in  t h a t  we fo rc e  
him in to  a p sy c h o lo g ic a l  frame and g ive  him, a t  l e a s t  i n  our 
im a g in a t io n ,  q u a l i t i e s  he m i ^ t  n o t  have o r  d e c l in e  t o  e x e rc is e  f o r  
our b e n e f i t .  The promisee m ight on th e  o th e r  hand r e a l l y  "unders tand  
and f o r g iv e " , b u t  we have no r i g h t  t o  bank on t h a t .
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t h e r e f o r e  always seem to  imply a d is r e g a rd  o f  the  p ro m isee 's  w i l l  i n  th e  
m a t t e r ,  h i s  independence a s  a " seek e r  o f  ends" in  h i s  own r i g h t ,  and h is  
t r e a tm e n t  as a "means alone" t o  be used t o  h i s  o r my own advantage as I  
see  f i t .
The terms we have been d r iv e n  to  u se  when examining th e  example o f  
p rom ise-keep ing  t e l l  t h e i r  own s to r y  and p o in t  th e  way to  what seems 
s t i l l  t h e  b e s t  fo rm u la tio n  o f  th e  u n d e r ly in g  p r i n c i p l e  frcm which promise- 
keep ing  d e r iv e s  i t s  e s s e n t i a l  r ig h tn e s s  and such c la im s as i t  has  on our 
a l l e g i a n c e ,  namely th e  second fo rm u la tio n  o f  K a n t 's  O a thegorica l 
Im p e ra t iv e :  "Never a c t  th u s  t h a t  in  y our a c t  you should use  a human
fe l lo w -b e in g  as a means a lo n e " .
2) "R ep ara tio n " , th e  second i t a n  i n  th e  l i s t  o f  prima f a c i e  d u t i e s ,  i s  
s i m i l a r l y  r e d u c ib le  to  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e ,  and even more e a s i l y  th an  
"p rom ise-keep ing" . For in h e r e n t  in  th e  case  of " r e p a r a t io n " ,  l i e s  th e  
f a c t  o f  having used somebody to  o n e 's  own advantage and h is  d e tr im e n t ,  
and t h e r e f o r e ,  a f o r t i o r i ,  'a s  a  means o n l y ' .  Some harm has been done 
in  th e  p a s t ,  and i t  i s  th e r e f o r e  incumbent on th e  c u l p r i t  even i f  he d id  
i t  i n a d v e r te n t ly ,  t o  make amends. For by n o t  r e v i s in g  th e  i n i t i a l  
harm ful a c t ,  one ag g rav a tes  i t  by o n e 's  t a c i t  acq u iescen ce , which amounts 
to  a renewed a f f i r m a t io n  o f  th e  misuse made of a human being i n  th e  p a s t .
5) "G ra ti tu d e"  i s  a form o f  ' r e p a r a t i o n '  and i t s  re d u c t io n  t o  th e  
p rim ary  p r i n c i p l e  o f  moral o b l ig a t io n  fo llo w s s im i l a r  l i n e s .
l )  We w i l l  haveoccasion  to  d e a l  l a t e r  w ith  th e  im p l ic a t io n s  o f  t h i s  
form ula and th e  problems r a i s e d  by i t .
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4) “J u s t i c e "  i s  an im personal and o b je c t iv e  v e r s io n  o f  th e  moral 
p r i n c i p l e  when considered  in  i t s  d i s t r i b u t i v e  a p p l i c a t io n ,
5) "Not harming o th e rs"  i s  t h e  most d i r e c t  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  th e  
p r i n c i p l e ,  f o r  i t  fo rb id s  th e  m isuse o f  a human fe l lo w -b e in g  f o r  t h e  
sake o f  some advantage to  be gained p le a s u re  t o  be had , o r  j u s t  c a re ­
l e s s l y  o u t o f  a d is re g a rd  o f  h i s  e x is te n c e  and i n t e r e s t s .
In  any c a se ,  th e  f i v e  prim a f a c i e  d u t ie s  considered  a re  n e i t h e r  
s e p a r a te  nor m u tu a l ly  e x c lu s iv e ,  * g ra t i tu d e *  being bu t a form o f  
* rep a ra t io n *  ( i . e .  a sp e c ie s  o f  which r e p a r a t io n  i s  th e  genus), *pr a n is e -  
keeping* bu t a form o f  *harming o th e rs  * ; ' rep a ra t io n *  lin k ed  c a u s a l ly  to
*not harming o thers*  o f  which i t  i s  t h e  d i r e c t  r e s u l t ,  e t c .  e t c .
6 ) "Beneficence" on th e  o th e r  hand seems a t  f i r s t  b lu sh  to  imply more 
th a n  i s  con ta ined  in  th e  p r i n c i p l e .  But unders tood  as a moral i n ju n c t io n  
(n o t  a s e n t im en ta l  ap p ea l)  as no doubt Ross meant i t  to  be un ders tood  ' 
( f o r  was n o t  t h i s  th e  very  purpose t h a t  made him d e f in e  p r im a - fa c ie  d u t ie s  
as d i s t i n c t  from d u t ie s  o f  conductiveness t o  good, in  g en e ra l  and
. ben e f icen ce  as a prima f a c i e  duty  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ! )  i t  w i l l  be seen to  be
n o th in g  more th a n  th e  p o s i t i v e  a f f i r m a t io n  o f  th e  n e g a t iv e  i n ju n c t io n  
embodied in  th e  b a s ic  p r i n c i p l e .  Namely a command to  regard  th e  person  
o f  a human fe l lo w -b e in g  w ith  a l l  th e  r e s p e c t  due t o  i t s  a s p i r a t i o n s ,  
w ish es ,  ch o ic es ,  and to  accord  i t  a l l  th e  h e lp  i t  may need on i t s  way.
In  s h o r t  we a re  en jo ined  t o  look upon o th e r  persons w ith  a fa v o u ra b le ,  
encouraging  eye. More th an  t h a t  would b r in g  us back in to  th e
U t i l i t a r i a n  rea lm , where n o t  th e  b e n e f ic e n t  sympathy w ith  ano th e r  person
(as  a prima f a c i e  duty) bu t th e  p roducing o f  more good (by bestowing i t
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on an o th e r  person) would seem t o  have claim ed our a l l e g ia n c e .
The s ix  prim a f a c i e  r i g h t  a c t s  l i s t e d  by Ross ^  th e r e f o r e  draw 
t h e i r  moral v a l i d i t y  from one b a s ic  p r i n c i p l e .  S ince  i t  a ls o  seans more 
p ro b ab le  and t a l l i e s  more w ith  our d a i ly  moral e x p e r ien c e ,  t h a t  moral 
i n t u i t i o n  be d i r e c te d  s o le ly  towards t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  as  i t s  only  c o n te n t ,  
we can conclude t h a t  only by v i r t u e  o f  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  ap p lied  as a
c r i t e r i o n ,  i s  moral s t a tu s  accorded to  any p r o p o s i t io n .  That i s ,  i n s o f a r
as a p r o p o s i t io n  in c o rp o ra te s  and se rves  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e ,  t o  t h a t  e x te n t  
w i l l  i t  be m o ra l ly  r i g h t  ; and in v e r s e ly ,  in s o f a r  a p ro p o s i t io n  in f r in g e s  
t h i s  p r i n c i p l e ,  i t  w i l l  be m o ra l ly  wrong. (Hence, i t  appears p e rm is s ib le  
and i t  c e r t a i n l y  i s  p r e f e r a b le  to  u se  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  and appeal to  i t  
whenever a q u e s t io n  d e a l in g  w ith  prima f a c i e  r ig h tn e s s  a r i s e s  i n  th e  
course  o f  our argument, r a t h e r  than  to  th e  unwieldy and p robab ly  incom plete  
l i s t  g iven 'ày R oss).
The q u e s t io n  we must now ask  i s  : Can t h i s  moral p r i n c i p l e  be sa id
t o  p re s e rv e  i t s  d e c i s iv e  im portance a t  th e  h ig h e r  d i a l e c t i c a l  l e v e l  a t
which th e  s o lu t io n  o f  complex, co n cre te  and unique moral problems a re  
d e l ib e r a te d ?  T hat i s ,  i s  what i s  ’prim a f a c i e  r ig h t*  a ls o  u l t im a te ly  
i . e .  always and n e c e s s a r i ly  r ig h t?  Or a re  t h e r e  o th e r  grounds o f  r i f i t ­
n e s s ,  beside  th e  p r i n c i p l e ,  v i z .  conduciveness to  good, which m ight 
o v e r r id e  i t  i n  .the  f i n a l  d e c is io n  w ith ou t im p a ir in g  th e  moral s t a t u s  o f  
t h i s  d e c i s io n ? According to  Ross -  d e f i n i t e l y  n o t  ( f o r  th e  f i r s t  
q u e s t io n ) ,  d e f i n i t e l y  yes f o r  th e  second: " I t  remains a f a c t  t h a t  an
a c t  o f  prom ise-keep ing  i s  m ora lly  u n s u i t a b le  i n s o f a r  as i t  i s  an a c t  o f 
prom ise b reak ing  even when we decide  t h a t  i n  s p i t e  o f  t h i s  i t  i s  th e  a c t
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we ought to  do ."^^  " I t  seems to  me . . .  r ig h tn e s s  depends n o t  oh a j o in t
c o n s id e ra t io n  of f i t t i n g n e s s  and u t i l i t y ,  bu t  on a j o i n t  c o n s id e ra t io n  of
f i t t i n g n e s s  a r i s i n g  from u t i l i t y  and f i t t i n g n e s s  a r i s i n g  from o th e r
2 )sou rces  such as t h a t  a prom ise has been made",  ^ i . e .  from vdiat we have 
seen u l t im a te ly  t o  be th e  moral p r i n c i p l e .  Now in  th e s e  two q u o ta t io n s  
th e  crux of th e  problem i s  s t a t e d  and decided i n  fav o u r  o f  th e  second 
a l t e r n a t i v e .  T here fo re  a c a r e f u l  exam ination o f  t h e  term s used and th e  
s ig n i f ic a n c e  and meaning they  a re  charged w ith ,  seems in d ic a te d .  F i r s t  
o f  a l l  th e r e  a re  th e  d i f f e r e n t  meanings o f  ’ r i g h t  *n e s s .  *R ig h t ’n e s s ,  
a cco rd ing  to  Ross, i s  i n  th e  f i r s t  p la c e  a s o r t  o f  moral s u i t a b i l i t y ,  th e  
q u a l i t y  o f  ’f i t t i n g  i n ’ w ith  th e  requ irem en ts  o f prima f a c i e  d u t i e s .
S ince  we have shown th e s e  d u t ie s  to  be both  d e rived  and deduced from a 
b a s ic  moral p r i n c i p l e ,  we have proved r ig h tn e s s  i n  R oss’ f i r s t  meaning to  
be n o th in g  e l s e  but an accordance  w ith  b a s ic  p r i n c i p l e .  Not so th e  
’ r i g h t n e s s ’ in  th e  second q u o ta t io n .  Here th e  i n t r i n s i c  and e s s e n t i a l  
q u a l i t y  o f  ’ r i g h t ’ness  i s  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  each and every  s u c c e s s f u l ,  i . e .  
com prehensive^  ^ s o lu t io n  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  m oral problem s, r e g a rd le s s  o f  
w hether t h i s  s o lu t io n  be in  accordance w ith  th e  f i r s t  meaning of r i g h t ­
n ess  or n o t .  This i s  s u b s ta n t ia t e d  by two assum ptions : a )  t h a t  th e
i n t r i n s i c  ’ r i g h t n e s s ’ o f a f i r s t  immutable and u n iv e r s a l  p r i n c i p l e  i s  
o f  th e  same o rd e r  and n a tu re  as t h a t  o f  an a c c id e n ta l ,  p a r t i c u l a r ,  and 
n o n - re c u r r in g  .d e c is io n ;  b) t h a t  th e  o b l ig a t io n  to  produce ’good’ i . e .  th e
1) D.W.Ross! The R ight and th e  Good, page 8 5 .)
) A ll  i t a l i c s  a re  mine.
2 ) D.W.Ross: idem page 8 l . )
5 ) i . e .  s u i t i n g  both th e  ’prim a f a c i e ’ and th e  ’p roducive  o f  good' 
d u t i e s .
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r igh tnesB  in h e re n t  i n  th e  p r i n c i p l e  of U t i l i t y ,  and th e  p u r s u i t  o f  va lues  
i s  on a p a r , bo th  as to  i t s  i n t r i n s i c  e x c e l le n c e ,  and i t s  o b l ig a to ry  
f o r c e ,  w ith  th e  b a s ic  moral p r i n c i p l e .
Now th e  second assum ption i s  l i a b l e  to  th e  fo l lo w in g  r e s e r v a t io n s .  
From th e  r e f l e c t i o n s  in  our f i r s t  c h a p te r  as w ell  a s  from our d a i ly  
exp erience  i t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  c l e a r  t h a t  we have no r i ^ t  t o  d is re g a rd  th e  
prima f a c i e  d u t ie s  (b reak  p rom ises , t e l l  l i e s )  to  our own p e rso n a l  
advan tage , t h a t  i s ,  i n  o rd e r  to  "produce good" f o r  o u r se lv e s .  I t  i s  
cons idered  q u i te  immoral t o  o v e rr id e  th e  prima f a c i e  d u t ie s  even i f ,  as 
r e fo rm e rs ,  we do so i n  o rd e r  t o  b r in g  humanity n e a r e r  to  th e  s t a t e  i n  
which we would l i k e  to  see  i t .
A l to g e th e r  i t  i s  q u e s t io n a b le  w hether we can be sa id  t o  s ta n d  under 
an o b l ig a t io n  to  "produce good" f o r  o u r s e lv e s ,  though p o s s ib ly  we m ight 
have such an o b l ig a t io n  tow ards o t h e r s . I n  what sense  we m ight be 
sa id  t o  s tand  under such an o b l ig a t io n  i s  made c l e a r  by th e  famous passage  
i n  K an t’ s M etaphysic o f  EJthics "What ends they  a re  th e  very  essence  where­
o f  i t  i s  t o  be d u t ie s  : such ends a re  one’ s own p e r f e c t i o n  -  our n e ig h ­
b o u r’ s h a p p in e s s . These ends cannot be in v e r te d  and we cannot s t a t e  as 
such , -  one’s own happ iness  -  our n e ig h b o u r’s p e r f e c t io n .  For h i s  own 
happ in ess  i s  an end which every man has by h i s  n a tu r a l  i n c l i n a t i o n  and 
t h e r e f o r e  cannot be regarded  as a du ty , w ithou t c o n t r a d ic t in g  i t s e l f .
What everyone in e v i t a b ly  w i l l s  cannot f a l l  under th e  n o t io n  duty  -  duty
l )  L ike P l a t o ’ s p h i lo so p h e r  who ought to  r e tu r n  from th e  con tem pla tion  
o f  th e  Sun to  t e l l  th e  chained  people  i n  th e  cave about i t ;  but 
see  a ls o  K an t’ s argument.
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im p o rt in g  an o b l ig a t io n  to  adopt an end n o t  wholly d e s i re d  a l r e a d y .  
T h ere fo re  i t  i s  a c o n t r a d ic t io n  in  term s to  say t h a t  a man i s  o b lig ed  
to  advance h i s  own happ iness  w ith  a l l  h i s  m ight.
And th e r e  i s  th e  l i k e  c o n t r a d ic t io n  in  say ing  t h a t  we ought to  
make th e  p e r f e c t io n  o f  a n o th e r  our end, and hold o u rse lv es  ob lig ed  to  
f u r t h e r  i t ,  f o r  th e  p e r f e c t io n  o f  a n o th e r ,  as a p e rso n ,  c o n s i s t s  i n  h i s  
a b i l i t y  to  choose h i s  own ends in  accordance w ith h i s  own co n cep tio n  o f  
h i s  d u ty , and i t  would be c o n tr a d ic to ry  to  impose on me as my d u ty ,  some­
th in g  which only he h im se lf  can accomplish"
The o b l ig a t io n  t o  ’produce good’ f o r  o u rse lv es  can , th e n ,  be
i n t e r p r e t e d  only  as an o b l ig a t io n  to  seek our moral p e r f e c t io n .  This
obv iously  cannot be done by o v e r r id in g  th e  most e lem entary  and s e l f -
e v id e n t  o f our d u t ie s  ( i . e .  by ly in g ,  b reak ing  prom ises e t c . ) .  But even
so I doubt whether we can be s a id  to  be under an o b l ig a t io n  to  seek our
moral p e r f e c t io n ,  s in c e  I do n o t  th in k  t h a t  moral p e r f e c t i o n  can be
2)
ob ta in ed  in  any such d i r e c t  and conscious way. Moreover th e  e x is te n c e  
o f  such an o b l ig a t io n  would amount to  an i n t o l e r a b l e  i n t e r f e r e n c e  w ith  
our freedom o f  cho ice  o f  ends and i d e a l s .  T here fo re  i t  seems to  me t h a t  
we cannot be sa id  a t  a l l  to  be under an o b l ig a t io n  to  ’produce good' f o r  
o u rs e lv e s .  I t  fo llow s th e n ,  t h a t  i f  we a re  a t  a l l  under an o b l ig a t io n  
to  ’produce good’ , t h i s  o b l ig a t io n  l i e s  n o t  in  th e  f a c t  t h a t  more good i s  
p roduced , f o r  th e  amount o f  good in  th e  world in c re a s e s  when we produce
1) Metaphysik der B i t t e n ,  I I  T e i l .  M etaphysische Aufa#gsgründe d e r  
Tugendlehre , E in le i tu n g .  & IV.
2 ) As I have t r i e d  to  show when d is c u s s in g  th e  "Twofold fu n c t io n  o f  
Values in  E th ic s " .
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i t  f o r  o u rse lv es  no l e s s  th an  when we produce i t  f o r  o th e r s ,  but i n  i t s  
"be ing  produced f o r  o th e r s " . Furtherm ore i f  i t  be produced f o r  o th e rs  
i t  must be produced as a m a t te r  o f d u ty , in  a d i s i n t e r e s t e d ,  "non- 
p a th o 1o g ic a l "^^ way. That i s  we must n o t  m erely  seek our own good,
p le a s u re  and s a t i s f a c t i o n  by th e  roundabout way o f  doing good to  o th e r s ;
2)nor because im pelled  by n a tu r a l  i n c l i n a t i o n s  we cannot he lp  doing i t .
Now i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  in  t h i s  m a t te r  o f  ’p roducing  good’ f o r  o th e rs  
th e  r e s p e c t  f o r  o th e r  p e o p le ’ s persons must stop  us a t  any tim e and s e t  
l i m i t s  to  our purpose o f  doing them good. Any a ttem p t t o  improve t h e i r  
moral c h a r a c te r  o r  f u r t h e r  t h e i r  s p i r i t u a l  p e r f e c t io n ,  i s  p e r  se  su sp ec t  
as an a r ro g a n t  i n t e r f e r e n c e  w ith  t h e i r  autonomous and sovere ign  
p e r s o n a l i t i e s ;  moreover acco rd in g  to  Kant i t  cannot be done a t  a l l .
But even to  p ro cu re  e x te rn a l  ’good’ f o r  o th e r  people  i s  a purpose which 
must be l im i te d  by a regard  f o r  th o se  p e o p le ’s w ish es ,  even when th e  
p ro ce ss  o f  "producing  th e  good" in  q u e s t io n ,  in v o lv es  no harm a t  a l l  to  
anybody, and no in fr in g em en t o f  any p r im a - fa c ie  du ty . Thus one must 
n o t  do good to  one’ s country  a g a in s t  th e  e l e c t o r a t e ’ s w i l l  on p a in  of 
becoming a d i c t a t o r .  A f o r t i o r i  we ought n o t  to  o v e rr id e  p e r f e c t l y  c le a r  
moral in ju n c t io n s  ( l i k e  n o t  ly in g ,  n o t  harming a n o th e r  e t c . )  i n  o rd e r  t o  
produce good f o r  somebody w ithou t h i s  exp ress  consen t ; no r  o v e r r id e  a
1 ) i n  th e  Kantiep. sense o f  th e  word.
2 ) v i z .  th e  example o f  " sav in g  a baby from th e  f i r e "  quoted on page 92
from Bernard de M a n d e v i l le : An Enquiry in to  th e  O rig in  of Moral
V ir tu e  & 1011 in  S e lb y -B ig g e ." . . . .  t h e  a c t io n  i s  n e i t h e r  good n o r  bad 
and whatever b e n e f i t  th e  i n f a n t  rec e iv e d  we only ob liged  o u rse lv e s ;
f o r  to  have seen i t  f a l l  and n o t  have s t r i v e n  to  h in d e r  i t ,  would
have caused us p a in ,  which s e l f - p r e s e r v a t io n  compelled us to  p r e v e n t . ."
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c l e a r  prima f a c i e  duty  we owe to  one man, i n  o rd er  to  produce good f o r
a n o th e r ,  o r  o th e r s .  In  s h o r t ,  no o b l ig a t io n  to  do good can, i n  case
#
o f  c l a s h ,  o v e r r id e  th e  prima f a c i e  d u t ie s  based on th e  b a s ic  p r i n c i p l e ,  
because i t  would be absurd to  ho ld  t h a t  we a re  m ora lly  ob liged  t o  commit, 
a c l e a r  wrong i n  o rd e r  to  b r in g  about a h y p o th e t ic a l  good.
We must th e r e f o r e  conclude t h a t  th e  o b l ig a t io n  to  ’produce good* 
i s  n o t  on a p a r ,  w ith  t h a t  a r i s i n g  from th e  b as ic  p r i n c i p l e  and, t h e r e ­
f o r e ,  must g ive  way t o  i t  i n  a l l  cases  i f  th e  d e c is io n  reached i s  to  
claim  m oral w orth  and v a l i d i t y .
Now i f  t h a t  be so i t  seems extrem ely  im probable t h a t  th e  u l t im a te  
d e c i s io n  u n le s s  i t  be i n  a l l  i d e n t i c a l  w ith  th e  prima f a c ie  o b l ig a t io n s  
in v o lv e d ,  i s  o f  th e  same o rd e r ,  n a tu re  and degree o f  r ig h tn e s s  as th e  
b a s ic  p r i n c i p l e .  In  f a c t  i t  can never be o f  th e  same deg ree , s in c e  th e  
p r i n c i p l e  i s  fo rm ula ted  a p r i o r i  and in  a way in  a b s t r a c to ,  w h i l s t  th e  
f i n a l  d e c is io n  in  a co n c re te  in s ta n c e  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  an adm ixture  o f  
m oral p r in c ip le s  and non-moral m a te r i a l .  We must th e r e f o r e  ask  our­
s e lv e s  what induced Ross t o  assume t h i s  s i m i l a r i t y  between th e  rig ih tness 
o f  th e  prima f a c i e  d u t ie s  o r r a t h e r  th e  b a s ic  p r i n c i p l e  and t h a t  o f  th e  
f i n a l  p r a c t i c a l  d e c is io n .  The fo l lo w in g  c o n s id e ra t io n  m i ^ t  p o s s ib ly  
f u r n i s h  us w ith  an answer : Given th e  i n i t i a l  ’ r i g h t ’ness  of prim a f a c i e
d u t ie s  t h i s  r ig h tn e s s  " i s  d i s t in g u i s h a b le  from our o b l ig a t io n  to  do them." 
(H.W.B. Jo sep h ’s fo rm u la t io n ) .  A ’ r i ^ t ’ a c t  i s  r i g h t  w hether i t  be 
performed o r  n o t .  But th e  same word ’r i g h t ’ i s  used t o  c h a r a c t e r i s e  
th e  in ju n c t io n  to  perform i t .  An ’o b l ig a t i o n ’ to  perform  an a c t  i s  
e q u iv a le n t  to  say ing  t h a t  ’one ough t’ to  perform t h a t  a c t ,  o r  t h a t  i t
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i s  ’ r i g h t '  t h a t  t h i s  a c t  should  be perform ed. Now th e r e  e x i s t s  th e  
o b l ig a t io n  to  perform a prima f a c i e  du ty  derived  from th e  i n t r i n s i c  and 
immutable n a tu re  o f  t h a t  d u ty ,  and th e r e  e x i s t s  th e  in ju n c t io n  to  perform 
" th e  b e s t  p o s s ib le  a c t io n  f o r  a l l  concerned" in  any given c ircum stan ce , 
which i s  a ls o  commonly expressed  i n  t e r n s  o f "ought" (as  i n  th e  f i r s t  
q u o ta t io n  from S i r  David Ross) and d e sc r ib e d  as ’ r i g h t ’ though always 
w ith  th e  p ro v iso  "under th e  g iven c ircum stances"  and a l t h o u ^  i t  i s  by 
no means s e l f - e v i d e n t  t h a t  such in ju n c t io n s ,  o b l ig a t io n s  and ' r i g h t s ’ 
p a r ta k e  o f  a moral n a tu re  o r a re  m ora lly  j u s t i f i a b l e .  By a s s o c ia t io n  
and analogy th e  a c c id e n ta l  p a r t i c u l a r  a c t io n s  which th e s e  in ju n c t io n s  
e n jo in  us t o  perform  a re  s a id  to  be ’ r i g h t ’ and procla im ed u l t im a te  
d u t i e s .  Whether moral s ig n i f i c a n c e  and moral o b l ig a to r in e s s  can be 
a sc r ib e d  to  th e s e  " u l t im a te  p a r t i c u l a r  and a c c id e n ta l  d u t ie s "  depends 
l a r g e ly  on whether we a re  p repared  to  a s c r ib e  moral s ig n i f i c a n c e  to  
U t i l i t a r i a n  c o n s id e ra t io n s  and th e  U t i l i t a r i a n  in ju n c t io n  ’to  produce 
good’ i . e .  on whether or n o t  we accep t  R oss’ second assum ption . Now 
t h i s  assum ption has been proved u n te n a b le  by an a n a ly s i s  of th e  term s 
(To produce good i s  o b l ig a to ry )  in v o lv ed . I t  must a ls o  be qu es tion ed  
i n  th e  l i g h t  o f  some l e s s  fundamental r e f l e c t i o n s  on th e  mode in  which 
i t  o p e ra te s .  Thus whereas th e  prima f a c i e  d u t i e s ,  i . e .  d u t ie s  de riv ed  
from th e  moral p r in c ip le  a re  what they  a re  by v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r  i n t r i n s i c  
n a tu re  and s t r u c tu r e ,  and remain so no m a t te r  under what c ircum stances ,  
and in  what c o n te x t  th ey  ap p ea r,  being roo ted  in  th e  one c o n s t i t u t i v e  
n o t io n  o f  "hum an-fellow -being" ; th e  "producive  o f  good" d u t ie s  change 
w ith  every changing c ircu m stance , and never appear tw ice  th e  same.
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Whereae th e  o b l ig a to r in e s s  o f th e  moral p r i n c i p l e  i s  s e l f - e v i d e n t ,  and 
• i t s  in ju n c t io n s  q u i te  c l e a r ,  t h e  req u irem en ts  o f th e s e  o th e r  
c o n s id e ra t io n s  a re  always a m a t te r  o f  p e r p l e x i ty ,  doubt and argument. 
Whereas an a b s o lu te ly  su re  in n e r  vo ice  responds t o  t h e  o b l ig a t io n  l a i d  
upon us by th e  moral p r i n c i p l e ,  and any in fr in g em en t o f  i t  i s  u s u a l ly  
accompanied by tw inges of ’consc ien ce* , even when t h a t  in f r in g em en t i s  
done ou t o f  c o n s id e ra t io n  f o r  th e  "producive  o f  good" d u t i e s ,  no such 
in n e r  v o ice  corresponds to  th e  o b l ig a t io n s  a r i s in g  ou t o f  th e  duty to  
produce good and any in fr in g em en t  of them done f o r  th e  sake of th e  moral 
p r i n c i p l e ,  i s  u s u a l ly  accompanied by th e  in n e r  c o n v ic t io n  o f  having  done 
th e  r i g h t  th in g .  Another r e f l e c t i o n  which should g ive  us pause i s ,  
t h a t  even when we f i n a l l y  d e c id e  t h a t  what we "ought" t o  do in  a c e r t a i n  
s i t u a t i o n  i s  t o  break  our p rom ise, we a re  p e r f e c t l y  aware t h a t  we have 
a llow ed c o n s id e ra t io n s  o f  an a l i e n  n a tu re  to  o v e rr id e  our moral 
p r i n c i p l e s ,  and c l e a r l y  d i s t in g u i s h  th e  one from th e  o t h e r . N o w  i t  
i s  a f a c t  t h a t  we o f te n  th u s  allow our moral p r in c ip le s  to  be p re v a i le d  
upon by, f o r  in s t a n c e .  U t i l i t a r i a n  c o n s id e ra t io n s ,  and t h a t  we 
d e l i b e r a t e l y  choose to  do so ,  and sometimes g lad ly  teike th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  t h i s  d e c is io n  upon u s .  But we always remain conscious o f  hav ing  
chosen th e  U t i l i t a r i a n  in  p re fe re n c e  to  th e  Moral p r i n c i p l e .  This th e
1 ) v i z ,  H .J .P a to n :  Can Reason be P r a c t i c a l ? ;  fo o tn o te  t o  page 28.
" I t  i s  commonly h e ld  t h a t  a good w i l l  may have o th e r  m otives than  
duty" ( i . e .  prima f a c i e  d u t ie s )  " I  do n o t  propose to  argue t h i s  here  
beyond say ing  t h a t  w i l l  based m erely  on th e s e  o th e r  m otives w i l l  
o f te n  n e c e s s a r i ly  i s s u e  in  wrong a c t s  and so (on my view) i s  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i ly  a good w i l l .  The w i l l  based on du ty  i f  i t  i s s u e s  in  
wrong a c t s  a t  a l l  does so n o t  because o f  i t s  m o tiv es ,  but from some 
ex traneous reason , such as ignorance  of th e  s i t u a t i o n . "
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f a c t .  There a re  b u t  two ways o f  d e a l in g  w ith  i t .  One i s  t o  seek to
j u s t i f y  such h a b i tu a l  d e c is io n ,  and p o s t  factum and in  t h e i r  co n c re te
e n t i r e t y ,  co n fe r  moral worth on them. The o th e r  i s  to  ana ly se  them 
la y  b a re  th e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  moral component in  t h e i r  make-up, and judge 
them by th e  way in  which, and th e  e x te n t  to  which, t h i s  moral component 
has  p re v a i le d  in  th e  f i n a l  outcome. The one way seeks to  co n fe r  moral 
w orth  on th e  p u r s u i t  o f  v a lu e s ,  and on a l l  a c t io n s ,  d e c is io n s ,  
o b l ig a t io n s  and r u le s  d e r iv in g  from t h i s  p u r s u i t .  The o th e r  w i l l  deny
moral s ig n i f i c a n c e  to  a l l  bu t  one s in g le  component o f our a c t io n s ,  a
component moreover, which we have seen ought n o t  to  i n s p i r e  and 
c o n s t i t u t e  a co n c re te  a c t io n  by i t s e l f .  The f i r s t  i s  th e  a t t i t u d e  o f  
th e  O c c a s io n a l i s t  school o f  E th ic a l  Thought and i t  would be o f  i n t e r e s t  
to  examine some o f  th e  r e s u l t s  o f  i t s  p r a c t i c a l  a p p l i c a t io n :  In  o rd e r  to  
do t h i s  l e t  us look  a t  some examples and s ta tem en ts  i n  which 
c o n s id e ra t io n s  o f  'good* have p re v a i le d  over th o se  a r i s i n g  from th e  moral 
p r i n c i p l e  and see  j u s t  how f a r  we a re  p repared  to  a t t a c h  moral worth to  
th e  outcome.
The s ta tem en ts  I  w ish to  examine a re  : "The maximum good o f  th e  few
i s  b e t t e r  th an  th e  minimum good f o r  th e  many assuming t h a t  we have only 
a c e r t a i n  amount o f  good a t  our d isp o sa l  and a re  faced  w ith  th e  problem 
o f  how b e s t  t o  d i s t r i b u t e  i t . " ^ ^  and "We should choose th e  to rm en t and 
s u f f e r in g  o f  an a b s o lu te ly  inn ocen t human being  i f  i t  were fo r  th e  common 
g o o d T h e  examples: Dr. Max Brod and th e  q u e s t io n  of th e  posthumous
1) D.W.Ross: Foundation of E th ic s .
2) D.W.Ross: The R ight and th e  Good; p . 64.
*
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p u b l ic a t i o n  o f  th e  w r i t in g s  o f  Franz Kafka; th e  q u e s t io n  of th e  
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  o f  m o ra lly  compromised a r t i s t s ;  and th e  q u e s t io n  of 
w hether th e  W orld -A ssoc ia tion  o f  Medical Research should  make u se  o f  th e  
f i l e s  and achievements o f  th e  German M edical I n s t i t u t e  -  a cq u ired  w h i l s t  
u s in g  human g u in e a -p ig s .
Taking th e  examples f i r s t  we f in d  t h e  fo llow ing  s i t u a t i o n  i n  th e  
f i r s t  case . Dr. Brod, on h i s  own p u b lish ed  evidence promised h is  dying 
f r i e n d  to  d e s tro y  a l l  h i s  w r i t in g s .  A fterw ards he f e l t  t h a t  i t  would 
be wrong to  d e p r iv e  th e  world o f  t h i s  incom parable i n t e l l e c t u a l  experience  
and s p i r i t u a l  enrichm ent, and h i s  f r i e n d  o f  h is  w e ll-e a rn e d  fame. So he 
broke h i s  prom ise. For th e  sake of t h i s  argument l e t  us assume th e s e  
w r i t in g s  to  be one o f  th e  m ajor b le s s in g s  ever co n fe rred  on mankind, th u s  
g ra n t in g  t h e i r  p u b l ic a t io n  th e  s t a tu s  o f  a  supremely and o b je c t iv e ly  good 
a c t .  No rea so n ab le  doubt can be e n te r ta in e d  as to  Dr. B rod 's  supremely 
good i n t e n t io n  i n  p u b l is h in g  th e s e  works, even to  th e  p o in t  o f  
s a c r i f i c i n g  h i s  moral s c r u p le s ,  f o r  th e  good o f  mankind.
Now, though we und ers tand  o r  even p r a i s e ,  though we m i ^ t  p o s s ib ly  
choose to  a c t  s im i l a r ly  under s im i la r  c ircu m stan ces , y e t  we a re  conscious 
t h a t  a l l  th e se  a re  but 'm i t i g a t i n g  c i rc u m s ta n c e s ' .  The m i t ig a t in g  
c ircum stances o f  a human and th e r e f o r e  n e c e s s a r i l y  c o n tin g en t  u n iv e r s e .
We cannot escape th e  consc iousness  t h a t  a moral wrong has been done. A 
prom ise has been broken. The confidence  and th e r e f o r e  th e  innerm ost 
p e r s o n a l i ty  o f  a human being  has  been m isused .
As our second example l e t  us c o n s id e r  th e  case  o f  a m ora lly  com­
promised a r t i s t ,  who, hav ing  l iv e d  a l l  th rou gh  th e  H i t l e r  regime w ithou t
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r a i s i n g  h i s  v o ice  i n  p r o t e s t  a g a in s t  t h e  d read fu l  ou trag es  p e rp e t r a te d  
by t h i s  regim e, now p lead s  t h a t  i t  i s  absurd  to  expec t an a r t i s t  l i v i n g  
only i n  and f o r  h i s  work to  ta k e  an i n t e r e s t  i n  " p o l i t i c s " .  He never 
was p a r ty  t o  any ou trage  h im s e l f ,  and as f o r  h i s  work, i t  speaks f o r  
i t s e l f .  L et us assume t h a t  t h i s  work i s  supremely b e a u t i f u l  and 
s a t i s f y i n g .  Then i n  rev e ren ce  o f  t h i s  c re a te d  beau ty  we s h a l l  a cc e p t  
both  i t  and i t s  c r e a to r .  But even w h i l s t  doing so we most p robab ly  
s h a l l  be conscious o f  th e  moral wrong done by a man who tu rn ed  h i s  ea r  
from th e  death  c r i e s ,  th e  t o r t u r e s ,  t h e  debasement o f h i s  human fe l lo w  
b e in g s ,  i n  o rd e r  to  devote h im se lf  to  th e  p u r s u i t  o f  a r t i s t i c  p e r f e c t i o n .  
And we s h a l l  be deeply conscious t h a t  a l l  our arguments about be ing  human 
and humanly i n t e r e s t e d  i n  th e  good and b e a u t i f u l  th in g s  o f  th e  w orld , a re  
bu t an enumeration o f  m i t ig a t in g  c ircum stances b rough t forward in  excuse.
The t h i r d  example : Although no one would f a i l  t o  f e e l  t h e  u tm ost
h o r ro r  a t  th e  th oug h t o f human beings used  a g a in s t  t h e i r  w i l l  a s  gu in ea -  
p ig s ,  s t i l l  most people  when c a l le d  upon to  decide  would probab ly  th in k
t h a t  th e  harm once done i t  m ight be b e t t e r  t o  u se  th e  f i l e s  f o r  th e
f u tu r e  b e n e f i t  o f  hum anity. The h o r r o r ,  as i s  a l l  to o  obvious, we f e e l  
a t  th e  d eg rad a t io n  o f  a human being to  "a  means only" i n  th e  ex trem est  
se n se .
The common f e a tu r e  o f  a l l  examples, has been th e  c la sh  between a
boon to  be co n fe rred  on mankind, and th e  in fr in g em en t o f  th e  moral
p r i n c i p l e  by which a lone  i t  could be b rough t abou t. And l e t  us
l )  v i z .  th e  passage  by T.H. Green, a l re a d y  quoted on page 102, i n  
fo o tn o te  2) t o  page 101.
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ex ag gera te  th e  im portance o f  th e s e  boons to  th e  u tm o s t.  L et us suppose 
t h a t  K a fk a 's  w r i t in g s  have b r o u ^ t  th e  g r e a t e s t  beau ty , th e  German medical 
f i l e s ,  p e r f e c t  h e a l th  to  a l l  people  f o r  a l l  t im e . Yet we have m o ra l ly  
condemned th e  a c t io n s  which have produced them. Moreover, th e  degree 
of our condemnation has stood  i n  d i r e c t  p ro p o r t io n  t o  th e  degree to  which 
a human being has been m isused , bu t has n o t  been in f lu e n c e d  a t  a l l  by th e  
m agnitude of th e  boon c o n fe r re d .  (Thus though th e  boon o f  h e a l th  i s  
incom parably g r e a t e r  and more u n iv e r s a l  th an  t h e  r a t h e r  q u e s t io n a b le  boons 
co n fe r red  by Modem A rt and L i t e r a t u r e ,  th e  condemnation f e l t  i n  th e  t h i r d  
case  was much s t ro n g e r  than  t h a t  f e l t  i n  th e  f i r s t  two c a s e s . )  Hence we 
must conclude: a) t h a t  th e r e  i s  no d i r e c t  connec tion  between th e
pronouncements o f  moral judgnent and th e  U t i l i t a r i a n  boons invo lved  in  
th e  s i t u a t i o n  judged, i . e .  t h e  former a re  com pletely  independent and 
i n d i f f e r e n t  to  th e  l a t t e r ,  and b) t h a t  moral judgments a re  d i r e c t l y  
dependent on th e  f a t e  and t r e a tm e n t  accorded  to  th e  b a s ic  moral p r i n c i p l e  
in  a g iven s i t u a t i o n  and t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e i r  so le  de term in ing  f a c t o r .
In  th e  words o f  Henri Bergson in  "Les deux sources de l a  r e l i g i o n  e t  
de l a  m o ra le " : i f  we could buy th e  p e r f e c t  happ iness  o f  a whole u n iv e r s e
fo r  evermore a t  th e  expense o f  a s in g le  human b e in g 's  e te r n a l  to rm en t,  
i t  would be m ora lly  incumbent on us t o  r e f u s e .  That we m ight, and 
p robab ly  shou ld , decide o th e rw ise  i n  a c tu a l  f a c t  out o f  c o n s id e ra t io n s  
f o r  ' good' i . e .  non-moral c o n s id e ra t io n s  of v a lu es  and expediency, does 
no t  change th e  f a c t  or c o n te n t  o f  th e  moral v e r d i c t .
This seems to  me to  prove co n c lu s iv e ly  t h a t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  reasons 
o f  "p ro d u c tiv en ess  o f  good" sometimes or even m ostly  p r e v a i l  over th e
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sh a r in g  o f  th e  moral p r i n c i p l e  i n  our a c tu a l  d e c is io n s  p o ssesse s  no 
moral s ig n i f i c a n c e  and c e r t a i n l y  does n o t  co n fe r  m oral worth on th e s e  
re a so n s .  T h e re fo re ,  th e  two p ro p o s i t io n s  quoted from Ross seem to  me 
both  m istaken  ( i n  what th e y  assume to  be th e  d a ta  o f  normal moral judgment 
as d i s t i n c t  from d e c is io n s  i n  moral problem s) and repugnant t o  our moral 
s e n s i b i l i t y .  I f  Ross' c o n te n t io n  were t r u e ,  i f  i t  be indeed m o ra l ly  
b e t t e r  to  g ive th e  maximum good to  th e  few th an  to  g ive  th e  minimum good 
to  th e  many, ( i . e .  to  d i s t r i b u t e  m isery  j u s t l y ) ,  th e n  we should be d r iv en  
to  h o ld  i t  an E th ic a l  o b l ig a t io n  to  d ea l  i n  B lack Market goods and 
c o n s id e r  th e  g ra n t in g  o f  M arshal Aid or th e  l i k e  a m o ra lly  e v i l  a c t .
But t h i s  i s  m a n i f e s t ly  ab su rd . As a m a t te r  o f  p l a i n  f a c t ,  we do no t 
regard  th e  "maximum good" as n e c e s s a r i l y  th e  m ora lly  b e s t .  Even, out 
and ou t U t i l i t a r i a n s ,  though th ey  do n o t  avow t h i s  i n  so many words, 
p ro c la im : " th e  maximum good f o r  th e  maximum number" n o t  s o le ly  and
e n t i r e l y  on grounds o f  q u a n t i t a t i v e  c a lc u la t io n s  ( f o r  as we have seen 
th e  q u a n t i ty  would remain th e  same had th e y  proclaim ed th e  "maximum good 
f o r  th e  sm a lle s t  number). R ather do th e y  p rocla im  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  f o r  
th e  same reason  which made Jeremy Benthem sa y :  "Everyone to  count f o r
one and no one f o r  more th an  one". The acknowledgnent o f  th e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  e q u a l i ty  o f  claim  o f  men-qua-men, i s  th e  moral p r i n c i p l e  
u n d e r ly in g  a l l  U t i l i t a r i a n  Systems; t h e  t a c i t  b r id g e  by which they  
c ro ss  from Egoism^^ to  E th ic s .  E th ic s ,  i t  must be remembered, i s  n o t
l )  Whether i t  be th e  Egoism o f th e  one, or th e  few, or any a r b i t r a r i l y  
l im i te d  g r e a t e r  s e c t io n  o f  hum anity, l i k e  a n a t io n .
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a m a t te r  f o r  t h e  chosen few (though e n q u ir ie s  in to  i t s  p r in c ip le s  and
s t r u c t u r e  may be) bu t i s  branded as a r a t h e r  p leb e ia n  a f f a i r  by i t s  very
f i r s t  fundamental h y p o th e s is ,  which by th e  way we have seen Rose accep t
f u l l y  and w ith o u t r e s e rv e ,  Everyman, by v i r t u e  o f  t h i s  h y p o th e s is ,  i s
allow ed to  be cap ab le  o f p ro c la im ing  moral ju dgnen ts , and competent to
do so .  In  o th e r  words, though a b e t t e r  edu ca tio n  and a v a s t e r ,  more
profound knowledge a re  by no means im m ateria l  t o  th e  b e t t e r  u n d e rs tan d in g
o f  th e  grounds and p r i n c i p l e s  on which th in g s  a re  h e ld  t o  be r i g h t  th ey
cannot a l t e r  th e  con ten t  o f  what i s  h e ld  to  be r i g h t . A ,  what Paton
2)
c a l l s  " too  i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t i c  approach to  th e  problems o f  a c t i o n " , f a r  
from p ro v id in g  a guaran tee  a g a in s t  d e v ia t io n s  from and t r a n s g re s s io n s  
a g a in s t  th e  normal moral t e n e t s  a c tu a l ly  causes them. Thus th e  second 
o f  Ross * p r o p o s i t io n s  to  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  we ought to  choose th e  to rm ent 
and s u f f e r in g  o f  an a b s o lu te ly  innocen t pe rson  i f  i t  were f o r  t h e  common 
good. Now i t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  t r u e  t h a t  as  a m a t te r  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  f a c t  we 
sometimes (o r  even ve ry  o f te n )  demand t h i s  s a c r i f i c e  f o r  th e  common good. 
But i t  i s  a ls o  a f a c t ,  and t h i s  tim e a  moral as w e ll  as an h i s t o r i c a l  
f a c t ,  t h a t  we do so w ith  a s l i g h t  m isg iv in g  a t  th e  b o t ta n  o f  our h e a r t .  
This s l i g h t  m isg iv in g  i s  th e  c a l l  o f  our moral s e n s i b i l i t y  ( " F e in g e fü h l" ) .  
And even i f  we never l i s t e n  t o  i t ,  even i f  i n  a l l  e t e r n i t y  we were never 
to  l i s t e n  to  i t ,  i t  has c a l l e d  o u t ,  and t h i s  f a i n t  c a l l  i s  d e c i s iv e  p roo f 
f o r  th e  moral w o r th le s sn e s s  o f  our ch o ic e ,  and indeed commonly recogn ised  
and re sp ec ted  as such,
T) See Kant: In t ro d u c t io n  t o  th e  C r i t iq u e  o f  P r a c t i c a l  Reason & V II I .
2) H .J .P a to n :  Can Reason be P r a c t i c a l ? ;  H e n r ie t te  Herz L ec tu re ,  1945,
page 55.
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The a b so lu te  su reness  and i n c o r r u p t i b i l i t y  o f  t h i s  moral 
s e n s i b i l i t y ,  which i s  n o th in g  b u t  th e  i n t u i t i o n  responding  and c o r r e s ­
ponding to  the  o b l ig a t io n  p u t upon us by th e  b as ic  moral p r i n c i p l e ,  i s  
most c l e a r ly  rev ea led  by th e  way in  which i t  i n s i s t s  on f u l l  p e rso n a l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a c t s  and emphasises th e  p e rso n a l f a c t o r  o f  m otive i n  
th e  e v a lu a t io n  o f  th e  o b je c t iv e  moral w orth  o f  a c t s .  This aga in  b r in g s  
i t  i n to  sharp c o n f l i c t  w ith  Ross ' o c c a s io n a l i s t  view o f  th e  t ig h tn e s s  o f 
a c t s ,  who ho ld s  t h a t  i f  an a c t  i s  o b j e c t iv e ly  r i ^ t  th en  i t s  perform ance 
must be m ora lly  r i g h t ,  no m a t te r  how and why i t  perform ed, o r  i f  i t  
be performed by a machine, s in c e  i t  i s  by i t s  o b je c t iv e  consequences and 
by th e  o b je c t iv e ly  defined  prima f a c ie  o b l ig a t io n s  con ta ined  i n  i t  t h a t  
th e  moral s t a t u s o f  a g iven a c t  i s  ad judged.
I have pursued  th e  argument a g a in s t  S i r  David Ross to  such le n g th
2 )
i n  o rd e r  to  show to  what s u b t l e  and a b s t ru s e  y e t  m a n ife s t  d e v ia t io n s  an 
i n i t i a l  e r r o r  as to  th e  n a tu r e  and s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  moral r ig h tn e s s  can 
lea d  one, u n le s s  i t  be c o n t in u a l ly  checked and re a d ju s te d  by th e  
c o n t r o l l i n g  e x e rc is e  o f  a normal^^ ( i . e .  an o rd in a ry )  moral s e n s i b i l i t y
1) I t  w i l l  be i n t e r e s t i n g  to  remanber t h a t  T .J .G reen  ho lds  t h a t  no a c t  
can be m ora lly  r i g h t  o r  have good consequences u n le s s  i t  a ls o  be done 
from a good m otive . And t h a t  a c t s  which appear r i g h t ,  t h o u ^  done out 
o f  a wrong m otive on c lo s e r  in s p e c t io n  w i l l  prove a f f e c te d  by th e  
wrongness o f  th e  m otive . This seems an unfounded and exagg era ted ly  
hopefu l a t t i t u d e  to  t a k e ,  b u t  i s  notew orthy  as an a ttem pt to  b r in g  th e  
r e s u l t s  o f  e la b o ra te  r e f l e c t i o n s  i n to  l i n e  w ith  th e  requ irem ents  o f  
th e  normal moral s e n s i b i l i t y .
2 ) i . e .  m an ife s t  when t e s t e d  by th e  u n f a i l i n g  to u ch s to n e  o f  normal moral 
s e n s i b i l i t y .
5 ) i . e .  t h a t  s e n s i b i l i t y  which i s  i d e n t i c a l  w ith  th e  prim ary i n t u i t i o n  
which corresponds and responds to  th e  appeal o f th e  b a s ic  moral 
p r i n c i p l e .  A f u r th e r  e lu c id a t io n  as to  th e  exac t  meaning o f  'normal* 
and th e  reasons  f o r  i t s  cho ice  as th e  q u a l i f y in g  a t t r i b u t e  o f  moral 
s e n s i b i l i t y  must be l e f t  f o r  a l a t e r  occasion .
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1)
o r  i n t u i t i o n  s u b t le  enough to  be d i a l e c t i c a l l y  conscious of i t s e l f  and 
i t s  fu n c t io n ,  bu t n o t  so s u b t l e  o r  so e la b o ra te  as t o  lo s e  c o n ta c t  w ith  
th e  more e lem entary  f a c t s  and f e a tu r e s  o f  moral judgment, no r so over­
b e a r in g ly  s e l f - c o n f id e n t  as  t o  s e t  i t s e l f  above and t r a n s g re s s  a g a in s t
2)
th e  ve ry  b a s i s ,  th e  very  assum ptions which a lone  make p o s s ib le  an 
in q u iry  in to  th e  n a tu re  and s t r u c tu r e  o f  moral experience .
To sum up : The fo reg o in g  r e f l e c t i o n s  and d is c u s s io n  show t h a t  Ross
i s  m is taken  i n  a t t r i b u t i n g  th e  same k ind  o f  s e l f - e v id e n t  and u n c o n d it io n a l  
m oral * righ t*n ess  and o b l ig a to r in e s s ,  which i s  possessed  by th e  b a s ic  
p r i n c i p l e ,  t o  th e  somewhat U t i l i t a r i a n  du ty  o f  "producing good". For 
we have shown t h a t  th e  duty  t o  *produce good* must always give way be fo re  
th e  most sim ple and unassuming o f  prima f a c i e  d u t i e s ,  i f  th e  f i n a l  
d e c is io n  i s  to  have moral w orth , i . e .  i f  i t  i s  t o  be m ora lly  r i g h t .  We 
have a ls o  shown t h a t  th e r e  i s  no such moral o b l ig a t io n  as th e  o b l ig a t io n  
to  'p roduce  good' and t h a t  by l e t t i n g  such c o n s id e ra t io n s  p r e v a i l  over th e  
claim s of th e  moral p r i n c i p l e ,  no m a t te r  how good th e  consequences, and 
how e x c e l le n t  t h e  i n t e n t io n  one d ep riv es  th e  f i n a l  d e c is io n  o f  i t s  moral 
w orth , and may even be s a id  t o  make i t  a m ora lly  wrong d e c is io n .
1) As was th e  case  w ith  U t i l i t a r i a n s  o f  a l l  d e s c r ip t io n s  who seem to  
reach  v a l id  moral conc lu sions  by i n v a l id  argum ents, only because th ey  
have always been c a r e fu l  to  avoid a b s u r d i t i e s  and to  a d ju s t  th e  r e s u l t s  
o f  t h e i r  c a lc u la t io n s  t o  th e  g e n e ra l ly  accep ted  f a c t s  o f  moral 
experience  and e v a lu a t io n ,  even though t h a t  invo lved  th e  adm ission  o f  
he te rogenous elements i n to  t h e i r  systems and th e  consequent n e a r  d i s ­
ru p t io n  o f  th o se  system s, v i z .  th e  s t r a n g e  case  o f  th e  concept o f  th e  
d ig n i ty  o f  man in  J . S . M i l l ' s  " U t i l i t a r i a n i s m " .
2 ) i . e .  th e  th r e e  assum ptions l i s t e d  in  th e  p re fa c e  v i z :  t h a t  t h e r e  
e x i s t s  a m oral ex p erien ce ;  t h a t  i t  i s  rec o g n isa b le  as such; and t h a t  
i t s  meaning i s  grasped by every man and conmunicable, o r  th e  e q u iv a le n t  
two d iscu ssed  by Ross a t  th e  beg inn ing  o f  th e  Foundations o f  E th ic s ,  
and which no enquiry  i n to  e th i c a l  m a t te r s  may t r a n s g re s s  o r i n f r in g e  
w ith  impunity i . e .  w ithou t the reb y  in v a l id a t in g  i t s  own co n c lu s io n s .
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In  connec tion  w ith  th e s e  r e f l e c t i o n s  we have mentioned th e  q u es t io n  
of a moral i n t u i t i o n .  We have d is t in g u is h e d  th e  e lem entary  moral 
i n t u i t i o n  d i r e c te d  a t  th e  s e l f - e v i d e n t  r ig h tn e s s  o f th e  b a s ic  moral 
p r i n c i p l e ,  th e  source  o f  a l l  moral o b l ig a t io n s  whose fu n c t io n  i s  a) to  
grasp th e  in n e r  c o n te n t  o f  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  as i t  s tan d s  i s o la t e d  f o r  
in s p e c t io n  and con tem p la tion ;  b) in  th e  g u ise  o f  moral s e n s i b i l i t y ,  to  
d e te c t  and re v e a l  i t  wherever i t  may be h idden, and procla im  i t s  primacy, 
and c) t o  demand and i n s i s t  t h a t  such primacy be accorded to  i t  whenever 
in  a g iven  complex and co n c re te  s i t u a t i o n  i t  i s  in  danger o f  be ing  over­
r id den  by the  o th e r  c o n s t i t u e n t  elements of th e  given s i t u a t i o n .  We 
have a l s o  mentioned in  p a s s in g  th e  d e r iv e d ,  secondary and e la b o ra te  
i n t u i t i o n  which S i r  David Ross u se s  t o  c u t  th e  Gordian knot o f  com plica ted  
and in te rm in a b le  moral and u t i l i t a r i a n  d e l i b e r a t io n s .
Hereby we have shown t h a t  th e  assum ptions which a lone  could have 
j u s t i f i e d  th e  O c c a s io n a l is t  c o n te n t io n  t h a t  th e  comprehensiveness o f \ a  
s o lu t io n  i s  what g ives t h a t  s o lu t io n  m oral v a l i d i t y  do no t h o ld .  These
assum ptions , namely a) t h a t  th e  i n t r i n s i c  ' r i ^ t n e s s ' o f  a f i r s t  
immutable p r i n c i p l e  i s  o f  th e  same o rd e r  as t h a t  o f  an a c c id e n ta l  
p a r t i c u l a r  and n o n - re c u r r in g  d e c is io n ,  and b) t h a t  th e  o b l ig a t io n  t o  
produce 'good* i s  on a p a r  as t o  i t s  i n t r i n s i c  e x ce llen c e  and i t s  
o b l ig a to ry  fo rc e  w ith  th e  b a s ic  moral p r i n c i p l e ;  have been proved 
u n j u s t i f i e d  and i n v a l id .
T here fo re  i f  Ross i s  t o  v in d ic a te  h i s  c o n te n t io n  about th e  
s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  comprehensiveness and to  defend th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  a 
P l u r a l i s t i c  B asis  f o r  E th ic s  he w i l l  have to  choose some o th e r  way.
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L et us see  whether such a p roo f  can be adduced from an exam ination 
o f  th e  way in  which th e  moral problem i s  paged and th e  comprehensive 
s o lu t io n  s o u ^ t  by O c c a s io n a l i s t s . In  o rd e r  to  do t h i s  we must examine 
th e  p ro cess  o f moral d e l i b e r a t io n  and rea ch in g  of d e c is io n s  as expounded 
by Ross and C a r r i t t  under th e  fo llo w in g  fo u r  headings :
(a )  What i s  meant by "a complex co n c re te  given s i t u a t i o n ? " '  ) i n s id e
) th e
(b) In  what way can such a s i t u a t i o n  be tak e n  to  d e f in e  a ) R ossian
) sy s ta n
su c c e ss fu l  s o lu t io n  o f  i t s  own problem?
(c)  How do we come to  know what th e  s o lu t io n  i s ?
(d) Can th e  c a r ry in g  ou t o f  t h i s  s o lu t io n  be sa id  t o  be m ora lly  
incumbent upon us s o le ly  because i t  i s  th e  s o lu t io n  (as Ross
c la im s ) ;  o r  a re  we f r e e  t o  d e f in e  our own d e c is io n s  indepen­
d e n t ly  o f th e  f e a tu r e s  o f  a given s i t u a t i o n  t h o u ^  no t re g a rd ­
l e s s  o f  i t .
a) Following Ross' e x p o s i t io n  c lo s e ly  bu t w ithou t p r e ju d ic e ,  we f in d  
t h a t  whenever we a re  faced  w ith  moral problems in  r e a l  l i f e  th e s e  
problems a re  n o t  i s o l a t e d  from th e  v a r ie g a te d ,  complex, concre te  stream  
o f  l i f e  bu t embedded i n  i t .  Hence th e  c ircum stances under which we a re  
faced  by th e s e  moral problem s, i . e .  th e  co n c re te  complex s i t u a t i o n ,  
c o n ta in s  many f e a t u r e s ,  each w ith  i t s  s e p a ra te  c la im  on our a t t e n t i o n  on 
th e  one hand. On th e  o th e r ,  i t  r e p r e s e n ts  a unique c o n s t e l l a t i o n  of
th e s e  f e a t u r e s ,  a p a t t e r n  and c o n f ig u ra t io n  which w i l l  never r e c u r  q u i te
i n  t h i s  same way. Now each such l i v i n g  complex c o n c re te  s i t u a t i o n  i s  
th e  outcome o f  an , a t  l e a s t  f o r  our human purpose , i n f i n i t e  number o f  
i n f i n i t e  causal s e r i e s  and i t s e l f  th e  f u tu r e  cause o f  an i n f i n i t e  number
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o f  r e s u l t s .  Again, th e  un ique  n o n - re c u r re n t  n a tu re  o f  such l i v i n g  
s i t u a t i o n s ,  p re c lu d e s  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  app ly ing  to  i t  p rep a red ,  ready­
made and a lre a d y  u sed , as i t  w ere, second-hand i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . ^^ By 
p a in  o f  m iss ing  some o f  i t s  f e a t u r e s ,  which may be s a l i e n t ,  i t  must n o t  
be c l a s s i f i e d  by analogy o r  a s s o c i a t io n .  Nor may some o f  i t s  f e a tu r e s  
be d e l i b e r a t e l y  suppressed  i n  o rd e r  to  f a c i l i t a t e  such c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  and 
enrôlem ent o f  th e  new s i t u a t i o n  amongst our p rev io us  e x p e r ien c es ,  f o r  
f e a r  o f  f a l s i f y i n g  i t s  unique  c h a ra c te r .  In  s h o r t ,  t h i s  ' l i v i n g  
s i t u a t i o n '  p u ts  us  under an o b l ig a t io n  to  acknowledge and r e s p e c t  i t s  
u n iq u en e ss ,  com plex ity , c o n c re te  "g iv en "n ess ,  i n f i n i t e  d i v e r s i t y ,  and 
w i th a l ,  u n i ty .  Thus f a r  th e  "given s i t u a t i o n " .  The o b l ig a t io n  by th e  
way under which i t  p u ts  us i s  n o t  o f  a moral but o f  a s c i e n t i f i c  n a tu r e .  
For i t  has a l l  th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  u s u a l ly  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  im p a r t i a l  
and u n p re ju d iced  experim ental i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  such as a re  common t o  th e  
n a tu r a l  s c ie n c e s .
b) Each l i v i n g  s i t u a t i o n ,  anbodies an i n d e f i n i t e  number o f  f e a t u r e s ,  
a l l ’ c la im ing  our a t t e n t i o n ,  b u t  sane clam ouring f o r  a sp e c ia l  s o r t  o f  
a t t e n t i o n ,  a dynamic, a c t iv e  and p ro d u c t iv e  a t t e n t i o n .  That i s ,  sane '
o f  th e  f e a tu r e s  o f  a given s i t u a t i o n ,  show an u rg e ,  an in n e r  tendency to  
reach  over them selves and in to  th e  f u t u r e .  They expect us to  s a t i s f y  , 
t h i s  u rg e .  They p u t  u s ,  as i t  were, under an o b l ig a t io n  to  do something
l )  This th e  main assum ption of th e  O c c a s io n a l is t  school i s  eked out
a seconds namely t h a t  t h e r e  a re  no g en e ra l  r u le s  and i f  t h e r e  were, 
i t  would be o f  no p r a c t i c a l  im portance , s in c e  th e  genera l r u le s  them­
se lv e s  have to  be judged on th e  m e r i t  o f  th e  r o l e  which th ey  p la y  in  
g iven in d iv id u a l  in s t a n c e s .  Our main o b je c t  now i s  t o  see  whether 
t h i s  assum ption "works" .
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abou t i t ;  t o  b r in g  in to  be ing  th e  d e s i r e d  f u l f i lm e n t  of t h e i r  in h e re n t
te n d e n c ie s .  Now t h i s  dynamic power in h e re n t  in  s i t u a t i o n s  and d r iv in g  :
i )f o r t h  i n to  th e  f u t u r e ,  can ten d  in  th e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  g r e a te r  good, or
o f  g r e a t e r  e v i l .  Being human, we s tan d  under no o b l ig a t io n  t o  a id  and
2 )a b e t  th e  more e v i l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f a s i t u a t i o n  on t h e i r  way to  t o e i r  
f u tu r e  r e a l i s a t i o n ,  indeed we o u ^ t  i f  we can to  s top  them, d e s t ro y  them 
or d e f l e c t  them. Now th e  o b l ig a t io n  to  he lp  a long th o s e . f e a tu r e s  o f a 
s i t u a t i o n  which a re  p roducive  o f  or conducive t o  good covers both  th e  
h e d o n is t i c  and th e  a g a t h i s t i c  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  and w i l l  henceforward be • -
r e f e r r e d  to  as th e  U t i l i t a r i a n  o b l ig a t io n s ,^ ^  Now th e s e  U t i l i t a r i a n  
o b l ig a t io n s  in h e re n t  i n  a g iven  s i t u a t i o n  a re  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  coheren t o r  
harm onious. They m ight c la s h  in s o f a r  as they  a re  d ia m e t r ic a l ly  opposed
1) I  w i l l  no t e n te r  h e re  upon a d is c u s s io n  of "good", bu t assume i t  t o  
be unders tood  in  th e  u su a l  accep ted  sense  o f  o p t im i f ic  and f e l i c i f i c ,  
o r  r o u g h l y , u t i l i t a r i a n .
2 )s This i s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  p o in t  to  fo llow  up i n  connec tion  w ith  th e  
p r in c ip le s  c e r t a i n  r e l i g io u s  s e c t s  ho ld  about th e  h o l in e s s  o f  a l l  
r e a l i t y .  An a t t i t u d e  found i n  a more s e c u la r  form amongst some 
s c i e n t i s t s  and a r t i s t s  o f  a l l  d e s c r ip t io n .
5) That we a re  under o b l ig a t io n  a t  a l l ,  i s  due to  our i n i t i a l  p o s i t io n
o f  being faced  by a moral problem, i . e .  fo rced  to  ta k e  some course  o f  
a c t io n ,  do something, no m a t te r  what t o  change th e  i n i t i a l  s i t u a t i o n .  
But t h a t  a c t s  which a re  conducive to  good a re  on t h a t  account 
o b l ig a to ry  i s  an assum ption in  which I b l in d ly  fo llo w  Ross' le a d  in  
s p i t e  o f  th e  su sp ic io n  t h a t  i t s  s ig n i f i c a n c e  and im p l ic a t io n s '  a re  • 
m o ra lly  more p e rn ic io u s  th a n  one would th in k  a t  f i r s t  b lu sh .  Doubts 
and su sp ic io n s  I  have a lre a d y  exp la ined  and which seem to  me con­
c lu s iv e .  However, a t  t h i s  s ta g e  o f  th e  p ro ceed in g s , i t  cannot do any 
harm to  fo llow  Ross' e x p o s i t io n ,  nor  does i t  s e r io u s ly  a f f e c t  the  
problem w ith  which we a re  concerned a t  th e  moment.
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and t h e i r  r e a l i s a t i o n s  m u tu a lly  e x c lu s iv e .  Again th ey  m ight c la sh  _
in s o f a r  as  our power o f  a c c e p t in g  o b l ig a t io n s  i s  l im i te d  and so much
a t t e n t i o n  pa id  t o  th e  one element n e c e s s a r i l y  means so much l e s s
a t t e n t i o n  pa id  to  a n o th e r .  In  a d d i t io n  th e r e  a re  i n  a given moral
s i t u a t i o n  c e r t a i n  f e a tu r e s  which p u t  us under an o b l ig a t io n  to  he lp
accom plish  t h e i r  s e l f - s e t  t a s k ,  which a re  n o t  p roducive  o f  o r conducive
t o  more 'good* : These a re  th e  s e l f - e v i d e n t l y  r i g h t  ten d e n c ie s  o f  prima
f a c i e  d u t ie s  to  g e t  them selves performed^^ o r  g e t  o th e r  m a n i fe s t ly  wrong
te n d e n c ie s  s top ped . These ag a in  do n o t  n e c e s s a r i ly  e n te r  in to  harmonious
and coheren t r e l a t i o n s  w ith  th e  U t i l i t a r i a n  o b l ig a t io n s  o r  w ith  each o ther ,
They may c la sh  i n  th e  same two ways i n  which U t i l i t a r i a n  d u t ie s  c la s h
among th em se lves ,  i . e .  because of i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s  o f  d i r e c t i o n ,  and
c o n te n t ,  and because only a l im i te d  amount o f  th e  o b l ig a t io n s  in h e re n t  in
a s i t u a t i o n  can be c a r r ie d  ou t by a f i n i t e  ag en t .  I t  i s  S i r  David Ross'
c o n te n t io n  t h a t  each o f  th e s e  given s i t u a t i o n s  d e f in e s  one s in g le  
2 )
s o lu t io n  which s a t i s f i e d  th e  g r e a t e s t  number o f  th e  given o b l ig a t io n s ,  
i . e .  produces t h e  maximum amount o f  good, and i n f r in g e s  th e  l e a s t  number 
o f  prima f a c ie  d u t ie s  to  th e  s l i g h t e s t  p o s s ib le  d eg ree . This s o lu t io n ,  
by v i r t u e  o f  i t s  comprehensiveness ( f o r  i t  i s  by th e  c r i t e r i o n  of 
comprehensiveness a lone  t h a t  i t  has been chosen among o th e r  p o s s ib le  
s o lu t io n s )  i s  proclaim ed th e  o b je c t iv e ly  r ig l i t  and u l t im a te  d e c is io n
1 ) In  th e  same way and f o r  more a cc ep tab le  reasons I  fo llow  Ross' lead  
in  a cc ep tin g  th e  o b l ig a to r in e s s  o f  prim a f a c ie  d u t i e s .
2 ) According E . P .C a r r i t t ,  who ho lds  s im i la r  i n t u i t i o n i s t i c  and 
o c c a s io n a l i s t  v iews, "one o r  a l im i te d  number o f ' r i ^ t '  s o lu t io n s " .
-1 4 2 -
determ ined by th e  given s i t u a t i o n .  The ex ac t  c o n te x t  o f  t h i s  d e c is io n
i s  a r r iv e d  a t  by a m ysterious  p ro c e ss ,  i n  which th e  c o n f l i c t i n g  c la im s
of U t i l i t a r i a n  c o n s id e ra t io n s  and th o se  a r i s i n g  from prima f a c i e  d u t ie s
a re  s e t t l e d  o f f -h a n d .  P rev a len ce  i s  e s ta b l ish e d ^ ^  on some in e x p l i c a b le
2)and m yster io us  grounds se e in g  t h a t  no common denominator o f  th e  two 
c o n f l i c t i n g  o b l ig a t io n s  e x i s t s  and t h a t  th e  sources from which th e y  draw 
t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  v a l i d i t y  remain independent and non-com parable. And 
i t  i s  decided w ith o u t  hope o f  appeal which o b l ig a t io n  w i l l  and which w i l l  
n o t  be in c luded  when th e  f i n a l  d e c is io n  s a t i s f i e s  th o se  t h a t  have been 
chosen. This p ro cess  Ross c a l l s  ' i n t u i t i o n * .  And he i n s i s t s  t h a t  by 
i t ,  by th e  a r b i t r a r y ,  g round less  e x e rc is e  o f  t h i s  ' i n t u i t i o n *  o b je c t iv e ly  
r i g h t  and m ora lly  binding^^ d e c is io n s  a re  a r r iv e d  a t .  The a c t
1) v i z . .  P a te n 's  argument a g a in s t  Ross: "while  we have many grounds f o r  
h o ld in g  t h a t  an a c t  i s  r i g h t  i n  some re s p e c ts  and wrong in  o th e r s ,  we^ 
have no ground w hatever, i n  th e  absence o f  some more u l t im a te  
p r i n c i p l e  f o r  dec id in g  which o f  th e s e  grounds i s  th e  o v e r r id in g  one, 
we have no grounds whereby we can determ ine th e  balance  o f  prima f a c i e  
r ig h tn e s s  over prima f a c i e  wrongness e i t h e r  in  th e  a c t  i t s e l f  o r  in  
th e  comparison w ith o th e r  p o s s ib le  a c t s " .  (P a ton :  Can Reason be
P r a c t i c a l ?  H e n r ie t te  Herz L ec tu re ,  1945, p . 5 0 ) .  As a m a t te r  o f  f a c t  
Ross u ses  th e  c r i t e r i o n  o f  com prehensiveness, a lm ost as though i t  were 
a more u l t im a te  p r i n c i p l e ; l a t e r  we s h a l l  s e e ,  t h a t  t h i s  im p lie s  
f a l l i n g  back on some o th e r  f i n a l  p r i n c i p l e  namely on th e  p r i n c i p l e
o f  "p rodu c tiveness  o f  good".
2) Here people who ho ld  t h a t  th e  'good* and th e  ' r ig h t*  a re  n o t  
i n t r i n s i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  and t h a t  one, no m a t te r  which, can be expressed  
in  term s o f  th e  o th e r ,  have an e a s i e r  s ta n d .  But Ross, who i n s i s t s  
q u i te  r i g h t l y ,  i n  t h e i r  h e te ro g e n e i ty ,  i s  fo rced  to  choose between th e  
two, no compromise be ing  p o s s ib le .
5) Here th e  d e c is io n  undoubted ly  draws i t s  moral v a l i d i t y  from i t s  com­
p re h e n s iv e n e ss ,  comprehensiveness being  th e  q u a l i t y  o f  a d e c is io n  to  
be as f i t t i n g  and as s u i t a b l e  as p o s s ib le  to  as many as p o s s ib le  o f 
th e  given f e a tu r e s  o f  a s i t u a t i o n ,  i n  such a manner as to  ta k e  a 
s u i t a b ly  g r e a t e r  account o f  pay and f i t t i n g l y  g r e a t e r  a t t e n t i o n  to  
such o f  th e  f e a tu r e s  as have been found o f  o v e r r id in g  im portance in  
e xac t  p ro p o r t io n  to  t h e i r  im portance .
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c ircu m scribed  by t h i s  d e c is io n  i s  th e  o b je c t iv e ly  v a l i d  and u l t im a te  
d u ty ,  th e  a c t  we a re  m o ra l ly  bound to  perform ,  ^ But though o b je c t iv e ly  
and u l t im a te ly  v a l i d  in  a g iven s i t u a t i o n ,  a duty  th u s  d e fined  can claim 
no u n i v e r s a l ,  o r  genera l v a l i d i t y .  For i t  r e p re s e n ts  th e  un ique 
s o lu t io n  o f  a un ique  s i t u a t i o n ,  and i s  d i r e c t l y  dependent and determ ined 
by a n o n - re c u r r in g ,  n o t  r e p e a ta b le  c o n f ig u ra t io n  o f  c ircu m stances ,  (Thus 
we cannot l e a m  from one r i g h t  s o lu t io n  about o th e r  r i g h t  s o lu t io n  :
A prima f a c i e  o b l ig a t io n  o f  o v e r r id in g  im portance , may under s l i g h t l y  
d i f f e r e n t  c ircum stances be o f  but minimal consequence. Each s o lu t io n  has 
t o  be worked out on i t s  own, i . e .  every  moral problem reso lved  
in d iv id u a l ly  and w ithou t th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  r e c u r r in g  to  genera l  o r  
u n iv e r s a l  p r i n c i p l e s .  For such p r i n c i p l e s  a re  by d e f .  in c o rp o ra te d  in  
th e  prima f a c i e  d u t i e s ,  and prima f a c i e  d u t ie s  a re  them selves dependent 
on th e  given s i t u a t i o n  f o r  th e  r e a f f i r m a t io n  o f  t h e i r  v a l i d i t y . )  The
*• V
only  f e a tu r e  th e s e  o b je c t iv e ly  but only once v a l id  d u t ie s  have i n  common 
i s  t h a t  o f  com prehensiveness. Comprehensiveness, however, i s  a 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  formal s t r u c tu r e  n o t  o f  th e  c o n cre te  c o n te n t  o f  
such d u t i e s .  I t  can never a s s u re  us t h a t  what i s  th e  r i g h t  d e c is io n  in  
one case  w i l l  a l s o  be r i g h t  in  an o the r  c a se .
The E x i s t e n t i a l i s t  view which ho lds  t h a t  a g iven moral problem 
does n o t  d e f in e  an o b je c t iv e ly  i . e .  im p e rso n a lly ,  v a l i d  duty  ought t o  be 
mentioned a t  t h i s  p o in t .  I t  i s  argued t h a t  what in  a c e r t a in  s i t u a t i o n  
i s  th e  r i g h t  d e c is io n  fo r  one p e rson , needs by no means, given an 
i d e n t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  be th e  r i g h t  d e c is io n  f o r  a n o th e r .  The p e r s o n a l i ty  
o f  th e  agen t i s  a p e r t i n e n t  f a c t o r  a f f e c t i n g  th e  whole o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n .
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and a change i n  i t s  q u a l i t i e s  ( i . e .  a d i f f e r e n t  p e r s o n a l i ty )  a f f e c t s  and 
changes th e  whole s i t u a t i o n  no l e s s  th an  any o th e r  change in  t h e  g iven  
c irc u m s ta n c e s ,
This seems to  me a v a l i d ,  d e c is iv e  and co nc lu s ive  argument a g a in s t  
th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  an o b je c t iv e  view o f  du ty  which y e t  den ies  th e  
e x is te n c e  o f  u n iv e r s a l ly  v a l i d  b a s ic  p r i n c i p l e s .  In  o th e r  words, u n le s s  
t h e r e  e x i s t  d u t ie s  which because o f  t h e i r  u n d e r ly in g  b as ic  p r i n c i p l e ,  a re  
u n i v e r s a l ly  v a l i d ,  no m a t te r  f o r  whom, no m a t te r  under what c ircu m stan ces , 
and q u i t e  independent o f  th e  c o n tin g e n t  and changing n a tu re s  o f  f a c t u a l  
s i t u a t i o n s  and th e  in d iv id u a l  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  whom i t  o b l ig e s ,  th e  
assum ption  of an o b je c t iv e ly  i . e .  i m p a r t i a l l y  but n o t  u n i v e r s a l ly  v a l i d  
d u ty  i s  u n t e n a b l e . I n  o th e r  words, u n le s s  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a b a s ic  
u n i v e r s a l ly  v a l i d  p r i n c i p l e  a t  th e  ground and source  o f  a l l  our moral 
judgments, t h e r e  i s  no good reason  to  assume t h a t  any th ing  can be 
o b je c t iv e ly  r i g h t ,  and no reason  w hatsoever why our moral u n iv e r s e  should 
n o t  r e v e r s e ,  o r  prove always t o  have been a m eaningless jumble o f  hap­
h a z a rd ,  r e l a t i v e  and s u b je c t iv e  p r e d i l e c t io n s .  T h e re fo re ,  we must 
r e c o n s id e r  th e  Rossian d e f i n i t i o n  of du ty  : as th e  o b je c t iv e ly  d e fin ed
s o lu t io n  o f  a g iven m o ra lly  p ro b lem atic  s o lu t io n ,  a s o lu t io n  reached  in  
accordance w ith  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  comprehensiveness and v a l id  because of 
i t ,  A d e f i n i t i o n  which a t  no p o in t  escapes th e  narrow confines of a 
p a r t i c u l a r  in s ta n c e ,  s in c e  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  comprehensiveness i t s e l f  i s
l )  v i z .  P a to n Î Can Reason be P r a c t i c a l ?  p . 55. " I f  a man w i l l s  to  do 
h i s  du ty , beeauwe i t  i s  t h i s  duty and n o t  a n o th e r ,  we should n o t  
rega rd  h is  m otive as m o ra l ."
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only de fin ed  in s id e  t h a t  one p a r t i c u l a r  in s ta n c e .  That i s  we must ask 
o u rse lv es  whether i t  be a t  a l l  t r u e  i . e .  p r a c t i c a l l y  p o s s ib le  t h a t  we 
"can judge an in s ta n c e  w ith o u t  a g en era l  r u l e " ?
Hence th e  ve ry  d e s c r ip t io n  and e x p o s i t io n  g iven by Ross o f  th e  f a c t s
and p ro ce sses  o f  moral d e l i b e r a t io n  in  complex s i t u a t i o n s  needs t o  be
examined with th e  g r e a t e s t  c ircum sp ec tio n  b e fo re  we a cc ep t  i t  as  a b a s is  
f o r  d i s c u s s io n .
For i t  now seems t h a t  t h e  O c c a s io n a l i s t  demand t h a t  each s i t u a t i o n  
be considered  s o l e ly  on i t s  own m e r i t s ,  and i t s  c o n f l i c t i n g  req u irem en ts  
a r b i t r a t e d  by an i n t u i t i o n  u n iq u e ly  a p p lie d  to  i t  i s  an im possib le
c o n d i t io n .  The O c c a s io n a l i s t  c o n te n t io n  t h a t  "no number o f  m oral r u le s
w i l l  save us from e x e rc is in g  i n t u i t i o n  f o r  a r u le  can only  be genera l  
b u t  an a c t  must be p a r t i c u l a r ,  so i t  w i l l  be always n e ce ssa ry  to  s a t i s f y  
o u rse lv e s  t h a t  an a c t  comes under th e  r u l e  and f o r  t h a t  no r u l e  can be 
g i v e n . . .  i f  we can judge an in s ta n c e  w ith o u t g en era l  r u l e s . . .  The enquiry  
o f  them (g en e ra l  r u le s )  i s  m ere ly  an occupa tion  n o t  w itho u t some u s e fu ln e s s  
fo r  men o f  l e i s u r e , . i s  th e re b y  s e t  a t  nought. Hence we can c o n s id e r  
and ought t o  co n s id e r  th e  f a c t s  o f th e  g iven  s i t u a t i o n  on t h e i r  own m e r i t s ,  
b u t  th e  e v a lu a t io n  o f  th e s e  f a c t s  by which a lone  we decide  which 
o b l ig a t io n s  to  s a t i s f y  and which to  r e j e c t ,  i s  accorded even b e fo re  we 
e x e rc is e  our * i n t u i t i o n '  i n  th e  in d iv id u a l  in s ta n c e  by what I  propose  to  
c a l l  th e  " ready-made e v a lu a t io n a l  app ro ach " . This ready-made e v a lu a t io n a l
l )  E .F .O arritt. c ite d  above on page
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approach, whether i t  be o f an a - p r i o r i  n a tu re  o r d e r iv ed  from experience
and determ ined by educa tion  g ives  a very  d e f i n i t e  b ia s  to  our very  f i r s t
e s t im a te s  o f  a given in s ta n c e  and co lo u rs  our view of th e  very  f a c t s
l )them se lves . Thus, Ross b e fo re  he c o n s id e rs  a g iven s i t u a t i o n  a lre a d y  
knows n o t  only t h a t  ' conductiveness t o  good* i s  amongst th e  f e a tu r e s  which 
ought to  be encouraged and * conductiveness to  misery* amongst th o se  which 
need to  be suppressed , but a ls o  t h a t  * conductiveness to  good* i s  th e  over­
r id in g  value wherever i t  c la sh  w ith  prima f a c ie  d u t ie s .  This p re ­
accep ted  e v a lu a t io n a l  approach i s ,  I  t h in k ,  th e  p roduct o f  an i n i t i a l  
i n t u i t i o n  of th e  n a tu re  o f  va lues  and o f  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  s t a tu s  i n  th e  
h i e r a r c h i c a l  s c a le  o f v a lu e s ,  a r r iv e d  a t  independen tly  of p a r t i c u l a r
T) B esides , a s  W.C.de B u r ^  po in ted  out ( in  The R e la t io n s  o f M o ra l ity  to  
R e lig io n ;  Proceedings of th e  B r i t i s h  Acadœiy, (1955) p . 14), th e  very  
f a c t  th a t  we consider  any th ing  a t  a l l  our duty and were i t  only th e  
duty to  make th e  " r i g h t  p r a c t i c a l  respon se” to  a given s i t u a t i o n  can­
n o t  "as s u c h . . .b e  accounted fo r  wholly in  terms o f  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  
s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  provokes i t . R ecognition  o f  t h i s  duty  as a duty 
c a r r i e s  w ith  i t ,  as Kant showed, th e  re c o g n i t io n  of duty as an 
U n iversa l P r i n c ip l e ,  i n  o th e r  words th e  consciousness o f  th e  Moral Law".
In  o th e r  words a g a in ,  a c e r t a in  p re -accep ted  e v a lu a t io n a l  
approach d e f in in g  a course  o f  a c t io n  to  be taken  in  a l l  cases namely, 
t o  seek and c a r ry  out th e  "most comprehensive s o lu t io n  th e  r i g h t  
p r a c t i c a l  response" in  every  and a l l  g iven in s ta n c e s ,  i s  c h a ra c te r ­
i s t i c  o f  Ross* E th ica l  Theory. But t h i s  approach i s  no t so un - 
d i s t in g u is h a b le  nor so u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  from th e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  "moral" 
one as De B u r ^  took i t  to  be.
On th e  o th e r  hand t h i s  i n v a l id a te s  P a to n *s c r i t i c i s m  of Ross:
"The i n te n t io n  of the  good man i s  always to  do a p a r t i c u l a r  duty  in  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n ,  h i s  motive i s  something more u l t im a te ,  a w i l l  t o  
do h i s  duty  whatever h i s  duty may tu r n  out to  be, a w i l l  to  a c t  in  
accordance w ith  what we may c a l l  h i s  genera l sense  of duty" (Can 
Reason be P r a c t i c a l ? ;  p . 5 5 .)  and " . . . t h i s  genera l  motive of duty  f o r  
duty * 6 sake i s  always n e c e s s a r i ly  p re s e n t  i n  a r a t i o n a l  man. Without 
i t  he would have no d u t ie s  a t  a l l  and h is  conduct would be n e i t h e r  
m oral nor immoral" ( in  th e  fo o tn o te  t o  th e  above quoted sen tence) and 
shows i t  t o  be based on a m isunders tand ing  of th e  deeper im p l ic a t io n s  ' 
o f  the  Rossian Theory.
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problems and sub sequen tly  a p p lie d  to  them. P re -ac ce p ted  e v a lu a t io n a l  
approaches a re  however by no means i d e n t i c a l ,  t h a t  i s ,  th e  e s t im a te  o f  
th e  r e l a t i v e  moral w e i ^ t  o f  d i f f e r e n t  v a lu e s  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i ly  
immutably c o n v in c in g ly  f ix e d  f o r  a l l  to  se e .  Bergson and Ross, f o r  
in s t a n c e ,  ta k e  d ia m e t r i c a l ly  o p p o s i te  m oral views on th e  q u e s t io n  o f  
w hether we ought to  buy " th e  common good a t  th e  expense o f  a human being* s 
s u f f e r i n g " . S ince  they  d id  n o t  d i f f e r  i n  t h e i r  a p p ra i s a l  of th e  n a tu re  
of th e  f a c t s  concerned nor i n  t h a t  o f  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  va lues  in v o lv e d ,  
th ey  d isag reed  s o le ly  on th e  q u e s t io n  o f - th e  r e l a t i v e  moral w orth  which 
ought t o  be a t t r i b u t e d  to  th e  va lues  i n  q u e s t io n ,  Bergson con tend ing  t h a t  
"human being" i s  th e  m o ra l ly  o v e r r id in g  c o n s id e ra t io n ,  Ross t h a t  th e  
"amount o f  o b je c t iv e  good". Now th e  f i r s t  i s  n o t  dependent on th e  
s in g le  s i t u a t i o n ,  th e  l a t t e r  v a r i e s  w ith  c ircu m stan ces . T h ere fo re  we 
must i n f e r  t h a t  th e  O c c a s io n a l i s t ' s very  demand f o r  s i t u a t i o n s  to  be 
judged on t h e i r  own m e r i t s ,  and th e  c o n fe r r in g  o f  moral worth on 
d e c is io n s  reached acco rd ing  to  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  comprehensiveness im p lie s  
a p re -a cc ep te d  e v a lu a t io n a l  a t t i t u d e  fav o u ra b le  to  U t i l i t a r i a n  con­
s i d e r a t io n s .
The q u e s t io n  we now fa c e  i s  w hether one p re -a c c e p te d  e v a lu a t io n a l  
approach  can be sa id  t o  be m o ra l ly  p r e f e r a b l e  to  a n o th e r .  In  o th e r  
words, \ ^ e t h e r  i n t u i t i o n s  a re  comparable as to  t h e i r  in h e re n t  moral w orth. 
Or, i n  o th e r  words: How can we j u s t i f y  our con ten tion^^  t h a t  th e
1 ) The c o n te n tio n  we made when we pronounced th e  two s ta te m e n ts  quoted 
from Ross t o  be immoral, and p a r t i c u l a r l y  so when co n s id ered  in  t h e i r  
r o l e  o f  " c o n te n ts  o f  an e lem entary  i n t u i t i o n " .
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p e r f e c t l y  s in c e r e ,  p e r f e c t l y  s e l f - c o n f i d e n t  i n t u i t i o n  o f  one man, i s  
b e t t e r  than  th e  p e r f e c t l y  s in c e r e ,  p e r f e c t l y  s e l f - c o n f id e n t  i n t u i t i o n  o f  
ano ther?  In  o th e r  words, how can we prove t h a t  m o ra l ly  speak ing  Bergson 
i s  r i g h t  and Ross i s  wrong?
c) We s h a l l  leav e  th e  q u e s t io n  f o r  th e  moment and r e tu r n  to  S i r  David 
Ross* d e s c r ip t io n  o f  how we come to  know th e  o b je c t iv e ly  r i ^ t  s o lu t io n  
to  a g iven  complex moral s i t u a t i o n .  T h e o re t ic a l ly  t h i s  knowledge i s  
p o s s ib l e ,  though p r a c t i c a l l y  i t  i s  ou t o f  th e  reach  o f  our human 
i n t e l l e c t .  In  o th e r  words, because o f  th e  i n f i n i t e  com plexity  o f  every 
c o n c re te  s i t u a t i o n ,  and th e  i n d e f i n i t e  number o f  ex p eriences  r e s u l t i n g  
from every  s in g le  conce ivab le  s o lu t io n ,  on ly  an i n f i n i t e  i n t e l l e c t  can 
be s a id  t o  p e rc e iv e  c l e a r ly  and know f o r  c e r t a in  which i s  th e  r i g h t ,  i . e .  
th e  most comprehensive s o lu t io n .  To our f i n i t e  comprehension such 
knowledge i s  im p ra c t ic a b le .  We can never  know. We can only o p in e .
A rea so n ab ly  w ell s u b s ta n t ia t e d  op in ion  i s  th e  b e s t  we can do. - "The 
g e n era l  q u e s t io n  i s  w hether our o b l ig a t io n s  and consequen tly  our d u t ie s  
depend upon our a c tu a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  in c lu d in g  our c a p a c i t i e s _f o r  a f f e c t i n g  
i t  and th e  consequences o f  what we may im m ediately  b r in g  about" ( i . e .  
our " r e a l  du ty")  "or upon our b e l i e f  abou t t h a t  s i t u a t i o n " ,  ( i . e .  our 
s u b je c t iv e  du ty) "or upon our moral e s t im a te  o f  what th e  supposed 
s i t u a t i o n  d e m a n d s " . ( i . e .  our p u t a t i v e  d u ty ) .
Now i t  seems un reasonab le  t o  hold  t h a t  we ought t o  perform an a c t  
which we do n o t  and cannot know to  be our du ty . On th e  o th e r  hand i f
l )  E .F .O arritt! E th ica l and P o l i t i c a l  Thinking; C h .II , p .14.
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we t h in k  an a c t  to  be our d u ty ,  t h i s  i s  th e  m o ra lly  r i g h t  a c t  f o r  us t o  
perfo rm . I f  i t  t r a n s p i r e  l a t e r  t h a t  we were m is taken  i t  would appear 
t h a t  we were m ora lly  bound t o  perform o b je c t iv e ly  wrong a c t s .  The 
impasse can be r e s t l e s s l y  re so lv ed  i n  two ways. Whether by g iv in g  up 
a l t o g e t h e r  an o b je c t iv e  view o f  duty o r  by acknowledging th e  e x is te n c e  
o f  some b a s ic ,  and u n i v e r s a l ly  v a l id  p r i n c i p l e  and abandoning th e  
O c c a s io n a l i s t  view.
Ross avo ids both  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  t h e i r  s t a r k e r  forms and s e t t l e s  f o r  
th e  o b l ig a t io n  to  perform  th e  m ora lly  r i g h t  a c t ,  w i th  th e  p ro v iso  t h a t  i t  
be considered  our f i r s t  du ty  to  a c q u a in t  o u rse lv es  as f u l l y  as p o s s ib le  
w ith  th e  f a c t s  o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n .  For t h e  more we know about a g iven  
s i t u a t i o n  th e  g r e a t e r  our chance o f  approxim ating  th e  supposed to  th e  
r e a l  d u ty , th e  m o ra l ly  r i g h t  to  th e  o b j e c t iv e ly  r i ^ t  a c t .  In  a d d i t io n  
i f  we seek th e  op in ion  and adv ice  o f  knowledgeable peop le  ( a t  t h i s  s ta g e  
m ain ly  as t o  what f a c t s  a re  p e r t i n e n t  and what consequences p ro b ab le )  
t h e r e  i s  a rea so n a b le  hope t h a t  s u b je c t iv e  e r r o r s  w i l l  cancel each o th e r  
out and s t i l l  f u r t h e r  reduce th e  m argin between th e  m o ra l ly  r i g h t  and th e  
o b je c t iv e ly  r i g h t  a c t .  Here we encoun ter  f o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e th e  f ig u r e  
of th e  W ell-educa ted , knowledgeable man i n  th e  r o l e  o f  c o u n c e l lo r  and 
a r b i t e r  m o ra l is .  At t h i s  s ta g e  h i s  p resen ce  i s  a c c e p ta b le  enough s in c e  
he p o sse s se s  good q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  d e c id in g  q u e s t io n s  o f  f a c t s ,  and 
because advice  i s  p o s s ib le  in  q u e s t io n s  o f  f a c t  in  th e  sense  t h a t  
f e a t u r e s  we m ight have overlooked b e fo re ,  a re  b rough t t o  our s i g h t ,  
ad-visum .
Furtherm ore, even though capable  o f  dom inating a l l  th e  f a c t u a l
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m a te r i a l  o f  a g iven  s i t u a t i o n ,  we should s t i l l  n o t  know what our duty  
i s  u n le s s  we a l s o  u nders tand  th e  v a lu a t io n a l  requ irem en ts  o f  t h a t  
s i t u a t i o n .  In  o th e r  words, u n le s s  our "moral e s t im a te  o f vdiat th e  
s i t u a t i o n  demands" were m o ra l ly  r i g h t .  Now in  an O c c a s io n a l i s t  System 
which bans th e  u se  o f  gen e ra l  r u le s  and u l t im a te  p r i n c i p l e s ,  th e  only 
v a lu a t io n a l  e s t im a te  p o s s ib le  i s  t h a t  in h e re n t  and deduced from th e  given 
s i t u a t i o n  i t s e l f ,  v i z .  th e  demand f o r  th e  comprehensiveness of th e  f i n a l  
d e c i s io n .  "Probably  most r i g h t  a c ts  c o n s i s t  in  b r in g in g  about t h e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n s  which i s  due i n  th e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s " ^  In  
o th e r  words, in  an O c c a s io n a l i s t  System th e  so le  d e f in a b le  c r i t e r i o n  o f  
moral w orth  i s  th e  * comprehensiveness * o f  th e  f i n a l  d e c i s io n .  But 
* comprehensiveness* i s  m ainly  a q u a n t i t a t i v e  p r i n c i p l e  and th e  q u e s t io n s  
r e s o lv a b le  in  i t s  l i g h t ,  p r im a r i ly  q u e s t io n s  o f  f a c t s .  The d e c i s io n  i t  
a id s  and a b e ts  us  t o  reach  i s  th e  d e c is io n  which r e a l i s e s  th e  maximum 
amount in  ’u n i t s  o f  good* and s a t i s f i e d  th e  g r e a t e s t  v a r i e t y  o f  
o b l ig a t io n .
Once ag a in  we must adm it a complete knowledge o f  th e  v a lu a t io n a l  
f a c t s  t o  be beyond our re a c h ,  and a w e ll- reaso n ed  and c a r e f u l l y  
c a lc u la te d  op in ion  th e  b e s t  we can hope f o r .  To a c t  upon t h i s  op in ion  
i s  th e  m o ra lly  r i g h t  th in g  to  do, w ith  th e  p ro v iso  t h a t  we c o n t in u a l ly  
seek f u r t h e r  p o in ts  o f  a s su ra n c e .  At t h i s  p o in t  to o ,  adv ice  i s  bo th  
p o s s ib le  and a c c e p ta b le ,  p r e f e r a b ly  th e  ad v ice  o f  w e ll-ed u ca ted  and 
knowledgeable p e rso n s .
l )  E .F .O a r r itt: The Theory o f M orals; (1928) O h .X lll, p . l l 4 .
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In  conc lu s io n  we may say t h a t  though we can never know th e  
o b je c t iv e ly  r i g h t  s o lu t io n  of a given problem and can th e r e f o r e  never 
reach  a b so lu te  c e r t a i n t y  about what our o b je c t iv e  duty i s ,  we must a c t  
on our op in ion  o f  what i t  i s ,  and we must seek  to  s u b s ta n t i a t e  t h i s  
op in ion  as f u l l y  as we may. Our only  two c l e a r l y  de fin ed  o b l ig a t io n s ,  
th u s ,  in  a c e r t a in  sen se , work a g a in s t  each o th e r :  th e  one e n jo in in g  us
to  a c t ,  th e  o th e r  t o  postpone a c t io n  in  o rd e r  to  seek f o r  f u l l e r  
in fo rm a tio n ;  and between them give our moral l i f e  a t r a i t  o f  p re c a r io u s ­
n ess  and u n c e r t a in ty .
This ve ry  u n s a t i s f a c to r y  r e s u l t  i s  f u r t h e r  agg rava ted  by th e  
r e f l e c t i o n  t h a t  our moral t a s k  when d e l i b e r a t in g  th e  s o lu t io n  of a problem 
i s  n o t  always completed when we have considered  th e  simple and th e  
v a lu a t io n a l  f a c t s  o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n  and decided  to  a c t  upon them. We 
m ight fo r  in s ta n c e  be faced  w ith  a choice  between what seem to  us two 
e q u a l ly  comprehensive, n o n - id e n t i c a l ,  p o s s ib le  s o lu t io n s ;  th e  one 
embodying one s e t  o f  va lues  and s a t i s f y i n g  one s e t  o f  o b l ig a t io n s ,  th e  
o th e r  a n o th e r .  Or we m ight be faced w ith  a choice  between th e  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  a u t i l i t a r i a n  o b l ig a t io n ,  and th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  a prima 
f a c i e  duty  l i k e  p rom ise-keep ing , which a re  m u tu a lly  e x c lu s iv e .  In  t h a t  
case  th e  p r i n c i p le  o f  comprehensiveness w i l l  be o f  no a v a i l  s in c e  i t  i s  
in ca p ab le  to  se rv e  as a q u a l i t a t i v e  c r i t e r i o n  fo r  th e  q u a l i t a t i v e  
e v a lu a t io n  of o b l ig a t io n s ,  and grounds o f  o b l ig a t io n .  I t  cannot, f o r  
in s t a n c e ,  t e l l  us which o b l ig a t io n  i s  s t r o n g e r ,  nor which v a lu es  a re  of 
g r e a te r  moral im port .  I t  f u rn is h e s  us w ith  no ground on which to  decide 
w hether th e  "s u f f e r in g  of an inno cen t human being" or th e  " g r e a t e s t  good,
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f o r  a l l "  i s  th e  m ora lly  o v e r r id in g  c o n s id e ra t io n .  That i s ,  i t  p rov ides
no rea so n  to  th in k  t h a t  we ought to  hold  o b l ig a t io n s  o f  a ' conductiveness-
to-good* n a tu re  as more o r  as l e s s  b ind ing  than  th o se  a r i s i n g  from th e
i n t r i n s i c  r ig h tn e s s  o f  th e  prima f a c i e  d u t ie s .^ ^  Nor can th e  on ly  o th e r
p r i n c i p l e  defined  in  an O c c a s io n a l i s t  System, th e  one e n jo in in g  us t o
2)
seek  more a c c u ra te  in fo rm a tio n ,  f u r n i s h  a reason  f o r  a d e c is io n  o f  
p re fe re n c e .  The O c c a s io n a l i s t  System den ies  t h a t  p re fe re n c e  ought to  
be g iven  from a moral p o in t  o f  view a p r i o r i  and by v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r  
i n t r i n s i c  n a tu re  to  c e r t a in  v a lu es  over o th e r s .  I t  d e c l in e s  t o  
acknowledge a f ix e d  iranutable h i e r a r c h i c a l  o rd e r  o f  v a lu e s ,  and i n s i s t s  
t h a t  th e  moral s t a tu s  o f a g iven value  changes w ith  th e  c ircum stances
5)under and th e  co n te x t  i n  which i t  a p p e a r s . D efiance o f  a u th o r i ty  may
1) i . e .  u l t im a te ly  and in  th e  l a s t  in s ta n c e  frcm th e  b a s ic  p r i n c i p l e .
2) The moral problem h ing es  n o t  on f a c t s ,  n o t  even on v a lu a t io n a l  f a c t s ,  
b u t  on th e  r e l a t i v e  moral o b l ig a to r in e s s ,  th e  moral e s t im a te  of th e  
v a lu es  concerned. When and i f  agreement about v a lu a t io n a l  f a c t s  has 
been reached th e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  moral d is c u s s io n  s e t s  i n ,  l i k e  in  th e  
a lre a d y  c i t e d  case o f  Bergson v e rsu s  Ross. A ll  moral d isagreem ents  
a re  d isagreem ents n o t  about th e  i n t r i n s i c  n a tu re  and s t r u c t u r e  of 
v a lu e s  and t h e i r  i n t e r r e l a t i o n  w ith  o th e r  v a lu e s .  Both Ross and 
Bergson mean th e  same t h in g ,  o r  as n e a r ly  th e  same th in g  as makes no 
d i f f e r e n c e ,  when they  speak about " th e  g r e a t e s t  good" and "human 
s u f f e r in g " , and y e t  th ey  a t t a c h  d ia m e t r i c a l ly  o p p o s i te  s ig n s  o f  moral 
o b l ig a to r in e s s  t o  them when fo rced  to  decide  which ought t o  be 
s a c r i f i c e d  t o  which. A ll  moral d isagreem ents  a re  d isagreem ents 
about th e  p re fe re n c e  t h a t  from a moral p o in t  o f  view o u ^ t  t o  be g iven 
to  one va lue  r a t h e r  th an  to  a n o th e r .  What meaning t h i s  command to  
p r e f e r  can be s a id  to  p o ssess  i n  an O c c a s io n a l is t  System w i l l  be our 
nex t  problem.
5) That i s ,  more moral s ig n i f i c a n c e  th an  would appear a t  f i r s t  b lu sh  
r e s id e s  i n  th e  o b l ig a t io n  to  acq u a in t  o n e se l f  w ith  th e  f a c t s  of a 
s i t u a t i o n .
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be th e  m ora lly  r i g h t  course  i n  one in s t a n c e ;  in  an o th e r  i t  may be wrong. 
I t  a lso  d e c l in e s  to  make any excep tion  i n  t h i s  r u l e , i . e .  to  acknowledge 
th e  e x is te n c e  of even one va lue  which, from a moral p o in t  o f  view, i s  
n o t  a f f e c te d  by th e s e  a c c id e n ta l  and c o n tin g e n t  f l u c t u a t i o n s  o f i t s  
o b l ig a to r in e s s .  (This i s  bu t ano the r  r e s u l t  o f th e  O c c a s io n a l i s t  d e n ia l  
t o  acknowledge th e  e x is te n c e  o f  an u l t im a te  b a s ic  p r i n c i p l e ,  and a 
g e n e r a l ly  v a l id  c r i t e r i o n  o f  moral w o r th ) . By t h i s  th e  O c c a s io n a l i s t  
d e p r iv e s  h im se lf  o f any ground, p r in c ip le  o r  reason  f o r  h is  u l t im a te  moral 
ch o ice , which assumes a wholly g r a tu i to u s  c h a r a c te r .  " I t  i s  bad enough 
t h a t  we have t o  f a l l  back upon op in ion  as opposed to  knowledge. I t  i s  
f a r  worse t h a t  we have t o  f a l l  back on a ground less  o p in io n ."  This 
"g round less  opinion" corresponds to  what we have c a l le d  th e  second 
fu n c t io n  of i n t u i t i o n  in  th e  Rossian system . Now t h i s  i n t u i t i o n  evoked 
f o r  th e  very  purpose o f  making p a r t i c u l a r  d e c is io n s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
in s t a n c e s ,  p e r .d e f .  i s  d i r e c te d  towards a v a s t  number o f  unique 
p a r t i c u l a r  c o n te n ts ,  each -o f  which i s  n o n - re c u r r in g ,  in c o n s ta n t ,  and no t 
s e l f - e v i d e n t .  N e i th e r  by i t s  c o n te x t ,  no r  by i t s  s t r u c t u r e ,  nor by th e  
way in  which i t  o p e ra te s ,  can th e  m e r i t  o f  t h i s  i n t u i t i o n  be e s t im a te d ;  
o r th e  m e r i t  o f  one such i n i t i a l  d e c is io n  be compared to  th e  m e r i t  o f  
a n o th e r .  That i s ,  i n  th e  case  o f  Bergson v e rsu s  Ross, we would have 
no way o f  d ec id in g  whose i n t u i t i o n  was r i g h t  and whose wrong. And t h i s  
i s  an extrem ely s e r io u s  m a t te r  f o r  a Theory o f  E th ic s  which c l in g s  to  an
l )  H .J .P a to n :  Can Reason be P r a c t i c a l ? ;  p . 50.
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o b je c t iv e  view o f  du ty .^^  For acco rd in g  to  t h i s  th e o ry  one o f  them must
be wrong, as th ey  cannot bo th  be r i g h t  s in c e  th e r e  i s  only  one
o b je c t iv e ly  r i g h t  s o lu t io n .  Nor can th e  n o t io n  o f  th e  "m orally  r i g h t "
se rv e  as a lo o p h o le ,  f o r  n e i t h e r  o f  than  can claim  to  have been ig n o ra n t
of th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  th e  o t h e r ’s d e c i s io n .
This c o n s id e ra t io n  d e p r iv e s  us o f  th e  l a s t  remnants o f  s e c u r i t y  and
c e r t a i n t y ,  and leav es  us more eager th an  ever f o r  some s o r t  o f  a ssu ra n ce .
2)
But th e  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t u i t i v e  d e c is io n  can be n e i th e r  j u s t i f i e d  n o r  
v i n d i c a t e d . I t  can only be c o n f i r m e d , I t  can be confirmed by, 
g iven th e  seme problem, th e  i d e n t i c a l  i n t u i t i v e  d e c is io n s  of o th e r  peop le .
1) The E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  would f e e l  no need f o r  an 
e x p la n a t io n  s in c e  acco rd ing  to  t h e i r  th eo ry  B ergson’s d e c is io n  o u g h t , 
one m i ^ t  a lm ost be tempted to  say , t o  d i f f e r  from Ross’ . I t  m i ^ t  
be i n t e r e s t i n g  a t  t h i s  p o in t  to  m ention W.D.Lamont’ s argument i n  
" P r in c ip le s  o f  Moral Judgment" (1947), p . 8 9 , f o r  a new d e f i n i t i o n  of 
o b je c t iv e  du ty , which would cover th e  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  argument and 
s t i l l  p re s e rv e  a modicum o f  o b j e c t i v i t y  : He a rgues t h a t  t h o u ^  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  du ty  may be s u b je c t iv e  ( i . e .  what i s  th e  r i ^ t  a c t  f o r
me m i ^ t  be wrong f o r  y o u , ;  i t  y e t  i s  o b je c t iv e  i n  th e  sense  t h a t  i f  
you were me i t  would be r i g h t  f o r  you to o ,  o r  i n  o th e r  words, you w i l l  
a g re e ,  and everyone e l s e  w i l l  ag ree  t h a t  f o r  me i t  was th e  r i g h t  a c t .  
In  th e  same way a s u i t  can be s a id  as  a m a t te r  o f  o b je c t iv e  f a c t  to  
be a good f i t ,  though i t  be a good f i t  f o r  me n o t  fo r  you, indeed  
though i t  can only be a good f i t  f o r  me i f  i t  i s  n o t  a good f i t  f o r  
you. But then  Lament as w ell  as th e  E x i s t e n t i a l i s t  have c e r t a i n  
c r i t e r i a  ( l i k e  doing th in g s  "au nom de l a  l i b e r t é " ) ,  o r  u l t im a te  
p r in c ip le s  which enable  them to  make m oral d e c i s io n s .
2 ) i . e .  by i t s  c o n te n t ,  s in c e  t h i s  i s  by hyp. u n ique , n o n - re c u r r in g ,  
and n o t  s e l f - e v i d e n t .
5) i . e .  by i t s  p r in c ip le  or d e f i n i t e  grounds, s in c e  by hyp. th e r e  i s  no 
p r in c ip le  and by th e  manner o f  i t s  g e n es is  i t  can have no grounds.
4 ) S ince  by d e f .  i . e .  by O c c a s io n a l i s t  d e f i n i t i o n  th e r e  e x i s t s  an
o b je c t iv e ly  r i g h t  s o lu t io n  to  th e  g iven  problem and t h i s  s o lu t io n  i s  
sought by a l l  who c o n s id e r  t h a t  problem.
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The w e i ^ t  o f  th e  con firm ato ry  evidence fo r  th e  o b je c t iv e  r ig h tn e s s  
of our i n t u i t i v e  d e c is io n  can be measured e i t h e r  by th e  sheer  number of 
i d e n t i c a l  i n t u i t i v e  d e c is io n s  ( i . e .  s t a t i s t i c a l l y ) , ^ ^  or by th e  q u a l i t y  
of th e  confirm ato ry  i n t u i t i v e  d e c i s io n s .  S ince t h i s  q u a l i t y  i s  no t  
determined e i t h e r  by th e  c o n te n t  no r by th e  s t r u c tu r e  o f  th e  i n t u i t i v e  
d e c i s io n ,  i t  can only  d e r iv e  from th e  p e r s o n a l i ty  of th e  one whose 
i n t u i t i o n  i t  i s .  The i n t u i t i v e  d e c is io n  o f  th e  w e l l-e d u c a te d ,  
knowledgeable man, ought th e r e f o r e  t o  be considered  o f  su p e r io r  moral 
worth in  i t s e l f  and of g r e a t e r  in f lu e n c e  as co n firm ato ry  evidence  because 
o f  h i s  be ing  w e ll-e d u ca te d  and knowledgeable. "The moral c o n v ic t io n s  
o f  th o u g h tfu l  and w e ll-e d u ca te d  people  a re  th e  d a ta  o f E th ic s .  The 
e x i s t i n g  body o f  moral c o n v ic t io n s  o f  th e  b e s t -p e o p le  a re  th e  fo u n d a tio n s  
on \diich we must b u i l d " . B e i n g  f i r s t  made, confirm ed or adv ised  by a 
" th o u g h tfu l  and w e ll-ed uca ted "  man, i s  t h e  n o n - p lu s - u l t r a  ground f o r  th e  
moral r ig h tn e s s  o f  an i n t u i t i v e  d e c is io n  and th e  u l t im a te  rea so n  why i t  
should be p r e f e r r e d  above a l l  o th e r s .  The f i n a l  ground o f  moral r i g h t ­
ness  l i e s  in  i t s  being accep ted  by th e  e l e c t  few who th u s  a re  i n s t a l l e d  
as th e  A u toc ra ts  o f M o ra l i ty ,  who ho ld  a l l  c o n s t i t u t i v e  and a l l  
l e g i s l a t i v e  power in  t h e i r  hands, and whom one cannot c a l l  to  account 
and whose d e c is io n s  cannot be p u t to  a t e s t  s in c e  t h e i r s  i s  th e  on ly  
m oral a u th o r i ty  and t h e i r  d e c is io n s  th e  only  norm.
This conclusion  i s  open to  so many o b je c t io n s  on so many grounds
1 ) T his p o s s i b i l i t y  Ross r e j e c t s  t a c i t l y  f o r  th e  obvious and I th in k  
conc lu s ive  rea so n s .
2 ) D.W.Ross: The R ight and th e  Good; p . 40.
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t h a t  I am tempted t o  pause f o r  a moment i n  o rd er  t o  quote  a passage
from Bergson, which fo r  a l l  i t s  apparen t i r r e le v a n c y  a t  t h i s  p o in t  may
y e t  prove most, u s e fu l  in  th e  course  o f  t h i s  d is c u s s io n  :
"The b e l i e f s  to  which we most s t r o n g ly  adhere a re  th o se  o f  which
we should f in d  i t  most d i f f i c u l t  to  g ive  an accoun t, and th e  reasons  by
which we j u s t i f y  them a re  seldom th o se  which have led  us to  adopt them.
In  a c e r t a in  sense  we have adopted them w ith o u t  any rea so n , f o r  what
makes them v a lu a b le  in  our eyes i s  t h a t  they  match th e  co lour o f  a l l  our
o th e r  id ea s  and t h a t  from th e  ve ry  beg inn ing  we have seen in  them scane-
t h in g  of o u r s e lv e s :  . . . .  th e  i n t e l l e c t  has  i t s  i n s t i n c t s "
L et us q u ick ly  pass i n  review th e  more obvious o b je c t io n s  t o  th e
r a t h e r  s t a r t l i n g  r e s u l t s  o f  th e  Rossian e x p o s i t io n .  F i r s t  of a l l  th e
a r b i t r a r y  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  th e  d a ta  to  be an a ly se d ,  and th e  d e c is io n s  t o  be
re s p e c te d  and em ulated, i s  c o n tra ry  to  what Ross h im s e lf  has adm itted  to
be th e  i n i t i a l  and n ecessa ry  assum ptions o f  a l l  e n q u ir ie s  i n to  E th ic s  by
2 )
which a lone  such E n qu ir ies  a r e  made p o s s ib l e .  This a lone  should g ive 
us  p ause . As f a r  as th e  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  what should be considered , 
r e l e v a n t  d a ta  i s  concerned such' l i m i t a t i o n  runs coun te r  th e  e lem enta l 
requ irem en ts  o f  any i n v e s t i g a t i o n  w ith  any p r e te n s io n  to  m ethodica l 
i n t e g r i t y .  This i s  so obvious t h a t  I  s h a l l  be s a t i s f i e d  to  quote  two 
r e l e v a n t  remarks and leav e  i t  a t  t h a t  : The f i r s t  from Lamont has been
aimed a g a in s t  t h i s  very  passage  by Ross and runs " a l l  moral judgments a re
1) Bergson: E ssa i su r  l e s  o/o^u,et^ immédiates de l a  co n sc ien ce , I I ,  p . l O l , '
2) P a r t i c u l a r l y  to  what i s  p o s tu la te d  i n  th e  second assum ption i . e .  t h a t  
m oral experience  be a c c e s s ib le  to  every  man-qua-man.
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r e le v a n t  to  our enqu iry , th o s e  o f  p l a i n ,  f o o l i s h  and even v ic io u s  men
w ith  th o se  o f  th e  educa ted , w ise  and v i r t u o u s " T h e  second from
Samuel C larke may p o s s ib ly  fu r n i s h  a conv inc ing  reason  why t h i s  should
be so : "For Men may d issem ble  and conceal from th e  world th e  judgement
of t h e i r  own consc ience , may by a s t r a n g e  p a r t i a l i t y  even impose upon and
dece ive  them selves (For who i s  th e r e  t h a t  does n o t  sometimes a llow
h im s e l f ,  nay and even j u s t i f y  h im s e l f  i n  t h a t  wherein he condemns
Another?) But Men’s judgment concerning  th e  A ctions of o th e rs  e s p e c i a l l y
where th ey  have no r e l a t i o n  th o n se lv e s  o r  repugnance to  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t ,
a re  commonly im p a r t i a l  and from t h i s  we may judge what u n e r r in g  sense  Men
2)
n a t u r a l l y  have o f  th e  u n a l t e r a b l e  d i f f e r e n c e  between R ight and Wrong".
Our o b je c t io n s  to  th e  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  th e  d e c is io n s  t o  be re sp e c te d  
and em ulated, to  tho se  reached by th e  " th o u g h tfu l  and w e l l-e d u c a te d " ,  
because  "being reached by th o u g h tfu l  and w e ll-ed u ca ted  men" i s  what g ives 
them t h e i r  moral v a l i d i t y ,  a re  as fo llow s
Let us assume t h a t  t o  be " th o u g h tfu l  and w ell-educa ted"  i s  to  be 
m o ra l ly  s e n s i t i v e  i . e .  good. Then what people  o f  t h i s  d e s c r ip t io n  
choose i s  r i g h t .  But how s h a l l  we know which people  a re  m o ra lly  
s e n s i t iv e ?  Obviously by see in g  then  choose th e  r i g h t .  That i s ,  i n  
o rd e r  to  reco g n ise  them when we come a c ro ss  them we must f i r s t  know what 
i s  r i g h t ,  and so , by see in g  them choose i t ,  know t h a t  th ey  a re  th e  ones 
we sough t. But how can we know what i s  r ig h t?  Ex hyp. by se e in g  th e
1 ) W.D.Lament : P r in c ip le s  o f  Moral Judgment ; p . 12.
2 ) Samuel C la rk e :  On N a tu ra l  R e lig io n ;  In  Selby Bigge Br.M, of th e  
X V In th  0. & 4 9 0 .
5) They a re  m ainly  r e c a p i t u l a t io n s  of or in fe re n c e s  from what has a lre a d y  
been p o in ted  out i n  a n o th e r  connec tion .
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moral ly  s e n s i t i v e  people  choose i t .  And so on. In  s h o r t ,  u n le s s  we 
re c u r  t o  an o u ts id e  p r i n c i p l e  we can n e i t h e r  reco g n ise  th e  " th o u g h tfu l  
people" nor know what i s  " r i g h t " .  The assum ption " th o u g h tfu l  and 
educated  = m o ra l ly  s e n s i t i v e  = h a b i tu a l  maker of r i g h t  d e c is io n s"  -  b r ings  
us i n to  th e  c i r c u lu s  v i t i o s u s  f i r s t  no ted  by A r i s t o t l e  i n  th e  Nicomachean 
E th ic s .  Besides Ross never in tended  to  lea d  us i n to  t h a t  c i r c u lu s  
v i t i o s u s .  His a r b i t r i  m o ra l i s ,  h i s  th o u g h tfu l  and w e ll-e d u ca te d  peo p le ,  
a r e  n o t  " th o u g h tfu l  and w e ll-edu ca ted"  because they  i n t u i t i v e l y  choose 
th e  o b je c t iv e ly  r i g h t  s o lu t io n .  They a re  " th o u g h tfu l  and w ell-ed uca ted "  
in  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  as a m a t te r  o f  f a c t .  And they  possess  by educa tion  
or by n a tu re  th e  same p re -accep ted ^^  v a lu a t io n a l  approach to  moral 
problem s. I t  i s  t h i s  i n s t i n c t i v e  knowledge t h a t  th e s e  people  a re  l i k e l y  
to  confirm h i s  own i n c l i n a t i o n s ,  h i s  own i n t u i t i v e l y  accepted^^ s c a le  o f 
v a lu e s ,  which makes Ross plump fo r  them as a r b i t r i  m o ra l is .  But having  
one’s own i n s t i n c t s  confirmed cannot be accep ted  as an o b je c t iv e ly  v a l id  
and s u f f i c i e n t  p ro o f  f o r  th e  moral r ig h tn e s s  o f t h a t  which s a t i s f i e s  
them. Unless o f  c o u rse , o n e ’s i n s t i n c t s  were such t h a t  they  a re  only  
s a t i s f i e d  by what i s  m orally  r i g h t . . .  And so on. But " th o u g h tfu l  and 
w e ll-ed u ca ted  people" a re  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  m ora lly  more s e n s i t iv e  than  
o th e r s .  We have a lre a d y  no ted  t h a t  g r e a t e r  knowledge, s u b t l e r  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  rea so n in g  i s  by no means a g ua ran tee  f o r  a f i n e r  moral 
s e n s i b i l i t y .  Indeed , one m ight alm ost be to n p ted  to  say , c o n t r a r iw is e .
Moreover, a cu te  moral s e n s i b i l i t y  i s  n o t  an e x c lu s iv e  q u a l i t y .
l )  Both terras need to  be ex p la in ed .
-1 5 9 -
dependent on knowledge, e d u ca tio n ,  b reed ing  and rese rv ed  f o r  th e  few.
By th e  b a s ic  p o s tu l a t e  o f m o ra lity ^^  i t  i s  p o t e n t i a l l y  i n  th e  p o sse s s io n
of every man, and in  a way i s  a c tu a l i s e d  and r e a l i s e d  by every man i f
2 )  ■ 'n o t  in  h i s  p r a c t i c a l  d e c is io n s  a t  l e a s t  i n  h i s  moral judgments ; i . e .  
every man i s  by d e f .  a q u a l i f i e d  a r b i t e r  m o ra l is .  The concept o f  
q u a l i f i e d  a r b i t e r  m o ra l is  i f  a r b i t r a r i l y  l im i te d  t o  a s in g le  group, i s  
t h e r e f o r e ,  m o ra l ly  speak ing , s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y .  The i n t u i t i v e  
d e c is io n s  and cho ices  o f  th e  th o u g h tfu l  and w e ll-e d u ca te d  have no more 
m oral s ig n i f i c a n c e  than  any o th e r  such d e c is io n s  and ch o ic e s ;  ( I f  t h e i r  
moral worth i s  to  be a s c e r t a in e d ,  i t  w i l l  have to  be by some o u ts id e  
p r i n c i p l e . )  w h i l s t  we must d e s p a i r  a l t o g e th e r  o f  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
e v a lu a t in g  th e  moral worth o f  p a r t i c u l a r  d e c i s io n s .  In  o th e r  words, we 
d e s p a i r  of th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  knowing our duty  in  any given s i t u a t i o n ;  
or guess ing  a t  i t ;  or g ra sp in g  i t  i n t u i t i v e l y ,  o r le a r n in g  i t  from th e  
l i p s  o f  a n o th e r .
N e v e r th e le ss  i t  seons to  me t h a t  i f  we c o n su lt  moral ex p e rien ce  we 
have in  most cases  a reaso nab le  c e r t a i n t y  about ou r  a c tu a l  du ty , and t h a t  
w ith o u t  t h i s  rea so n ab le  c e r t a i n t y  we should in  p r a c t i c e  be tempted to  s e t
5 )a s id e  du ty  a l t o g e th e r . "  This seems t o  me a very  convincing  d e s c r ip t io n  
o f  our moral experience  e s p e c i a l l y  s in c e  i t  i s  confirmed by what we can 
i m p l i c i t l y  l e a m  from Ross; f o r  Ross i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  innumerable
1 ) i . e .  t h a t  moral experience  i s  open and a c c e s s ib le  to  every man-quannan.
2 ) See th e  q u o ta t io n  from S .C la rk e .
5) H .J .P a to n : Can Reason be P r a c t i c a l ,  p . 55. See a l s o  th e  a l r e a d y
quoted passage  from V.G.de B u r ^ : The R e la tio n s  o f M o ra l i ty  to
R e lig io n ,  P roceedings of Br. Academy 1955, p . l 4 .
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d i f f i c u l t i e s  and p i t f a l l s  o f  h i s  th e o ry  se®ns much more c e r t a in  o f  h i s  
du ty  th an  th o se  p i t f a l l s  and d i f f i c u l t i e s  would w a r ra n t .
This i s  accounted f o r  by our c o n te n t io n  t h a t  moral op in ions about 
vdiat i s  and what i s  n o t  our d u ty , a re  u l t im a te ly  determ ined by a p re ­
accep ted  e v a lu a t io n a l  approach. This c o n te n t io n  I  hope i f  n o t  to  p ro ve ,-  
a t  l e a s t  to  make s u f f i c i e n t l y  p la u s ib le  and p e rsu a s iv e  by th e  fo llo w in g  
r e f l e c t i o n s .  In  th e  c o n te x t  o f  th e  Rossian Theory, which on th e  fac e  
o f  i t  tak e s  account only o f  what happens in s id e  th e  co n fin es  of a g iven  
p a r t i c u l a r  problem, and a f t e r  th e  problem has been posed , th e  p re -a c c e p te d  
e v a lu a t io n a l  approach severed  from i t s  ro o ts  and s e t  a d r i f t ,  t a k e s  on th e  
g u ise  o f  an i n s t i n c t i v e  p r e ju d ic e  o f  no moral o r  o th e r  v a l i d i t y .  Without 
p e rc e iv a b le  ground, rea so n , p r i n c i p l e ,  i t  makes i t s  g r a t i t u i t o u s  ch o ice , 
(ennobled by th e  Rossian term o f  i n t u i t i o n ) ,  o f  th e  co ncre te  g iven  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  ; and once th e  s i t u a t i o n  ceases  t o  e x i s t ,  so does i t ,  on ly  
t o  be reborn  w ith  a com plete ly  d i f f e r e n t  con cre te  c o n te n t  th e  moment th e  
n e x t  problem comes up. The i n f i n i t e  number o f  i t s  appearances , makes us 
d e s p a i r  o f  l e a r n in g  something about i t  o r  from i t .  However t h i s  i s  but 
one s id e .  The s id e  p re sen te d  by th e  O c c a s io n a l i s t  School o f  Thought ' 
which w i l f u l l y  a tom ises our m oral ex p e r ien ce . In  r e a l i t y  though th e   ^
p a r t i c u l a r  moral s i t u a t i o n s  and th e  i n t u i t i v e  d e c is io n s  r e s o lv in g  them
be innum erable , t h e r e  a re  b u t  a small number o f  p re -a c c e p te d  e v a lu a t io n a l
l )approaches ' which b a s i c a l l y  remain th e  same in  t h e i r  m u lt ip le  c o n c re te  
g u i s e s .  The p re -a cc ep te d  e v a lu a t io n a l  approach i s  genera ted  and
1) B a s ic a l ly  only  two groups.
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q u a l i t a t i v e l y  determ ined by an o r ig in a l  s e t  o f  i n t u i t i o n .  In  t h i s
o r i g in a l  a c t  two phases a re  c l e a r ly  d i s c e r n ib le  : th e  f i r s t  when th e
in n e r  n a tu re  o f d i f f e r e n t  v a lu es  l i k e  Beauty, T ru th , S i n c e r i ty ,  e t c .  i s
seen and on being  seen im m ediately  and f u l l y  g rasped . The second when
a v a lu a t io n a l  o rd e r  i s  imposed on th e  given v a lu e s ,  a H ierarchy
1)e s ta b l i s h e d  in  accordance w ith  th e  d i c t a t e s  o f  one’s n a tu re .  Thus f o r  
one man Beauty becomes th e  supreme v a lu e ,  f o r  ano th e r  T ru th , though both  
have a s im i la r  i n t u i t i v e  g rasp  both o f  Beauty and of T ruth in  th e  f i r s t  
phase .
Our r e f l e c t i o n s  on th e  n a tu re  o f  v a lu e s  in  th e  f i r s t  ch ap te r  le d  us
to  b e l ie v e  t h a t  v a lues  a re  n o t  commensurable (as  t o  t h e i r  worth) and
t h a t  such o rd e r  as i s  e s ta b l i s h e d  amongst them by a human temperament i s
s u b je c t iv e  and o f  no g e n e ra l  v a l i d i t y .  On th e  o th e r  hand, we have found
2)
t h a t  by a c e r t a i n  p o s t u l a t e ,  a "Machtspruch der V e m u n ft" ,  ' supremacy 
i s  g ran ted  to  th e  "Moral Value" over a l l  o th e r  v a lu e s .  This "moral 
va lue" may be roughly  d esc r ib ed  as " th e  consciousness of th e  un ique  value  
o f  a human being" . And i t s  supremacy as th e  in ju n c t io n  on a l l  o th e r
I
v a lu es  to  r e s p e c t  th e  i n v i o l a b i l i t y  o f  th e  moral va lue  u n c o n d i t io n a l ly ,  
and under a l l  c ircum stances  to  g ive  way to  i t  ; t h a t  i s ,  t o  co n s id e r  
i t s  requ irem ents  as d e f i n i t e l y  and in  a l l  c ase s  o v e r r id in g .  Two p o s s ib le  
r e a c t io n s  to  th e  fo rm u la tio n  of t h i s  p o s t u l a t e  lead  t o  t h e  fo rm atio n  o f  
two b a s ic  e v a lu a t io n a l  approaches. The one once and f o r  a l l  a cc ep ts
1 ) i . e .  any and every man’ s .
2) The terra i s  F i c h te ’s .  I t  i s  h e re  used to  denote th e  b a s ic  moral 
p o s tu l a t e .
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t h i s  "Machtspruch der Vernunft" and in  obedience o rd e rs  h i s  own
in d iv id u a l  s c a le  o f  va lues  so t h a t  th e  moral va lue  r e ig n  supreme; th e
/
o th e r  r e j e c t s  i t ,  and forms h i s  own o rd e r  w ith  e i t h e r  Beauty, T ru th , ' 
P le a s u r e ,  o r  Power, e t c .  supreme. Roughly th e  one i s  c h a r a c te r i s e d  by 
th e  catchword " r i ^ t " , th e  o th e r  by th e  catchword "good". Even more 
roughly  th e  one i s  c a l le d  th e  moral th e  o th e r  th e  u t i l i t a r i a n  approach . 
When faced  w ith  a concre te  p a r t i c u l a r  problem th e se  two approaches might 
y i e ld  e i t h e r  th e  same o r  th e  o p p o s i te  p r a c t i c a l  d e c i s io n ,  bu t they  w i l l  
always d i f f e r  in  t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  i t .  Thus, r e tu rn in g  to  th e  
case  o f  Bergson v e rsu s  Ross : Ross w i l l  choose th e  " g r e a t e s t  good" and
Bergson w i l l  choose th e  "no t harming o f  a human being" as th e  over­
r id in g  v a lu e . Ross no t having  o r i g i n a l l y  accep ted  th e  p o s tu la t e  f o r  . 
th e  supremacy and o v e rr id in g  o b l ig a t io n  o f  th e  " d ig n i ty  o f  human beings"
A
w i l l  c la im  moral va lu e  (which r e a l l y  means t h a t  he i s  conscious o f  having
a c ted  r i g h t l y  i n  se rv in g  h i s  own supreme v a lu e ,  o f  hav ing  been t r u e  to
h i s  i n i t i a l  i n t u i t i o n )  f o r  h i s  d e c is io n ;  w h i l s t  Bergson w i l l  claim  i t
f o r  h i s .  But should both  Ross and Bergson choose th e  " g re a te r  good" i n
p re fe re n c e  of th e  d ig n i ty  o f  a human b e in g ,  i . e .  should  t h e i r  p r a c t i c a l
d e c is io n s  be th e  same, Bergson would ho ld  t h a t  h i s  d e c is io n  w h i l s t
n e c e s s i t a t e d  by p r a c t i c a l  c o n s id e r a t io n s ,  ( i . e .  t h e  same c o n s id e ra t io n s
which Ross took to  be o f  a moral n a tu re )  was m ora lly  wrong, w h i l s t  Ross
1 )would s t i l l  i n s i s t  t h a t  i t  was m ora lly  and o b je c t iv e ly  r i g h t .
l )  S im i la r ly ,  U t i l i t a r i a n s  m ight and p robab ly  would make th e  same 
p r a c t i c a l  d e c is io n  as Bergson (an i n t e r e s t i n g  p o in t )  but would 
s u b s ta n t i a t e  i t  w ith  th e  same reasons  which Ross u ses  to  v in d ic a te  
th e  o p p o site  d e c is io n .
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In  a d d i t io n  Bergson would be conscious o f  h i s  p re -a c c e p te d  
v a lu a t io n a l  approach, and would measure th e  moral worth o f  h is  p r a c t i c a l  
d e c is io n  by i t .  Ross would n o t  be conscious o f  t h i s  p re -a cc ep te d  
v a lu a t io n a l  approach and would i n s i s t  t h a t  he had taken  h i s  d e c i s io n  
a f t e r  th e  problem had been p r e s e n te d , and in s id e  i t s  confines in  accord­
ance w ith  th e  so le  p r in c ip le  o f  com prehensiveness. That t h i s  i s  n o t  so 
can be seen from th e  fo l lo w in g :  th e  v e ry  choice o f  th e  p r in c ip le  o f
comprehensiveness as a moral c r i t e r i o n  i s  ve ry  s i g n i f i c a n t .  By v i r tu e  
o f  i t s  q u a n t i t a t iv e  n a tu re  t h i s  p r in c ip le  tends to  o v e rr id e  c o n s id e ra t io n  
o f  " th e  r e s p e c t  owed to  human beings" which cannot be measured i n  favou r  
of c o n s id e ra t io n s  o f va lues  m easurable  i n  u n i t s ,  l i k e  Good, P le a s u re ,  
e t c .  I t  t h e r e f o re  a id s  and a b e ts  a p re -a c c e p te d  e v a lu a t io n a l  approach 
o f  a U t i l i t a r i a n  d e s c r ip t io n  so t h a t  one would a lm ost say t h a t  
comprehensiveness was p a r t  o f  t h a t  approach and p ro o f  o f  i t s  u t i l i t a r i a n  
n a tu r e .  On th e  o th e r  hand ’com prehensiveness ' r e p re s e n ts  no v a lu e  a t  
a l l  f o r  th e  p re -a cc ep te d  e v a lu a t io n a l  approach o f  a ’moral p e rs u a s io n " ,  
s in c e  b e fo re  th e  appearance o f  th e  dan and to  " re s p e c t  a human being" a l l  
o th e r  v a lu es  p a le  and o b l ig a t io n s  a r i s i n g  from them a re  d e c la re d  n u l l  and 
void w h i l s t  t h e i r  more in c lu s iv e  com binations and q u a n t i ty  does n o t  
a f f e c t  th e  i s s u e  a t  a l l .  Another p e r t i n e n t  c o n s id e ra t io n  i s  t h a t  th e  
p r i n c i p l e  o f comprehensiveness i s  d e fined  in s id e  a g iven  s i t u a t i o n .
A given concre te  s i t u a t i o n  c o n ta in s  many f e a tu r e s  o f a non-moral 
c h a r a c te r .  The p r in c ip le  o f  comprehensiveness by i t s  very  n a tu re  w i l l  
t h e r e f o r e  tend  to  minimize th e  p a r t  p layed  and in f lu e n c e  e x e rc ised  by th e  
m oral f a c to r  in  th e  u l t im a te  d e c is io n .  T herefo re  th e  comprehensiveness
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of a p a r t i c u l a r  d e c is io n  f a r  from in c r e a s in g  i t s  moral w orth , w i l l  a lm ost
always tend  to  d im in ish  i t . ^ ^  '
Another outcome o f  t h i s  O c c a s io n a l i s t  e v a lu a t io n a l  approach i s  th e
"M o ra lisa t io n  o f  a l l  m a te r ia l"  f o r  e v e ry th in g  i s  made t o  p a r ta k e  o f
m oral v a l i d i t y  and w orth . Whereas to  t h e  ’moral app roach’ p r a c t i c a l
d e l ib e r a t io n s  a re  only m a te r i a l  fo r  an a n a ly s i s  whose aim i t  i s  to
d is c o v e r  t h e i r  moral component f a c t o r  and th e  way in  which i t  o p e ra te s ,
and p r a c t i c a l  d e c is io n s  a re  p u t  to  th e  t e s t  in  o rd e r  to  measure th e
e x te n t  t o  which th e  moral component has in f lu e n ce d  and p re v a i le d  i n  t h e i r
f i n a l  fo rm u la tio n  ( t h i s  be ing  th e  only c r i t e r i o n  f o r  t h e i r  o b je c t iv e
m oral w o r th ) ; m oral s ig n i f i c a n c e ,  v a l i d i t y ,  w orth, i s  a t t r ib u t e d '  by
th e  O c c a s io n a l i s t s  t o  a l l  d e c is io n s  reached in  p r a c t i c a l  d e l ib e r a t io n s
(o r  a t  l e a s t  to  a l l  reached by " t h o u ^ t f u l  and w e ll-e d u ca te d  p e o p le " ) ,
r e g a rd le s s  o f  w hether t h i s  d e c is io n  m ight have r idden  roughshod over th e
s p e c i f i c a l l y  m oral o b l ig a t io n s  and in  th e  d e l i b e r a t io n  overwhelming '
a t t e n t i o n  had been pa id  to  c o n s id e ra t io n s  o f  a non-moral or amoral
c h a r a c t e r .  In  o th e r  words, p r a c t i c a l  d e c is io n s  a re  r a i s e d  to  th e  s t a tu s
2)
o f moral v e r d i c t s ,  alm ost o f  moral p r i n c i p l e s .  Consequently i t
1) I f  t h i s  be n o t  acknowledged and th e  moral v a lu e  overrun by th e  
comprehensiveness o f  a s o lu t io n  no moral worth can be sa id  t o  a t t a c h  
to  t h a t  s o lu t io n  no m a t te r  how comprehensive. In  o th e r  words, i t  i s  
n o t  th e  equal d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  which a s i t u a t i o n  demands 
t h a t  makes an a c t  r i g h t ,  bu t th e  e x c lu s iv e  a t t e n t i o n  pa id  t o  such 
f e a tu r e s  o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n  as a re  d e f in e d  as m oral.  We must th e r e f o r e  
conclude t h a t  R oss’ was th e  m orally  wrong c o n te n tio n .  For m o ra lly  
speaking a prima f a c ie  du ty  r e t a in s  i t s  o v e r r id in g  o b l ig a to r in e s s  
unimpaired in  whatever c ircum stances i t  appear;  nay in c re a s e s  i t s  
v a l i d i t y  i n  p ro p o r t io n  to  th e  s t r e n g th  o f  th e  c o n f l i c t i n g  c o n s id e r ­
a t io n s  so a s ,  always to  be su re  o f  p r e v a i l in g  over them.
2 ) i . e .  in  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e i r  o b je c t iv e  n o t  t h e i r  u n iv e r s a l  v a l i d i t y .
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1)
becomes im possib le  f o r  a d h e ren ts  o f  th e  O c c a s io n a l i s t  School to  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between th e  e n t i r e l y  d i s s im i la r  p ro ce sses  o f  e t h i c a l  
a n a ly s i s  and moral d e l i b e r a t i o n .  Now th e  aim we pursue  and th e  method 
we employ i n  en q u ir in g  a f t e r  th e  n a tu re  and v a l i d i t y  o f  a ground of 
o b l ig a t io n  i s  very  d i f f e r e n t  from th e  aim pursued and method used when 
we seek  to  make up our minds on how t h i s  o b l ig a t io n  a f f e c t s ,  app l i e s ,  and 
in  i t s  tu rn  i s  m odified  to  meet th e  p r a c t i c a l  c o n tin g en c ies  o f an a c tu a l  
s i t u a t i o n .  The l a t t e r  method i s  r a t h e r  l i k e  t h a t  o f  a su rgeon’s s c a lp e l  
which i s o l a t e s  and lay s  bare  a c e r t a i n  tendon . To la y  bare  th e  moral 
component o f  a c t io n ,  to  re v e a l  th e  moral p r in c ip le  in  i t s  p u r i t y  i s  th e  
aim o f  a n a ly s i s .  Now t h i s  cannot be done by going over th e  p a r t i c u l a r  
t r a i t s  o f  a g iven s i t u a t i o n  b u t  only by going beyond them, as we have 
done in  our exam ination o f  th e  s ix  prima f a c i e  d u t ie s  c i t e d  to  something 
which i s  o u ts id e  and p r i o r  to  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  m o d if ic a t io n s  of which 
s i t u a t i o n s  a re  capab le . Tne moral p r i n c i p l e  i s  n o t  as th e  O c c a s io n a l is ts  
ta k e  i t  th e  sum, o r  outcome o f  th e  o b l ig a t io n s  in h e re n t  in  a s i t u a t i o n  
bu t something beyond them, something which i s  both th e  ground f o r  th e  
i n i t i a l  v a l i d i t y  of th o se  o b l ig a t io n s  and th e  a r b i t e r  r e g u la t in g  and 
a s s ig n in g  t h e i r  re s p e c t iv e  and r i v a l  c la im s. 'There i s  no need to  
dec ide  which in s ta n c e s  f a l l  o r  do no t f a l l  under i t s  sway, s in c e  we know 
t h a t  a l l  i n s ta n c e s ,  inasmuch as they  a re  in s ta n c e s  o f th e  d e c is io n s  and 
a c t io n s  o f  a human a g en t ,  come under i t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  (What i s  open to
l )  Here I fo llow  c lo s e ly  a lm ost word by word my arguments in  "E th ic s  
w ith o u t  Law?".
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q u e s t io n  i s  th e  degree to  which we a re  a b le  to  r e a l i s e  th e  moral 
p r i n c i p l e  in  our a c tu a l  d e c is io n s  and th e  forms i t  ta k e s  when m odified  
to  meet p r a c t i c a l  c o n t in g e n c ie s . These a re  indeed determined by th e  
mind, th e  temperament and th e  a t t i t u d e  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  agen t a t  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  t im e .)
Now i t  seems t o  me t h a t  we r e f e r  back to  t h i s  law in  every s in g le  
d e c is io n  we t a k e ,  and t h a t  we measure th e  va lue  o f  our d e c is io n s  by i t s  
norm. (This i s  by no means so f a r  fe tc h ed  as i t  sounds : we have only
t o  observe vdiat anyone does when d e l i b e r a t i n g  on a moral d e c is io n  o r  
pronouncing a m oral judgment in  o rd er  to  fu rn is h  th e  re q u ire d  p ro o f .
L e t  us r e c a l l  f o r  a moment how we a c t u a l l y  reach  a moral d e c is io n ,  i n  a 
g iven  in s ta n c e .  We weigh th e  claims our n e a r e s t  and d e a r e s t  have on u s ,  
th e  o b l ig a t io n s  under which we lab o u r ,  our own d e s i r e s  i n  th e  m a t t e r ,  our 
e s t im a te  o f  th e  f a c t s  and th e  p o s s ib le  consequences. But a f t e r  we have 
done a l l  t h i s  we s t i l l  have t o  pose th e  moral question** Am I a c t in g  
e q u i ta b ly  (towards a l l  men) i n  doing t h i s ,  o r  am I  abasing  th e  d ig n i ty  o f  
any man?) Whatever our a c tu a l  d e c is io n  may f i n a l l y  t u r n  out t o  be , th e  
moral v e r d ic t  remains unchanged. Moreover we seom to  be held  
re s p o n s ib le  f o r  every f a i l u r e  to  implement th e  moral law in  i t s  f u l l n e s s .  
For i s  n o t  t h i s  th e  ground on which we judge even th e  b ra v e s t  o f  Nazi 
s o l d i e r s  m orally  both re s p o n s ib le  and g u i l ty ?  He obeyed o rd e r s .  He 
s a t i s f i e d  th e  c laim s o f  co u n try , fa m ily ,  p o s i t io n  and honour. His only 
f a u l t  was h i s  r e f u s a l  to  a cc e p t  what th e  l a t e  M aster o f  B a l l i o l  term s 
" th e  cha lleng e  to  p e r f e c t io n ."  He f a i l e d  to  s a t i s f y  th e  claim s of th e  
u n iv e r s a l ly  b in d in g ,  u n iv e r s a l ly  v a l id  moral law, which p r i o r  t o  a l l
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s i t u a t i o n s  i s  th e  u n c o n d it io n a l  duty o f  a l l  men. For t h i s  he i s  
p e r s o n a l ly  r e s p o n s ib le  and o f  t h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  no one can f r e e  him.
I t  can th e r e f o r e  n o t  agree w ith  C a r r i t t ’s d e f i n i t i o n  of p u ta t iv e  duty : 
what a man th in k s  h i s  duty to  be under c e r t a i n  c ircu m stan ces , s in c e  what 
we r e a l l y  hold  him re s p o n s ib le  f o r  i s  w hether or n o t ,  and to  what deg ree , 
he i s  p repared  to  make th e  upho ld ing  o f  th e  moral law h is 'p a ram o u n t duty 
under a l l  c ircum stances . This seems to  me a reaso nab ly  a c c u ra te  
d e s c r ip t io n  o f  what a c tu a l ly  happens when we pronounce moral judgments on 
p e o p le .  Of co u rse , being human, we a llow  f o r  human f a i l i n g s .  Of 
course  we temper th e  wind to  th e  shorn lamb. But i n  o rd e r  t o  do t h i s  
e f f e c t i v e l y  we need to  c o n s id e r  n o t  only th e  ba re  c o n d i t io n  o f  th e  
lamb’ s sk in  bu t a ls o  th e  fu ry  o f  th e  wind. To compromise i s  one t h in g :  
to  m is tak e  t h i s  compromise f o r  th e  p r i n c i p l e , th e  c i r c u m s ta n t ia l  
m o d if ic a t io n  f o r  th e  e s s e n t i a l , th e  o c ca s io n a l  f o r  th e  law i s  a n o th e r . ^^ 
Another r e s u l t  o f  th e  w holesa le  "m o ra l is a t io n "  o f  non-moral m a te r ia l  
i s  th e  cu rious i n a b i l i t y  o r  u n w il l in g n e ss  o f  th e  O c c a s io n a l is ts  to  
d i s c r im in a te  between two o th e r  e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  p ro c e s s e s ;  v i z .  between
1) B esides , a moral th e o ry  which does i t s  b e s t  to  b lu r  th e  o u t l in e s  o f 
th e  moral law, and rend er  i n d i s t i n c t  tlie  e x te n t ,  mode and n a tu r e  o f  
i t s  in f lu e n c e  on p r a c t i c a l  d e c is io n s ;  a th e o ry  which in  c o n tr a ­
d i c t i o n  and d is re g a rd  of th e  p e r t i n e n t ' f a c t s  o f  moral experience  
(b o th  as d e c is io n  and as judgnent) n e g le c ts  to  examine th e  d i s t i n c t i v e  % 
fu n c t io n  o f  th e  moral component o f  a c t io n  e r r s  on two d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s .  
I t  e r r s  as a th eo ry  o f  m orals by unaccountab ly  n e g le c t in g  some o f  th e
• w e ig h tie r  p o in ts  o f  i t s  problem. And i t  e r r s  as a th e o ry  o f  m orals 
i n ' t h a t  by denying th e  e x i s te n c e - o f  th e  moral law, i t  ten d s  to  
weaken th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  t h a t  law on f u tu r e  p r a c t i c a l  d e c i s io n s .
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th e  lo g ic a l  a n a ly s i s  o f th e  ground o f  r i g h t  on which a l l  moral judgment 
i s  based , (w ith  a l l  i t s  ensu ing  problems of th e  l i b e r t y  o f  th e  w i l l ,  th e  
e x is te n c e  o f  th e  sense o f  du ty , e tc .  e t c . )  on th e  one hand and th e  
p ro cess  o f  a c t io n  and ed uca tion  d e a l in g  w ith  man i n  h i s  whole psycho­
l o g i c a l  c o n te x t  on th e  o th e r .  Thus, th e  perform ing o f  r i g h t  a c t s  even 
i f  n o t com pletely done out o f  a r i g h t  m o tiv e ,^ )  i s  an im p ortan t  edu ca tiv e  
f a c t o r ,  and th e r e f o r e  in  p r a c t i c e  we o f te n  accep t them a t  t h e i r  fa c e  
v a lu e .  But from th e  p o in t  o f  view o f  m o ra l i ty  th e  only  th in g  t h a t  g ives 
an a c t  i t s  moral va lue  i s  th e  human w i l l  th e  sense o f  duty which informs 
i t .
In  t h i s  c o n te x t  i t  i s  q u i te  i r r e l e v a n t  to  p o in t  out as Ross does
t h a t  we cannot ask  of any man to  po ssess  a c e r t a in  m otive or a c e r t a i n
d e s i r e  inasmuch as man i s  n o t  m aster o f  h i s  d e s i r e s ,  and cannot command
h is  f e e l in g s  a t  w i l l ;  we cannot f o r  in s ta n c e  ask a man to  f e e l  "sorrow
2 )
a t  th e  death  o f  h i s  a u n t" ,  and must be s a t i s f i e d  i f  he appear du ly  a t  
th e  fu n e ra l  w ithou t showing too  much g le e ;  i . e .  we cannot ask  o f  any man 
t h a t  he should n o t  only do h i s  duty b u t  a ls o  do i t  o u t  o f  a sense  o f  du ty . 
B ut, though i t  i s  q u i te  t r u e  t h a t  in  a c tu a l  l i f e  we cannot coerce  th e  
f e e l in g s  and d e s i r e s  o f  any man, and t h a t  " i f  a man had no sense  o f  duty  
i t  would be absurd  to  say t h a t  he ought to  f e e l  i t " ' ,^ ^  m orally  speaking
1 ) I p r e f e r  t o  t a l k  h e re  of th e  ’sense  o f  duty* r a t h e r  th an  o f  m otive
s in c e  we have seen ( v i z .  p .  . -  ) t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  in  th e  good m otive
bu t in  th e  a b i l i t y  to  r i s e  above th e  b e s t  o f  m otives t h a t  th e  ro o t
o f  m o ra l i ty  l i e s .
2 ) D.W.Ross: Foundations o f  E th ic s ;  p . 122.
5) H.W.B.Joseph : Some problems in  E th ic s ,  p .49 , p . 151.
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t h i s  i s  im m ate r ia l .  M orally  we s t i l l  ho ld  him re s p o n s ib le .  That i s ,  
hav ing  once p o s tu la te d  ’man’ as an a t  a l l  m ora lly  r e s p o n s ib le  c re a tu r e  
( f o r  o therw ise  a l l  moral judgment would be devoid o f  meaning) we a re  
e n t i t l e d  in  a sense  to  demand n o t  only th e  performance o f  d u t ie s  b u t  
a l s o  th e  p resence  of th e  sense  o f  du ty  in  every man. Any o th e r  
assum ption  would a u to m a t ic a l ly  ru le  him out of th e  moral world a l to g e th e r  
s in c e  from th e  p o in t  o f  view o f  m o ra l i ty ,  i . e .  moral s e n s i b i l i t y  and
i n t u i t i o n ,  i t  i s  t h i s  sense  o f  duty a lone  which g ives  an a c t  i t s  moral
1
v a lu e .  An a c t io n  performed by a Robot t h o u ^  i t  be th e  same in  a l l  
e x te r n a l  r e s p e c ts  and c o n seq u e n tia l  r e s u l t s  as t h a t  done by a re s p o n s ib le  
c r e a tu r e ,  would be devoid of moral meaning; i t  would be e t h i c a l l y  n e u t r a l  
and i r r e l e v a n t .  I t  i s  t h i s  l a s t  in e x p l ic a b le  remnant o f  a c t io n  -  th e  
human w i l l  i n  i t s  l i b e r t y ,  t o  which a l l  E th ic a l  demands a re  a d d re ssed .
By i n s i s t i n g  on t h i s  l i b e r t y  o f  th e  w i l l  -  and th e  im plied  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
o f  th e  agen t -  a l l  e th i c a l  demands ta k e  on an a b so lu te  form a d m it t in g  of 
no in fr in g em en t and no degree -  even when faced  by incom ple te , f i c k l e ,  
i . e .  human o b je c ts  o f  judgment. A wrong a c t  done by an in f a n t  i s  j u s t  
as wrong as t h a t  done by a grown up. That committed by an i d i o t ,  as 
t h a t  by a man in  f u l l  p o sse s s io n  of h i s  f a c u l t i e s .  I t  i s  only  when we 
t r a n s l a t e  t h i s  u n c o n d it io n a l  judgment based on an assum ption o f  a b so lu te  
l i b e r t y ,  and f u l l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  in to  th e  a c tu a l  punishment (which , 
i t s e l f  tak e s  p lac e  in  th e  te m p o ra l-p sy c h o lo g ic a l-p h y s ic a l  « sequence of 
e v e n ts )  t h a t  " m it ig a t in g  c ircum stances"  a re  taken  in to  accoun t. Ross by 
c o n t in u a l ly  changing from th e  t h e o r e t i c a l ,  to  th e  c a s u i s t i c a l - e d u c a t io n a l  
t re a tm e n t  o f E th ic s  and v a c i l l a t i n g  between th e  two com plica tes th e  i s s u e  
undu ly .
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An even more im p o rtan t  consequence from t h a t  p re -a cc ep te d  
e v a lu a t io n a l  approach which d e c l in e s  to  bow to  th e  p o s tu l a t e  e s t a b l i s h in g  
th e  a b so lu te  supremacy o f  th e  moral v a lu e  and i n s i s t s  on t r e a t i n g  i t  l ik e  
any o th e r s  a s s ig n in g  to  i t  n e i t h e r  a g r e a t e r  nor a sm a lle r  claim  and 
always su b ju g a tin g  i t  w ith  a l l  th e  o th e rs  t o  th e  p r in c ip le  of 
"com prehensiveness” a re  th e  s ta tem en ts  : A) t h a t  th e  " r ig h t"  and th e
"good" a re  p a r tn e r s  o f  equal im portance i n  th e  e t h i c a l  com bination , i . e .  
po ssessed  o f  equal v a l i d i t y  o r equal r i g h t s  o f  claim over our a l l e g ia n c e ,  
and B) t h a t  th e  reasons which have led  to  th e  i n f i l t r a t i o n  o f  id e a s  o f 
th e  " r ig h t"  ty p e  in to  systems o f  th e  "good" ty p e ,  and th o se  t h a t  have led  
to  th e  o p po site  p rocess  were e q u iv a le n t  and o f  th e  same s ig n i f ic a n c e .
The f i r s t  assumption cannot be d isproved  to  one who does n o t  admit 
o f  th e  s p e c i f i c  meaning o f  th e  moral though i t  i s  d e b a tab le  whether any­
th in g  i s  to  be gained by unduly  e n la rg in g  th e  domain of th e  moral s in c e  
t h e r e  i s  no l im i t  to  which i t  cannot be s t r e tc h e d  se e in g  t h a t  e v e ry th in g  
i s  m a te r ia l  f o r  human a c t i v i t i e s  and th e r e f o r e  alm ost ev e ry th in g  may come 
under th e  heading  o f  good. But to  anyone who has accep ted  th e  f u l l  
im p l ic a t io n  o f  th e  prima f a c i e  d u t ie s  and t h e i r  u n d e rly in g  p r i n c i p l e  i t  
i s  q u i te  c le a r  t h a t  the  m oral va lue  of th e  "good" p a r tn e r  i s  incom parably 
s m a l le r ,  and i t  remains an open q u es t io n  whether m oral v a lue  in  th e  
s t r i c t e s t  sen se , can be a t ta c h e d  to  i t  a t  a l l .
Moreover, though i t  i s  a f a c t  t h a t  a lm ost a l l . e t h i c a l  systems up to  
now, a re  m ix tu res  o f th e o r i e s  o f  " r ig h t"  and th e o r i e s  o f  "good" o r  th e o r ie s  
of law and th e o r i e s  o f  end; i t  i s  by no means su re  t h a t  t h i s  i s  
n e c e s s a r i l y  so, o r  t h a t  th e s e  two th e o r i e s  a re  equal p a r tn e r s  in  th e
^  ^  ' ' - . 171-
com bination as Ross assumes.
I t  i s  th e  second o f  th e s e  assum ptions which m ight he lp  us t o  re so lv e  
th e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  We have seen t h a t  th e  th eo ry  of good i s  s p l i t  i n to  
innumerable system s, acco rd ing  to  c o u n try ,  c reed , c a s te  o r even 
in d iv id u a l  temperament. I t s  d i f f e r e n t  v a lu e s  a re  incommensurable in  
t h e i r  own domain. I t  i s  im possib le  to  decide  w itho u t r e c u r r in g  to ou t­
s id e  s c a le s ,  whether wisdom i s  b e t t e r  th a n  innocence , o r  courage th an  
benevolence. Whether s o c i a l  v i r t u e s  a re  h ig h e r  than  c re a t iv e  v i r t u e s ,  
w hether dynamic a c t io n  i s  b e t t e r  th an  con tem p la tion , whether th e  good o f  
th e  common man in  i t s  s p e c i f i c  European-American m a t e r i a l i s t i c  and 
a c t i v i s t i c  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  p r e f e r a b le  to  having one*s soul saved by  ^
having  o n e 's  body b u rn t  a t  th e  s ta k e .  But examples in  t h i s  f i e l d  a re  
innum erab le , fo r  th e re  a re  a t  l e a s t  as many a b so lu te  'goods ' i n  th e  world 
as t h e r e  a re  men l i v i n g ,  and men dead who have l e f t  us t h e i r  concep tion  
o f  th e  supreme good in  w r i t in g .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  moral g ra d a t io n  i s  
given w ith  th e  in t r o d u c t io n  in to  th e  system o f th e  e s s e n t i a l l y  s t r a n g e  
and d i f f e r e n t  id e a  (an id e a  n o t  t o  be confounded w ith  th e  id ea  of a good 
man e i t h e r  as a r i s t o c r a t i c ,  i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  h e ro ic ,  good h e a r te d  e t c .  which 
belongs in to  th e  domain o f  th e  good) o f  th e  d ig n i ty  o f  man-qua-man.
Thus when M ill  says "an unhappy S o c ra te s  i s  b e t t e r  than  a con ten ted  p ig ,"  
and t h a t  "Man i s  possessed  of d ig n i ty "  t h i s  sen tence  i s  n o t  w a rran ted  by 
h i s  p reced ing  arguments. More than  t h a t  th e  r e c o g n i t io n  and ad o p tio n  of 
t h i s  s t ra n g e  and heterogenous f a c to r  i n to  th e  U t i l i t a r i a n  System i s  th e  
so le  ground and reason  f o r  such moral c o n te n t  and v a l i d i t y  as i t  may have 
I th in k  i t  very  probab le  t h a t  i n  most t h e o r i e s  o f  "ends" th e  case  i s
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s i m i l a r ,  and th e  moral f a c t o r  n o t  in h e re n t  in  th e  id e a  o f  "en d s" , 
has been taken  in to  i t  from o u ts id e  to  p rov ide  th e  moral backbone o f  
th e  system .
I t  i s  th e r e f o r e  n o t  s u r p r i s in g  t h a t  " th e o r ie s  o f  end" should seek
to  absorb some elements o f  th e  " theo ry  o f  r i g h t " ;  th e  q u e s t io n  r a t h e r
i s  why a th eo ry  o f  " r i ^ t "  should  f in d  occasion  t o  absorb  some o f  th e
fundam entals o f  th e  th e o ry  o f  "good"? Does t h i s  n o t  prove t h a t  one _
th e o ry  cannot s tan d  w ithou t th e  o th e r ,  and t h a t  rec o g n is in g  t h i s  we must
a ccep t  however r e l u c t a n t l y  Ross ' P l u r a l i s t i c  B asis  o f  E th ics?  I  should
say , n o t  a t  a l l .  The only example of a th eo ry  o f  R igh t which we need
c o n s id e r  i s  th e  system o f Kant. What induced Kant to  in tro d u c e  elements
o f  "good" in to  h i s  system seems to  me to  have no b e a r in g  on th e  i n t r i n s i c
need o f  th e  system f o r  such a d d i t io n s .  Moreover th e s e  a d d i t io n s  d id  n o t
s t r e n g th e n  th e  t r u l y  sublime m o ra l i ty  o f  th e  system but r a th e r  le s se n ed
1 ^i t  by i r r e l e v a n t  c o n s id e ra t io n s  o f  reward and punishm ent. '
Secondly, whereas th e  " th e o r i e s  o f  good" b e fo re  th e  more or l e s s  ex- 
machina in t r o d u c t io n  o f  th e  "moral element" appear more l ik e  l i s t s  o f  
what people  in  a c e r t a in  cou n try  a t  a c e r t a i n  tim e considered  d e s i r a b le  
i n  th e  double meaning of t h i s  word ( i . e .  as w e ll  as  what was a c t u a l l y  
d e s i r e d ,  as what in  t h e i r  op in ion  should be d e s i r e d ) ,  and so. appear more 
l i k e  a n th ro p o lo g ic a l  e n q u ir ie s  than  moral a n a ly se s ,  th e  " th eo ry  o f  
r ig h t"  before  th e  in t r o d u c t io n  o f  th e  "elem ents o f  good" appears a
l )  To show t h i s  w i l l  be th e  o b je c t  o f  our n e x t  c o n s id e ra t io n .
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p e r l ’e c t ly  s a t i s f a c t o r y  a n a ly s i s  o f  m o r a l i ty .  '  But s in c e  people  f e a re d  
t h a t  such an a n a ly s i s  r a i ^ t  la0k  th e  power to  move a c tu a l  human beings 
to  do what i s  r i g h t ,  they  t r i e d  to  remedy t h i s  by in tro d u c in g  th e  
"elem ents o f  good" : v i r t u e ,  h a p p in e ss ,  s e l f - s a t i s f a c t i o n .  However,
th e  a d d i t io n  o f  th e s e  elements does n o t  a f f e c t  th e  moral v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  - 
a n a ly s i s  in  th e  l e a s t ,  s in c e  a d m it te d ly  th e y  have been added in  o rd e r  to  . 
promote i t s  t r a n s l a t i o n  i n to  r e a l i t y .  T herefore  th e s e  two f a c t o r s  a re  
no t e q u iv a le n t ,  and no such in fe re n c e s  from t h e i r  mutual p resence  in  th e  
d i f f e r e n t  T heories  o f  E th ic s ,  as have been drawn by Ross a re  w arran ted . 
Again though a system of E th ic s  based on a th eo ry  o f  'good ' needs th e  
backbone o f  some modicum o f  ' r i g h t ' ,  a System o f  E th ic s  based on r i g h t  
can p e r f e c t l y  w ell s tand  f o r  i t s e l f .  There i s  no a b so lu te  need f o r  a 
P l u t a r i s t i c  B asis f o r  E th ic s  and th e r e f o r e ,  out o f  reverence  f o r  th e  
p r i n c i p l e :  E n tia  non esse  m u lt ip l ic a n d e  p r a e t e r  n e c e s s i ta te m , we o u g h t '  "
t o  r e j e c t  i t .
Thus f a r  th e  p ro o f  by absence . Now i f  we could s u c c e s s fu l ly  b u i ld
up a s a t i s f a c t o r y  System o f  E th ic s  on th e  id ea  o f  th e  r i g h t  a lo n e ,  and
t h i s  would prove to  cover as w ell  as e x p la in  a l l  th e  f a c t s  o f  our moral 
experience  and ren der  them i n t e l l i g i b l e ;  i f ,  in  a d d i t io n  i t  would seem 
to  p o ssess  m otive power enough to  f u l f i l  i t s  p r a c t i c a l  fu n c t io n s  and on 
th e  o th e r  hand, being b u i l t  on th e  r ig o ro u s  ex ac tin g  n o t io n  of " r ig h t"  
w i l l  no t l i e  too  heavy on our c o n s id e ra t io n  fo r  human h ap p in e ss ,  our
problem w i l l  have been so lved .
* * * * *
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Ooming back to  our f i r s t  p o in t ,  we r e c a l l  th e  q u e s t io n :  Were such
a d d i t io n s  of elem ents o f "good"^^ as Kant saw f i t  to  make r e a l l y  
in d isp e n sa b le  to  h i s  c r i t i c a l  system o f  e th ic s ?  O bviously, th e  answer 
t o  t h i s  q u e s t io n  must be sought in  K a n t 's  own e x p o s i t io n  of h i s  th o u g h ts  
on e t h i c s .  I  s h a l l  t r y  to  fo llow  K a n t 's  e x p o s i t io n  as c lo s e ly  and as 
b e s t  I can.
Like every o th e r  enquiry  i n to  th e  p r in c ip le s  of e th i c s ,  K a n t 's  
c r i t i c a l  th e o ry  s t a r t s  o f f  w ith  th e  s ta te m e n ts  : a )  t h a t  moral experien ce
e x i s t s ,  b) t h a t  i t  i s  d i f f e r e n t  and d i s t i n c t  from every o th e r  k ind  o f  
e x p e r ien c e ;  and c) t h a t  i t  i s  commonly undergone and recognized when 
met w ith  by a l l  peo p le ,  by th e  common no l e s s  than  by th e  educa ted .
In  a d d i t io n  Kant f in d s  t h a t  th e  Primacy o f  M o ra l i ty  i m p l i c i t  in
a l l  moral experience  i s  made m an ife s t  in  th e  concept o f  th e  "Good W ill"
and acclaimed in  th e  e x p l i c i t  judgment : "The good w i l l  i s  th e  only th in g
2)
in  th e  world which i s  a b s o lu te ly  and a l t o g e th e r  good". This judgment 
Kant s t a t e s  to  be g e n e ra l ly ,  nay u n i v e r s a l ly ,  a cc ep ted .
S ta tem ents  o f th e  type : "This i s  r i g h t " ,  "This i s  wrong", a re
h a b i t u a l l y  made by a l l  people  and a re  always and d e f i n i t e l y  un ders tood  
by th o se  who pronounce and th o se  who h e a r  them to  r e f e r  to  a s p e c i f i c
1) Such as th e  n o t io n  o f  im p e rfec t  d u t i e s ,  th e  id e a  o f  th e  kingdom 
o f  ends and th e  p o s tu la t e s  of p r a c t i c a l  rea so n , p lu s  a l l  t h a t  
th ey  imply.
2 ) Kant: Grundlegung zur M etaphysik der B i t t e n ; Opening
sen ten ce .
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q u a l i ty  o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  m o d ality  in  th e  ac t^^  so ad judged , d i f f e r e n t
and d i s t i n c t  from a l l  o th e r  g iven  d e te rm in a tio n s  o f t h a t  a c t .  T his
s p e c i f ic  q u a l i ty  may o r may n o t be an in h e re n t  and e s s e n t ia l  q u a l i ty  of
th e  a c t  in  q u e s tio n . That i s ,  t h i s  q u a l i ty  may o r may n o t be dependent
on th e  " f i t t in g n e s s "  of th e  a c t  in  q u e s tio n ; i . e .  on w hether th e  new
s i tu a t io n  e s ta b l is h e d  and b r o u ^ t  about by th a t  a c t  f i t s  o r does n o t f i t
2)th e  o v e ra l l  s i tu a t io n  in  which i t  tak e s  p la c e . Now t h i s  o v e ra l l  
s i t u a t i o n ,  t h i s  frame o f  o b je c tiv e  r e a l i t y  in  which our a c tio n s  a re  s e t  
i s  l i a b l e  to  be d esc rib ed  in  v a rio u s  ways. I t  can be d e sc rib e d  as th e  
U n iverse  o f Immutable Essences o rdered  in  view o f The Essence o f  T ru th  
and Goodness by God th e  C r e a t o r . O r  i t  can be d e sc rib e d  in  term s o f
1) I  s h a l l  assume i t  as understood  t h a t  Kant acknowledges only human 
a c t io n  ( d e s i r e s ,  p u rp o ses , m o tiv es , v o l i t i o n s ,  a c t s ,  h a b i t s ,  
b ehav iou r) to  be th e  p ro p e r s u b je c t  m a tte r  o f E th ic s  and o th e r  
"goods" ( l ik e  H appiness, W ealth , e t c . )  only  in s o f a r  as th ey  a f f e c t  
human a c tio n  : v o l i t i o n s ,  a c t s ,  e t c . .  That i s ,  Kant does n o t embark 
on an enqu iry  in to  th e  n a tu re  o f 'good* and 'v a l u e s ' ,  in  o rd e r  to  
deduce th e  ' r i g h t '  from them as th e  q u a l i ty  o f th e  a c tio n  m ost l ik e ly  
to  b rin g  th e  'good ' about ; bu t s t a r t s  on an a n a ly s is  o f  th e  g rounds, 
p r in c ip le s ,  c o n d itio n s  and re a so n s , which lead  to  th e  judgment ' r i ^ t '  
and d e fin e s  th e  'good ' as t h a t  which r e a l i s e s ,  in c a rn a te s ,  acco rds 
w ith , and re s p e c ts  th e  requ irem en ts o f  'r i g h t* .
2 ) C e r ta in  p assages in  Kant a re  open to  t h i s  i n te r p r e ta t io n  : Thus Kant
seems to  make th e  r ig h tn e s s  o f a c ts  depend on t h e i r  s u i t a b i l i t y  to  
se rv e  as U n iv e rsa l Laws in  a Kingdom o f Ends. T h is , however, i s  
in co m p atib le  w ith  K a n t 's  r e i t e r a te d  and f u l ly  dem onstrated  view t h a t  
th e  r ig h tn e s s  o f  a c ts  can only be grounded in  th e  m odality  ( th e  
s p e c i f ic  manner o f w i l l in g )  o f th e  w i l l  i t s e l f .  The l a t t e r  t h e s i s  
i s  th e  more s p e c i f i c a l ly  K antian  be ing  one o f th e  m ainstays o f h is  
C r i t i c a l  Theory o f  E th ic s . This i s  bu t one of s e v e ra l a m b ig u itie s
o f th e  K an tian  e x p o s itio n  and ought to  be no ted  as such. I  s h a l l  t r y  
to  show t h a t  t h i s  am b igu ity , l ik e  a l l  o th e r s ,  has i t s  deeper ro o ts  in  
th e  tw o-fo ld  o r ig in ^  o f K a n t's  E th ic a l  Theory.
5) The view o f c e r ta in  B r i t i s h  M o ra lis ts  l ik e  Cudworth, S .C la rk e ,
W ,W ollaston acco rd ing  to  whose th e o r ie s  "To l i e  i s  wrong" i s  a lm ost 
a T auto logy .
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an ephem eral and a c c id e n ta l  p o l i t i c o - s o c i a l  s e t t i n g  o f r e s t r i c t e d  and 
e x c lu s iv e  v a l i d i t y , W h a t e v e r  th e  u l t im a te  t r u t h  o f t h i s  q u e s t io n , th e  
s a l i e n t  p o in t f o r  u s ,  a t  t h i s  moment, i s  t h a t  s ta te m e n ts  o f th e  ty p e ,
"T his i s  r i g h t " ,  "This i s  wrong" a re  n o t m erely  p ro p o s i t io n s  abou t th e  
o b je c tiv e  s u i t a b i l i t y  o f a c t s .  They a ls o  c a r ry  th e  fo rc e  o f  e v a lu a t io n . 
In  a d d it io n  th%r c a r ry  th e  m otive-pow er o f  an in ju n c t io n .
Moral judgments exp ress th re e  s e ts  o f r e la t io n s  : th e  r e l a t i o n s  o f
th e  a c t  to  i t s  c o n c re te  s e t t i n g ,  ( f i t t i n g  o r u n f i t t i n g )  th e  r e l a t i o n  o f 
th e  a c t  to  th e  m oral s c a le  o f  e v a lu a tio n  ( r ig j i t  o r  wrong) and th e  r e l a t i o n  
o f th e  a c t  to  th e  human w i l l  ( in ju n c t io n ,  o b l ig a t io n :  one o u ^ t ,  o r  one
ought n o t to  do t h i s  o r  t h a t . )  The m oral judgment "To l i e  i s  wrong", 
f i r s t  s t a t e s  a c e r ta in  r e la t io n s h ip  which h o ld s  between ly in g  and 
o b je c tiv e  r e a l i t y ,  i . e .  th e  system  o f r e la t io n s h ip s  in  which th e  a c t  i s  
s e t .  In  th e  T w elfth  C entury  f o r  in s ta n c e ,  to  h o ld  t h a t  th e  Sun rev o lv es  
around th e  E arth  was n o t " to  l i e " ,  and th e r e fo re  n o t co n sid ered  m o ra lly  
wrong. Secondly , th e  m oral judgment "To l i e  i s  wrong" c a r r i e s  th e  fo rc e  
of an e v a lu a tio n , and t h i s  e v a lu a tio n  i s  meant to  be an e v a lu a tio n  o f  a  
s p e c i f i c  k ind d i f f e r e n t  from a l l  o th e r  k in d s o f a e s t h e t i c ,  f e l i c i f i c ,  
o p tim if ic  e tc .  e v a lu a t io n s , namely a  m oral e v a lu a t io n . I t  may be more 
o p tim if ic  f o r  my c h a ra c te r  to  l i e  o c c a s io n a lly  out o f  p i ty  f o r  o th e r s ,  by 
t e l l i n g  somebody how much I loved  h is  poems f o r  exam ple, e s p e c ia l ly  i f  I 
i n c l in e  h a b i tu a l ly  to  enjoy  c r i t i c i z i n g  o th e r  p e o p le 's  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
e f f o r t s .  Of course  th e  p o s i t io n  would be rev e rsed  i f  I  were o f  an
l )  The view o f R e la tiv e  E th ic s .
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a c q u ie sc e n t n a tu re ,  whose c h ie f  am bition  i s  to  be l ik e d  r a th e r  th a n
re s p e c te d . Then I should f o r  o p tim if ic  reasons fo rc e  m yself to  t e l l  th e  -
unhappy p o e t th e  u n p lea sa n t t r u t h .  Both c a se s  a re  sh a rp ly  d i s t i n c t  from
th e  m oral e v a lu a tio n  o f  a l i e  a s  a b reach  o f  r e s p e c t  fo r  th e  p e rso n  o f
l )th e  p o e t '  to  whom I owe th e  t r u th  o f  my s in c e re  o p in io n . The word 'owe* 
ju s t  used  in d ic a te s  th e  t r a n s i t i o n  from th e  e v a lu a t io n a l  ( i . e .  s t a t i c )  
fu n c t io n  o f m oral judgments to  t h e i r  dynamic fu n c tio n  as m oral in ju n c t io n s ,  
T his t r a n s i t i o n  and th e  dynamic fu n c tio n  o f  m oral judgments has l a t e l y
2 )been red isco v e re d  in  America and s t r e s s e d ,  e s p e c ia l ly  by C.L. S tevenson  
th rough  th e  u se  o f  such d e s c r ip t iv e  term s as em otive a p p e a l, p e rs u a s iv e  
a d d re s s , im p e ra tiv e  ad d ress  e t c .  T h is d e s c r ip t io n  appears a t  f i r s t  
b lu sh  p a r t i c u l a r ly  a p p o s ite  and f e l i c i t o u s  in  i t s  u se  o f  e p i th e t s .  
N e v e rth e le ss  we must be c a re fu l  and on our guard a g a in s t  th e  tendency  
(ram pant in  America as w e ll as in  Europe) to  m istake  t h i s  d e s c r ip t iv e  
enum eration  o f an a c c id e n ta l  m odality  o r  secondary  q u a l i ty  o f  m oral 
in ju n c t io n s  f o r  a  s t r in g e n t  ded u ctio n  o f th e  grounds o f t h e i r  v a l i d i t y .  - 
Indeed th e se  em otive a p p e a ls , p e rsu a s iv e  a d d re sse s , e tc .  a re  n o t even th e  
cause o f th e  e f f ic a c y  o f m oral in ju n c t io n s ,  i f  m oral in ju n c t io n s  as such 
become e f f ic a c io u s .  They c e r t a in ly  cannot be tak en  (w ith o u t f u r th e r  
p ro o f)  to  in v a l id a te  r e t r o a c t iv e ly  th e  c la im s to  o b je c tiv e  s ig n if ic a n c e  
o f  m oral e v a lu a tio n s . That i s ,  i t  seems o v e r-h a s ty  and unw arran ted  to
1) M o lie re 's  M isanthrope i s  an example o f  o p tim if ic  rea so n in g  r a th e r  
th an  o f  m oral r e f l e c t io n s ,  A lc e s te 's  prim ary i n t e r e s t  being  h i s  own 
p e r f e c t io n  and r e c t i tu d e ,
2 ) O.L. S tevenson : E th ic s  and Language.
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assiome t h a t ,  because m oral judgments have a dynamic fu n c tio n  and because 
t h i s  dynamic fu n c tio n  a t  tim es adop ts th e  c h a ra c te r  o f  an em otive ap p ea l, 
th e r e fo re  m oral judgments as  such a re  n o th in g  bu t ex p re ss io n s  o f  
em otional re sp o n se s , and m oreover, as i s  u s u a l ly  assum ed, s u b je c t iv e  
m oral re sp o n se s .
The in n e r  dynamic p ro g re s s  from th e  s ta tem en t "X i s  wrong" to  th e  
command "One should  n o t do X" d e fin e s  a number o f  in te r im  s te p s  and 
s ta g e s .  I t  may very  w ell be t h a t  each o f  th e s e  s te p s  and s ta g e s  
p o sse sse s  s tro n g  em otive c o n n o ta tio n s , which d i r e c t l y  appeal to  c o n a tiv e  
te n d e n c ie s . But th e s e ,  however s tro n g , do n o t p ro v id e  a s u f f i c i e n t  
ground f o r  th e  o b je c tiv e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  th e  s te p s  o r o f  th e  f i n a l  
in ju n c t io n .  Indeed , th e  o b je c tiv e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  th e s e  s te p s  and s ta g e s  
i s  e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  dem onstrab le  and j u s t i f i a b l e ,  o r i t  d e fin e s  th e  very  
q u e s tio n s  about th e  p o s s ib le  v a l i d i t y  o f  m oral commandments which Kant 
t r i e d  to  e lu c id a te  by th e  c r i t i c a l  method o f  tra n s c e n d e n ta l  d e d u c tio n .
To compound a l l  th e s e  in to  th e  n o tio n  o f  "em otive appea l"  used in  i t s  
m ost equ ivocal se n se , i s  t o  sk ip  th e  q u e s tio n  r a th e r  th a n  to  so lv e  i t .
In  o th e r  words : I t  seems ex trem ely  im probable t h a t  what I  mean o r  anyone
means when pronouncing th e  words "X i s  wrong", i s  m ere ly  to  say  t h a t  "I 
d isap p ro v e  o f X; do so l ik e w is e ;" ^ )  T hat i s ,  "I d isap p ro v e  o f ly in g ;  
do so lik ew ise"  i s  n o t e q u iv a le n t to  "To l i e  i s  wrong". I t  i s ,  as f a r  
as I  can se e , a  r a th e r  p o in t le s s  and sonehow i r r e l e v a n t  b i t  o f in fo rm a tio n  
about someone who pronounces "To l i e  i s  wrong" and a secondary  f e a tu r e  o f
1) O.L. S tevenson: E th ic s  and Language; Some p ragm atic  a sp e c ts  o f
m eaning.
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th e  p o s s ib le  e f f e c t  th e  judgment "To l i e  i s  wrong" may have on somebody
who h e a rs  i t  and who, f o r  some reason  o r  o th e r  i s  g r e a t ly  in f lu e n c e d  by
th e  person  who pronounces i t .  The im p o rtan t and d e c is iv e  f e a tu r e  from
a m oral p o in t o f view o f th e  judgment "To l i e  i s  wrong" l i e s ,  r e g a rd le s s
o f  any in c id e n ta l  and s u b je c t iv e  d is a p p ro v a l, in  th e  f a c t  t h a t  by i t  a
c e r t a in  complex s i t u a t io n  i . e .  " to  l i e " ,  i s  connected  w ith  th e  p re d ic a te
"wrong" in  such a way as t o  ex p ress  what we b e lie v e  to  be a  n e c e ssa ry
r e l a t i o n  between th e  two te rm s . I f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n  i s  indeed  o b je c t iv e ly
n e c e ssa ry , "To l i e  i s  wrong" w i l l  be an o b je c tiv e  v a lu a t io n a l  judgnen t.^^
A v a lu a t io n a l  judgm ent, l i k e  a cau sa l judgm ent, i s  th e  s ta te m e n t o f  a
r e la t io n s h ip ,  which we b e lie v e  h o ld s o f  n e c e s s i ty ;  t h i s  n e c e s s i ty  being
2)s o le ly  and w holly determ ined  by th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  term s invo lved  and
th e re fo re  u n iv e r s a l ly  and o b je c tiv e ly  v a l id .  I t  i s ,  i n  s h o r t ,  an
u n iv e r s a l  and o b je c tiv e  law , "To l i e "  i s  wrong and rem ains so w hatever
th e  c irc u m sta n ce s , c o n d it io n s , consequences. "To l i e "  i s  wrong, w hether
peop le  d isapprove  o f  i t  o r  n o t ,  even when th e y  a re  com plete ly  unaware o f
i t s  p o s s ib le  e x is te n c e . But th e  command "one should  n o t  l i e "  d e riv e d
5)from i t ,  i s  n o t th e  s ta te m e n t o f  an o b je c tiv e  n e c e s s i ty ,  bu t o f  a
1) I  s h a l l  n o t h e re  e n te r  in to  a d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  i n t r i n s i c  n a tu re  and 
s t r u c tu r e  o f th e  complex s i tu a t io n  " to  l ie "  n o r in to  i t s  f i t t i n g n e s s  
o r u n s u i t a b i l i t y  to  th e  o b je c tiv e  r e a l i t y  in  w hich i t  i s  s e t ,  e t c ;  
s in c e  i t  i s  n o t my o b je c t  h e re  to  v in d ic a te  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  m oral 
judgment b u t only  to  p o in t  ou t what i s  meant by such a judgm ent, i . e .  
when som ething i s  p rocla im ed  wrong.
2 ) T his n e c e s s i ty  m ight be d e fin e d  as a ta u to lo g y  ( c r u e l ty  i s  wrong) an 
a n a ly t ic a l  p ro p o s it io n  ( to  l i e  i s  wrong) o r  a  s y n th e t ic a l  p ro p o s i t io n  
( to  la z e  i s  w rong).
5) Nor does i t s  emotive ap p ea l make i t  an o b je c tiv e  n e c e s s i ty .
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n e c e s s i t a t io n .  I t  i s  n o t a law , i t  i s  an o b l ig a t io n .  The r e l a t i o n  
expressed  in  an o b l ig a t io n ,  i s  t h a t  h o ld in g  between a p a r t i c u l a r  and 
c o n c re te  human w i l l ,  and an o b je c tiv e  v a lu a t io n a l  judgm ent, i . e .  a m oral 
law . The n a tu re  o f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n  i s  to  demand t h a t  th e  w i l l  be 
determ ined  in  th e  cho ice  o f  i t s  a c ts  s o le ly  by th e  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  th e  
m oral law s. T h is r e l a t io n  i s  n o t a n e c e s s i ty  because th e  human w i l l ,  
g iven  i t s  p a r t i c u l a r  co n c re te  n a tu re  : i t s  s u b je c t iv e  d e s i r e s ,  i n c l i n ­
a t io n s ,  p u rp o ses , i s  n o t a u to m a tic a lly  determ ined by a  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f 
th e  m oral law . T his r e l a t i o n  i s  a n e c e s s i t a t io n ,  because th e  human w i l l  
i s  m o tiv a ted  by i t s  c o n c re te  and s u b je c t iv e  d e s i r e s ,  i n c l i n a t io n s ,  
p u rp o ses , a p a r t  and b e fo re  m oral laws can c laim  i t s  a l le g ia n c e ,  i . e .  
demand to  m o tiv a te  e f f e c t iv e ly  and de te rm ine  d e c is iv e ly  and by th em se lv e s , 
i t s  cho ice  o f a c t s .  (We a re  f o r  example under an o b l ig a t io n  "n o t to  l i e "  
w hatever th e  r e s u l t s  o f  our a c t io n ,  and i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f th e  pu rposes t h i s  
a c t  o f  "no t ly in g "  m ight hamper, postpone o r  re n d e r  a l to g e th e r  u n a t ta in ­
a b le . )  O b lig a tio n s , i f  o b je c t iv e ly  v a l id  -  and t h i s  depends on ly  on 
what th ey  command -  a re  so w hatever th e  c irc iim stan ces , c o n d it io n s , 
consequences, o r m a te r ia l  c o n c re te  c o n te n ts  o f th e  w i l l .  O b lig a tio n s , 
i f  th ey  a re  o b je c t iv e ly  v a l id ,  a re  so , w hatever t h e i r  em otive ap p ea l and 
re g a rd le s s  o f th e  e x is te n c e  o f  t h i s  em otive a p p ea l. Indeed th e  em otive 
m eaning o f  a m oral judgment and i t s  ap p ea l w i l l  become th e  d e c is iv e  and 
b a s ic  ground o f  an o b l ig a t io n  only i f  i t  be m isused d e l ib e r a te ly  to  
d e c e iv e ; i . e .  when th e  o b l ig a t io n  i s  n o t o b je c t iv e ly  grounded in  a v a lid  
m oral judgnen t. Thus when I  say "one ought to  u se  perfum e", because I  
happen to  be a sh a reh o ld e r  in  a f a c to ry  f o r  c o sm etic s , I  m isuse th e
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em otive o vertones o f th e  word "o ugh t" , in  o rd e r to  make i t  a p p ea r, as i f  
th e r e  were some o b je c tiv e ly  v a l id  ground f o r  such a  command, a p a r t  from 
th e  t r i v i a l  f a c t  o f my app rova l o f  th e  u se  o f  perfume because o f  some 
p r iv a te  reason  o f  g a in . In  o th e r  w ords, t h o u ^  em otive o v e rto n es m ight 
h e lp  th e  p ro cess  o f n e c e s s i t a t io n ,  th ey  a re  n o t th e  grounds f o r  w hich 
t h i s  p ro cess  has been i n i t i a l l e d  and do n o t re p la c e  th e  i n i t i a l  m oral 
e v a lu a tio n , u n le s s  w ith  i n t e n t  to  d e ce iv e .
Now th e  d a ta  o f everyday m oral e x p e rien ce  r e f e r  e q u a lly  to  th e  
s t a t i c  ( i . e .  th e  e v a lu a tio n a l  o r law -p roc la im ing ) and to  th e  dynamic 
( i . e .  n e c e s s i ta t in g  o r o b l ig a t io n  d e f in in g )  fu n c tio n  o f m oral ju d g n en ts . 
In  a d d it io n  th e  d a ta  o f everyday m oral ex p erien ce  c o n ta in  a d i s t i n c t  
re fe re n c e  to  th e  prim acy o f  m o ra lity  as  made m a n ife s t i n  th e  concep t o f  
th e  good w i l l .  In  o th e r  w ords, peop le  pronounce "one should  do X" ju s t  
as h a b i tu a l ly  as th ey  say "X i s  r i g h t " . M oreover, peop le  a re  p e r f e c t ly  
aware o f  th e  connec tion  between th e s e  two s ta te m e n ts  and o f th e  n a tu re  
o f th e  o b l ig a t io n  im plied  in  th e  one, e x p l i c i t  in  th e  o th e r ,  un d e r which 
they  a re  pu t by e i t h e r .  In  s h o r t ,  p eo p le  a re  c o n sc io u s , th rough  t h e i r  
d a i ly  m oral e x p e rie n c e s , o f  hav ing  d u t ie s ,  and fu rth e rm o re  p o sse ss  a 
s u f f i c ie n c ly  c le a r  id e a  of what th e s e  d u t ie s  a re .  "A c r i t i c  o f t h i s  
essay  has succeeded b e t t e r  th a n  he r e a l i s e d ,  when he sa id  t h a t  no new 
p r in c ip le  o f m o ra lity  has been e s ta b l is h e d  bu t only  a new fo rm u la . Who 
indeed  could in v e n t a new p r in c ip le  o f  m o ra lity  and announce i t  as h is  
own? As though th e  whole w orld could have ignored  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  
duty o r m istaken  i t s  n a tu re  u n t i l  he a r r iv e d !" ^ )  Kant h o ld s t h a t  i t  i s
l )  Kent : " K r i t ik  d e r p ra k tis c h e n  V e rn u n ft; V orrede
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n o t th e  purpose o f an enqu iry  in to  E th ic s ,  to  in v e n t i t s  own su b je c t  
m a t te r !  i . e .  d isc o v e r  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  du ty  and d ec id e  th e  c o n te n t o f  
d u ty , f o r  i t s  s u b je c t-m a tte r  i s  a datum o f o b je c tiv e  and u n iv e r s a l  human 
e x p e rie n c e . The purpose o f  an enqu iry  in to  E th ic s  i s  to  e x p la in  th e  
im p lic a tio n s  o f t h a t  e x p e rie n c e , i . e .  to  d isc o v e r  w hat c o n d it io n s , 
g rounds, hypo theses a re  n e c e ssa ry  in  o rd e r  to  make t h i s  experience  
i n t e l l i g i b l e  and dem onstra te  i t s  p o s s i b i l i t y .  Not th e  "what" b u t th e  
"how" and th e  "why" o f  m oral e x p erien ce  a re  th e  q u e s tio n s  which a 
t h e o r e t i c a l  en q u iry  in to  E th ic s  ought to  p o se . F o r, th e  "w hat", th e  
s p e c i f i c  c o n te n t and m eaning o f  r i ^ t n e s s ,  o b l ig a t io n ,  good w i l l ,  i s  
n o t to  be e x p la in e d , b u t m ust be grasped  im m ediately  in  i t s  c o n c re te  
" g iv e n n e ss" . The "why", ( th e  grounds and rea so n  which dem onstra te  and 
v in d ic a te  th e  o b je c tiv e  v a l i d i t y  claim ed by m oral law s) and th e  "how"
( th e  c o n d it io n s , h y p o th ese s , grounds which must be presupposed i f  th e  
o b je c tiv e  v a l i d i t y  o f o b l ig a t io n  i . e .  th e  c au sa l co n n ec tio n  between m oral 
law and human p a r t i c u l a r  w i l l ,  i s  to  be e x p la in e d ,) a re  q u e s tio n s  which 
a  th e o ry  o f  E th ic s  must s o lv e , o r a t  l e a s t  e lu c id a te .  In  s h o r t ,  l ik e  
every  o th e r  th e o ry , a Theory o f  E th ic s  i s  n o t supposed to  in v e n t i t s  
s u b je c t ,  b u t to  e x p la in  i t .
I t  m ust be n o ted  t h a t  Kant a t ta c h e s  f a r  g r e a te r  im portance to  th e  
en q u iry  in to  "how" m oral o b l ig a t io n  i s  p o s s ib le  th a n  to  th e  en q u iry  "why" 
th e  m oral law i s  v a l id .  The reason  f o r  t h i s  p re fe re n c e  becomes c le a r  
when we remember t h a t ,  a cco rd in g  to  s t r i c t  K an tian  th e o ry  th e  o b je c tiv e  
m oral r ig h tn e s s  o f  a c e r ta in  deed depends n o t on th e  c o n te n t o f t h a t  
deed , bu t on th e  s p e c i f ic  m o d a lity  o f th e  w i l l .  In  o th e r  w ords, th e
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m oral r ig h tn e s s  o f a w ille d  a c t io n  depends n o t  on th e  q u a l i ty  o f th e  
pu rpose  in fo rm ing  th e  w i l l  i n  q u e s tio n , b u t on th e  manner in  which t h a t  
w i l l  r e g u la te s  i t s e l f  in  r e s p e c t  o f a g iven  m oral law . In  th e  same way, 
in  th e  C r i t iq u e  o f  Pure Reason th e  o b je c tiv e  r e a l i t y  o f knowledge was 
grounded n o t in  th e  c o n te n t b u t in  th e  m o d a lity  o f t h o u ^ t .  As f o r  th e  
g iven  law and i t s  o b je c tiv e  r ig h tn e s s ,  Kant t r i e d  to  s u b s ta n t ia te  i t  in  
v a r io u s  ways. F i r s t  he th o u g h t o f i t  a s  de rived  from th e  T e le o lo g ic a l 
n a tu r e  o f  th e  u n iv e r s e .  L a te r ,  Kant d e fin e d  i t  as  th e  essence  o f 
l e g a l i t y ,  i . e .  as  v in d ic a te d  by i t s  own cosm olog ica l o r lo g ic a l  
s u i t a b i l i t y .  And f i n a l l y  Kant d e sc rib e d  i t  as a  spontaneous and 
autonomous id e a  o f P r a c t i c a l  Reason. The f i r s t  two d e f in i t io n s  
r e p re s e n t  a  d e f i n i t e  t h r e a t  to  th e  u l t im a te  autonomy o f  e th ic s .  The 
l a s t  c ircum vents t h i s ,  b u t engenders a s e r ie s  o f new d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  which 
we s h a l l  c o n s id e r  l a t e r .
At p re s e n t  we ought to  n o te  a n o th e r  p o in t  which i s  o f th e  g r e a te s t  
im portance  fo r  u n d e rs tan d in g  a r ig h t  th e  p e c u l i a r i t i e s  o f K a n t 's  
e x p o s i t io n . I f  we w ish to  fo llow  K a n t 's  meaning a l l  q u e s tio n s , and 
e s p e c ia l ly  th e  q u e s tio n  o f "How m oral o b l ig a t io n  i s  p o ss ib le ? "  m ust be 
r e f e r r e d  to  i t s  s e t t i n g  in  K a n t 's  c r i t i c a l  th eo ry  o f e th ic s .  In  o th e r  
w ords, when Kant a s k s :  "How i s  m oral o b l ig a t io n  p o ss ib le ? "  o r  "How can
th e  b a re  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  th e  m oral law m o tiv a te  th e  human w ill? "  he 
a sk s a f t e r  th e  assum ptions we m ust make, th e  c o n d itio n s  we must 
p o s tu la te  in  o rd e r  to  l in k  up a p r i o r i  th e  d is p a ra te  term s o f c o n c re te  
p a r t i c u l a r  w i l l ,  and u n iv e r s a l  a b s t r a c t  law . He p o in ts  ou t Freedom, 
R a t io n a l i ty  and Autonomy as th e  c o n d itio n s  which w i l l  w a rran t th e
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o b je c t iv e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h i s  a p r i o r i  s y n th e s is .  But w hether t h i s  
s y n th e s is  ta k e s  p la c e  in  r e a l i t y ,  w hether “th e  C a te g o r ic a l Im pera tive*  
fu n c tio n s  in d eed , i s  o u ts id e  th e  scope o f  t h i s  m ethod, s in c e  i t  i s  ou t­
s id e  th e  scope o f  h i s  method o r indeed any method to  dem onstra te  th e  
r e a l i t y  o f  Freedom. K a n t 's  a n a ly s is  o f  m oral e x p erien ce  moves in s id e  
th e  h y p o th e t ic a l  c i r c l e  o f  ^  . . .  th en  . . .  That i s  ^  o b je c t iv e ly  v a l id  
o b l ig a t io n s  e x i s t ,  th ey  m ust fu n c tio n  in  such and such a manner u nder 
such and such c o n d it io n s . ^  m oral ex p erien ce  e x i s t s ,  th e n  t h i s  i s  how 
i t  i s  p o s s ib le .  Nowhere can Kant b reak  from th e  d ed u c tiv e  c i r c l e  and 
prove th e  f a c tu a l  e x is te n c e  o f  t h a t  th e  tra n s c e n d e n ta l  s t r u c tu r e  o f  which 
he d e m o n s tra te s .
The datum o f m oral ex p erien ce  however hav ing  been th e  i n i t i a l  
s t a r t i n g  p o in t ,  th e  b ru te  e x is te n c e  o f  some s o r t  o f  o b l ig a t io n  cannot be 
q u e s tio n e d . What can be q u estio n ed  i s  th e  u l t im a te  m oral s ig n i f ic a n c e  
o f th e s e  o b l ig a t io n s .  T hat i s ,  we can ask  w hether o b l ig a t io n s  be n o t 
u l t im a te ly  re d u c ib le  to  and v a l id  because o f  some b a s ic  concept o r  
p ro p o s i t io n  n o t i t s e l f  d e fin e d  as  p a r t  o f  th e  m oral domain? In  o th e r
w ords, we may w e ll a sk  w hether th e  ex p e rien ce  o f  m oral o b l ig a t io n  be n o t
u l t im a te ly  re d u c ib le  to  some e x tra -m o ra l ground l i k e  th e  a u th o r i ta t iv e  
w i l l  o f  God, th e  n a tu r a l  purpose  o f m ankind, th e  in n a te  a n x ie t ie s  o f 
th e  human s o u l, e tc?  Hence, when Kant says m oral ex p erien ce  e x i s t s ,  
th en  . . .  e t c . ,  he s e t s  in  p a re n th e s is  n o t th e  f i r s t  b a s ic  assum ption  o f
a l l  e th ic a l  en q u iry  ( i . e .  t h a t  a l l  peop le  a re  capab le  o f i t ,  and a l l
rec o g n ize  i t  as  p o sse ss in g  a s p e c i f ic  c h a ra c te r  o f  i t s  own), b u t th e  
second ( i . e .  th e  one t h a t  s t a t e s  t h a t  m oral ex p erien ce  i s  a ls o  u l t im a te ly
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d i f f e r e n t  from a l l  o th e r  e x p e r ie n c e s ) . I t  i s  w e ll to  keep t h i s  
d i s t i n c t io n  in  m ind, f o r  i t  i s  o f te n  co n fu sed . Not th e  e x is te n c e  o f 
m oral ex p erien ce  bu t th e  t r u t h  o r  i l l u s o r i n e s s  o f i t s  m oral c h a ra c te r  
can be q u e s tio n e d . W hatever th e  u l t im a te  m etap h y sica l answer to  t h i s  
q u e s t io n , -  and an answer to  i t  must be based on m etap h y sica l rea so n in g  
even i f  i t  were only  th e  n e g a tio n  o f a l l  m etap h y sica l rea so n in g  o f  
p o s i t iv is m , -  th e  m ethod ica l s t r u c tu r e  o f  K a n t 's  a n a ly s is  rem ains 
un im paired  w ith in  i t s  se lf-d ra w n  l im i t s .  The q u e s tio n  : "Why a re  m oral
laws v a lid ? "  r e t a in s  i t s  v a l i d i t y .  So does th e  q u e ry : How can one
v in d ic a te  th e  o b je c tiv e  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  a p r i o r i  s y n th e s is  between 
p a r t i c u l a r  w i l l  emd u n iv e r s a l  law which i s  g iven  and c a r r ie d  o u t in  th e  
co n cep t o f  m oral o b l ig a t io n  o r ,  in  K an tian  te rm s, in  th e  id e a  o f th e  
c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e?
Now th e  m oral o b l ig a t io n  th e  grounds f o r  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  which 
we w ish  to  exam ine, i s  m oral o b l ig a t io n  p e r  s e , m oral o b l ig a t io n  in  th e  
a b s t r a c t ,  i n  s h o r t ,  th e  id e a  o f  m oral o b l ig a t io n  i t s e l f .  This id e a  of 
m oral o b l ig a t io n s ,  even in  th e  a b s t r a c t  p o sse sse s  c e r t a in  w ell d e fin e d  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  i t s  most e s s e n t ia l  q u a l i ty  be ing  i t s  u n c o n d itio n a l and 
o b je c t iv e  v a l i d i t y .  M oral o b l ig a t io n ,  o b lig e s  everyone p r io r  to  a l l  
in c id e n ta l  c ircum stances and s i t u a t i o n s .  I t  i s  n o th in g  bu t th e  
in ju n c t io n  to  r e s p e c t  th e  m oral law a t  a l l  tim es and under a l l  circum ­
s ta n c e s .  In  s h o r t ,  i t  i s  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e . Hence th e  m oral 
law , th e  m oral e v a lu a tio n , ^ o s e  dynamic fu n c tio n  i s  re p re se n te d  by th e  
m oral o b l ig a t io n ,  cannot c o n ta in  any p a r t i c u l a r ,  c o n c re te , and th e r e fo re  
in c id e n ta l  f e a tu r e s .  I t  must be a b s t r a c t ,  o b je c t iv e ,  u n iv e r s a l .  In
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e h o r t ,  i t  must be law as su ch , th e  v e ry  essence  o f l e g a l i t y .  Now th e  
e s s e n t i a l  f e a tu r e  o f  " l e g a l i t y  as such" i s  t h a t  i t  i s  'b in d in g * , and 
'b in d s*  w ith o u t e x c e p tio n . In  o th e r  words th e  e s s e n t ia l  f e a tu r e  o f 
" l e g a l i t y  as su ch " , i s  i t s  a b so lu te  v a l i d i t y ,  i t s  im p a r t ia l ,  u n iv e r s a l ,  
and u n e x ce p tio n ab le  a p p l ic a t io n .  The law which embodies th e  very  
e ssen ce  o f l e g a l i t y  d e f in e s  a c e r ta in  o b l ig a t io n  in  i t s  dynamic fu n c t io n . 
The o b l ig a t io n  i t  d e fin e s  i s  an o b l ig a t io n  to  acknowledge t h a t  th e  m oral 
law a p p lie s  to  a l l  im p a r t i a l ly ,  u n iv e r s a l ly ,  and w ith o u t e x c e p tio n , and 
to  a c c e p t th e  p r a c t i c a l  im p lic a tio n s  and consequence o f t h i s  acknowledge­
m ent. The fo rm ula  e x p re ss in g  t h i s  o b l ig a t io n  w i l l  be "Act on ly  on t h a t  
m a x i m " w h i c h  i s  a lso  f i t  to  se rv e  as u n iv e r s a l  law . T his however i s  
th e  f i r s t  fo rm u la tio n  Kent g iv es  o f th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e . As we 
have seen  t h i s  fo rm u la tio n  i s  a n a ly t i c a l ly  d e riv ed  from th e  id e a  o f 
" l e g a l i t y  as su ch " .
In  a d d it io n  th e  n o tio n  o f  m oral o b l ig a t io n  o r c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  
e s ta b l is h e s  a connec tion  between t h i s  fo rm ula and a p a r t i c u l a r  human w i l l  
such t h a t  t h i s  form ula d e c is iv e ly  de te rm ines ( i . e .  m o tiv a te s )  th e  w il l  
in  i t s  cho ice  o f  a c t io n s .  I t  does t h i s  in  such a  way t h a t  proposed 
a c t io n s  whose maxims do n o t f i t  t h i s  fo rm ula  a re  abandoned by th e  w i l l ,  
and th e  form ula i s  used as a c r i t e r i o n  f o r  th e  m oral r i ÿ i t n e s s  o f maxims 
o f  a c t s  and o f  a c t s .  Under what c o n d itio n s  i s  t h i s  cau sa l r e l a t i o n
l )  The ex ac t m eaning o f  maxim w i l l  be d isc u sse d  a lm ost im m ed ia te ly .
For th e  moment maxim i s  meant to  s ig n i f y  th e  u n i ty  o f th e  w i l l  th rough  
w hich m o tiv e , means and end a re  amalgamated in to  one w ille d  a c t io n .
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between form ula and w i l l  conce ivab le?  What q u a l i f ic a t io n s  must a w il l  
p o sse ss  to  be cap ab le  o f be ing  m o tiv a ted  by a form ula? F i r s t  th e  w i l l  
m ust be f r e e  i n  g e n e ra l . I t  m ust be cap ab le  o f  choosing  and r e j e c t in g  
a l l  p o s s ib le  maxims o f a c t io n s  o f  which th e  fo rm ula  i s  bu t one, as and 
when i t  l i k e s .  Secondly , th e  w i l l  must be capab le  in  p r in c ip le  to  
choose t h i s  fo rm ula  as one o f  i t s  maxims. That i s ,  i t  must be amenable 
to  reaso n  and a b s t r a c t  r a t io n a l  d e l ib e r a t io n s .  Now th e  w i l l  canno t be 
swayed by r a t io n a l  c o n s id e ra t io n , u n le s s  i t  p o sse sse s  a r a t io n a l  n a tu re . 
T h e re fo re  th e  second c o n d itio n  f o r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o r  m oral o b l ig a t io n  
i s  t h a t  th e  w i l l  be r a t io n a l  in  g e n e ra l . T h ird ly  th e  w i l l  m ust be 
c ap a b le  o f  choosing  th e  fo rm ula  in  p re fe re n c e   ^ t o  a l l  i t s  o th e r  (m a te r ia l)  
maxims; i t  m ust be capab le  o f  be ing  e x c lu s iv e ly  a c tu a te d  by r a t io n a l  
c o n s id e ra t io n s .  And i t  m ust be f r e e  from i t s  m a te r ia l  d e te rm in a tio n s , 
i t s  d e s i r e s ,  i n c l i n a t io n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r  p u rp o se s ; t h a t  i s ,  f r e e  to  
d is re g a rd  them , subdue them, l i b e r a t e  i t s e l f  from t h e i r  bondage. A w i l l  - 
t h a t  i s  e x c lu s iv e ly  r a t io n a l  and w holly f r e e  in  t h i s  sense  (n o t in flu e n c e d  
o r  determ ined by m a te r ia l  and p a r t i c u l a r  c o n s id e ra t io n s ) ,  a w i l l  t h a t  
chooses th e  form ula  in  p re fe re n c e  to  a l l  o th e r  m a te r ia l  maxims (p re fe re n c e s  
f o r  i t s  own sa k e , fo r  th e  sake o f  th e  law i t  em bodies), i s  a ls o  a 
g o o d -w ill .
In  o rd e r  to  g rasp  K a n t 's  id e a  o f th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e , we 
have to  examine s e v e ra l ly  th e  d e f in i t io n s  g iven  by Kant f o r  th e  concepts
l ) . . .  i . e .  f o r  i t s  own sa k e , f o r  th e  sake o f th e  fo rm ula  a lo n e .
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o f Freedom, R a t io n a l i ty  and Goodness as  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  o f w i l l . In  th e se  
d e s c r ip t iv e  d e f in i t io n s  Freedom and R a t io n a l i ty ,  i n  so f a r  as th ey  a re  
q u a l i f i c a t io n s  o f th e  human w i l l ,  a re  each g iven  two se p a ra te  sen ses and 
two s e p a ra te  fu n c t io n s .  In  th e  cou rse  o f th e  argum ent th e s e  a re  used  
in d is c r im in a te ly  hy K ant, and th e  dangers caused by th e  r e s u l ta n t  
am biguity^^ canno t be over-em phasised . The confused  and confusing  u se  o f  
two sen ses  o f  "Freedom" and " R a tio n a l i ty "  t h r o u ^ o u t  th e  c r i t i c a l  enqu iry  
in to  E th ic s  i s  th e  ground f o r  many o f th e  cu rio u s  v a c i l l a t i o n s  and 
h e s i t a t i o n s  in  K a n t 's  e x p o s i tio n . The concom itan t m is in te r p r e ta t io n s  
and seem ingly in s o lu b le  problem s a re  f u r th e r  agg ravated  by K a n t 's  h a b it  
o f  u s in g  th e  one sense  in  o rd e r  to  prove som ething abou t th e  o th e r  w ith ­
ou t su sp e c tin g  t h a t  th e  two sen ses  m ight be unconnec ted , m i ^ t  even be 
in c o m p a tib le , so t h a t  a  cho ice  m ight have to  be made as to  which o f them 
i s  to  be k ep t and which d is c a rd e d . T his d e c is io n  i s  e a s i ly  tak e n  in  th e  
c a se  o f "Freedom ", by th e  f a c t  t h a t  one o f  th e  two sen ses i s  e s s e n t ia l  
t o  th e  c r i t i c a l  th e o ry  o f E th ic s ,  w h ile  th e  o th e r  i s  a  s u rv iv a l  from 
R ousseau-dom inated p r e - c r i t i c a l  days. M oreover, th e  two sen ses a re  
in c o m p a tib le . In  th e  case  o f  R a t io n a l i ty ,  K a n t 's  in s i s te n c e  r e s t s  
d e f i n i t e l y  on th e  second se n se ; th e  f i r s t  being  h a rd ly  m entioned , though* 
as an in d is p e n s a b le  p re c o n d itio n  i t  i s  t a c i t l y  assumed th ro u g h o u t. The 
ro o t  o f  t h i s  in s i s te n c e  m ust be sought : i n c id e n ta l ly ,  in  a to o  r i g id ly
l )  The o th e r  concep ts am biguously and c o n fu s in g ly  used by Kant to  cover 
to o  d i s t i n c t l y  d i f f e r e n t  sen ses  a re  " r ig h tn e s s "  (o f  laws and o f  
w il le d  a c t io n s )  and m an-as-an-end  in  h im s e lf  ( in  h is  m oral c a p a c ity  
only  and in  th e  c o n c re te  whole o f  h i s  m a te r ia l  e x is te n c e ) ,
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pursued  p a r a l l e l  to  th e  C r i t iq u e  o f Pure  Reason; and b a s ic a l ly  in  K a n t's  
a t t i t u d e  to  th e  concept o f  Reason. T h is  a t t i t u d e  i s  compounded in  equal 
p a r t s  o f an i n f i n i t e  rev e ren ce  fo r  Reason, an u nshakab le  c o n v ic tio n  o f  
i t s  i d e n t i t y  w ith  m oral goodness, and an u n h e s i ta t in g  f a i t h  in  i t s  
redeem ing power: e x tr a  in te l le c tu m  n u l la  s a lu s .  Rousseau can h a rd ly
be blamed fo r  t h i s ,  f o r  Rousseau was deep ly  su sp ic io u s  o f  th e  m oral 
q u a l i t i e s  o f  R eason, and c u r io u s ly  u n a ffe c te d  by th e  Z e i tg e i s t  in  t h i s  
one p o in t .  The two sen ses o f  r a t i o n a l i t y  a re  n o t in c o m p a tib le . Never­
t h e le s s  t h e i r  con fu sio n  can be c r i t i c i s e d  in s id e  th e  K an tian  th e o ry . 
Whereas a c r i t i q u e  o f  K a n t 's  fundam ental a t t i t u d e ,  w h i ls t  s t i l l  p o s s ib le  
w ith in  th e  bounds o f  th e  C r i t i c a l  th e o ry , canno t be passed  o f f  as mere 
comment.
a ) Freedom : Freedom i s  f i r s t  deduced by Kant as a n e ce ssa ry  p re ­
c o n d it io n  o f  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  m oral o b l ig a t io n ;  a p o s tu la te d  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  w i l l ,  a s in e -q u a -n o n  as f a r  as th e  e x p la n a tio n  o f 
m oral r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  c h o ic e , o b l ig a t io n  i s  concerned . That i s ,  freedom 
as th e  u l t im a te  ground and c o n d itio n  f o r  th e  i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y  o f  m oral 
ex p e rien c e  and as an e s s e n t ia l  f e a tu r e  o f our v e ry  co n cep tio n  o f w i l l  as 
su ch , i s  a p ro d u c t o f  th e  tra n s c e n d e n ta l  d e d u c tio n . In  t h i s  sense  
freedom  i s  d e fin e d  as th e  C ategory o f  P r a c t i c a l  Reason, i . e .  w i l l ;  which 
Reason cannot conceive ex cep t as f r e e .  In  th e  second p la c e , freedom i s  
d e sc r ib e d  as freedom  from m a te r ia l  d e te rm in a tio n s , and equated w ith  an 
e x c lu s iv e  and p e rs u a s iv e  d e te rm in a tio n  by th e  m oral law i . e .  w ith  
R a t io n a l i ty  and th e r e f o re  w ith  Goodness. I t  i s  th u s  a d i r e c t  t r a n s ­
c r ip t io n  from Rousseau, who d e sc rib e d  "V irtu e"  a c tu a te d  by an in n a te
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n a tu r a l  se n tim en t, conquering  f i r s t  o n e 's  own d e s i r e s  which do n o t 
harm onize w ith  th e  te n o r  o f  our l i f e  and th en  o n e 's  p a r t i c u l a r  purposes 
w hich do n o t harm onise w ith  th e  purposes o f  o th e r s ,  as l i b e r t é  m o ra le .
These two sen ses  o f freedom  a re  n o t com patib le . M oreover, w h ile  
freedom  o p e ra tin g  in  i t s  f i r s t  fu n c tio n  a lre a d y  in c lu d e s  as a  s p e c ia l  
case  freedom  in  i t s  second fu n c tio n , freedom  when o p e ra tiv e  in  i t s  second 
fu n c t io n  a n n ih i la te s  freedom in  i t s  f i r s t  fu n c tio n . F or, i f  freedom i s  
a n e c e ssa ry  and e s s e n t ia l  f e a tu r e  o f th e  co n cep tio n  o f  w i l l  as such , i . e .  
a n e c e ssa ry  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o f  a l l  w i l l ,  i t  cannot a t  th e  same tim e  be th e  
s p e c i f i c  and s u f f i c i e n t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o f  a good w i l l .  A gain, i f  Freedom 
end Goodness i . e .  tho roughgo ing  R a t io n a l i ty ,  were th e  same, th e n  a w holly 
re a so n a b le  w i l l  would n e c e s s a r i ly  w i l l  th e  good. "To w i l l  th e  good 
n e c e s s a r i ly "  i s  however, a p ro p o s i t io n  more s u i ta b le  to  d e sc r ib e  th e  
n a tu re  o f  a " F r e ie r  B ratenw ender" to  u se  a  K an tian  te rm , th an  a p t  to  
se rv e  a s  a  d e f in i t i o n  o f a w holly  re a so n a b le , w ho lly  good, and th e r e f o r e ,  
h o ly  w i l l .  M oral d e c is io n s  a re  p o s s ib le  on ly  i f  th e y  a re  tak e n  in  
"freed o m ". "To be m o tiv a ted  by th e  id e a  o f m oral o b lig a tio n "  i s  n o t a 
n e c e s sa ry , bu t a f r e e ly  chosen s e lf -d e te rm in a t io n  o f  th e  w i l l  which 
p roposes to  fo llo w  i t s  se lf-im p o se d  maxims w ith o u t e x c e p tio n . A w i l l  
w holly  determ ined  by Reason, i f  i t  i s  a good w i l l ,  must f u l f i l  th e  same 
c o n d it io n s .  The i n t e l l i g i b l e  w i l l  m ust n o t be n e c e s s a r i ly  good, fo r  
th e n  i t  would n o t be a c t in g  f r e e ly  b u t u nder th e  com pulsion o f  i t s  n a tu re . 
I t  would have to  w i l l  th e  good and in  consequence would be devoid o f  m oral 
e x c e lle n c e . T h ere fo re  even a rea so n a b le  ag en t h a b i tu a l ly  and e f f o r t ­
l e s s l y  w i l l in g  to  good must do so in  freedom . "Even God's W ill i f  i t
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can be th o u g h t a t  a l l ,  must be t h o u ^ t  as f r e e ly  choosing  to  fo llo w
th e  law s i t  s e t s  b e fo re  i t s e l f .  L essin g  used  to  say "Kein Mensch muss
1 )m uessen ." I  can bu t add: "Und noch w eniger e in  G o tt" . Freedom i s
th e  c a te g o ry  o f  m o ra l i ty .  N e c e ss ity  i t s  d is s o lu t io n .  T his in  b r i e f ,  i s  
O t to 's  argument f o r  keep ing  th e  f i r s t  sen se  o f freedom  and d is c a rd in g  
th e  second.
The case  f o r  keep ing  th e  second sen se  o f  freedom and d is c a rd in g  th e  ■ 
f i r s t  depends upon th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  p rim ary  e x e rc is e  o f  freedom i s  to  
overcome m a te r ia l  d e s ire s  and p a r t i c u l a r  purposes in  th e  name o f  th e  
law , i . e .  o f  Reason. There i s  in  f a c t  no o th e r  way in  which we can
2)
e x e rc is e  qjir freedom (m o tiv a tio n  by m a te r ia l  c o n s id e ra tio n s  i s  bondage!) 
In d eed , we d is c e rn  our freedom , t e s t  i t s  m e t t le ,  ta k e  i t s  m easure , and 
above a l l ,  become conscious and most c e r t a in  o f  i t ,  when th e  o b s ta c le s  
on our way to  th e  f u l f i lm e n t  o f  m oral o b l ig a t io n s ,  a re  g r e a t e s t .  More­
o v e r, we can n e v e r  be so c e r t a in  o f  our freedom as when th e re  i s  a 
c o n f l i c t  between our in c l in a t io n s  and th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e , w ith  
none o f  our n a tu r a l  d e s i r e s  on th e  s id e  o f o b l ig a t io n ,  and our w i l l  
a s s e r t s  i t s  freedom  in  th e  fa c e  o f a l l  p e rsu a s io n  and chooses to  fo llo w  
th e  m oral law . Then we a re  f i l l e d  w ith  th e  co n sc io u sn ess  o f  freedom , 
which i s  n o th in g  bu t th e  consciousness o f  be ing  a r a t io n a l - b e in g ,  m aste r 
o f i t s  s o u l , and e le v a te d  h i ^  above th e  yoke o f m a te r ia l  c a u s a l i ty .
1) R. O tto : E ro erte ru n g en  in  h i s  e d i t io n  (1950) o f  K a n t 's  
Grundlegung zu r M etaphysik d e r S i t t e n ; p . 194.
2) A d o c tr in e  o f  c le a r ly  P a u lin e  o r ig in s :  f o r  S t .  P au l c a l l s
r ig h te o u sn e ss  freedom , and s in  bondage.
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Hence to  be co nsc ious o f  th e  freedom o f th e  w i l l ,  i s  to  be co nsc ious o f 
a p u re ly  r a t io n a l  d e te rm in a tio n  in  th e  fa c e  o f  a l l  m a te r ia l  m o tiv a tio n .
But r a t io n a l  d e te rm in a tio n  o f t h i s  d e s c r ip t io n  i s  th e  e s s e n t ia l  q u a l i ty  
o f  th e  good w i l l .  T h ere fo re  a f r e e  w i l l  i s  a good w i l l .  But a "Good 
W ill" m ust be good a p a r t  from th e  o b s ta c le s  i t  overcom es. I f  i t  were 
n o t  so , "H o liness i t s e l f  w ou ld .be  e c l ip s e d  by our im p e rfec t s t ru g g le s  
tow ards G o o d n e s s . T h o u g h  freedom i s  f i r s t  e x e rc is e d , d is c e rn e d , and 
m easured by th e  bonds i t  b reaks and th e  o b s ta c le s  i t  overcom es, th e  
overcom ing o f o b s ta c le s  i s  n o t an e s s e n t ia l  p a r t  o f  i t s  n a tu re . A 
w holly  r a t io n a l  ag en t who f in d s  no im pedim ents in  h i s  h e a r t ,  i s  th e r e ­
fo re  n o t  le s s  b u t more f r e e .  The good he n e c e s s a r i ly  w i l l s  i s  w il le d  
in  freedom . The n e c e s s i ty  to  which a w holly  r a t io n a l  agen t i s  s u b je c t ,  
th e  n e c e s s i ty  which he cannot b u t a cc ep t s in c e  he knows no o th e r  be ing  f r e e  
o f  a l l  n a tu ra l  d e s i r e s ,  i s  th e  n e c e s s i ty  to  obey th e  d ic t a t e s  o f  h is  
re a so n . T his be ing  so , a  w holly  r a t io n a l  agen t i s  m o tiv a ted  in  a l l  h is  
a c t io n s  by r a t io n a l  c o n s id e ra tio n s  e x c lu s iv e ly . R a tio n a l c o n s id e ra tio n s  
however a re  n o th in g  e ls e  b u t th e  c o n s id e ra tio n s  o f th e  r a t io n a l  law .
Now th e  r a t io n a l  law i s  th e  .very p r in c ip le  o f freedom . T h ere fo re  
m o tiv a tio n  by r a t io n a l  c o n s id e ra tio n s  i s  m o tiv a tio n  in  freedom . In  
K an tian  term s : r a t io n a l  c a u s a l i ty  i s  th e  c a u s a l i ty  o f freedom . A
w holly  r a t io n a l  a g e n t, n e c e s s a r i ly  fo llo w in g  h is  own r a t io n a l  n a tu r e ,  i s  
in  consequence, w holly  f r e e .  A freedom n o t to  fo llo w  h is  r a t io n a l
l )  Kant : M etaphysik de r S i t t e n . T ugend leh re ; E in le i tu n g ;  X,
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n a tu r e ,  a freedom o f c h o ic e , f o r  such an ag en t i f  i t  mean a n y th in g  a t  a l l
can on ly  mean a d im in u tio n  o f  h i s  f r e e d o m , s i n c e  som ething d i r e c te d
a g a in s t  th e  v e ry  p r in c ip le  o f  freedom canno t e f f e c t  an in c re a s e  o f
freedom . The freedom  n o t to  fo llo w  h i s  r a t io n a l  n a tu re  i s  th e r e f o r e  a
2 )
concep t which c a n c e ls  i t s e l f ;  in  o th e r  w ords, i t  i s  m ean in g less .
N e v e rth e le ss  i t  s t i l l  rem ains c o n ce iv ab le  as long  as th e  d e f in i t io n
o f freedom as a C ategory o f  Reason in  th e  f i r s t  sen se  s tan d s  unchallenged ,
A new in te r p r e t a t i o n  o f  freedom  as a C ategory  o f Reason, to  accord  w ith
th e  second sen se  o f freedom  and to  re p la c e  and annul th e  o ld  d e f in i t io n
i s  needed. On th e  b a s is  o f th e  p rec ed in g  c o n s id e ra tio n s  such a new
in te r p r e t a t i o n  can now be fo rm u la te d , th e  argum ent b e ing  b r i e f ly  t h i s .
«
S in ce  only two s e p a ra te  c a u s a l i t i e s  a re  known to  e x i s t ,  namely t h a t  o f  
th e  p h y s ic a l u n iv e rs e  in  w hich man i s  en slaved  and su b ju g a te d , and t h a t  
o f th e  i n t e l l i g i b l e  w orld , where P r a c t i c a l  Reason l e g i s l a t e s  and i s  
de term ined  by i t s  own p u re ly  r a t io n a l  law s, man can only  th in k  o f  h im se lf  
a s  f r e e  (a s  he n e c e s s a r i ly  does) in  so f a r  as he th in k s  h im se lf  s u b je c t  
to  th e  laws o f  re a so n . S in ce  th e re  e x i s t s  no p r in c ip le  o f s e l f -  
d e te rm in a tio n  a p a r t  from th e s e  two, th e  r a t io n a l  and th e  m a te r ia l ,  m an's 
freedom  i s  e n t i r e l y  co n ta in ed  by h is  a b i l i t y  to  superim pose th e  c a u s a l i ty  
o f  th e  i n t e l l i g i b l e  w orld on t h a t  o f th e  p h y s ic a l u n iv e rs e  and t h i s  is , 
how man th in k s  h im s e lf  when he th in k s  h im s e lf  f r e e .  To superim pose th e
1) Compare S t .  A u g u s t in e 's : posse  non p ecca re  magna l i b e r t a  e s t ,  non
p o sse  p eccare  maximaacaaa e s t .
2) In  o th e r  w ords, th e  two sen ses  o f freedom  a re  n o t com patib le
th e  o p e ra tio n  o f  freedom in  th e  second sense  annu ls  th e  fu n c tio n  o f 
freedom  in  th e  f i r s t  se n se .
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m a te r ia l  laws on th e  r a t io n a l  i s  on th e  o th e r  hand d e fin e d  as bondage, 
s i n ,  and th e  ro o t  o f a l l  e v i l .^ ^  M an's dua l n a tu re  i s  th e r e fo re  in  a
V
Way a p re c o n d itio n  o f  h is  l i b e r t y ,  s in c e  man as a  member o f a mundus 
i n t e l l i g i b i l i s  i s  th e  only p o s s ib le  in s ta n c e  o f  a  v a l id  concep tion  o f  
human free d o n . Any o th e r  concept o f freedom  one may a ttem p t to  
fo rm u la te  w i l l  o f  n e c e s s i ty  rem ain empty as re g a rd s  th e  human w i l l ,  and 
s e l f - c a n c e l l in g  as reg a rd s  a w holly  r a t i o n a l  w i l l .  Now t h i s  p o s i t io n ,  
though p e r f e c t ly  c o n s is te n t ,  and in  f a c t  th e  one e x p l i c i t l y  p re fe r r e d  by 
Kant th ro u g h o u t h i s  e x p o s i tio n , i s  y e t  open to  two ex trem ely  s e r io u s  
o b je c t io n s :  (a )  I f  freedom means being  determ ined  e x c lu s iv e ly  by
r a t io n a l  law , th e n  th e  concep t o f f r e e  w i l l  i s  red u n d an t. For i f  th e  
concep t o f  f r e e  w i l l  i s  i d e n t i c a l  w ith  th e  concept o f  a r a t io n a l  w i l l ,  
th e  fo rm er can , w ith o u t lo s s  o f  m eaning, be re p la c e d  by th e  l a t t e r .  A 
c o n c e p t, o r a p r in c ip le  which can be re p la c e d  should  be d ispensed  w ith  
fo r th w ith  in  th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  economy. I t  seems however 
v e ry  im probable t h a t  a th e o ry  should  be a b le  to  d is c a rd  a  concept d e fin ed  
in  i t  as a C ategory  o f  Reason. In  a d d i t io n ,  i t  makes no se n se , and i t  
i s  q u i te  u n tru e , to  say  t h a t  R a tio n a l i ty  i s  th e  C ategory  o f  Reason w ith  
reg a rd  to  w i l l ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h a t  we cannot conceive  o f our w i l l  ex cep t as 
w holly  determ ined  by r a t io n a l  grounds. Hence, e i t h e r  freedom i s  n o t a 
C ategory  o f P r a c t i c a l  Reason, o r i t  i s  n o t i d e n t i c a l  w ith  r a t io n a l  
d e te rm in a tio n  (b ) Now we cannot th in k  o f  our w il l  w ith o u t th in k in g  o f i t
1) K an t: o/u 3.
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as f r e e .  M oreover we conce ive  th e  w i l l  as f r e e  in  i t s  every  cho ice  and
d e c is io n ;  when choosing  between two m a te r ia l  in c l in a t io n s  no l e s s  th an
when choosing th e  C a te g o ric a l Im p era tiv e  f o r  i t s  own sak e , o r when
choosing  to  fo llo w  a m a te r ia l  i n c l i n a t io n  in  th e  fa c e  o f  th e  C a te g o r ic a l
I m p e r a t i v e , F r e e d o m  o f  th e  w i l l  may be i l l u s o r y  inasmuch as  i t s  degree
o f  r e a l i t y  i s  concerned . As a  C ategory  o f Reason i t  has i t s  f i e l d  and
fu n c t io n  c le a r ly  d e fin ed  by th e  d a ta  o f  r e f l e c t i v e  th o u g h t and n e i th e r
th e  one no r th e  o th e r  can be r e s t r i c t e d  a r b i t r a r i l y  to  a u se  d e fin e d  as
r a t i o n a l  d e te rm in a tio n  o n ly . In  o th e r  w ords, when I  th in k  o f  my w i l l  as
f r e e  and when I  th in k  o f my w i l l  as de term ined  e x c lu s iv e ly  by r a t io n a l
«
grounds I  th in k  o f i t  in  two d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c ts ,  th e  f i r s t  be ing  th e  
l a r g e r .  Thus, when I  th in k  o f my w i l l  a s  w holly r a t i o n a l ,  I  th in k  o f  
i t  as n e c e s s a r i ly  de term ined  by r a t io n a l  law w ith o u t f u r th e r  o p tio n .
But when I  th in k  o f i t  as f r e e  I  th in k  o f  i t  as n o t d e c is iv e ly  determ ined 
by a n y th in g , in  o th e r  w ords, as always po ssessed  o f c h o ic e . In  a g a in  
o th e r  words,* a  f r e e  w i l l  i s  f r e e  to  choose; and th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f 
choosing  one way m ust p resuppose  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f choosing a n o th e r  way. 
P a to n , who u s u a l ly  s id e s  w ith  Kant on t h i s  is s u e  and co n tin u es  to  u se  th e
l )  Compare th e  d e c is io n  ta k e n  by S ir  David Ross, in  The R igh t and th e  
Good; p . 2 ) :  " , ,  an a c t  o f  prom ise b reak in g  i s  m o ra lly  u n s u i ta b le  
in s o f a r  as i t  i s  an a c t  o f  prem ise b reak in g  even when in  s p i t e  o f t h i s  
we decide  i t  i s  th e  a c t  we ought to  d o ."  Compare a ls o  th e  case  o f 
Prom etheus, th e  f i r s t  d e l ib e r a te ly  to  break  th e  law in  th e  name o f
*good* ( i . e .  th e  w e lfa re  o f mankind) Prom etheus knew he was b reak in g  
a law to  which he su b sc r ib e d . He had th e  power to  fo re s e e  a l l  th e  
r e s u l t s  o f h i s  a c t io n  in c lu d in g  h i s  own (m e rite d I)  pun ishm ent, Yet 
he (g la d ly )  chose to  b reak  t h a t  law :  ^ ,
sLio dc 'To^oxS>'^rL6Lv7’ 'LjiiflrToL/>yt^ 
tKtov', , Oc/v
But I  knew a l l  th e s e  th in g s  would happen
y e t  w i l l in g ly ,  w i l l in g ly  d id  I  s i n ,  1*11 n o t deny i t .
A eschy los: Prom etheus Bound; 265-266.
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second sense  o f  freedom , w r i te s  : "A ccording to  K ant when we say  t h a t  a
r a t i o n a l  agen t ought to  do som ething we mean, w h a te v e r .e ls e  we mean, 
t h a t  t h i s  i s  what a rea so n a b le  ag en t would n e c e s s a r i ly  do i f  he were n o t 
h in d e re d  by d e s i r e s .  The word "ought" in d ic a te s  an o b je c tiv e  n e c e s s i ty ,  
a n e c e s s i ty  which h o ld s f o r  a l l  r a t io n a l  beings qua r a t i o n a l .  Yet 
because o f human i r r a t i o n a l i t y  t h i s  o b je c t iv e  n e c e s s i ty  i s  n o t a ls o  a  
s u b je c t iv e  n e c e s s i ty ,  and i t  i s  p o s s ib le  f o r  us to  a c t  n o t in  accordance 
w ith  rea so n  b u t in  accordance w ith  d e s i r e .  Hence i t  i s  le g i t im a te  to  
say  t h a t  th e  word "ought" in d ic a te s  a p r a c t i c a l  n e c e s s i ty  a lth o u g h  i t  
a ls o  in d ic a te s  som ething m ore. I  am n o t su re  t h a t  t h i s  answ er i s  w holly 
s a t i s f a c to r y  s in c e  i t  r a i s e s  th e  d i f f i c u l t  q u e s tio n  o f freedom , in  
p a r t i c u l a r  th e  q u e s tio n , w hether th e  freedom  o f a  r a t io n a l  be ing  to  do an 
a c t  does n o t p resuppose  freedom  to  r e f r a in  from doing th e  same a c t ."^^
Given two d e l ib e r a te  ch o ic e s  one in  fav o u r o f  th e  m oral law fo r  th e  
sake  o f  th e  m oral law , th e  o th e r  in  fav o u r o f  some c o n c re te  end; 
fo rm a lly  both  ways o f  choosing  a re  p o s s ib le  ( i . e .  d e l ib e r a te )  both  a re  
chosen under th e  a e g is  o f  freedom ; and both  a re  chosen in  th e  name o f  
freedom . In  i t s  c o n c re te  c o n te x t, th e  m oral i . e ,  r a t i o n a l  ch o ice  trends 
on th e  whole to  be th e  " f r e e r " ,  s in c e  i t  i s  a  more c o n sc io u s , more s e l f -  
c o n sc io u s , le s s  im pu lsive  ch o ic e . T h is  i s  a n a tu r a l  t h o u ^  by no means 
a n e c e ssa ry  outcome o f  human psycho logy . A cho ice  in  fav o u r o f  a 
m a te r ia l  end in  th e  fac e  o f  a c o n f l i c t in g  C a te g o r ic a l Im p e ra tiv e , can
l )  H .J . P a to n : Can Reason be P r a c t ic a l?  p , l 6 .
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be ju s t  as c o n sc io u s , s e l f - c o n s c io u s ,  f r e e  from im pulse  and d e l ib e r a te  
as th e  m oral c h o i c e , I n  o th e r  w ords, j u s t  as f r e e .  W hatever th e  
d eg ree  o f freedom o f th e  c o n te n ts  o f a c h o ic e , th e  v ery  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
a ch o ice  depends on th e  freedom  o f th e  w i l l  to  choose. B efore  th e  moral- 
cho ice  i s  p o s s ib le ,  th e  w i l l  must be f r e e ,  so t h a t  even i f  we subsequen tly
2 )d e f in e  th e  m oral ch o ice  as th e  f r e e  c h o ic e , '  freedom  as a  n e c e ssa ry  p re ­
su p p o s it io n  o f th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f m oral ch o ice  i s  a  more e x te n s iv e  
concept th a n  th e  f re e d  cm re p re se n te d  in  a m ora l; i . e .  r a t i o n a l ly
»
determ ined  c h o ic e . As th e  n e c e ssa ry  manner o f co n ce iv in g  w i l l - a s - s u c h  
Freedom i s  d e fin e d  as an in d is p e n s a b le  p re -c o n d it io n  bu t n o t as  a 
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d itio n  fo r  th e  w holly r a t io n a l  d e te rm in a tio n  o f a w i l l ,  i . e .  
f o r  a good w i l l .  F ree w i l l  in  o th e r  w ords, i s  a  n o tio n  o f w ider 
d e n o ta tio n  and narrow er c o n n o ta tio n  th a n  th e  n o tio n  o f  a good w i l l .  In  
a d d i t io n  r a t i o n a l i t y  seems to  be w ider in  d e n o ta tio n  th an  m oral goodness, 
so t h a t  a  good w i l l  must be r a t io n a l  b u t a r a t io n a l  w i l l  need n o t be good.
1 ) v i z .  th e  m oral op in io n s o f  th e  O c c a s io n a l is t  sc h o o l, f o r  e x . .
2 ) v i z .  C udw orth: "The t r u e  l i b e r t y  o f man, as i t  speaks pure  p e r f e c t io n
i s  when th e  r ig j i t  u se  o f  th e  f a c u l ty  o f  th e  w i l l  ( to g e th e r  w ith  th e  
a s s i s ta n c e  o f  th e  D ivine G race!) he i s  h a b i tu a l ly  f ix e d  in  m oral good 
. . . .  b u t when by th e  abuse o f f r e e  w i l l  men come to  be h a b i tu a l ly  
f ix e d  in  e v i l  and s in f u l  i n c l in a t io n s ,  th en  a re  th ey  as B oeth ius 
w e ll exp ressed  in  p ro p r ia e  l i b e r t a t i  c a p t iv i  -  made c a p tiv e  and 
b rough t in to  bondage by t h e i r  own f r e e  w i l l " .  Cudworth d e f i n i t e l y  
adm its h e re  o f th e  two sen ses  o f  freedom , though he th in k s  n e i th e r  
d isp e n sa b le . See however a ls o  Aldous Huxley*s shrewd rem ark about 
th e  u se  o f " tru e "  and " r e a l " , True and r e a l ,  he sa y s , a re  used  as 
e p i th e ts  on ly  when we mean to  d e p riv e  a word o f  i t s  normal s ig n if ic a n c e  
and e i t h e r  have i t  empty and m ean ing less or tu r n  i t  in to  i t s  o p p o s ite .
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K a n t 's  d e f in i t i o n  o f  freedon  as th e  su b ju g a tio n  o f  d e s ir e  by reason  
e n t a i l s  th e  eq u a tio n  freedom = r a t io n a l  d e te rm in a tio n . S im ila r ly ,  Kant*s 
d e f i n i t i o n  o f th e  good w i l l  as  th e  w i l l  which su b ju g a te s  d e s ir e s  to  
reaso n  e n ta i l s  th e  eq u a tio n  : m oral goodness = r a t io n a l  d e te rm in a tio n .
In  bo th  cases Kant seems a c tu a te d  by an unw arranted  b e l i e f  in  th e  m oral 
goodness o f Reason as such . T his b e l i e f  as w e ll as th e  r e s u l t in g  
d e f in i t io n s  can be d isc a rd e d  w ith o u t in  th e  l e a s t  im p a irin g  th e  working 
o r th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  c r i t i c a l  method o f  t r a n s c e n d e n ta l  d ed u c tio n .
The d is c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  p o in t  m ust however be postponed t i l l  th e  concept 
o f r a t i o n a l i t y  as d e fin ed  by Kant has been examined more c lo s e ly .
X X  X X X r
B efore v e n tu r in g  t h i s  exam ina tion , one word on th e  q u e s tio n  o f 
" o b s ta c le s " ,  m entioned in  co n n ec tio n  w ith  th e  problem  o f freedom . The 
id e a  o f  o b s ta c le s  seems p a r t i c u l a r l y  u s e fu l  to  th e  e lu c id a t io n  o f th e  
n a tu re  o f a good w i l l ,  though p o s s ib ly  n o t re le v a n t  to  an e lu c id a t io n  o f 
th e  n a tu re  o f a f r e e  w i l l .
A p rom ising  approach to  t h i s  q u e s tio n  would be to  examine w hether 
th e  "overcom ing o f  o b s ta c le s "  i s  n o t a n e c e ssa ry  c o n d itio n  w ith o u t which 
i t  would be im p o ssib le  to  ex p e rien ce  a * g o o d -w ill* , (n o t a f r e e  w i l l ) .
In  a d d it io n  we should  e n q u ire  w hether t h i s  "overcom ing o f o b s ta c le s " ;  
t h i s ,  in  a  way, n e g a tiv e  manner o f o p e ra tio n  i s  n o t a more e s s e n t ia l  
f e a tu r e  o f th e  * m o ra lly  r ig h t*  than  K ant had a llow ed . That t h i s  'n e g a t iv e  
manner o f  o p e ra tio n * , i s  l i k e l y  to  prove an e s s e n t ia l  f e a tu r e  o f  th e  
"m o ra lly  r ig h t"  seems in d ic a te d  in  th e  m ostly  n e g a tiv e  fo rm u la tio n  o f  th e  
b a s ic  m oral law s. Thus, f o r  one th in g ,  th e  d e c a lo g ic a l  "Thou s h a l t
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no t  . . . "  p e r s i s t s  th roughou t th e  B ib le  in  a most rem arkab le  manner even 
in  v e ry  s in g u la r  and d e ta i l e d  law s. The S o c ra tic  Daimon, f o r  a n o th e r , 
n e v e r urged  S o c ra te s  to  do a n y th in g , b u t on ly  stopped  him from doing 
th in g s .  T his seems to  me a p o in t  o f  some im portance , s in c e  even th e  
G reeks, w ith  t h e i r  fundam en ta lly  d i f f e r e n t  approach to  m orals h e re  
t e s t i f y  to  o u rs . I  s h a l l  pu rsue  th e  d is c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  m a tte r  a t  a more 
opportune  p o in t .  For th e  tim e being  I  w ished on ly  to  p o in t  o u t , t h a t  i f  
we a c c e p t t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  we avoid th e  awkward im p lic a tio n  o f hav ing  
to  m easure th e  goodness o f a w i l l  by th e  dim ensions o f  th e  o b s ta c le s  i t  
h a s  to  overcome, w ith o u t h av in g  to  s a c r i f i c e  th e  f r u i t f u l  id e a  o f th e  
overcom ing o f o b s ta c le s  as such , o r in  more p re c is e  term s : th e  * n e g a tiv e
manner o f o p era tio n *  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f th e  m o ra lly  r i g h t .
X X X X X
B) R a t io n a l i t y : The n o tio n  o f th e  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  w i l l  ( i . e .  th e
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a r a t io n a l  d e te rm in a tio n  o f  th e  w i l l )  i s  d e fin e d  by Kant 
in  two w%ys. In  th e  f i r s t  p la c e  i t  i s  d e fin ed  as an in h e re n t  f e a tu r e  o f
w i l l  as  such . Thus th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  w i l l  being  determ ined  by a  w holly
r a t i o n a l  ( i . e .  m oral law) i s  allow ed f o r .  And in  th e  second p la c e  i t  i s
d e fin e d  as th e  e x c lu s iv e  d e te rm in a tio n  o f  th e  w i l l  by a p re fe re n c e  f o r  th e
m oral law , and, hence , as e q u iv a le n t to  th e  m oral r e c t i tu d e  o f th e  w i l l ,  
o r to  th e  good w i l l .  The two d e f in i t io n s  a re  n o t in co m p atib le  no r i s  
th e  second, th e  eq u a tio n  o f th e  thoroughgo ing  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  th e  w i l l  
w ith  i t s  goodness o b v io u sly  in a d e q u a te . But b e a rin g  in  mind th e  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  freedom and r a t i o n a l i t y  which has proved u n te n a b le , we 
may expec t s im ila r  r e s u l t s  h e re .
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What i s  th e  d e s c r ip t iv e  d e f in i t io n  o f  w il l  as such? A modem 
p sy c h o lo g ic a l p aper n o t p r im a r i ly  concerned w ith  m oral q u e s tio n s  g ives 
th e  fo llo w in g  d e s c r ip t iv e  d e f in i t i o n  o f  w il le d  a c t s :  "The p ro ce ss  o f
normal w il le d  a c t io n s  in  d a i ly  l i f e  ta k e s  th e  fo llo w in g  c o u rse : A
m otive  appears in  th e  form o f  any o b je c t  o f our in n e r  o r  o u te r  ex p e rien c e . 
We p e rc e iv e  t h i s  o b je c t  and g e n e ra te  id e a s  o f p o s s ib le  a t t i t u d e s  to  i t ,  
w hich lend  th e  o r ig in a l ly  n e u tr a l  o b je c t  a p ro v o ca tiv e  c h a ra c te r .  T his 
p ro c e ss  we c a l l  m o tiv a tio n . To th e  p ro v o c a tiv e  c h a ra c te r  o f  t h i s  m otive 
th e  "I* co rresponds w ith  an a c t iv e  movement: th e  'I*  d ec id es i t s  
a t t i t u d e  to  th e  c o n te n t o f th e  m o tive , i t  a c t iv a te s  i t s e l f  and d e fin e s  a 
c o n s is te n t  l in e  o f  fu tu re  conduct f o r  i t s e l f  in  r e s p e c t  o f th e  g iven  
o b je c t .  The a t t i t u d e  th u s  assumed c o n s t i tu te s  th e  o b je c tiv e  moment, th e  
maxim o f th e  w il le d  a c t io n .  I t s  c o n te n t however i s  determ ined by th e  
c o n te n t  o f  i t s  id e a s  which c e n tre d  on th e  g iven  o b je c t  and tu rn ed  i t  in to  
a  m o tiv e . T h is , th e  p ro ce ss  o f  w il le d  a c t io n ,  i s  fo llow ed  by p h y s ic a l 
and p sy c h o lo g ic a l p ro c e sse s  which t r a n s l a t e  i t  in to  p h y s ic a l a c t io n  bu t no 
lo n g e r  in f lu e n c e  o r change th e  i n i t i a l  p ro ce ss  o f w il le d  a c t io n " .
A dopting t h i s  e x p o s itio n  to  our more im m ediate needs we can say : By w ill
l )  Jaen sch  and H. W ied ling : "Grundformen M enschlichen S e in s" ;
Experim ente l l e  S tru k tu r= p sy c h o lo g isch e  U ntersuchungen u e b e r das 
W ille n s le b e n ; E in le i tu n g  zum V erstaen d n is  de r Uebergangsform en von 
d e r  i n t e g r i e r t e n  zu r n ic h t  i n t e g r i e r t e n  S t r u k tu r ; p . 547. I t  i s  
i n t e r e s t i n g  to  n o te  t h a t  t h i s  e x p o s i tio n  by E .Jaen sch  t a l l i e s  in  a l l  
w ith  th e  accoun t H .J .P a to n  g iv es o f  "w ille d  a c t io n s ” in  g e n e ra l in  
"Can Reason be P r a c t ic a l? "  p . 11 , and "The C a te g o ric a l Im p e ra tiv e " ; 
p .60-61 ; 166-16 7 .
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in  g e n e ra l we r e f e r  to  th e  re sp o n siv e  a t t i t u d e  adopted  by a human being
to  an o b je c t o f  h is  o u te r  o r h is  in n e r  l i f e  (m o tiv a tio n ) by assum ing a
d e f i n i t e  l in e  o f  a c t io n  in  connec tion  w ith  th e  g iven  o b je c t  ( p r a c t i c a l
maxim) in  o rd e r  to  r e a l i s e  th e  o r ig in a l  in te n t io n s  o f  th e  f i r s t  response
( th e  e n d ). The s a l i e n t  f e a tu r e s  o f t h i s  d e s c r ip t io n  f o r  our purpose  a r e :
t h a t  a l l  w il le d  a c t io n  m ust be s u f f i c i e n t l y  m o tiv a te d , must be d ir e c te d
tow ards a c le a r ly  conceived end and m ust fo llo w  a d e f in i t e  cou rse  which
i t  s e t s  i t s e l f  w ith  a view to  i t s  p u rp o se . In  o th e r  w ords, a l l  w i l l
in s o f a r  as i t  r e a l ly  i s  a w i l l ,  and n o t a p a ss in g  and in e f f e c t iv e  whim,
p ro ceed s frcxa a g iven  m otive w ith  a c o n s is te n c y  o f  p r in c ip le  and a
p e r s is te n c y  o f pu rpose . " In  a l l  a c t io n s  th e  w il l  i s  determ ined by a
1 )  'p r in c ip le  and so has a meixim". "The maxim, as i t  were g e n e ra l is e s  my
a c t io n ,  in c lu d in g  my m o t iv e . . .  i t  i s  th e  d e te rm in in g  ground o f  my a c t io n ,
and i t  does n o t p ro fe s s  l i k e  an o b je c tiv e  p r in c ip le  to  be v a lid  f o r  anyone
2 )e ls e  and i t  may be good o r  i t  may be e v i l " . *
T his i s  an im p o rtan t p o in t ,  f o r  i t  su g g ests  t h a t  th e re  i s  a c e r ta in  
amount o f  o b je c tiv e  c o n s is te n c y , a c e r t a in  amount o f autonomy ( th e  w i l l  
s u b je c ts  i t s e l f  to  a p r in c ip le  which i t  reco g n ize s  as n ecessa ry  fo r  th e  
achievem ent o f i t s  p u rp o se , on ly  because i t  re c o g n ise s  i t  as n e c e ssa ry , 
i . e .  a cco rd in g  to  a r a t io n a l  judgnen t) in  a l l  i n t e l l i g e n t  w i l l in g .  I t  
a ls o  su g g ests  t h a t  every  w i l l  p o sse sse s  a  c e r ta in  amount o f  l i b e r t y
1) H .J .P a to n : The C a te g o r ic a l  Im p e ra tiv e ; p . 61.
2 ) H .J .P a to n : idem ; p . 60.
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v i s - a - v i s  i t s  n a tu r a l  in c l in a t io n s  and d e s ir e s  and t h a t  t h i s  has n o th ing  
to  do w ith  what i s  w il le d  be i t  m o ra lly  r ig h t  o r be i t  m orally  wrong.
I t  would th e r e fo re  seem t h a t  th e  p r in c ip le s  o f  c o n s is te n c y , autonomy and 
freedom  do n o t by them selves c o n s t i tu te  th e  m oral w orth  o f th e  w i l l  th ey  
q u a l i f y .  Nor do they  a s su re  u s  t h a t  a w i l l  choosing  in  conform ity  w ith  
th e s e  p r in c ip le s  w i l l  n e c e s s a r i ly  choose th e  " r i ^ t ” . T his however 
amounts to  p ro p o sin g  th a t  th e  f i r s t  fo rm ula  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a r  im p e ra tiv e  
in  i t s  a b s t r a c t  and empty fo rm a li ty  i s  no fo o l-p ro o f  c r i t e r i o n  o f  th e  
m oral goodness o f  th e  w i l l  i t  inform s o r o f  th e  a c t io n s  which conform .
Now such a p o in t  a g a in s t  Kant could no lo n g e r  be c o n ta in ed  by th e  l im i t s  
o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  I  s h a l l  th e r e f o re  postpone i t s  d is c u s s io n  t i l l  l a t e r .
0 ) The good w i l l  : What acco rd in g  to  Kant a re  th e  s p e c i f i c  f e a tu re s  
o f  th e  good w i l l  as d i s t i n c t  from a l l  o th e r  k inds o f w i l l?  S in c e , qua 
w i l l  i t  must be m o tiv a te d , d i r e c te d  tow ards a p u rp o se , and a c t  acco rd in g  
to  a p r in c ip le ,  i t s  s p e c i f ic  c h a ra c te r  w i l l  have to  be sought n o t  in  i t s  
fo rm al s t r u c tu r e  as a w i l l  b u t in  th e  s p e c i f ic  q u a l i ty  o f  i t s  m o tiv e , end, 
and p r in c ip le .  Now i t  i s  a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  th e  m oral w i l l  t h a t  i t  
n ever u rg es  a wrong a c t .  A man a c tu a te d  by a good w i l l ,  w i l l  n ev e r 
choose " to  l i e " .  H is m otive f o r  "no t ly in g "  w i l l  be d i s in te r e s te d ,  
t a k in g  no accoun t o f any d e s i r e s ,  i n c l in a t io n s  e tc .  he m i ^ t  have to  th e  
c o n tra ry ;  n o r o f  any p o s s ib le  advantage t h a t  m ight acc ru e  to  him from 
" ly in g " ,  no r o f  any d i r e  r e s u l t s  "no t ly in g "  m iÿ it  b r in g  a b o u t. ^^ In
l )  Compare Kant * s paper a g a in s t  Benjamin C onstan t :
- 205-
o th e r  w ords, a  man o f good w i l l  ta k e s  no account o f any m a te r ia l  a 
p o s t e r io r i  m o tiv e s . He- pays a t t e n t io n  s o le ly  to  th e  " r ig h tn e s s "  o f 
n o t ly in g ,  th e  o b je c tiv e  u n c o n d itio n a l r ig h tn e s s  o f th e  m oral law which 
i s  recogn ized  and revered  by Reason, The law i t s e l f  i s  h is  only  m otive . 
The rev e ren ce  engendered by th e  law qu ickens t h a t  m otive bu t i s  n o t i t s  
ground. The man o f  good w i l l  i s  e n t i r e ly  a c tu a te d  by Reason, e n t i r e ly  
independen t o f  h i s  d e s i r e s .  In  th e  second p la c e , he dec ides on a 
p r in c ip le ,  a p r a c t i c a l  maxim s o le ly  w ith  a view to  i t s  con fo rm ity  w ith  
th e  law . He chooses a maximum which i s  o b je c t iv e ly ,  u n iv e r s a l ly  v a l id ,  
i . e .  a r e p re s e n ta t io n  o f  th e  m oral law i t s e l f .  L a s tly  th e  end which a 
man o f  good w i l l  p roposes to  h im se lf  canno t be a p a r t i c u l a r  m a te r ia l  
s u b je c t iv e  end. I t  must be an end proposed by re a so n , an end v a l id  fo r  
every  r a t io n a l  b e in g , an o b je c tiv e  end, an end which i s  so n o t in  view 
o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  d e s i r e ,  b u t by v i r tu e  o f  i t s  e s s e n t ia l  n a tu re  recogn ized  
by rea so n , in  s h o r t :  an End in  i t s e l f , an A bsolu te  End.
Kant s e ts  us such an end in  h is  a s s e r t i o n :  "Now I  say man and
g e n e ra l ly  every r a t io n a l  b e ing  e x is ts  as an end in  i t s e l f  -  and must 
n ev e r be t r e a te d  as a means a lo n e " . T his a s s e r t io n ,  ex p re sses  a 
fundam ental i n t u i t i o n ,  b u t Kant t r i e d  to  v in d ic a te  i t  n e v e r th e le s s  by 
th e  fo llo w in g  form al argum ent : When I  reg a rd  m yse lf as a m oral a g e n t .
s u b je c t  to  th e  m oral law and th e r e f o re  p o sse ss in g  i n f i n i t e  v a lu e , I  
th in k  o f  m yse lf as an end to  m y se lf. But I  am a m oral agen t s u b je c t  to
1 ) K ant : Grundlegung zu r M etaphysik d e r  S i t t e n ;  O h .I I .
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m oral law only in  v i r tu e  o f  my r a t io n a l  n a tu re .  But so i s  every  o th e r  
man. T here fo re  every  o th e r  man must a ls o  reg ard  h im se lf  as an end to  
h im s e lf .  My s u b je c t iv e  assum ption  t h a t  I  am an end to  m yse lf i s  made 
by ev e ry  r a t io n a l  ag en t about h im s e lf . I t  i s  th e r e fo re  an o b je c tiv e  
p r in c ip le  v a l id  f o r  a l l .  In  v i r tu e  o f  my r a t io n a l  n a tu re  I am conscious 
o f t h i s  and th e r e f o r e  must reg a rd  and t r e a t  a l l  p e rso n s in c lu d in g  m yself 
as m oral a g e n ts . That i s  I  t r e a t  them as Ends in  th a n s e lv e s ,  and th e r e ­
fo re  as n e c e ssa ry  Ends to  a l l  men.^^ Paton  aware o f  th e  v ery  s u p e r f ic i a l  
and dubious n a tu re  o f t h i s  f o r m a l is t ic  p ro o f  f o r  th e  o b je c tiv e  v a l i d i t y  o f  
M a n -as -an -e n d -in -h im se lf  and th e ,  in  consequence, n e ce ssa ry  u n iv e r s a l  
acknowledgement o f M an's S ta tu s  as an End t r i e d  to  p u zz le  ou t as in  a 
jig saw  some o th e r  p o s s ib le  d e d u c tio n : The end o f th e  good w i l l  he a rg u e s ,
cannot be le s s  p e r f e c t  th an  th e  w i l l .  L et us th e r e f o re  look f o r  some­
th in g  t h a t  i s  n o t l e s s  p e r f e c t  th an  th e  good w i l l .  There a re  f o r  
in s ta n c e  ends which a re  a ls o  d u t ie s  l ik e  perfo rm ing  m oral a c t io n s  f o r  th e  
sake o f  d u ty . (M .d.S; T ugend lehre , E in l . ;  111 , 1V .) But p ro d u c ts  o f 
m oral a c t io n s  a re  n o t a b s o lu te ly  good, and m o ra lly  good a c tio n s  a re  n o t
l )  T h is f o r m a l is t i c  argum ent sk a te s  over th in  i c e .  A d is c u s s io n  o f  i t s  
f u l l  im p lic a tio n s  must be l e f t  f o r  l a t e r .  For th e  moment j u s t  a few 
rem arks. There i s  an u n b rid g e a b le  g u lf  between th e  p ro p o s i t io n :  
" Every man re g a rd s  h im se lf  as an end" and th e  p ro p o s i t io n  "Every man 
re g a rd s  every  o th e r  man as an end" . The second i s  in  no way 
n e c e s s i ta te d  by th e  f i r s t ;  s im i la r ly  th e  second form ula o f th e  
C a te g o r ic a l  Im p era tiv e  f a r  from be ing  a mere e x p o s itio n  o f th e  
o b l ig a t io n  im plied  in  th e  f i r s t  b r in g s  a com plete ly  new concep t in to  
th e  system  o f  E th ic s , a concept in  i t s e l f  s u f f i c i e n t  to  w a rran t th e  
v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  C a te g o r ic a l Im p e ra tiv e .
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a b s o lu te ly  good, such supreme goodness be long ing  on ly  to  th e  w i l l  
(K r .d .P r .V ; 6 2 -1 8 2 .) Now s in c e  th e  end cannot be l e s s  p e r f e c t  th a n  th e  
w i l l ,  th e re fo re  only r a t io n a l  ag en ts  as f a r  as th ey  a re  possessed  o f a 
w i l l  i t s e l f  cap ab le  o f be ing  a  good w i l l  a c tu a te d  by th e  id e a  o f th e  law , 
can be th e  Ends o f a C a te g o r ic a l Im p e ra tiv e .^ )
Now Kant p u ts  forw ard h is  f o r m a l is t i c  argum ent r a th e r  c a s u a l ly .
'
Kant d id  n o t in te n d  to  convince anyone by t h i s  argum ent s in c e  he d id  n o t 
th in k  t h a t  any man, in  h is  c a p a c ity  o f r a t io n a l  a g e n t, would need to  be 
convinced by what h i s  own Reason would t e l l  him most p la in ly  should  he 
b u t s to p  to  re a so n . A ll one needed to  do was to  make men sto p  in  th e  
p u r s u i t  o f  t h e i r  d e s ire s  -  and make them rea so n . T h is i s  done by th e  
C a te g o r ic a l  Im p e ra tiv e , In  h i s  argum ent, Kant only  meant to  r e t r a c e  
w hat happens when men ^  s to p  to  rea so n . That i s ,  Kant th o u g h t he was 
m ere ly  fo rm u la tin g  in  p r e c is e  term s what men th in k  in  t h e i r  own s lo v e n ly  
way, when they  d e c la re :  "O ther men a re  human beings to o ."  To Kant th e
moment someone s e t s  up a C a te g o r ic a l  Im p era tiv e  f o r  h im s e lf ,  th e  moment 
he f e e l s  bound by th e  m oral law , he i s  governed by Reason. And being  
governed by P ure Reason, when Reason i s  no lo n g e r th e  se rv a n t o f  h is  
d e s i r e s  bu t t h e i r  m a s te r , he imposes c e r t a in  l im i ta t io n s  on h im s e lf .
He a sk s h im se lf  w hether he could  w ish o th e r  people  to  a c t  in  th e  way in  
which he i s  j u s t  p roposing  to  a c t .  By do ing  t h i s  he a lre a d y  assumes 
o th e r  men to  be possessed  o f r a t i o n a l i t y ,  o f  f r e e  w i l l s ,  in  s h o r t ,  o f  a 
w i l l  which can be determ ined by th e  m oral law . So t h a t  when he d ec id es  
t h a t  a c e r ta in  maxim w i l l  n o t do , he a t  th e  same tim e im p lie s  t h a t  o th e r  
p e o p le , d id  th e y  bu t stop  to  th in k ,  would r e j e c t  i t  to o . He a c ts  a g a in s t
l )  H .J .P a to n : The C a te g o r ic a l Im p e ra tiv e ; p . 166-172.
—206—
th e  background o f a m oral u n iv e r s e , where th e  same Reason reaso n s  in  
a l l  in d iv id u a ls  t h r o u ^  th e  same c a t e g o r i e s . O n  t h i s  view reaso n  i s  
what i s  common to  a l l  men, and i f  i t  i s  n o t fo rced  in to  th e  s e rv ic e  o f  
one m an 's p a r t i c u l a r  d e s i r e s ,  c o r r e c t ly  reasoned  c o n c lu sio n s  a re  v a l id  
f o r  a l l ,  and would be reached  by a l l  who co n sid ered  th e  same problem .
I f  one man becomes aware t h a t  r a t io n a l  be ings a re  E n d s-in -th e m se lv e s , by 
re p re s e n tin g  to  h im se lf  th e  m oral law , t h i s  aw areness being  r a t i o n a l  i s  
im p l i c i t ly  v a l id  f o r  a l l  men and a c c e s s ib le  to  a l l  men. I t  i s  th e r e fo re  
enough i f  men s to p  to  rea so n , (and t h i s  th e y  u s u a l ly  do) to  make them 
r e a l i s e  t h a t  o th e r  men a re  E n d s-in -th e m se lv e s . The main d i f f i c u l t y  fo r
l )  In  t h i s  argum ent Kant m ost c lo s e ly  fo llo w s th e  S to ic  D o c trin e  as 
expounded by Marcus A u re liu s , in  j fbA I f . 4 ^ : g ?
To \ / o t p i v  K o c f
t I ^ \ c. _ / V ^ \KOl/ 0^  • t> TO \f 10 0 7~Qv /I Tct)
ko  I ■ t ?  TOuTD , 0 r C o ! \ /o ^  ; £/  t o O t o  HOa T rju^  ; 6 ?  T o ^ T j
n O A  I > : z l  T O o t o  o / yC O ^ ^ * »  C W /"(.T fLD A' r E ^ l  > ^  :
' ■'»  ^ f '
^ o t j  oC /^A oi/  T / ^  TO  T w v  <X >f ^  fL to  \T l~ lo / f  ^  ( . f C j  Af 0 / WO U
^  A/T^u'yx^uTC  ^ g r  S't 7"^ hLot\/-y^
K a U  0 6 0 T O  ■no K o y  OW A C ^ i S i J S i /  *to<f/ '  </ ^ - j '  ^  J
That i s ,  " i f  th e  f a c u l ty  to  reason  i s  common to  u s  ( i . e .  a l l  human 
b e in g s) th en  Reason i t s e l f ,  by and th ro u g h  w hich, we a re  r a t i o n a l ,  
m ust be our common p o ss e s s io n . I f  t h a t  be so , th e n  a ls o  th e  Reason 
which p re s c r ib e s  what ought and what ought n o t to  be done i s  common 
( to  a l l  human b e in g s ) . I f  t h a t  be so , th en  th e  law to o  i s  common 
( i . e .  v a l id  f o r  a l l  human b e in g s .)  I f  t h a t  be so , th en  we a re  
c i t i z e n s .  I f  t h a t  be so , we ta k e  p a r t  i n  scxne commonwealth. I f  
t h a t  be so th e  U niverse  i t s e l f  m ust be in  a way, a commonwealth.
For in  what o th e r  commonwealth, could  anyone c la im , t h a t  th e  vdiole 
o f  th e  human ra c e  ta k e  p a r t  as c i t iz e n s ?  Thence th e n , from t h i s  
commonwealth in  which we a l l  have p a r t ,  we ho ld  our very  f a c u l ty  o f 
re a so n in g , and our r a t i o n a l i t y ,  and our being  s u b je c ts  to  law s; o r 
whence ( e l s e  could we h o ld  i t ) ?
I j
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ary s o c ie ty  den ies Truth, den ies th e in tr in s ic  w orth lessn ess  
o f man and h is  desperate need fo r  god 's grace, d en ies , in  
sh o rt, i t s  fa ith :  C h r is t ia n ity . F a ith  i s  th e only l in k
which holds s o c ie ty  to g e th e r , C h r is t ia n ity  th e  only tru e  
C iv i l is a t io n  (Toda c iv i l iz a c io n  verdadera v ien e  de cr istian ism o)  
Europe has l o s t  i t s  f a i t h ,  th e  germ o f rev o lu tio n s  i s  destroyin g  
i t ,  European S o c ie ty  i s  dying: La sociedad  europea se  muere 
I t  i s  f u t i l e  to  hope th a t Truth w i l l  triumph in  th e end, th a t . 
good must p r e v a il:  Indeed i t  i s  w e ll known th a t fa i th  once V'
l o s t  i s  hard to reg a in , fo r  an in d iv id u a l -  im p ossib le  to , 
rega in  fo r  a whole nation: Europe i s  lo s t :  **No hay s a l vac ion
para Euro pa -  d ie  en que vamos a l a  barb aria" . Europe i s  
going towards a despotism  th e  l ik e  o f which in  c r u e lty  and 
d e s tr u c t iv e  power we have never y e t  seen in  h is to r y . Man 
by try in g  to  reform th e natu ra l order, by b e lie v in g  in  h is  
own d ig n ity , and by s e t t in g  h im se lf above th e  need o f god, 
has brought about h is  own p e r d itio n . S o c ia l reforms lea d  
to  d ic ta to r sh ip s  not to  freedom. "There i s  no q u estion  o f  
choosing between l ib e r t y  and d ic ta to r sh ip . There i s  no 
l ib e r ty  in  Europe . . . .  I would fa in  choose l ib e r t y  could I
choose i t .  B u t-th e g iven  ch o ice  i s  between th e  d ic ta to r sh ip  ^
\  /  - -
1) D. Cortes; D iscurso sobre la  s itu a c io n  general de Europa.
2) " idem.
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Kant l i e s  in  making men a ls o  a c t  by th e  l i g h t  o f t h e i r  rea so n . I t  
n e v e r occu rred  to  Kant t h a t  men cou ld , on r a t io n a l  g rounds, r e fu s e  to  
t r e a t  o th e r  men as ends. He could n o t  conceive  o f  such an a t t i t u d e  
ex cep t tow ards depraved and c rim in a l men, who p u t them selves o u ts id e  th e  
m oral law , vdio th e r e f o re  do n o t p r o f i t  by th e  d ig n ity  vdiich obeying th e  
m oral law , b e ing  a  m oral a g e n t, co n fe rs  on men, and which indeed  f i r s t  
c o n s t i tu te s  a man as an E n d - in -h im se lf . But even in  t h e i r  case  Kant 
made p ro v is io n s .  Even th e y , as long as th e y  a re  n o t a l to g e th e r  b e r e f t  
o f  Reason, a re  s t i l l  c ap a b le , a t  l e a s t  p o t e n t i a l ly ,  o f  ta k in g  th e  m oral
/
law a s  t h e i r  g u id e , and th e r e f o r e  even th e y  never f o r f e i t  t h e i r  human 
d ig n i ty  a l to g e th e r .
The c h ie f  accoun t to  which Kant tu r n s  t h i s  argum ent i s  n o t  to  
e s t a b l i s h  th e  v a lu e  o f  Man. T his men m ust, and do, accom plish  f o r  th o n - 
s e lv e s .  He u t i l i s e s  i t  t o  p rune th e  to o  r i c h ,  overflow ing  c o n te n t o f 
h i s  i n t u i t i o n ,  th e  im p u lsiv en ess o f "Now I  say man e x is t s  as an E n d -in - 
h im se lf"  to  make i t  harm onize w ith  th e  more a u s te re  c lim a te  o f  h i s  u su a l
manner o f th in k in g . So i n t e n t  was he on t h i s  t h a t  he  p a id  no a t t e n t io n
to  th e  req u irem en ts  o f  h is  E th ic a l  Theory. On th e  c o n tra ry , Kant d id  h is  
b e s t  to  in v a l id a te  and r e t r a c t  th e  p o s i t io n  reached in  th e  quoted 
se n te n c e , to  e ra s e  i t s  memory, even to  deny i t s  ev er hav ing  been s ta te d  
in  t h i s  se n se . Thus Kant e x p la in s  t h a t  what he r e a l ly  meant to  say was 
t h a t  man i s  an E n d -in -h im se lf  on ly  in  h is  m oral c a p a c i ty , only in  so f a r
as he i s  a m oral a g e n t. But what man can be sa id  to  e x is t  in  h i s  m oral
c a p a c ity ?  S u re ly  Kant m eant more th an  he w il l  adm it by th e  quoted 
a s s e r t io n !  Indeed t h i s  can be shown by th e  fo llo w in g  r e f l e c t io n  : '
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I f  Kant meeunt only  to  imply t h a t  th e  v a lu e  o f  man depends on h i s  m o ra lity , 
and h i s  a sp e c t o f  a m oral a g e n t, th en  t h i s  v a lu e  could  have been deduced 
from th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  in  i t s  f i r s t  form. The f r e e  and 
r a t i o n a l  s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n  o f  each m oral agen t determ ined s o le ly  by th e  
c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  would be th e  w a rra n t and th e  sou rce  f o r  such v a lu e  
as a l l  p o sse s s . There was th e n  no p o in t ,  no need , indeed  no room a t  a l l  
f o r  a c a te g o r ic a l  d e c la ra t io n  t h a t  man e x is t s  as an E n d -in -h im se lf , an 
a b s o lu te  v a lu e . Kant we must allow  th e r e f o re  d id  reach  t h i s  p o s i t io n  in  
a s in g le  momentary v is io n .  That he th en  w ithdrew  from i t  does n o t make 
t h i s  moment le s s  bu t r a th e r  more r e a l ,  e s p e c ia l ly  vdien we c o n s id e r  K a n t's  
o v e ra l l  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p o s i t io n .  I t s  im portance  o r th e  im portance o f  th e  
"co n cep t o f  man" i t  c o n s tru e s  can h a rd ly  be o v e rra te d . T his concept w i l l  
l a t e r  prove o f  th e  m ost f a r  re a c h in g , m ost d e c is iv e  w eigh t o f a l l  E th ic a l 
c o n c e p ts . For th e  moment how ever, we m ust be s a t i s f i e d  to  p o in t  o u t , 
t h a t  th e  a t t a n p t  o f  c e r ta in  i n t e r p r e t e r s  to  account f o r  t h i s  concep t by 
rem inding  one t h a t  t h i s  concept a lone  could  p rov ide  a  ground f o r  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f d e f in in g  im p e rfe c t d u tie s^ ^  m ust a s s u re d ly  f a i l .  F o r, 
Kant as a m a tte r  o f  f a c t  n e g le c te d  to  work ou t th e  im p lic a tio n s  and 
r e s u l t s  con ta ined  in  th e  id e a  o f  " im p e rfec t d u t ie s " ,  an id e a , by th e  way, 
v a r io u s ly  and re p e a te d ly  n e c e s s i ta te d  by th e  e x ig e n c ie s  o f h is  th e o ry  
e x a c tly  because any e la b o ra t io n  o f  im p e rfe c t d u tie s  meant u s in g  t h i s  
c o n ce p t.
l )  Im p erfec t d u t ie s  a cco rd in g  to  Kant : M etaphysik d e r  S i t t e n :
E in le i tu n g ;  & 4 . *• "Weiche s in d  Zwecke d ie  z u g le ic h  P f l ic h te n  sind?" 
can  only com prise th e  h ap p in ess  n o t th e  m o ra lity  o f  o th e r  men. V iz. 
pp . 13^-'2.T where I  d is c u s s  th e  p e r t in e n t  passage  a t  g r e a te r  le n g th .
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I  suppose a c e r ta in  d i a l e c t i c a l  p ro c e ss  to  have been touched o f f
by th e  in tru d in g  concept as i t  g ra te d  K a n t 's  b a s ic  i n t e l l e c t u a l  a t t i t u d e ,
a p ro c e ss  whose o u t l in e  i s  s t i l l  d i s c e r n ib le .  The th e o r e t i c a l  sequence
o f  w hat I  suppose to  have tak e n  p la c e , can be b r i e f l y  ske tched  as fo llo w s :
At a c e r ta in  p o in t  in  th e  argum ent o f "Die Grundlegung zur M etaphysik d e r ^
S i t te n "  Kant f in d s  h im se lf  endowed or sad d led  w ith  th e  a l ie n  concept
o f  th e  i n t r i n s i c ,  in a l ie n a b le  v a lu e  o f man in  s e . T hat i s ,  th e  e n t i r e
man, n o t only th e  m oral man i s  an o b je c t  o f r e s p e c t .  This co n cep t, now,
h o ld s  c e r ta in  ad v an tag es , to  which Kant was by no means i n d i f f e r e n t ,  f o r
h i s  system . Man as v a lu a b le  in  h im s e lf  i . e .  v a lu a b le  in  th e  co n c re te
l iv i n g  w holeness o f h is  p a r t i c u l a r  p u r s u i t s ,  a t  l a s t  f r e e s  th e  concept of
man o f  i t s  a b s tr a c tn e s s  and d e f in e s  sp h e res  o f a c tu a l  i n t e r e s t s  f o r  man,
in  which no l e s s  th a n  in  h i s  ba re  m oral p e rso n , he m ust be re s p e c te d  and
1)n o t in te r f e r e d  w ith  * i . e .  n e v e r t r e a te d  as a mere m eans. The
c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  th u s  f o r  th e  f i r s t  tim e a c q u ire s  a c o n c re te  c o n te n t,
2 )and g a in s  a new s ig n if ic a n c e  which i s  o f  g re a t  p r a c t i c a l  im portance .
1) Kant : Grundlegung zur M etaphysik d e r S i t t e n : Z w eiter A b sc h n itt .
2) Compare th e  T enth Commandment : "Thou s h a l t  n o t co v et th y  n e ig h b o u r 's  
house , thou  s h a l t  n o t co v e t th y  n e ig h b o u r 's  w ife , n o r h is  m anservan t, 
n o r h is  m a id se rv a n t; n o r h is  ox no r h i s  a s s ,  n o r an y th in g  t h a t  i s  
th y  n e ig h b o u r 's .  A lso Exodus xx,17* "Thou s h a l t  n o t cu rse  th e  d eaf 
o r  p u t a s tum bling  b lock  b e fo re  th e  b lin d "  and "Thou s h a l t  n o t  h a te  v 
th y  b ro th e r  in  th y  h e a r t ,  thou  s h a l t  n o t avenge no r bear grudge 
a g a in s t  th e  c h ild re n  o f  th y  p e o p le , bu t thou  s h a l t  love th y  neighbour 
as t h y s e l f . . .  And i f  a s t r a n g e r  so jo u rn  w ith  th e e  ye s h a l l  n o t vex 
h im .. .  th e  s t r a n g e r . . .  s h a l l  be u n to  you as one bom  among you, and 
thou  s h a l t  love  him as th y s e l f "  L e v itic u s  : x ix ,1 4 , 17* l 8 , 55 , 54.
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Secondly  t h i s  concep t o f m a n -a s -v a lu a b le - in -h im se lf , d e fin e s  man’s w orth 
u n c o n d it io n a l ly ,  a  p r i o r i ,  and th e re fo re  as exempt from f lu c tu a t io n s ,  
even from th e  f lu c tu a t io n s  o f  h is  own m o ra l i ty .  I t  could have served  
as a r a t io n a l  ground fo r  th e  v a l i d i t y  and e x is te n c e  o f  th e  C a te g o ric a l 
Im p e ra tiv e . T his one would say , should  be o f in e s tim a b le  advantage to  
K an t, who a f t e r  a l l  was o u t to  i n s i s t  on th e  a p r i o r i  r i g h t  o f  everyone ' 
to  be re sp e c te d  as a p e rso n . L a s t ly ,  th e r e  were th e  im p e rfec t d u t ie s  
which could only  be e s ta b l is h e d  on t h i s  c o n d itio n . Yet Kant made only  
th e  m ost cu rso ry  u se  of t h i s  new sense  o f  m an-as-an -end . At th e  c i te d  
p o in t  in  "Die G rundlegung", and in  th e  d e f in i t i o n  o f  im p e rfec t d u t ie s  
K a n t’s argument on im p e rfec t d u t ie s  i s  as fo llo w s . Assuming m an-as-an - 
end to  be d e fin e d  in  i t s  f i r s t  sense  i . e .  man i s  o f i n f i n i t e  v a lu e  in  so
f a r  as he i s  a m oral a g e n t, th en  fo r  th e  C a te g o r ic a l Im p era tiv e  he
re p re s e n ts  an in v io la b le  b a r r i e r ,  a l im i t in g  c o n d it io n , f o r  a l l  p r a c t ic a l  
maxims which u se  means to  an end, f o r  nobody must u se  him as a mere end. 
He i s  th u s  an end in  a n e g a t iv e , p r o h ib i t iv e  se n se . P e r f e c t  d u t ie s  only 
can be d e fin ed  in  reg a rd  to  him . B ut, a rgues K ant, prompted by th e  
v is io n  o f  man as a l e g i s l a t i n g  member in  a Kingdom o f Ends, i t  seems a 
poor s t a t e  o f a f f a i r s  when men m erely r e f r a in  from abu sin g  each o th e r .  
From a m oral p o in t  o f  view th e y  should  a ls o  h e lp  each  o th e r ,  and f u r th e r  
each o th e r ’ s i n t e r e s t s .  I t  does n o t seem q u i te  s a t i s f a c to r y  m erely  to  
a b s ta in  from u s in g  a r a t io n a l  agen t as a m ere means, one must a ls o  t r e a t
him as an End in  h im se lf  o r r a th e r  as a s u b je c t  o f  ends, which one must
h e lp  him to  a t t a i n  by a d o p tin g  them as f a r  as p o s s ib le  as one’ s own.^^
l )  i . e .  Im p e rfec t d u t ie s !
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Now i t  i s  a paradox o f  E th ic s  t h a t  one cannot h e lp  a man to  a t t a i n  h is  
own m oral p e r f e c t io n :  f o r  t h o u ^  one can u rg e , a d v ise  even compel a 
man " to  perform  a c t io n s  d i r e c te d  tow ards c e r ta in  ends one canno t compel
him to  adopt c e r t a in  ends as h i s  own. M oral p e r f e c t io n  however, l i e s  in
1 )  ^th e  a d o p tio n  o f  c e r ta in  en d s, and in  th e  f r e e  and autonomous ado p tio n
o f th o se  ends. I t  fo llo w s th e r e f o re  t h a t  we cannot t r e a t  man as a
" p o s i t iv e "  end in  h is  m oral and r a t io n a l  c a p a c i ty . That i s ,  we can have
no im p e rfe c t d u t ie s  tow ards men co n sid ered  only as m oral a g e n t, whose so le
end and purpose i s  t h e i r  m oral p e r f e c t io n ,  s in c e  by v i r tu e  o f th e  s p e c i f ic
n a tu re  o f t h i s  end i t  i s  im p o ss ib le  to  d e f in e  such d u t ie s .  T h e re fo re ,
th e  on ly  ends o f o th e r  men which we can adop t a s  f a r  as p o s s ib le  as our
own, so as to  f u r th e r  t h e i r  a tta in m e n t by o th e r  men, a re  th e  m a te r ia l ,
non-m oral ends th e y  p u rsu e , in  th e  c o n c re te  l iv in g  w holeness o f  t h e i r
b e in g . The on ly  p u r s u i t  o f  a n o th e r  man we can r e a l ly  f u r th e r ,  i s  h is
2 )p u r s u i t  o f  m a te r ia l  goods, * i r r a t i o n a l  goods, h a p p in e ss . T h e re fo re , i f  
im p e rfe c t d u t ie s  a re  to  be p o s s ib le ,  man in  h i s  c o n c re te  wholeness 
in c lu s iv e  o f h i s  m a te r ia l  p u r s u i t s ,  m ust be co n sid ered  an E n d -in -h im se lf , 
t o  be re sp e c te d  and never abused . I n f i n i t e  va lu e  w i l l  have to  be 
a t t r i b u t e d  to  man, a p a r t  from, h i s  a sp e c t as a m oral a g e n t. Kant however 
i s  v e ry  r e lu c ta n t  t o  a ccep t t h i s  outcome. So much so t h a t  when he w ishes
1 ) Compare : "Thou s h a l t  n o t see  th y  b ro th e rs  ox o r h i s  sheep go a s t r a y  
and h id e  t h y s e l f  from th a n " . . .  "Thou s h a l t  n o t see  h is  a ss  o r  h is  ox 
f a l l  down by th e  way and h id e  t h y s e l f  from them . Thou s h a l t  su re ly  
h e lp  i t  to  l i f t  up again" Deuteronomy : 22 ;1 ,4 -
2) Kant : M etaphysik  d e r  S i t t e n ; T ugend lehre , E in ^ itu n g , & 7*
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to  a s s e r t  th e  in v io la b le  d ig n i ty  of everyone and th e  c a te g o r ic a l  
p r o h ib i t io n  a g a in s t  abusing  any man even th e  most degraded , v ic io u s ,  and 
dep raved , he p r e f e r s  to  do t h i s  by way o f supplem entary  fo rm u la tio n s  to  
th e  f i r s t  ( l im i te d )  sense  o f m an-as-an-end  in  h im self^^  r a th e r  th an  make 
u se  o f  th e  e n la rg ed  second sen se  which was ready  to  hand. Why? Because 
K a n t 's  b a s ic  and fundam ental a t t i t u d e  to  a l l  q u e s tio n s  i s  t h a t  : What i s
re a so n a b le , i s  good. What i s  n o t rea so n a b le  cannot be good, and n o th in g  
good can be u n re a so n a b le , o r repugnan t to  Reason. "Was v e m u e n f tig  i s t ,  
i s t  g u t ." ^ )  T h is i s  th e  v e ry  d ev ice  o f  K a n t 's  " i n s t i n c t  o f th e  
i n t e l l e c t " ,  as Bergson would sa y . T h is b a s ic  v a lu a t io n a l  a t t i t u d e  o f  
K a n t 's  r e s u l t s  in  such d e f in i t io n s  as th e  second sen se  o f  freedom  : To
be f r e e  i s  to  be r a t i o n a l ly  de te rm ined . To be de term ined  by reaso n  i s
to  be good. To be m o ra lly  good i s  to  be r a t i o n a l ,  t o  be f r e e ,  to  p o ssess
v a lu e  and w orth e t c .  M an's w orth  depends on h i s  m oral p e r f e c t io n .  The
1 ) A l te r in g  t h i s  i n i t i a l  p o s i t io n  which d e fin e s  m an 's i n f i n i t e  w orth 
a s  grounded in  th e  a c tu a l  goodness o f h is  w i l l ,  so as to  in c lu d e  a 
c a p a b i l i ty  o f  m a n ife s tin g  a good w i l l ;  and even to  embrace, as a 
t h i r d  e x te n s io n , a p o te n t i a l  c a p a b i l i ty  o f m a n ife s tin g  a c tu a l  good­
n e ss  o f w i l l .  F o r, Kant a rgues in  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e s e  e x te n s io n s , 
however low a man may have sunk, he never q u i te  lo se s  th e  power to  
dete rm ine  h im se lf  to  a tte m p t th e  good, and ly  so doing and p e rse v e r in g  
w i l l  in  tim e  ach ieve  a c tu a l  goodness o f  w il l  and m oral s t a tu s .  This 
in a l ie n a b le  c a p a c ity  o f  man to  d isp o se  h im se lf  tow ards th e  goodness
o f  h is  w i l l ,  should  he indeed  w i l l  t h i s  w ith  a l l  h i s  h e a r t ,  co n fe rs  
an i n f i n i t e  w orth  on th e  v e ry  lo w est among men, and e n t i t l e s  him to  
be re sp e c te d  as an end in  h im s e lf .
2 ) See H e g e l's  subsequent e x te n s io n  "A llé s  was i s t ,  i s t  v e m u e n ftig "  
and th e r e f o re  in  conscious and unconscious ev o ca tio n  o f Kant -  good.
-2 1 5 -
a c tu a l  degree o f  man’s m oral p e r f e c t io n  de te rm ines th e  a c tu a l  deg ree  o f
h is  w o rth . A part from h is  m oral c a p a c i ty ,  man has no w orth o r v a lu e .
A ll t h i s  forms a  v e ry  c lo s e ly  k n i t  homogenous a t t i t u d e  which in  a l l  bu t
i t s  b e l i e f  in  reason  (which in  th e  end g iv es  i t  a s tra n g e  tw is t  away and
in im ic a l  to  a l l  t r u ly  r e l ig io u s  in s p i r a t io n )^ ^  i s  re m in isc e n t and in  p a r t
d i r e c t l y  d e riv ed  from t h a t  P a u lin e  d o c tr in e  which has been so i n f lu e n t i a l
and d e c is iv e  f o r  P r o te s ta n t  th o u g h t. Thus th e  view o f  th e  dual n a tu re
o f  man, o f h is  m a te r ia l  in c l in a t io n s  a s  bondage and s la v e ry , th e  ro o t of,
a l l  e v i l  and a l l  s in ;  th e  view o f freedom as th e  su p p re ss io n  o f th e
se n su a l d e s ire s  o f th e  n a tu r a l  man, th e  view o f m oral p e r f e c t io n  as th e
goal o f a l l  man’ s endeavours, m oral p e r f e c t io n  b e in g  t h i s  su p p re ss io n  o f
th e  normal ( n a tu r a l ! )  man and th e r e f o re  th e  same as freedom ; th e  view
t h a t  in  t h i s  endeavour to  f r e e  h im se lf  from th e  bondage o f  h is  m a te r ia l
d e s i r e s  man m ust be a law u n to  h im se lf  : h i s  h ig h e r  n a tu re  d i c t a t i n g  to
2)
h i s  low er and in s o f a r  as he i s  s t i l l  one, autonom ously; and f i n a l l y ,I
th e  view t h a t  t h i s  b a t t l e  m ust be fo u g h t by th e  in d iv id u a l  in  h i s  own 
h e a r t ,  and won by th e  in d iv id u a l  in  h i s  own h e a r t ;  -  a l l  th e s e  p o in ts  
a re  d i s t i n c t l y  P a u lin e . But Paul depends on God’ s g race  to  awaken th e  
h e a r t ,  God’ s g race  to  g ive  i t  th e  power to  conquer and God’ s m y ste rio u s 
w i l l  to  e l e c t  as i t  l i s t s  th e  r e c ip ie n t s  o f His g ra c e . Kant depends in
1 ) Kant : S t r e i t  d e r  F a k u l ta e te n ; S t r e i t  d e r  T heologischen  m it de r
P h ilo so p h isc h en  F a icu ltae t; Von R e lig io n sse k te n ,
(
2) Compare: "The G e n tile s  hav ing  n o t th e  law . . .  a re  a law u n to
th em se lv e s" : . . .  2 / 7 X  /y-
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a l l  on Reason, Man as a  r a t i o n a l  c re a tu re  ho lds th e  power to  determ ine  
h im se lf  tow ards th e  good. Of h is  own f r e e  w il l  man adopts th e  ends 
proposed  by Reason. At th e  same tim e Reason w arran ts  t h a t  th e s e  ends 
can be a t ta in e d  by m an's own e f f o r t s  by th e  e x e rc is e  o f  M an's N a tu ra l
Pow ers, in d eed , t h r o u ^  them a lo n e . F o r, Kant a rg u e s , i f  Reason proposes
a  c e r t a in  end to  Man as th e  v ery  purpose f o r  which he l iv e s  and which i t  
i s  h i s  bounden du ty  to  p u rsu e , th en  Man must be cap ab le  o f a t t a in in g  i t .
A duty  to  pu rsue  an end w ith  a l l  our m ight which cannot be a t ta in e d  except
by a g ra tu i to u s  and a r b i t r a r y  d isp e n s a tio n  o f  Grace i s  n o t an o b l ig a t io n  
b u t a  mockery and a d e c e p tio n . I t  i s  an id e a  u t t e r l y  repugnant to  
. R eason. To be u t t e r l y  u n reaso n ab le  i s  to  be u t t e r l y  im m oral. But what 
i s  a v e rse  to  Reason and a v e rse  to  M o ra lity  can n ev er be from God, o r 
proved to  be from God, What i s  good and what i s  bad we know f o r  c e r ta in .  
W hether God in s p i r e d  S t .  P au l^ ) in  a l l  th in g s  we know n o t .  T hat we need 
a s p e c ia l  d isp e n sa tio n  o f  g race  a p a r t  from and in  a d d it io n  to  our good 
w i l l  b e fo re  we can be governed by th e  m oral law , i s  a d o c tr in e  u t t e r l y  
repugnan t to  Reason. And even more so i s  th e  d o c tr in e  t h a t  some men 
a re  vouchsafed  t h i s  g race  den ied  to  o th e r s ;  tlie  d o c tr in e  o f  e le c t io n  and 
p r e d e s t in a t io n .  Reason re q u ire s  t h a t  a man be as r i ^ t e o u s  and as w orthy 
as he w i l l s  to  be t h r o u ^  h is  s in c e re  d e te rm in a tio n  to  be governed in  a l l  
th in g s  by th e  m oral law . To see  a w orthy man dep rived  o f th e  e f f e c t s  o f 
h is  r e c t i tu d e  or a le s s  w orthy a t t a i n  m oral p e r f e c t io n  by an a r b i t r a r y
l )  Kant : S t r e i t  d e r F a k u l ta e te n ; e t c . . .  Von R elig ionssek ten , und
F ried en s  a b sc h lu s s .
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d is p e n s a tio n  o f g race  i s  a v e rse  to  Reason, to  M o ra lity , to  J u s t i c e .  
F u rtherm ore , s in c e ,  u n l ik e  m oral p e r f e c t io n ,  i t  i s  beyond our power to  
ach iev e  m a te r ia l  happ iness by our own e f f o r t s ,  and s in c e  m a te r ia l  
h a p p in e ss  i s  in d is p e n s a b le  to  th e  p e r f e c t  l i f e  f o r  which we were c re a te d , 
Reason re q u ire s ^ )  t h a t  God a p p o rtio n  H appiness in  d i r e c t  p ro p o r tio n  and 
e x ac t harmony w ith  M o ra lity . M oral R e c titu d e  a lone  makes us w orthy of 
h a p p in e ss , and i t  i s  repugnan t to  Reason to  see  th e  w o rth in ess  o f th e  
r ig h te o u s  d isd a in e d  and mocked. T h ere fo re  th e  P o s tu la te s  o f  P r a c t i c a l  
Reason r i ^ t l y  demand t h a t  H appiness be a l l o t t e d  us in  exac t p ro p o r tio n  
w ith  M o ra lity , and th a t  th e r e  be a God to  see  to  i t .  That i s ,  a  God, 
who governs and o rd e rs  th e  U n iverse  so , as to  make th e  rea so n a b le  a t  a l l  
tim es th e  a c tu a l .^ )
I  have e n la rg ed  th e  argum ent so f a r ,  because both  K an t’s c o n f l i c t  
w ith  S t .  P a u l, and th e  P o s tu la te s  o f  P r a c t i c a l  Reason, a re  p a r t  o f  th e  
same complex, th e  same a t t i t u d e  which made Kent d i s l ik e  and re p u ls e  at* 
so g r e a t  a c o s t to  h is  th e o ry  and a g a in s t  h is  own opposing  i n t u i t i o n  th e  
concep t o f th e  D ig n ity  o f man conceived in d ep en d en tly  o f m oral w orth .
H is a d m ira tio n  and p r id e  i n  th e  Prom ethean sp lendou r o f  m oral r e c t i tu d e  
as th e  s e l f -g iv e n ,  s e l f - c r e a te d  w orth o f Man i s  m atched by a s tro n g  
f e e l in g  o f in ju r y  whenever m oral r e c t i tu d e  i s  n o t g iven  i t s  due. Kant 
i n s i s t s  as i t  w ere, on " th e  re a so n a b le  r i ^ t  o f  th e  r ig h te o u s " ,  on 
" j u s t i c e  f o r  th e  w orthy". The i n j u s t i c e  o f hav ing  v a lu e , w o rth , and
l )  K ent : C r i t iq u e  o f P r a c t i c a l  Reason; D ia le c t ic  o f  P r a c t i c a l  Reason;
O h .l . i , 2 , 5 .
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d ig n i ty  a t t r ib u t e d  to  th e  r ig h te o u s  and u n rig h te o u s  a l ik e  is^ ^  so
d i s t a s t e f u l ,  so repugnan t a th o u g h t t h a t  in  th e  fa c e  o f th e  m ethod ica l
e x ig e n c ie s  o f th e  C r i t i c a l  Theory o f  E th ic s ,  Kant p r e f e r s  to  drop th e
2)
id e a  o f  im p e rfec t d u t ie s  a l to g e th e r ,  r a th e r  than  ag ree  t h a t  man i s  to
be re s p e c te d  in  h i s  c o n c re te  wholeness no l e s s  th a n  i n  h i s  m oral c a p a c ity .
At one p o in t  Kant had indeed  allow ed h is  i n t u i t i o n ,  h is  f e e l in g  fo r
"Humanit&t" to  run  away w ith  him . On r e a l i s in g  how ever, j u s t  how f a r
t h i s  u p s e t  h is  m ost c h e rish e d  c o n v ic tio n  : ' t h a t  on ly  th e  rea so n a b le  i s
5 )g o o d ', he had prom ptly  w ithdraw n th e  new concep t. I  b e lie v e  th is ;  
r a th e r  th an  th e  e x p la n a tio n  o ffe re d  by R. Otto^^ to  be th e  more p ro b ab le
1) Compares "E t c 'e s t  n 'e s t im e r  r ie n  q u 'e s t im e r  to u t  l e  m o n d e ... je  
v e u t qu 'on  me d i s t i n g u e . . . "  A l c e s t i s i n  M o lie re 's  M isan th rope;
Act 1 . 8 c .1 .
2) The need fo r  which i s  t h r i c e  encoun tered  in  K a n t 's  e x p o s i t io n , f i r s t
in  th e  concept o f  th e  Kingdom o f  I n t e l l i g i b l e  Ends; seco n d ly , in  th e
argum ent on th e  m eaning o f  Autonomy and th e  f r u i t f u l n e s s  o f th e  id e a  
o f freedom which in s p i r e s  men to  new e f f o r t s  in  m oral p e r f e c t io n ;  
and l a s t l y  as urged  a g a in  by K a n t 's  f e e l in g  f o r  hum anity and h is  
p e rso n a l c o n v ic tio n  t h a t  i t  i s  our d u ty  in  a l l  to  f u r th e r  th e  Ends o f 
Humanity.
5) For th e  same reaso n  Kant would have r e je c te d  t h i s  concept as th e  
u l t im a te  ground o f th e  C a te g o r ic a l Im p e ra tiv e , and would n ev er have 
ag reed  to  R .O tto 's  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f h i s  th e o ry . For Kant would never 
have accep ted  any in te r p r e t a t i o n  by which m o ra l i ty  would in  th e  l a s t  
in s ta n c e  and u l t im a te ly  be grounded n o t in  Reason. I  s h a l l  d isc u ss  
t h i s  problem  in  d e t a i l  l a t e r .
4 ) " I t  seems p ro b ab le  t h a t  in  h i s  f i r s t  d r a f t  o f  th e  Groundwork Kant had
n o t  in tro d u c ed  th e  id e a  o f  th e  d ig n i ty  o f  man and had worked o u t h i s
system  in  accordance w ith  a form ula  x . In  a l a t e r  r e v is io n  he th en  
re p la c e d  form ula x w ith  th e  second im p e ra tiv e  as we know i t  now urged  
by a r i c h e r  and deeper i n t u i t i o n  r i s i n g  from h is  h e a r t .  He d id  n o t 
however draw a l l  th e  consequences o f  th e  new view opened by t h i s  
i n t u i t i o n ,  and re tu rn s  to  co n tin u e  w ith  th e  o ld  argum ent. A fterw ards 
Kant t r i e d  in  v a in  to  reduce  th e  new concep t to  th e  d im ensions o f 
" th e  o ld  a rg u m en t.."  R .O tto : N otes to  K a n t 's  "G rund legung .. " ;p p .198-
199 . O tto a ls o  w r ite s  t h a t  A lfred  H egler was th e  f i r s t  to  p ropose  
t h i s  th eo ry  o f  a tim e la g  between th e  in c e p tio n  and th e  r e v is io n  o f 
th e  "G ru n d leg u n g ..."  in  h i s  "I^sychologie von Kant As E thik”; F re ib u rg  I 85I .
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rea so n  why Kant d id  n o t make f u l l  u se  o f h is  d isc o v e ry  o f th e  u n c o n d itio n a l 
w orth  o f th e  human being as such . I  a ls o  b e lie v e  t h i s  a t t i t u d e  o f 
K a n t 's  to  fu rn is h  th e  l i k e l i e s t  answer to  t h a t  r e c u r r e n t  and p l a in t iv e  . ' 
q u e s tio n  in v a r ia b ly  vo iced  by m y s tif ie d  in te r p r e te r s ^ ^  "Why d id  Kant n o t 
pu rsu e  h is  so p rom ising  id e a  o f  im p e rfe c t d u tie s? "  K ant, I  b e l ie v e ,  
d id  n o t pu rsue  th e  id e a  o f  im p e rfe c t d u t ie s  because t h i s  would in v o lv e  
an accep tan ce  w ith o u t r e s e rv a t io n s  o f th e  second sen se  o f m an-as-an-E nd.
And Kant could n o t  a cc ep t t h i s  second sen se  w ith o u t r e s e rv a tio n s  because 
t h i s  would be e q u iv a le n t to  an adm ission  t h a t  what i s  rea so n a b le  i s  n o t 
n e c e s s a r i ly  good, and t h a t  in  consequence i t  may w e ll be t h a t  th e  'good* 
h as i t s  ro o ts  deep in  th e  u n reaso n ab le  h e a r t ,  o r in  an a r b i t r a r y  
g r a tu i to u s  d e c is io n  o f  th e  w i l l ;  in  s h o r t ,  in  som ething i r r a t i o n a l .
T h is however, would n o t be r e a s o n a b le . . .
These r e f l e c t io n s  make i t  p o s s ib le ,  even im p e ra tiv e  to  re c o n s id e r  
c e r t a in  o f  K a n t 's  views which a re  n o t  d i r e c t l y  determ ined  o r e n ta i le d  by 
th e  method o f t r a n s c e n d e n ta l  d e d u c tio n . E sp e c ia lly  th o se  o f K a n t 's  
view s which seem unduly p re ju d ic e d  by h i s  c u l t  o f  rea so n  o u ^ t  to  be re ­
examined most c a r e f u l ly  in  o rd e r  to  d ec id e  w hether th ey  a re  o r a re  n o t 
in d is p e n s a b le  to  K a n t 's  c r i t i c a l  system  o f E th ic s .
I t  must be p o in te d  ou t t h a t  Kant sometimes u se s  a t h i r d  sense  of 
m a n -a s -a n -e n d - in -h im se lf . In  c e r ta in  p assag es Kant speaks as though he 
would a l to g e th e r  deduce m an 's i n f i n i t e  w orth  from h is  d e s tin y  and h is  
p o t e n t i a l  membership in  a Kingdom o f Ends, conceived n o t in  i t s
l )  v i z .  P a to n , C a s s ir e r ,  Hermann Cohen, O tto  h im se lf  e tc .
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tra n s c e n d e n t sen se  o f an i n t e l l i g i b l e  w orld , bu t in  i t s  t e l e o lo g ic a l  sense
as th e  u to p ia n  fu tu re  o f Hum anity. In  t h i s  se n se , only  th o se  have va lue
who, s t r i v in g  f o r  p e r f e c t  r e c t i tu d e  in  th em se lv es , h e lp  to  r e a l i s e  and to
f u r th e r  th e  common ends o f  hum anity . T h is , however, i s  a r a r e  u s e ,  and
o f  no deeper consequence f o r  K a n t 's  p h ilo so p h y .^^
Summa summarum : Man, a cco rd in g  to  Kant i s  o f v a lu e  in  so f a r  as he
i s  m o ra l. Man i s  m oral in  so f a r  as he i s  r a t i o n a l .  In  consequence a l l
2 )men p o ssess  p o te n t ia l  w orth . ^
A ctual w o rth , however, i s  d i r e c t l y  dependent on a c tu a l  m oral 
r e c t i t u d e .  Thus indeed  a re  we viewed by God: so t h a t  we s ta n d  equal
in  th e  eyes o f men,^^ unequal b e fo re  God.^) For i s  i t  n o t a wondrous 
th in g ,  exclaim s Kant th a t  man should  s e t  a m oral law un to  h im s e lf ,  and be 
governed by i t ,  and made f r e e  by i t  to  dw ell as an i n t e l l i g i b l e  be ing  in  
an i n t e l l i g i b l e  w orld , amongst be ings whose w orth  i s  i n f i n i t e  and s e l f -
5)
c o n fe rre d !  The same Prom ethean e la t io n  and p r id e  inform  th e  famous
1) C on tra ry  to  th e  views o f  c e r ta in  o f  K a n t 's  i n t e r p r e t e r s  l i k e  H arold 
H& ffding, R ichard  M ü lle r , e tc .  which I  s h a l l  d is c u s s  l a t e r .
2) "Das d ie  M enscheit in  i h r e r  Idee  zu e in e r  Wüzde e rh e b t ,  d ie  man im 
Mens Chen a l s  Gegenstand d e r E rfah rung  n ic h t .  verm ut en s o i l " ,  as Kant 
hum orously rem arks in  Der S t r e i t  d e r  F ak u lt& ten : S t r e i t  d e r  Theolog­
isc h e n  F a k u l t i t  m it d e r  P h ilo so p h isc h e n ; Von R e lig io n sse k te n .
5) Who do n o t know th e  h e a r t  where m oral p e r f e c t io n  dw ells in  th e  in n e r ­
m ost goodness o f th e  w i l l ,  b u t on ly  see  th e  e x te rn a l  and f l a g r a n t  
b reach  o f  law .
4 ) Who sees  th e  h e a r t  and i t s  re a so n s .
5 ) Kant % K r i t ik  d e r p ra k tis c h e n  V e m u n ft; E r s te r  T e i l ,  E rs te s  Buch.
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ap o stro p h e  on d u ty : " \
L)0 ^ v d e i aaaoj<^  oU<L U)Av^yiS. .. a r^ '
Ue^ctsAA, a fe ^ V ^ < X /V v ,/v v e^  <?l'i /V» /yi ^  ^  o J ^  o i < i y ) ^ v ^ ^
Ip  Uv^ Cô i''^ ole^ Cji'civ cXc<2>u<^c£,e>u ^  ''
and th e  conclud ing  passage  o f  th e  C r i t iq u e  o f P r a c t i c a l  Reason :
lO^ l/^£; Qia^ Ù ^  'Cc/C'’j^  ’
/v\ Va^  C u^ CA () i^'hylA^^JÎ:
u /fe e x  ua^ i'l o{ ql^  u j L & \ ^ i ^ c A j i  G e ^ e / ^  »'t, ^ , ' j L  "
That i s  to  say ; n o th in g  in  th e  w orld can compare w ith  th e  m ajes ty  o f
th e  s t a r r y  heavens above, u n le s s  i t  w ere " th e  m a jes ty  o f  th e  m oral law
in  ou r h e a r t s ."
I t  i s  p ro b ab le  t h a t  th e  em otions in fo rm ing  th e s e  passages e c lip s e d
f o r  Kant th e  hum bler i n t u i t i o n  expressed  in  th e  p a ssa g e : "Now I say ,
5)
m a n ,.,  e x is ts  as an end in  h i m s e l f . . .  What we have c a l le d  th e
Prcttiethean e l a t i o n  and nob le  p r id e  o f i t ,  i s  indeed  more f i t t i n g l y  
combined w ith  th e  a p o th e o s is  o f  re a so n ; -  reason  which makes men l ik e  
u n to  Gods so t h a t  th e y  know good and e v i l  by i t s  l ig h t^ ^  and th ro u g h  i t  
p o sse ss  th e  power to  a t t a i n  m oral p e r f e c t io n  - ,  th a n  w ith  a r e s p e c t  f o r  
men accorded  w ith o u t rea so n , and w ith o u t d is c r im in a t io n  : "Qu*e s tim e r
to u t  l e  monde". . .
1 ) Kant : K r i t ik  d e r p ra k tis c h e n  V e m û n ft; E r s te r  T e i l ,  E rs te s  Buch.
2) K an t: idem ; B esch lu ss .
5) Compare a l s o :  " 0-u. iTb'^^ o ole^o oOyocSio'ux^ /fjf •••
Ctug (j/c. <Mtu(^ d.jyuL *' i. C^r\\JU.  ^ ^jw ©u*.^
'j f '  ^ __
4) Compares " . .  feiTwuv e i 4m o X ü ^ ‘' CpCu - ui.Ç^
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At t h i s  p o in t  we must pause  fo r  a moment to  sum up as b e s t  we may 
th e  r e s u l t s  and th e  im p lic a tio n s  o f th e  c r i t i c a l  method and K a n t' s th eo ry  
o f E th ic s ,  s in c e  from now on a lm ost a l l  e x p o s itio n s  and e la b o ra t io n s  and 
argum ents, even though th e y  s t a r t  from concepts and id e a s  i n t r i n s i c  to  
th e  c r i t i c a l  ph ilo so p h y  tra n sc e n d  what i s  s t r i c t l y  speak ing  w arran ted  by 
th e  c r i t i c a l  m ethod, egged on by what can b e s t  be term ed "The 
h u m an ita rian  s u p e r s t i t io n s  o f th e  e ig h te e n th  c e n tu ry " , and , w hich, w ith  
one n o ta b le  e x c e p tio n , reached  Kant by way o f  R ousseau.
B r ie f ly ,  th e n , th e  c r i t i c a l  th eo ry  s t a r t s  w ith  th e  d a ta  o f  m oral 
ex p e rien c e  and f in d s  o b je c t iv e ,  u n iv e r s a l  laws and an o b je c t iv e ly  and 
u n iv e r s a l ly  v a l id  o b l ig a t io n  a t  th e  co re  o f t h i s  e x p e rie n c e . From th e  
datum o f th e  C a te g o r ic a l Im p e ra tiv e  so d e fin e d  Kant deduces th e  freedom 
o f th e  w i l l  as i t s  n e ce ssa ry  p re -c o n d it io n  and th e  r a t i o n a l i t y  and th e  
autonomy o f th e  w i l l  in  d i a l e c t i c a l  d is c u s s io n  o f th e  n a tu re  o f th e  law , 
th e  im p e ra tiv e , and th e  w i l l .  The good w i l l ,  i t s e l f  a datum o f m oral 
e x p e r ie n c e , th e  Prim acy o f M o ra lity  p e r s o n i f ie d ,  has been f i t t e d  in to  
i t s  p la c e  as th e  w il l  which chooses to  be m o tiva ted  by th e  c a te g o r ic a l  
im p e ra tiv e  f o r  th e  sake o f th e  law . And man as th e  p o te n t ia l  p o sse sso r 
o f  good w i l l  has been recogn ized  as th e  ground o f th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f 
d u t ie s  and o b l ig a t io n s  and in  a c e r ta in  sense  th e  ground o f th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  freedom , and m oral r e c t i tu d e .
t
The d i a l e c t i c a l  developm ent o f id e a s  in h e re n t  in  th e  c r i t i c a l  th eo ry  
a lo n g  l in e s  determ ined  by heterogenous assum ptions a r e :  (a )  The
developm ent from m an-as-an-end to  th e  Kingdom o f Ends a long  th e  l i n e  o f 
im p e rfe c t d u t ie s  and th e  t e l o s  o f hum anity ; (b) The developm ent from th e
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I
good w i l l  to  th e  p o s tu la te s  o f P r a c t i c a l  Reason a long  th e  l in e s  o f m oral 
p e r f e c t io n  as th e  d e s tin y  o f  man; (c )  The developm ent from th e  Freedom 
o f  th e  w i l l  to  th e  Autonomy o f P r a c t i c a l  Reason rem ains th roughou t in s id e  
th e  l im i t s  o f th e  th e o ry  and can be d e fin e d  in  i t s  te rm s . So does K a n t's  
f i n a l  d is c u s s io n  o f what has and what has n o t  been dem onstra ted  by th e  
c r i t i c a l  method and what can and what cannot be so dem onstra ted . I  s h a l l  
in d ic a te  very  b r i e f l y  th e  main l in e  of each o f th e s e  argum ents b e fo re
I
h a z a rd in g  a c r i t i c i s m  o f  K a n t 's  th e o ry  o f  E th ic s .
(a )  The Kingdom o f  Ends : Man i s  an e n d - in -h im s e lf , a p o s i t iv e  end 
f o r  im p e rfe c t d u t ie s ,  d u t ie s  whereby I  adop t o th e r  p e o p le 's  ends as my
I
own and help  to  f u r th e r  them to  th e  b e s t  o f my a b i l i t i e s .  The id e a  o f 
p o s i t iv e  d u t ie s  i s  f u r th e r  developed in  th e  id e a  o f th e  Kingdom o f  Ends, 
w here a l l  E n d s-in -th em selv es ag g reg a te  a t  f i r s t  on ly  in  th e  sense  o f a 
" n e x t- te -e a c h -o th e r"  i . e .  as each r a t i o n a l 'a g e n t  l im i t s  h is  own ends so 
as n o t to  u se  a n o th e r  r a t io n a l  agen t as a means and th u s  a c e r t a in  o v e ra ll  
harmony i s  ach iev ed . Then in  th e  s ig n  o f  " fo r - e a c h -o th e r " , when each 
r a t i o n a l  agen t ta k e s  th e  p e rso n a l ends o f  th e  o th e r  as h is  own in  th e  
sen se  t h a t  he t r i e s  to  f u r th e r  them as f a r  as p o s s ib le .
(b ) The p o s tu la te s  o f  p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n : Kant s t a r t s  o f f  w ith  th e  
concep t o f  th e  good w i l l .  The good w i l l  i s  th e  on ly  th in g  in  th e  w orld 
which can be s a id  to  be " a b s o lu te ly  and a l to g e th e r  good",^^ a l l  o th e r  
goods being  bu t c o n d it io n a l  goods, th e  c o n d itio n  be ing  t h a t  th ey  do n o t
1 ) K ant : Grundlegung zu r M etaphysik d e r  B i t t e n . Opening sen ten ce
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1 )h in d e r  o r c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  th e  good w i l l .  H appiness 
though th e  most d e s ire d  end o f  mankind i s  n o t judged a s u f f i c i e n t  ground 
f o r  th e  r ig h tn e s s  o f a c t io n s  pu rposing  to  b r in g  i t  a b o u t. For th e s e  
a c t io n s  a re  judged n o t by su ccess  in  a ch ie v in g  t h e i r  end, namely
2 )
h a p p in e ss , b u t by w hether th e y  were a c t io n s  conform ing to  th e  good w i l l .  
T hat th e  good w i l l  i s  th e  suprême good we can see  from th e  f a c t  t h a t  
hum anity has been endowed w ith  Reason : were happ iness th e  c h ie f  end f o r
which hum anity was c re a te d , we would have no need o f Reason f o r  i n s t i n c t  
would have been a s w if te r  and s u re r  way o f a t t a in in g  h a p p in e ss . B u t ' 
s in c e  God has endowed us w ith  Reason t h i s  can only  be f o r  th e  purpose  
of e x e rc is in g  our good w i l l  and a t t a in in g  m oral p e r f e c t io n .  Kant 
e x p l i c i t l y  p ro c la im s th e  t e l e o lo g ic a l  h y p o th e s is  in  th e  Grundlegung (1785), 
" to  make t h i s  m a tte r  as c le a r  as p o s s ib le ,  l e t  i t  be rem«nbered t h a t  i t  i s  
a fundam ental p o s i t io n  i n  a l l  p h ilo sophy  t h a t  no means a re  employed except 
th o se  only  m ost a p p ro p r ia te  and conducive to  th e  end and aim p roposed".
T his acco rds p e r f e c t ly  w ith  what Kant had f i r s t  " le a rn e d  from  Rousseau 
nam ely, th e  deep h idden  N atu re  o f  Man and th e  s e c r e t  Law acco rd in g  to  which 
P rov idence  i s  j u s t i f i e d  by what man le a m s  and observes from h is  l i f e . " ^ ^
1) Thus Kant announces what we have p re v io u s ly  ( i n  P a r t  One) c a l le d  th e  
p o s tu la te  t h a t  prim acy be accorded to  m oral w orth  over a l l  o th e r  v a lu es
2) i . e .  Kant f in d s  t h i s  Prim acy a c tu a l ly  accorded to  Moral Worth in  our 
d a i ly  m oral ex p e rien c e .
5) Kant : Grundlegung zu r M etaphysik d e r  B i t t e n . B k .l .  C h .l .
Kant : idem . B k .l .  Oh.8 . .
4 ) Kant : News o f  th e  Theme f o r  h is  L e c tu re s  o f 1765 : E th ics
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F o r, acco rd ing  to  Rousseau th e  N ature  o f Man i s  such as to  cause him to  
seek  h i s  m oral p e r f e c t io n ,  and to  seek h is  m oral p e r f e c t io n  i s ,  a g a in  
a cc o rd in g  to  Rousseau, m an 's c h ie f  m oral du ty  : " I I ' y a d 'u n e  p a r t
■ I
l 'o r d r e  qui e s t  dans le  monde e t  d 'a u t r e  p a r t  l a  conscience  m orale  qui
e s t  l 'am o u r de c e t te  o rd re . 0 ' o rd re  v ie n t  du même Dieu to u t - p u is s a n t
' 1 )qu i a c re e r  l a  consc ience  e t  l'homme pour l u i  f a i r e  aim er l 'o r d r e .
What i s  a ffirm ed ' in  t h i s  "P ro fe s s io n  o f F a ith "  i s  t h a t  th e re  a c tu a l ly  
e x i s t s  a n a tu r a l  d i s p o s i t io n ,  a se n tim e n t, a r e a l  n eed : co n sc ien ce , which
ach iev e s  a p e r f e c t  concordance between our p a r t i c u l a r  pe rsons and th e  
u n iv e r s a l  d e s t in y  thanks to  th e  cause and o r ig in  common bo th  to  our 
co n sc ien ces and to  t h a t  u n iv e r s a l  good.
The te n o r  o f t h i s  co rresponds e x a c tly  to  K a n t 's  c o n te n tio n  t h a t ,  
s in c e  th e  good w i l l  in  s p i t e  o f being  th e  supreme good i s  n o t th e  so le  
good n o r  th e  e n t i r e t y  o f goodness and s in c e  God has endowed us w ith  
Reason in  o rd e r  t h a t  we may pu rsue  our m oral p e r f e c t io n  and our m oral 
p e r f e c t io n  o n ly , i t  seems absu rd  and repugnan t to  th in k  t h a t  (a )  such 
p u r s u i t  must needs rem ain u n f u l f i l l e d  because o f th e  s h o r t  space o f tim e 
we a re  a l l o t t e d ,  and (b) t h a t  good w i l l ,  and m o ra l ity  should  la c k  th e  
m a te r ia l  happ iness which a lo n e  can h e lp  i t  to  r e a l i s e  th e  summum bonum. 
(Good w i l l  i s  th e  supremum bonum). T h ere fo re  i t  seems in d ic a te d  t h a t  
Reason demand t h a t  Im m o rta lity  be g iven  us to  work o u t our m oral p e r f e c t io n  
and t h a t  H appiness be a l l o t t e d  in  e x ac t harmony w ith  M o ra lity , so t h a t  th e
l )  Rousseau : P ro fe s s io n  de f o i  de V ic a ire  Savoyard: S n ile
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summum bonum be th e  p o r t io n  o f  th e  m o ra lly  p e r f e c t .  The f u l f i lm e n t  o f
th e s e  demands i s  " p o s s ib le  in  th e  w orld only on th e  su p p o s itio n  o f  a
supreme N atu re  hav ing  a c a u s a l i ty  co rrespond ing  to  Moral C h a ra c te r .
( t h a t  i s  th e  E x is ten ce  o f God). Hence th e  e x is te n c e  o f God i s  th e
2)
t h i r d  requ irem en t o f Reason, and th e  c o n d itio n  o f th e  f i r s t  two. A ll ' 
th e s e  a re  n e c e ssa ry  to  Reason in  so f a r  as only in  t h e i r  l i g h t  can moral 
o b l ig a t io n  become a l to g e th e r  i n t e l l i g i b l e ,  a l to g e th e r  re a so n a b le .
Kant had been under R o u sseau 's  in f lu e n c e  a t  th e  beg inn ing  o f  h is
5)w r i t in g s  to  an a s to n is h in g  d eg ree . He had however re p u d ia te d
R o u sseau 's  grounding o f  M o ra lity  in  Human N atu re  r ig h t  a t  th e  beg inn ing  
o f h i s  c r i t i c a l  w r i t in g s .  Rousseau had tak en  freedom  to  be an a c tu a l  
c o n s t i tu t iv e  elem ent o f  human n a tu re  : "Der Mensch habe in  seinem G e is t
d ie  F r e ih e i t  a l s  s c h ie c th in  A b so lu te s , d e r f r e i e  W il ls  s e i  d e r B e g r if f
« 4)des Menschen . Rousseau had t a u ^ t  t h a t  th e  e x e rc is e  o f h i s  in n a te  
freedom  by one man, i s  l im ite d  by and indeed  d e fin ed  in  re s p e c t  o f th e  
e x e rc is e  o f th e  f r e e  w i l l s  o f o th e r  men. This r e c ip ro c a l  l im i ta t io n  and, 
d e te rm in a tio n , acco rd in g  to  Rousseau, c o n s t i tu te s  th e  " c o n tra t  s o c ia l " .
He a ls o  he ld  t h a t  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  s o c ia l  c o n tra c t  eoid o f a l l
1 ) K ant! K r i t ik  d e r P ra k tis c h e n  V ern u n ft, B k . l l . ;  Ch. 11 & V .; ( 1788) .
2 ) i . e .  d e r  V ern u n ft.
5 ) Kant used to  say t h a t  i t  was Rousseau "Her ih n  z u re c h tg e b ra c h t h â tte "  
i . e .  who had f i r s t  shown him th e  p a th  to  t r u e  m o ra l i ty .  T h is i s  
quoted from K a n t 's  N ach lass by E rn s t C a s s ire r  in  h is  book K ants Leben 
und L eh re , p . 251.
4 ) H egel: V orlesungen u e b e r d ie  G esch ich te  d e r P h ilo so p h ie  XV. p .527.
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o b l ig a t io n s  d e r iv in g , from i t  were u l t im a te ly  grounded in  th e  s e l f -  
i n t e r e s t  and s e l f - lo v e  of each in d iv id u a l member: "Les engagements qui
nous l i e n t  au c o n tr a t  s o c ia l  ne so n t o b l i g a t |6}pB que p a rce  q u ' i l s  so n t 
m u tu e ls . ,  l 'e 'g a l i t e  du d r o i t  e t  l a  n o tio n  de l a  j u s t i c e  q u 'e l l e  p ro d u it  
d é r iv e n t  de l a  p re fe re n c e  que chacqun se  donne e t  p a r consequence de l a  
n a tu re  de 1 'homme".
Kant on th e  o th e r  hand h e ld  t h a t  freedom  was an in d is p e n s a b le  
c o n d itio n  f o r  th e  v e ry  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  m o ra l ity  and o b l ig a t io n .  A ccording 
to  Kant we a re  s u f f i c i e n t l y  j u s t i f i e d  in  o p e ra tin g  w ith  th e  concept" o f 
freedom , i f  we can show t h a t  u n le s s  we u se  t h i s  concept m oral ex p erien ce  
would rem ain u n i n t e l l i g i b l e .  Once th e  id e a  o f freedom  has been demon­
s t r a t e d  as a c a te g o ry  o f  p r a c t i c a l  rea so n  and as such a  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
manner o f th e  spontaneous o p e ra tio n  o f  rea so n  when b ro u g h t to  bear on 
m oral prob lem s, th e re  i s  no need , (and th e r e fo re  no j u s t i f i c a t i o n ! )  to  
conce ive  freedom as an a c tu a l  f e a tu r e  o f human n a tu re  and a c t io n s .
• In  a d d it io n  Kant t r i e d  to  in v a l id a te  th e  appeal to  sen tim en t and to  
ground m o ra lity  in  rea so n . He th e re b y  hoped to  make E th ic s  independen t 
o f  th e  c o n tin g e n c ie s  o f human n a tu re  even when tak e n  in  i t s  Rousseauean 
sen se  o f  th e  'norm ' o f  hum anity . He th u s  hoped to  g a in  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
to  ex tend th e  scope o f  h is  e th ic a l  system , and re n d e r i t  v a l id  f o r  a l l
\
r a t i o n a l  a g e n ts .
I t  seems th e r e f o re  m ost rem arkable t h a t  Kant should  have h e ld  f a s t
l )  R ousseau: Le C o n tra t S o c ia l ;  1 1 .24 .
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th ro u g h o u t to  a n o th e r  id e a  which he had tak e n  o v e r, and shared  w ith  
Rousseau, th e  t e le o lo g ic a l  id e a  o f th e  d e s t in y  o f man, e s p e c ia l ly  as t h i s  
i s  th e  v e ry  id e a  most l ik e ly  to  im p e r il  th e  autonomy o f e th ic s .  P o ss ib ly  
Kant m istook  t h i s  danger by c o n c e n tra tin g  on th e  " reaso n ab le"  s id e  o f th e  
t e l e o lo g ic a l  id e a . W hatever K a n t 's  reaso n s  f o r  h o ld in g  f a s t  to  t h i s  
id e a  may have been , th e  u p sh o t was t h a t  in  th e  D ia le c t ic  o f p r a c t i c a l  
re a so n , and e s p e c ia l ly  in  th e  p r a c t i c a l  p o s tu la te s  Kant manages to  annul, 
w hatever he had achieved in  th e  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  n a tu re  o f m o ra lity  
and th e  e lu c id a t io n  o f  i t s  fu n c tio n  in  human rea so n in g  and w i l l in g ,  
choosing  and a c t in g .  Kant had t r a v e l l e d  a long way, a  way one could 
somewhat d a r in g ly  term  th e  voyage from Rousseau th rough  Kant to  Rousseau. 
T h is voyage was K a n t 's  voyage in  tim e . K a n t 's  l a t e r ,  ag a in  Rousseau 
dom inated w r i t in g s  have no r e t r o - a c t iv e  e f f e c t ,  from a m ethod ica l and 
t h e o r e t i c a l  p o in t  o f  view , on th e  achievem ents o f th e  c r i t i c a l  philosophy^^ 
o r on th e  d isc o v e ry  o f  th e  method o f  tra n s c e n d e n ta l  d e d u c tio n . Sub 
sp e c ie  a e t e m i t a t i s  th e  crown o f  K a n t 's  m oral th e o ry  i s  n o t th e  Kingdom 
o f  Ends and n o t th e  p o s tu la te s  o f p r a c t i c a l  reason  : im m o rta lity , th e
summum bonum, and th e  e x is te n c e  o f  God, b u t th e  id e a  o f autonomy which 
i s  t h e i r  very  o p p o s ite . Even th e  m oral e th o s o f C a r r i t t  whose : "Which
i s  th e  purpose o f  our e x is te n c e  from th e  p o in t  o f view o f God? I  do n o t
l )  Thougji in  a way which I  s h a l l  d is c u s s  l a t e r ,  th e  id e a  o f human 
d e s t in y  and th e  f i n a l  t e l o s  o f hum anity inform s th e  C r i t i c a l  
P h ilo sophy  th ro u g h o u t and p rep o n d e ra te s  i t  tow ards th e  p o le  o f 
"M en sch en freu n d lich k e it" .
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know and as a m oral p h ilo so p h e r I do n o t c a r e " . . .  I  can bu t echo in  . - 
a more humble way, w i l l  f in d  no f a u l t  w ith  th e  d i a l e c t i c a l  emergence o f 
th e  id e a  o f  autonomy from th e  concept o f  m oral o b l ig a t io n  and i t s  
n e c e ssa ry  p re c o n d itio n :  th e  freedom o f  th e  w i l l .
(c )  The autonomy o f e th ic s  : A ccording to  K ant, as we must r e c a l l  "
a t  t h i s  p o in t ,  m oral o b l ig a t io n  i s  n o t p r im a r ily  an o b l ig a t io n  to  do o r  ^
to  r e f r a in  from doing c e r ta in  a c t s ,  s in c e  m oral r ig h tn e s s  l i e s  n o t in  th e  
a c t  as such bu t in  th e  s p e c i f i c  q u a l i ty  and m o d a lity  o f  th e  w i l l  t h a t
Ù :w i l l s  th e  action". Moral o b l ig a t io n  i s  th e re fo re  p redom inan tly  an 
o b l ig a t io n  on th e  w i l l  to  o p e ra te  only  in  th e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  m oral way: 
t o  choose a c e r t a in  m o tiv a tio n  f o r  i t s e l f ,  ( i . e .  on ly  th o se  maxims which . 
a ls o  a re  f i t  to  se rv e  a s  U n iv e rsa l Laws) and m oreover to  be m o tiv a ted  by 
th e  chosen m o tiv a tio n  in  a c e r t a in  way. ( i . e .  to  choose th o se  maxims 
because th ey  a re  f i t  f o r  u n iv e r s a l  law , and only  because o f t h a t . )  An 
o b l ig a t io n  to  be m o tiva ted  on ly  by c e r t a in  s p e c i f ic  m otives in  a c e r ta in  \  ^
way, i s  an o b l ig a t io n  to  adop t a c e r ta in  end. ( i . e .  th e  end o f  be ing  so 
m o tiv a te d .)  T his no law can .h e lp  me do. The m oral law in  so f a r  as 
i t  compels th e  freedom o f  each to  harm onize w ith  th e  freedom o f  o th e rs  
can be deduced from th e  id e a  o f freedom i t s e l f .  The m oral law , in  
s h o r t ,  compels me to  make a law fu l u se  o f my freedom . O bviously , one 
can be com pelled to  so l im i t  o n e 's  freedom . In  K an tian  term s : "one_
can be com pelled to  perform  a c tio n s  which a re  d i r e c te d  tow ards c e r ta in
l )  i . e .  A ccording to  th e  p o s i t io n  reached  by th e  end o f  th e  
G rundlegung.
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en d s" .^ ^  But no one can compel me to  re s p e c t  th e  law . No one can
compel me to  choose to  l im i t  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  my freedom to  i t s  law fu l
u s e s .  In  K an tian  term s : "no one can compel me to  adopt any end as my
2)
own". T his I  must do m y se lf , v o lu n ta r i ly  and d e l ib e r a te ly ,  and u n le s s  
I have done t h a t  I  cannot be s a id  to  obey a c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e , i . e .  . 
to  be a m oral a g e n t. T h ere fo re  i f  I  am to  accep t m oral o b l ig a t io n s  a t  , 
a l l ,  th e y  m ust be o b l ig a t io n s  which I  impose on m y se lf , l e g i s l a t i n g  fo r  
m y se lf as my own Nom othetos. The c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  I  impose on 
m y se lf i s  th e  d e c is io n  to  determ ine  m y se lf  and s e t  a law un to  m yse lf in  
acco rdance  w ith  th e  id e a s  o f  u n iv e r s a l i t y  and duty  re g a rd le s s  o f my 
s u b je c t iv e  ends. These id e a s  cannot be imposed on my w i l l  by any agency 
(w hether e m p iric a l ex p erien ce  o r  a s p i r i t u a l  a u th o r i ty )  o th e r  th a n  my o to  _ 
rea so n  w ith o u t im p a irin g  th e  m oral w orth  o f my d e c is io n . I  m ust th e r e ­
fo re  g iv e  th o se  id e a s  to  m y se lf . I  m ust produce them c r e a t iv e ly . I
Autonomy o f w i l l  i s  th e re fo re  more th a n  ju s t  th e  d e te rm in a tio n  o f th e  
w i l l  to  be a law un to  i t s e l f ,  c o n s is te n t  w ith  i t s e l f ,  i . e .  to  choose only 
such maxims as a re  f i t  to  become u n iv e r s a l  law . Autonomy i s  th e  c a p a c ity  
o f  w i l l  as p r a c t i c a l  reason  to  fo rm u la te  laws fo r  i t s e l f  in  view o f id eas  
which as pure  reaso n  i t  p roduces sp o n tan eo u sly . Reason i s  no more 
p a s s iv e  in  i t s  p r a c t i c a l  fu n c tio n  o f a r a t i o n a l l y  and th e r e f o re  m o ra lly  
d e te rm in a ted  w i l l ,  th an  in  i t s  "pure" fu n c tio n  o f th e o r e t i c a l  th in k in g .
In  bo th  cases Reason i s  n o t m ere ly  r e c e p t iv e  o f  th e  given  d a ta  o f  in n e r
1) K an t: M etaphysik d e r S i t t e n ;  T ugend lehre , E in le i tu n g .
2) K an t: idem.
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and o u te r  ex p erien ce  bu t imposes i t s  own modes and m o d a li tie s  on th e s e  
d a ta ,  acknow ledging, a d m ittin g  and a c c e p tin g  them only  in  so f a r  as th ey  
have been o rd e re d , moulded and perm eated by i t s  own c a te g o r ie s .
Autonomy i s  th e r e f o re  e q u iv a le n t to  freedom as a ca teg o ry  o f  
p r a c t i c a l  (and pu re) Reason and c h a ra c te r is e s  p r im a r ily  th e  spontaneous 
p ro d u c tio n  of id e a s .  The c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  i t s e l f ,  i . e .  th e  moral 
law in  i t s  b a s ic  co n cep tio n , i s  c r e a t iv e ly  formed and in  i t s  fo rm atio n  
absorbed  by Reason. Thus n o t only th e  cho ice  o f  maxims bu t th e  m oral 
law i t s e l f  i s  b r o u ^ t  under th e  c a teg o ry  o f  a u t o n o m y . A u t o n o m y ,  th e  
f a c u l ty  o f spontaneous c re a t io n  would th e n  be th e  e f f e c t iv e  cause f o r  
th e  e x is te n c e  o f th e  m oral law , and th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  c a te g o r ic a l  
im p e ra tiv e  f o r  w holly  re a so n a b le  and f r e e  b e in g s , and would th u s  in  p a r t  
r e s o lv e  th e  dilemma o f  a  h o ly  and y e t  f r e e  w i l l .  For a f r e e  w i l l  being  
autonomous fo rm u la te s  i t s  own law to  h im s e lf .  The law so fo rm u la ted  
w i l l  p o ssess  th e  u n c o n d itio n a l c h a ra c te r  o f th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e , 
b u t  n o t i t s  b in d in g , n e c e s s i t a t in g ,  demanding c h a ra c te r ,  s in c e  a ho ly  
be ing  a u to m a tic a lly  acc ep ts  th e  d ic t a t e s  o f  h is  own reason  f in d in g  no 
m a te r ia l  o b s ta c le s  anywhere in  h im s e lf ,  o r any reaso n  o u ts id e  h im s e lf ,  
to  r e j e c t  them . On th e  c o n tra ry , in  th e  joy o f i t s  spontaneous
1 ) Thus th e  q u e s tio n  as to  th e  d i f f e r e n t  grounds, d e g re es , v a l i d i t y  o f 
th e  r ig h tn e s s  o f th e  law and th e  r ig h tn e s s  o f th e  w i l l  i s  p a r t i a l l y  
re so lv e d  by t h e i r  common o r ig in  and g e n e s is . I t  m ust be no ted  t h a t  
K a n t 's  g r e a t  in n o v a tio n  was th e  c re a t in g  o f  Id e a s ,  as c a te g o r ie s ,  o r 
r e g u la t iv e  id e a s  by a spontaneous Reason, (what P la to  d e fin ed  as th e  
d isc o v e ry  o f e x is t in g  id e a t i c  e n t i t i e s . )  The id e a  o f Reason 
c re a t in g  id e a s  and laws f o r  i t s e l f  o r ig in a te s  w ith  S t .  P a u l, who as 
we have seen  d e fin e s  th e  term  o f  Autonomy f o r  i t  : -
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unopposed c re a t iv e n e s s ,  th e  Reason o f a holy  being  in v e n ts  new " d u t ie s " ,  
new t a r g e t s  f o r  i t s  w i l l .  But so does our own Reason n o tw ith s ta n d in g  
i t s  m a te r ia l  im pedim ents : "Reason by i t s e l f  and independen t o f  e m p iric a l
d a ta ,  commands what ought to  be , t h a t  i s  a c t io n s  o f which th e  w orld has 
perhaps n ever heard  b e fo re  and though th o se  who base  ev e ry th in g  on t h e i r  
e x p e r ie n c e , doubt th e  s a g a c ity  o f  such a c t io n s ,  y e t  reaso n  commands them ’ 
i n s i s t e n t ly ." ^ ^
Reason, in ^ o th e r  w ords, im pelled  by i t s  in n e r  m otive-pow er, does
2)
n o t r e s t ,  t i l l  i t  fo rc e  th e  id e a s  produced by i t s e l f ,  ou t o f t h e i r  
t ra n s c e n d e n ta l  u n r e a l i t y ,  and in to  th e  r e a l i t y  o f th e  cau sa l u n iv e r s e ,  
th e r e  to  se rv e  as th e  immanent and c o n s t i tu t iv e  grounds f o r  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  r e a l i s in g  i t s  own aim s, th e  p e r f e c t io n  o f  M o ra lity . The 
id e a  o f  Freedom in  p a r t i c u l a r  seems w e ll adap ted  to  t h i s  ta s k .  By 
showing th e  way t o ,  and n o t f e a r in g  to  demand and i n s i s t  on, " th e  ^
seem ingly  im p o ss ib le , i t  e n la rg e s  th e  domain o f  th e  p o s s ib le " .  This 
indeed  i s  th e  s p e c i f ic  k ind  o f " r e a l i t y "  which Freedom i s  capab le  o f 
and which i t  a ch iev es  a s ,  b e in g  a t ra n s c e n d e n ta l  and r e g u la t iv e  id e a , i t
' 5)e n te r s  th e  w il le d  a c t io n  as an immanent and c o n s t i tu t iv e  e lem ent. Not 
" r e a l"  as a cause i t  becomes " re a l"  as in  i t s  e f f e c t s .  At t h i s  p o in t no 
f u r t h e r  e x p la n a tio n  f o r  th e  " fa c t"  o f Freedom i s  r e q u ire d , s in c e  t h a t
1) K an t: Grundlegung zu r s in # ?  M etaphysik der S i t t e n .  B k . l l .  Oh.IV.
2) K ant: Grundlegung zur M etaphysik de r S i t t e n ,  z w e ite r  A b s c h n it t , & IV.
5 ) By c o n s is te n t ly  a c t in g  as though ( v .V a ih in g e r : Die P h ilo so p h ie  des
A ls Ob) we were f r e e  we in  a sense  become r e a l ly  f r e e ,  s in c e  we make 
e f f e c t iv e  u se  o f freedom .
- 251-
which can never be ex p la in ed  ( i . e .  how freedom i s  o b je c tiv e ly  p o s s ib le  in  
a p h y s ic a l  c a u sa l U n iverse) i s  given to  u s . The l im i t  o f u n d e rs tan d in g  
i s  n o t th e  l im i t  o f c e r t a i n t y : th e r e  i s  no g r e a te r  c e r t a in ty  p o s s ib le
th a n  t h a t  which a s su re s  us o f  our m oral s e l f ,  o f th e  autonomous freedom
1 ) ' ' so f  our p e r s o n a l i ty .  '
Now, though we a re  in c a p a b le  o f e x p la in in g  th e  o b je c tiv e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f freedom , we a re  y e t  c o n s tra in e d  as r a t io n a l  be ings to  t r y  
a t  l e a s t  a s u b je c t iv e  e x p la n a tio n . We cannot avoid a sk in g  o u rse lv e s  how 
we can a d ju s t  th e  c e r ta in ty  we have o f  th e  autonomous freedom o f our 
p e rso n , o r more p r a c t i c a l l y  even, how to  j u s t i f y  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  
im p e ra tiv e s  w ith  which we a d d re ss  o u rse lv e s  because o f t h a t  freedom  to  
our ex p erien ce  o f our n a tu ra l  s e lv e s .  Brought fa c e  to  fa c e  w ith  our­
s e lv e s  as p a r t s  o f  a n a tu r a l  u n iv e rs e , su b s e rv ie n t l i k e  a l l  o th e r  th in g s  
to  i t s  p h y s ic a l c au sa l law s, we see  o u rse lv e s  p o ssessed  by d e s i r e s ,  w ants, 
p a s s io n s . We watch o u rse lv e s  l iv e  under and fo llo w  laws imposed by our 
b o d ie s , our unconscious f e a r s ,  our a n x ie t i e s .  We s la v e  under a yoke of 
a n e c e s s i ty  we have n o t c re a te d  and which we cannot e scap e . And in  a l l  
t h i s  c lo se  web o f  p h y s ic a l cause and e f f e c t  th e r e  seems no lo o p h o le  to  
a f fo r d  th e  m ost tenuous j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  our a s s e r t io n  o f freedom , nor 
th e  s l i g h t e s t  ground f o r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  and e x is te n c e  o f freedom .
l )  K an t: Die Grundlegung zu r M etaphysik der S i t t e n ;  z w e ite r  A b sc h n itt;
K r i t ik  de r P ra k tis c h e n  V ern u n ft; von d e r  D eduktion d e r G rundsàtzen
d e r p ra k t .  V ern u n ft, and a ls o  E in le i tu n g :  .Von d e r Id ee  e in e r  K r i t ik ,
de r P ra k tis c h e n  V ernun ft.
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Indeed , thoroughgoing  a llp e rv a d in g  c a u s a l i ty  be ing  a c a teg o ry  o f  
Reason, we m ust ask  o u rse lv e s  : How can we even conceive o u rse lv e s  as f r e e ?
On th e  o th e r  hand we must b ear in  m ind, t h a t  we cannot conceive o u rse lv es  
ex cep t as f r e e , freedom , to o ,  being  a c a teg o ry  o f Reason. K a n t 's  answer 
to  t h i s  dilemma i s  t h a t  we th in k  of o u rse lv e s  in  d i f f e r e n t  c a p a c i t i e s ,  
we view o u rse lv e s  under d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c ts ,  once, as p a r t s  o f th e  p h y s ic a l ' 
u n iv e rs e  and, once as members in  an I n t e l l i g i b l e  Kingdom o f Ends. We 
impose m oral law s on o u rs e lv e s , we claim  autonomy, we ad d ress  o u rse lv e s  
w ith  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e s , because "we a rro g a te  freedom from th e  laws 
o f c a u s a l i ty  govern ing  n a tu r e ,  vdien, and in  o rd e r t o ,  th in k  o f ou rse lves*  
as p a r t s  o f an i n t e l l i g i b l e  Kingdom o f Ends p a r t i c ip a t in g  in  th e  
l e g i s l a t i o n  o f  m oral laws ; a f te rw a rd s  we f in d  o u rse lv e s  bound by th e s e  
law s, because we have claim ed th e  freedom o f th e  w i l l .  For Freedom and 
s e l f - l e g i s l a t i o n  o f  th e  w i l l  a re  both Autonomy and th e r e f o re  i n t e r ­
c h an g e ab le ."^ )
In  o th e r  w ords, K a n t 's  answer i s  to  p o in t o u t c e r ta in  o n to lo g ic a l  
p re s u p p o s it io n  which we m ust assum e, ( i . e .  th ey  a re  n e ce ssa ry  c o n d i t io n s ,) , 
in  o rd e r  to  e x p la in  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f conce iv ing  freedom and th e  
c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e . M oral o b l ig a t io n s ,  he p o in ts  o u t a re  d e fin e d  
on ly  f o r  be ings whose w i l l s  can be f r e e ly  de te rm ined , and who a t  th e  same 
tim e  p o ssess  a s u b je c t iv e ,  and m a te r ia l ly  determ ined  n a tu re .  In  o th e r  
w ords, in  o rd e r  to  e x p la in  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f freedom and th e  c a te g o r ic a l  
im p e ra tiv e  human beings must be viewed a t  one and th e  same tim e under two _
l )  Kant : Grundlegung zur «=3W  M etaphysik der S i t t e n ;  D r i t t e r  A b sc h n itt.
d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c ts .  They m ust be seen , a t  one and th e  same tim e , as
1 )members o f  two d i f f e r e n t  and m u tua lly  e x c lu s iv e  w o rld s . They m ust be ' 
regarded  a t  one and th e  same tim e as law g iv e rs  in  th e  Kingdom o f 
I n t e l l i g i b l e  Ends whose pu re  w i l l s  and a c t io n s  a re  d i r e c t l y  determ ined  by 
th e  law , and as tem poral be ings swayed by d e s ire s  and u n reaso n ab le  
im p u lse s , whose im pure w i l l s  a re  r e lu c ta n t ly  'n e c e s s i ta te d *  by th e  
commands which as 'p u re  re a s o n s ' th e y  s e t  b e fo re  th em se lv e s . By reg a rd in g  
man as a dual b e in g , a being  o f  dual n a tu re ,  and y e t  b a s ic a l ly  one by 
v i r tu e  o f  h is  in d iv id u a l i ty  we p ro v id e  th e  n e ce ssa ry  o n to lo g ic a l  c o n d itio n s  
f o r  th e  e x p la n a tio n  o f th e  phenomenon o f m oral o b l ig a t io n .  From th e  
p o in t  o f  view o f psychology th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  m oral o b l ig a t io n  i s  
e x p la in e d  by th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  in d iv id u a l  p e rc e iv e s  m oral o b l ig a t io n  as a 
c o n f l i c t  in  h i s  own h e a r t  between a  h ig h e r  and low er w i l l .  The o n to ­
lo g ic a l  h y p o th e s is  o f  th e  d u a l n a tu re  o f man, and th e  p sy c h o lo g ic a l i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n  o f th e  sou rce  and g e n e s is  o f  o b l ig a t io n ,  a re  th e  c o n d itio n s  on
which r e s t s  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f conce iv ing  th e  id ea  o f  freedom . They
2)p ro v id e  a s u b je c t iv e  e x p la n a tio n , o f  th e  phenomenon o f  o b l ig a t io n .
T his however s t i l l  le a v e s  open th e  q u e s tio  j u r i s , as to  th e  
s u f f i c i e n t  reaso n  f o r  th e  le g itim a c y  o f  a l l  m oral o b l ig a t io n ,  t h a t  i s ,  
th e  q u e s tio n  as to  th e  o b je c tiv e  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  im p lied  claim  on th e  .
j,.
e x c lu s iv e  a l le g ia n c e  o f our w i l l :  Why, f o r  in s ta n c e ,  should  our h ig h e r
1) In  t h i s  Kant fo llo w s a lm ost to  th e  l e t t e r  th e  P a u lin e  d o c tr in e  o f  
n a tu r a l  man and heaven ly  man.
2) v i z .  R .O tto : E rlâu te ru n g en  zu K a n t 's  "G rundlegung. . . "  p . 154.
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w i l l  c la im  a v a l id  r i g h t  to  de te rm ine  our low er w i l l?  "But t h i s  q u e s tio n  
could only be answered i f  th e r e  were a 'd e f i n i t e  g o o d ', a supreme v a lu e  
found to  supply  th e  c o n te n t o f  th e  m oral im p e ra tiv e . But even th en  we 
shou ld  have to  ask  about th e  ground o f th e  pre-em inence o f  t h i s  supreme - 
v a lu e , and u n le s s  we were p rep a red  to  a c c e p t i t  as dogna, we would have 
to  en q u ire  in to  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  i t s  ground and so o n ."^ )
The q u e s tio n  o f th e  o b je c tiv e  v a l i d i t y  o f m oral o b l ig a t io n  as m oral 
o b l ig a t io n  would s t i l l  s ta n d , even i f  w ith  R udolf O tto  we ta k e  th e  
p a r t i c u l a r  q u e s t io  j u r i s  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  to  have been 
im p l i c i t ly  answered by Kant i f  a c e r ta in  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f th e  concept 
o f "m an -as-an -en d -in -h im se lf"  i s  a c c e p te d ,^ )  "U ncond itional m oral 
o b l ig a t io n s  a re  n o t to  be j u s t i f i e d  o r v in d ic a te d  in  any way, f o r  each 
such j u s t i f i c a t i o n  would make th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  law depend on some 
u l t e r i o r  ground, and would reduce i t  to  a c o n d it io n a l  h y p o th e t ic a l ,  • 
in s te a d  o f  an u n c o n d itio n a l command. The very  n a tu re  o f  th e  fundam ental
c e r t a in ty  o f  m oral judgments c o n ta in s  th e  im p o s s ib i l i ty  o f a d ed u c tiv e
. /
p ro o f . No p ro o f  can be g iven  f o r  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f m oral o b l ig a t io n  
i t s e l f . " ^ )
- •
In  o th e r  w ords, i t  i s  n o t in  th e  power o f  any E th ic a l  Theory to  " 
d em o n stra te  why we o u ^ t  to  subm it our w i l l  to  th e  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f m oral 
law s, o r ,  i n  th e  term ino logy  o f  th e  th e o ry  o f  v a lu e s  •* why we should  accord 
th e  "R ight" p recedence  and supranacy over a l l  o th e r  v a lu e s .
T) E rn s t C a s s i r e r :  K a n t 's  Leben und L eh re ; p .255.
2 ) v i z .  p . 22 (^ .
5 ) Kant : Ein Versuch u eb er den k la re n  und bestim m ten Sinn d e r  Maximen ^
e in e r  n a t& rlic h en  T heo log ie  und M oral; IV R e f le k tio n ;  &> 2 .
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The answer t h a t  t h i s  i s  accom plished fo r  us : "Das U n b esch re ib lich e
i s t  f u e r  uns g e ta n " ; t h a t  th e  e x is te n c e  o f Reason, t h a t  i t s  re a so n s ,
and t h a t  i t  i s  bound by i t s  own reaso n in g  and determ ined  by i t s  own id ea s
2 )
i s  a p rim ary  f a c t ,  which cannot be e x p la in e d , and th e  e x p la n a tio n  of 
which i t  would be s e n s e le s s  to  seek  -  would seem much more s a t i s f a c to r y  
and much le s s  d is tu rb in g  i f  we d id  n o t b ear in  mind t h a t  m oral judgments
m ight be i l l u s o r y  in  th e  sense  t h a t  they  m ight be re d u c ib le  to  some
heterogenous grounds, and t h a t  n e i th e r  th e  c l a r i t y  and c e r t a in ty  o f our 
m oral e x p e rien c e , n o r t h e i r  o b je c tiv e  com m unicab ility  a f fo rd s  p ro o f  to  
th e  c o n tra ry . We cannot be su re  t h a t  th e  in d e s c r ib a b le  which i s  done 
f o r  us i s  what we b e lie v e  i t  to  be, nam ely th e  a ssu ra n ce  o f th e  r e a l i t y  
o f ou r autonomous and m oral p e r s o n a l i ty .  T his i s  agg ravated  by th e  f a c t
5)
t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  in te r p r e t a t i o n s  o f th e  " in d e s c r ib a b le "  have been p u t 
fo rw ard  and most p la u s ib ly  defended , bo th  in  th e  name o f  R e lig io n  and, in  
th e  name o f w hat, f o r  want o f  a b e t t e r  word, we s h a l l  c a l l  M aximalism.^^
X  X X X X
1) E rn s t C a s s i r e r :  K a n t 's  Leben und L eh re ; p . 279.
2) R .O tto : E rlâu te ru n g en  zu K a n t 's  "G rundlegung. . . "  p . 115.
5) v i z .  a d d it io n a l  f i r s t  rem ark.
4) v i z .  a d d it io n a l  second rem ark.
From B a s t id e 's :  " L 'im p é ra t i f  de l a  conscience  m orale e s t :  Soi au
maximum une personne, c 'e s t  à d i r e :  Soi au maximum de v a le u r ." p .127.
E sq u isse  d 'u n e  a x io lo g ie  de l a  p e rso n n e ; E tudes de M étaphysique e t  
de l a  M orale, 1945.
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Two f i n a l  rem arks on some o f th e  im p lic a tio n s  o f  th e  l a s t  r e f l e c t io n  : 
A) In s id e  th e  boundaries o f K a n t 's  C r i t i c a l  Theory th e  q u e s tio n  o f th e  
i l l u s o r in e s s  o f m oral e x p e rie n c e , and th e re fo re  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  th e  
r e a l i t y  o f  our autonomous and m oral p e r s o n a l i ty  cannot be ra is e d  a t  a l l .  . 
The very  s t r u c tu r e  o f th e  C r i t i c a l  Method " i f  m oral experience  . . .  
t h e n . . . "  excludes th e . p o s s i b i l i t y  o f d e f in in g  th e  q u e s tio n  o f i l l u s o r i n e s s .  
N e v e r th e le s s , K ant, o v e rs tep p in g  h is  own m ethod ica l r u l e s ,  u n d e rs tan d s /
X
t h i s  q u e s tio n  to  be answered a ) on th e  ground o f th e  c e r t a in ty  we 
e x p erien ce  when e x p e rien c in g  our m oral s e l f ,  and b) on th e  ground t h a t ,  
in  v i r tu e  o f  th e  te le o lo g ic a l  o rd e r , which inform s th e  u n iv e rse  we 
i n h a b i t ,  and which a ssu re s  us o f our p u rp o se : namely th e  a tta in m e n t o f
M oral P e r fe c t io n  as th e  T elos o f Humanity, t h i s  c e r t a in ty  cannot be 
d e c e p tiv e . The extreme p re c a r io u sn e ss  o f  t h i s  l a s t  c o n te n tio n  i s  
e lu c id a te d  in  a d d it io n  by th e  argument o f  th e  second remark : B) D if fe re n t
i n te r p r e t a t i o n s  o f th e  " in d e s c r ib a b le " ,  t h a t  i s ,  th e  prim ary f a c t  t h a t  
Reason e x i s t s ,  t h a t  i t  re a so n s , and t h a t  i t  i s  bound by i t s  own rea so n in g , 
a re  p o s s ib le ,  because o f  th e  f a c t  overlooked o r denied^^ by K ant, t h a t  
e x p erien ces  o th e r  th an  th e  sen su a l and th e  m oral e x i s t .  These ex p erien ces 
a re  g iv en , commonly met w ith , and rec o g n ize d . The c r i t i c a l  a n a ly s is  of 
t h e i r  im p lic a tio n s , th e  tra n s c e n d e n ta l deduction  o f  t h e i r  prim ary  ground, 
de term ine  re g u la t iv e  id eas  and C a te g o rie s  o f  Reason o th e r  than  c a u s a l i ty  
and freedom . This n e c e s s i t a te s  a r e v is io n  o f th e  K an tian  assum ption th a t
l )  Kant : Der S t r e i t  d e r F a k u ltn e te n , S t r e i t  d e r P h i1os^h ischen
F a k u ltâ t  m it der T heo log ischen ; von R e lig io n s se k ten.
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r a t i o n a l i t y  as such i s ,  eo ip s o , e q u iv a le n t to  m oral goodness. Reason, 
in  o th e r  w ords, i s  n o t by v i r tu e  o f i t s  v e ry  n a tu re  and in  i t s  essence 
id e n t i c a l  w ith  goodness in  th e  m oral se n se . The prim ary  f a c t  t h a t  Reason 
e x i s t s ,  t h a t  i t  re a so n s , and i s  bound by i t s  own re a so n in g , i s  n o t a p ro o f 
f o r  th e  r e a l i t y  o f m oral ex p erien ce  o r th e  v a l id i ty  o f th e  m oral law .
For th e  f a c t  t h a t  " i t  reasons"  does n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  mean t h a t  i t  reasons 
th e  m oral law , no r th e  f a c t  t h a t  Reason i s  bound by i t s  own re a so n in g , 
t h a t  Reason i s  always bound by th e  M oral Law. J u s t  as i t  may reason  th e  
laws o f  c a u s a l i ty  which a re  in co m p atib le  w ith  m oral law , so Reason may 
reaso n  a r e l ig io u s  law , which i s  in co m p atib le  w ith  e i t h e r .  The c e r ta in ty  
o f  our m oral freedom , p e r s o n a l i ty ,  even experience  ( in  so f a r  as th e  
r e a l i t y  o f i t s  be ing  an u l t im a te ly  m oral experience  i s  concerned) i s  th e re ­
fo r e  r e l a t i v e .  We know t h a t  in  i t ,  and througih i t .  Reason m a n ife s ts  
i t s e l f .  But we do n o t know, w hether "M o ra l-cau sa lity -cu m -Id eas"  i s  th e  
predom inant m o d a lity  o f  Reason, i t s  innerm ost m a n ife s ta t io n , (no le s s  i s  
demanded by M o ra lity  n o r can M o ra lity  adm it o f l e s s ;  v iz .  K a n t 's  
d e f i n i t i o n :  o v e rr id in g  o f p h y s ic a l c a u s a l i ty  by m oral law i s  freedom ,
th e  o v e rr id in g  o f  Moral Law by p h y s ic a l c a u s a l i ty  i s  s i n ) . We do n o t 
know, w hether m oral ex p erien ce  re p re s e n ts  a m odality  o f Reason a t  a l l  or 
i s  a r e f le c te d  and p a r a s i t i c a l  e n c ru s ta t io n  on some o th e r  m o d a lity , 
a lth o u g h  t h i s  q u e s tio n  i s  capab le  o f e lu c id a t io n  and perhaps even p ro o f.
We do know however t h a t  i t  i s  n o t th e  only m o d ality  o f  Reason, and t h i s  i s  
enough to  show t h a t  th e  K an tian  eq u a tio n  : r a t i o n a l i t y  » goodness, i s  a t
b e s t  an unw arranted  assum ption  in  need o f  p ro o f.
«  X K X X
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On stu d y in g  K a n t's  th e o ry  o f e th ic s  c e r ta in  q u e s tio n s  and 
r e s e rv a tio n s  a r i s e  and fo rc e  them selves on o n e 's  a t t e n t io n .  R e fe rr in g  
th e s e  q u e s tio n s  and re s e rv a tio n s  to  our l a s t  r e f l e c t io n s  we can express 
them as fo llow s :
(a )  I t  seems p robab le  t h a t  th e  form al em ptiness o f  th e  fo rm ulas g iven 
by Kant fo r  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  im pa ir th e  v a l i d i t y  o f t h a t  
im p e ra tiv e  in  a c e r ta in  way and to  a c e r t a in  d eg ree . That i s ,  we a sk :
Does th e  f a c t  t h a t  an a c t io n  i s  w ille d  on p u re ly  r a t io n a l  grounds
c o n s t i tu te  a com plete a ssu ran ce  o f i t s  m oral goodness?
(b ) Concepts and id e a s  n o t "given" in  m oral ex p erien ce  n o r deduced
by th e  c r i t i c a l  a n a ly s is  o f t h i s  ex p erien ce  a re  u sed  by K ant, w ith o u t 
p rev io u s  n o tic e  to  impose a c e r ta in  o r ie n ta t io n  on h i s  m ethod ica l argum ents. 
These id e a s  and concep ts a re  regarded  by Kant as o f  c o n s t i tu t iv e  im portance 
to  h is  system o f e th ic s  and t r e a te d  a c c o rd in g ly . The id ea s  in  q u e s tio n  
a r e ,  b r i e f ly  :
( l )  A te le o lo g ic a l  concep tion  o f  th e  U niverse  w hich p o s tu la te s  a 
p re - e s ta b l is h e d  harmony in  th e  u n iv e rse  a t  th e  same tim e as i t  assumes 
(a s  a f a c t )  th e  e x is te n c e  o f an u l t im a te  and supreme purpose in  Human L if e ,  
( 2 ) The m oral goodness o f  reaso n  as exp ressed  in  th e  d e v ic e : "Was
v e m û n f t ig  i s t ,  i s t  g u t" . And, (5) The m oral and i n f i n i t e  w orth  o f th e  
human p e rso n . Though n o t a l l  o f th e s e  id e a s  and concep ts a re  o u t o f 
p la c e  in  an E th ic a l  system , some a re  d isp e n sa b le  to  a C r i t i c a l  Theory of 
EJthics w h ils t  some o th e rs  may w ell prove in d isp e n sa b le  to  any 
E th ic a l  Theory, In  any case  Kant ought to  have g iven  e x p l i c i t
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n o t ic e ^ )  whenever he w ished to  u se  o r to  p o s tu la te  any of th e s e  id e a s . 
Kant should a ls o  have examined each o f  th e s e  id ea s  and concepts as to  
w hether i t s  assum ption i s  n e ce ssa ry  to  a c r i t i c a l  Theory o f E th ic s  and 
dem onstrated  why i t  i s  n e c e ssa ry  and how one could j u s t i f y  and e x p la in  
t h i s  n e c e s s i ty .  (c )  F in a lly  concepts l i k e :  Reason, Freedom, R ig h tn ess ,
and M an -as-an -ab so lu te -E n d , which a re  h a b i tu a l ly  used  by Kant in  two 
se n se s , ought to  be re-exam ined and am b ig u itie s  e lu c id a te d , in co m p a tib i­
l i t i e s  e lim in a te d  as f a r  a s  p o s s ib le .  E sp e c ia l ly  th e  concept o f  Reaàon, 
th e  c e n t r a l  and b asic  concept o f K a n t's  E th ic a l System , indeed o f  h is  
P h ilo so p h ic a l System as a w hole, needs to  be re-exam ined and i t s  
e s s e n t ia l  f e a tu r e s ,  fu n c t io n , and l im i ts  re -a s s e s se d  in  view o f i t s  claim  
( i . e .  K a n t's  c la im ) to  fu rn is h  th e  u l t im a te  and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  b a s is  fo r  
E th ic s .
X X X X X
(A) F i r s t ,  th e n , we contend t h a t  th e  form al o n p tin e ss  o f th e  
c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  im p a irs  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f t h a t  im p e ra tiv e  as a 
c r i t e r i o n  and a ground fo r  th e  m oral r ig h tn e s s  o f a c t io n s  determ ined  by,
2)and conform ing t o ,  t h a t  same im p e ra tiv e . '  T his co n te n tio n  can be more
1 ) As he indeed d id  w ith  reg a rd  to  th e  t e le o lo g ic a l  concep tion  o f human 
l i f e  in  Die Grundlegung zur M etaphysik d e r S i t t e n ; E r s te r  A b sc h n itt.
On th e  o th e r  hand, w ith  reg a rd  to  th e  id e a  o f th e  w orth o f th e  human 
p e rso n , Kant though t he had d e riv ed  and deduced i t  from th e  v e ry  con­
c ep t o f Reason i t s e l f ,  and th e re fo re  n e g le c ted  to  in v e s t ig a te  i t s  
o r ig in s  and in q u ire  in to  i t s  im p lic a tio n s .  F in a lly  th e  m oral goodness 
o f what i s  rea so n ab le  i s  K a n t 's  m ost fundam ental m ost p rim ary  con­
v ic t io n  a g a in s t  se v e ra l a t ta c k e r s  ( J a c o b i, M endelssohn, R e lig io u s  
d o c tr in e )  he never ana ly sed  i t  c r i t i c a l l y  in  h is  m ajor works.
2 ) The sense in  which I. w ish t h i s  r e s e rv a t io n  a g a in s t  Kant understood  
w i l l  be e lu c id a te d  a l i t t l e  l a t e r ,  i t  i s  n o t th e  sense  in  which t h i s  
r e s e rv a t io n  i s  u su a lly  made.
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b r i e f l y  fo rm ula ted  th u s  : The r a t i o n a l i t y  o f an a c t io n  i s  n o t a
s u f f i c i e n t  g u a ran tee  ( i . e .  n o t a s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d itio n ) o f th e  m oral 
r ig h tn e s s  o f t h a t  a c t io n .
The argument f o r  t h i s  c o n te n tio n  runs as fo llo w s : Kant h e ld  t h a t
th e  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  an a c t io n  was a n e ce ssa ry  and th e  s u f f i c i e n t  co n d itio n
o f th e  m oral r ig h tn e s s  o f t h a t  a c t io n . He m ain ta ined  t h i s  p o s i t io n  most
• f irm ly  a g a in s t  a l l  a ttem p ts  o f encroachm ent, and e s p e c ia l ly  a g a in s t
encroachm ents by r e l ig io u s  d o c tr in e .  The r e l ig io u s  argum ent, as a m a tte r  \
o f f a c t ,  cunningly  ta c k le s  K a n t 's  th eo ry  a t  i t s  m ost v u ln e ra b le  p o in t ,
i t s  ad m itted  i n a b i l i t y  to  so lv e  th e  problem  o f "how freedom i s  p o s s ib le ? " .
At th e  end o f th e  Grundlegung Kant s t a t e s  t h i s  i n a b i l i t y  in  c le a r  te rm s,
and in  a d d it io n  m a in ta in s  t h a t  t h i s  i n a b i l i t y  h o ld s f o r  a l l  human
re a so n in g ."  . .  how th e  bare  p r in c ip le  t h a t  a l l  th e  w i l l ' s  maxims must be
capab le  o f p o sse ss in g  "the u n iv e r s a l  v a l i d i t y  o f  laws can by i t s e l f . . .
supp ly  a m otive to  th e  w il l  a l l  human reason  i s  t o t a l l y  u nab le  to  e x p la in . . .
How freedom  i s  p o s s i b l e . . .  how reason  can be p r a c t ic a l  . . .  to  make t h i s
com prehensible i s  e x a c tly  th e  problem we a re  un ab le  to  s o l v e . R e l i g i o u s
d o c tr in e  on th e  o th e r  hand does o f f e r  a s o lu t io n  to  t h i s  problem by
o p e ra tin g  w ith  th e  concept o f d iv in e  g ra c e . By th e  power o f d iv in e  grace  
2 )and on ly  by i t  men a re  enab led  to  overcome t h e i r  s in f u l  and s u b je c t iv e
1) Kant : G rundlegung. . . ;  D r i t t e r  A b s c h n itt .
2 ) The only ex cep tio n  i s  C h r is t  h im s e l f . . .  "T here fo re  does th e  F a th e r  
love  me, because I  la y  down my l i f e  t h a t  I  may ta k e  i t  ag a in  . . .  I  
have power to  la y  i t  down and I have power to  ta k e  i t  a g a in ."
John ; k . 1 7 , l 8 . The Greek makes t h i s  p o in t even c le a r e r :  toZto
Q ^  ) /  ' / _ ,  "------------------- T~------
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in c l in a t io n s ,  and to  a c t  e f f ic a c io u s ly  in  accordance w ith  m oral law s.
"For i t  i s  God which w orketh in  you bo th  to  w il l  and to  work^  ^ f o r  h is
good p le a s u re " .  O bviously Kant must r e j e c t  t h i s  s o lu t io n  i f  m oral
o b l ig a t io n  as he d e fin e s  i t ,  i s  to  have any sense a t  a l l .  He does so
by th e  fo llo w in g  argument : "People ta k e  i t  f o r  g ran te d  t h a t  by v i r tu e
o f our r a t io n a l  n a tu re  we a re  s u b je c t  to  m oral laws and stand  under an
o b l ig a t io n  to  s a c r i f i c e  th e  am en itie s  o f l i f e  in  o rd e r  to  obey th o se
2)law s. Commonsense f in d s  t h i s  so n a tu r a l ,  t h a t  i t  never doubts th e
v a l i d i t y  o f  th o se  law s, nor demands to  know whence th ey  come, o r t h a t  we 
postpone  our obedience t i l l  t h e i r  o r ig in  be uncovered^) . . .  But t h a t  we 
a r e ,  in  e f f e c t ,  capab le  o f b rin g in g  th e  re q u ire d  s a c r i f i c e s ,  f o r  th e  sake 
o f m o ra lity  and in  s p i t e  o f our sen su a l n a tu re , . . .  t h a t  i s  what 
a s to n is h e s  u s .  That we indeed  can do what we so c le a r ly  know t h a t  we 
ougjit to  do, t h i s  p rev a len ce  o f th e  su p ra  sensua l man in  us over th e
4 )
s e n s u a l , . . .  t h i s  m oral c a p a c ity  in se p a ra b le  from mankind . .  i s  what we 
adm ire most and always anew in  o u r s e lv e s . . .  I t  seems th e re fo re  a 
pardonab le  f a u l t  in  th o se  who m is led  by th e  incom prehensib le  n a tu re  o f
1 ) P h i l .  1 1 . 1 5 : 1^6 o 61/ i /^ />  ttp
iP t J  6^  y r>0 u n ê f  f  J cTofC/le
2 ) i . e .  "d er gesunde M enschenverstand^ .
5) i . e .  acco rd in g  to  K ant, th e  " r ig ji tn e s s"  o f  th e  law ; t h a t  i s ,  th e  
n a tu re  o f what i s  r i g h t ,  i s  never q u estio n ed  by any r a t io n a l  be ing . 
What i s  q u estio n ed  i s  w hether f a l l i b l e  men a re  capable  o f perform ing  
r i g h t  a c t io n s .
4) i . e .  "von der M enscheit u n z e r tre n n lic h e  A nlage".
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o f t h i s  power, i . e .  th e  su p e rsen su a l in  u s ,  tak e  i t ,  because o f  i t s  
v e ry  e f f i c a c i t y ,  to  be som ething su p e rn a tu ra l i . e .  som ething which i s  n o t 
in  our power a t  a l l  and does n o t a p p e r ta in  to  us b u t i s  th e  r e s u l t  o f  th e  
e f f e c t iv e  in f lu e n c e  o f a n o th e r and h ig h e r  being  upon u s . This however 
i s  a g rave  m is ta k e . For i f  i t  i s  n o t in  our power to  make e f f e c t iv e  use  
o f our moral c a p a c ity  whenever we so w i l l ,  th en  th e  m e r it  o f  our a c tio n s  
i s  no lo n g er a t t r i b u t a b l e  to  o u rse lv e s , yea th e  v e ry  c a p a c ity  no lo n g er 
o u r s . . .  The m oral c a p a c ity  however i s  our b i r t h r i g h t .  From our 
e a r l i e s t  youth  we a re  urged to  make u se  o f t h i s  incom prehensib le  power 
which we p o s s e s s . . .  The whole o f  th e  B ib le  te a c h e s , and e n jo in s  n o th in g . . 
b u t t h a t  we make th e  e th ic a l  s p i r i t  o f  C h r is t  o u rs ; o r r a th e r ,  t h a t  we 
make room fo r  i t  in  our h e a r ts  where i t  dw ells  a lre a d y  in  our in bo rn  
m oral c a p a c i ty ." ^ )
The purpose of K a n t's  argument i s  to  defend th e  r a t io n a l  and m oral
5)autonomy o f th r e e  b a s ic  m oral concep ts a g a in s t  th e  claim s o f r e l ig io u s  
a u th o r i ty ,  and th e re b y  to  e s t a b l i s h  t h e i r  independence and s e l f -  
s u f f ic ie n c y .  Not c o n te n t w ith  t h i s  Kant p roceeds to  show t h a t  r e l ig io n  
in  a l l  i t s  m a n ife s ta t io n s  ; r e v e la t io n ,  d o c tr in e ,  a u th o r i ty  
( i n s t i t u t i o n s )  and p r a c t ic e  i s  dependent on m o ra l i ty .  That i s ,  th e  
v a l i d i t y  o f r e l ig io u s  te a c h in g  and a u th o r i ty  i s  a t  a l l  tim es s u b je c t  to
1) i . e .  " '
2 ) K an t: S t r e i t  d e r F a k u ltâ te n ; S t r e i t  d e r th e o l .  Fac. m it d e r  p h i l . ;
Von R e lig io n s s e k ten.
5) Namely, freedom and th e  two se p a ra te  senses o f " r ig h tn e s s " .
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th e  t e s t  o f pu re  rea so n , and th e  ex ig e n c ie s  o f  p r a c t i c a l  rea so n . S ince 
he d en ie s  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  a " r e l ig io u s  experience" as such, Kant 
e a s i ly  m a in ta in s  t h i s  p o s i t io n .
The f i r s t  o f  th e  th re e  concepts in  q u e s tio n  i s  th e  concept o f th e  
in b o rn  c a p a c ity  o f  man a c tu a l ly  and in  e f f e c t  to  w i l l  and to  do what in
th e  s in c e r i ty  o f  h is  m oral d e te rm in a tio n  he s e ts  ou t to  w il l  and to  do.
The second concep t i s  th e  concep t o f " r i ^ t n e s s "  as th e  e s s e n t ia l  q u a li ty  
o f m oral laws which a re  fo rm u la ted  on w holly  r a t io n a l  grounds and a re  
v a l id  fo r  a l l  r a t io n a l  a g e n ts . The th i r d  concept i s  th e  concept o f 
" r ig h tn e s s "  as th e  e s s e n t ia l  q u a l i ty  o f  w i l l s  and w ille d  a c tio n s  which 
conform to  and a re  e x c lu s iv e ly  determ ined by m oral law s.
Now, th e  in bo rn  c a p a c ity  o f man a c tu a l ly  to  w i l l  and to  do what in
th e  i n t e g r i t y  o f h is  m oral d e te rm in a tio n  he s e ts  ou t to  w il l  and to  do
i s  bu t a p a rap h rase  on th e  freedom of th e  human w i l l  to  choose to  do o r 
to  r e f r a in  from doing as i t  p le a s e s .  The f u r th e r  d is c u s s io n  o f th e  ' 
e f f i c a c i t y  of human w i l ls  ought th e re fo re  to  be in c lu d ed  in  th e  d isc u ss io n  
on freedom and postponed u n t i l  th e n . For th e  moment i t  must s u f f ic e  us 
to  n o te ,  t h a t  t h i s  c a p a c ity , be ing  alm ost e q u iv a le n t to  "freedom ", i s  a 
n e c e ssa ry  p re c o n d itio n  o f  th e  very  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f m oral o b l ig a t io n ,  and 
a n e ce ssa ry  assum ption as f a r  as th e  i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y  o f moral o b l ig a t io n
i s  concerned. T hat i s ,  i t  i s  a ca teg o ry  o f p r a c t ic a l  reaso n . As such
/
i t  may n o t be den ied  by r e l i g io n ,  u n le s s  r e l ig io n  fo reg o  a l l  i t s  claim s 
to  r a t i o n a l i t y  and assume th e  c h a ra c te r  " e in e r  êôsen  Trâum erei" (o f  an
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e v i l  dream)
As f o r  th e  two senses o f " r i ^ t n e s s " ,  only th e  second th e  
( s u b je c t iv e )  sense  can be regarded  as p o sse ss in g  m oral s ig n if ic a n c e  in  
a  s t r i c t  se n se . For i t  i s  t h i s  " r ig h tn e s s "  which q u a l i f i e s  th e  human 
w i l l  and s ig n i f ie s  m oral m e r i t . " R i g h t n e s s "  in  i t s  f i r s t  (o b je c tiv e )  . 
sen se  i s ,  s t r i c t l y  speak ing , b u t a c irc u m sc r ip tio n  fo r  a c e r ta in  ty p e  o f  
r a t i o n a l ly  n e ce ssa ry  r e la t io n s h ip s .  (S y n th e tic  a p r i o r i  p ro p o s i t io n s ,  
f o r  exam ple). M oral law s, t h a t  i s ,  a re  " r ig h t"  in  v i r tu e  o f t h e i r  
i n t r i n s i c  s t r u c tu r e .  In  o th e r  words, m oral laws a re  " r ig h t"  thanks to  
c e r t a in  r e la t io n s h ip s  they  e s ta b l i s h  between t h e i r  re s p e c t iv e  c o n s t i tu e n t  
e lem en ts . And th e s e  r e la t io n s h ip s  a re  " r ig h t"  because they  a re  
r a t i o n a l l y  n e c e ssa ry  r e la t io n s h ip s ,  i . e .  in d isp e n sa b le  to  th e  p r a c t ic a l  
e x e rc is e  o f rea so n . I t  i s  Kant*s c o n te n tio n  th a t  in  th e  f i r s t  p la c e  
r e la t io n s h ip s  which a re  r a t i o n a l l y  n e ce ssa ry  in  t h i s  way cannot be m orally  
wrong. And in  th e  second p la c e , Kant a l to g e th e r  den ies  th e  e x is te n c e  o f 
r e la t io n s h ip s  in v o lv in g  human w i l l s  and cho ices which a re  r a t i o n a l ly  
determ ined  and y e t  n o t p r im a r ily  m oral.
1) Compare th e  f r ig h te n in g ,  a lm ost n ig h tm arish  im p lic a tio n s  o f  S t.P a u l* s  
a lre a d y  c i te d  d ictum : i<rjv^,]/ . v 7^
2 ) Compare th e  p assa g e : "The method o f  t r a in in g  young people  in  m oral
a c t io n  ta k e s  th e  fo llo w in g  c o u rse : F i r s t  one in q u ire s  w hether th e
proposed a c t io n  accords (o b je c t iv e ly )  w ith  th e  m oral law , and w ith  
which m oral l a w . . .  and one 1earns to  d is t in g u is h  between e s s e n t ia l  
and secondary o b lig a tio n s  and to  d is c r im in a te  between them even when 
th ey  a re  merged in  one s in g le  a c tio n "  (That i s  one le a rn s  th e  n a tu re  
o f r ig h tn e s s  in  th e  f i r s t  s e n s e ) . .  "Secondly one in q u ire s  w hether th e  
a c t io n  in  q u e s tio n  had been perform ed ( s u b je c t iv e ly )  fo r  th e  sake o f  
th e  m oral law , so t h a t  i t  possess n o t only  r ig h tn e s s  o f f a c t  (which 
i s  b u t l e g a l i t y )  bu t a ls o  r ig h tn e s s  o f  in te n t io n ,  i . e .  m oral m e rit  in  
th e  way i t  chose i t s  maxims", Kant : K r i t ik  de r re in e n  p ra k tis c h e n  
V ern u n ftj M ethodenlehre,
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K an t’s reasons f o r  th e  f i r s t  c o n te n tio n  a re  as fo llo w s : The m orally
wrong cho ice  can be accounted fo r  only in  term s o f th e  wrong p ro p o r tio n a l
dominance which th e  se n se s , o n ,th e  one hand, and reason  on th e  o th e r  '
»
e x e rc is e  over w i l l .  M oral wrongness o r e v i l  c o n s is ts  in  th e  su b o rd in a tio n  
o f  rea so n  and th e  m oral law i t  fo rm ulated  to  th e  g r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f d e s i r e s ,  
b u t n o t in  th e  e x is te n c e  o f th o se  d e s i r e s .  For man can be he ld  
r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  h is  p ro p e n s ity  to  e v i l ,  h i s  r e c u r re n t  f a i l u r e  to  subo rd in ­
a te  h is  d e s ire s  to  th e  d i c t a t e s  o f re a so n , i . e .  th e  m oral law s, bu t n o t 
f o r  th e  e x is te n c e  o f th o se  d e s i r e s .  I t  fo llow s t h a t  e v i l  i s  n o t grounded 
sim ply in  th e  se n su a l n a tu re  o f man, nor sim ply in  reason  but in  th e  wrong 
p ro p o r tio n  o f dominance between th e  two. Indeed , acco rd in g  to  K ant, i t  
i s  q u i te  im p o ssib le  t h a t  e v i l  be grounded in  reason^^ s in c e  i t  i s
a b s o lu te ly  im p o ssib le  fo r  rea so n  to  be c o r r u p t . Reason which fo rm u la tes  
th e  m oral law cannot c o n tr a d ic t  i t s  own law . Reason can never disown 
th e  a u th o r i ty  o f  th e  law , or i t s  own o b l ig a t io n  to  i t . . .  b e c a u s e . . .  to  
conceive  o n e se lf  as a f r e e ly  a c t in g  be ing  and y e t  re le a s e d  from th e  law 
which i s  a p p ro p r ia te  to  such a be ing  ( th e  m oral law) would be th e  same as 
to  conce ive  a c a u s a l i ty  o p e ra tin g  w ith o u t any law ( f o r  d e te rm in a tio n  by 
n a tu r a l  laws i s  excluded by th e  assum ption  o f freedom ) and t h i s  would be 
a s e l f - c o n t r a d ic to r y  concep t. In  s h o r t ,  "was v e m fin f tig  i s t ,  i s t
g u t" , alw ays and o f n e c e s s i ty .  What i s  r a t i o n a l ly  determ ined can never 
be m o ra lly  bad. Reason i s  in c o r r u p t ib le .
1) K an t: ' î ’/t
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Indeed , and h e re  Kant comes to  h i s  second c o n te n tio n , th e re  can 
be no r a t io n a l  ground on which reason  m ight re le a s e  i t s e l f  from obedience 
to  i t s  own m oral law s. Only "antagonism  to  th e  law as such could serve  
as th e  sp rin g  o f  a c t io n  to  t h i s  m alig n an t reason  ( f o r  th e  w i l l  cannot be 
determ ined  w ith o u t some s p r in g ) . .  But to  disown th e  m oral law f o r  no 
rea so n  bu t an u n a d u lte ra te d  h a tre d  f o r  th e  m oral law would bespeak a 
d e v i l i s h ,  n o t a human b e i n g . I n  o th e r  words re a so n , when disow ning
th e  m oral law i s  prompted th e r e to  e i t h e r  by an i n i t i a l  antagonism  to  th a t
'
law , and i s  th e r e fo re  d e v i l i s h ,  o r i t  i s  induced to  do so by a cause 
which o p e ra te s  w ith o u t any law * and i s  th e re fo re  no lo n g er r a t i o n a l .
I t  fo llo w s t h a t  reason  when r e le a s in g  i t s e l f  from th e  m oral law does so 
on i r r a t i o n a l  grounds, ccm nits an a c t  o f d e n ia l and b e tra y a l  o f  i t s  
r a t i o n a l  n a tu re  and in  so f a r  indeed ceases to  be r a t i o n a l .  T h is argument 
r e s t s  m ainly on th e  assum ption t h a t  no r a t io n a l  o rd e r  o th e r  th an  m o ra lity  
can be conceived and t h a t  in  consequence reason  can never re p u d ia te  th e  
m oral o rd e r  f o r  th e  sake o f some o th e r  o rd e r  w ith  which th e  m oral i s  
in co m p atib le  in  p r in c ip le  or in  p r a c t ic e .  T his assum ption however i s  
tan tam oun t to  an a s s e r t io n  t h a t  reason  can n o t produce id ea s  o r  fo rm u la te  
laws which though o f th e  same form al s t r u c tu r e  and r a t io n a l  o rd e r as th e  
m oral law a re  n o t id e n t i c a l  o r even n o t com patib le  w ith  i t .  In  o th e r  
words, Kant advoca tes a r e s t r i c t i o n  o f th e  r a t io n a l  to  th e  m o ra l, and o f
1) Kant : .
2 ) For freedom th e  law o f reaso n  and n e c e s s i ty  th e  law o f n a tu re  a re  
bo th  excluded by hyp. and Kant a llow s o f no o th e r s .
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a l l  au p ersen su a l experience  t o  m oral ex p erien ce  and i t s  e x ig e n c ie s .
In  p a r t i c u l a r  t h i s  means a  d e n ia l o f th e  autonomy o f r e l ig io n  and
th e  o b je c tiv e  v a l i d i t y  o f th e  s p e c i f ic  r e l ig io u s  ex p e rien c es .^ ^  R e lig io n
in  i t s  a ttem p ts  to  govern and te a c h  mankind ap p ea ls  to  th e  m oral laws
fo rm u la ted  by p r a c t i c a l  rea so n . But r e l ig io n  d id  n o t  g e n e ra te  th e se
law s, no r does i t  v in d ic a te  them , no r must i t  in  case  o f  c la sh  t r y  to
o v e rr id e  them. Indeed in  doing  so , r e l ig io n  in v a l id a te s  i t s e l f  as i t
i s  dependent i n  a l l  on th e  m oral law s, nay in  i t s  innerm ost essence
d e r iv e s  from th e  fundam ental needs of m oral rea so n in g . Thus, acco rd ing
to  K ant, God's very  e x is te n c e  i s  grounded in  a p o s tu la te  o f  p r a c t ic a l
re a so n , genera ted  by a need o f m oral re a so n in g . I t s  c e r ta in ty  r e l a t i v e
to  th e  i n te n s i ty  of th a t  need , i t s  v a l i d i t y  determ ined by th e  r a t io n a l
2)
n e c e s s i ty  o f t h a t  need a re  b o th , acco rd in g  to  Kant a b so lu te ly  assu red  
x \
f o r :  "This need . . .  o f p r a c t i c a l  reaso n  i s  a b so lu te  s in c e  we a re  d riv en
to  assume th e  e x is te n c e  o f God n o t sim ply because we w ish to  judge in  a 
c e r ta in  way, (a s  i s  th e  case  when T h e o re tic a l (p u re ) reason  w ishes to
1 ) As f o r  th e  "m axim alist" e x p e rien c e , Kant seems to  have ignored  i t s  
p o s s i b i l i t y  a l to g e th e r
2) According to  Kant t h i s  need i s  so in te n s e  and so in e sca p ab le  t h a t
th e  'e x is te n c e  of God' which a lone  s a t i s f i e s  i t ,  p o ssesses  f o r  us th e  
h ig h e s t  deg ree  o f c e r ta in ty  o f which we a re  c ap a b le . N e v erth e le ss  
when u n re la te d  to  th e  needs o f m oral rea so n in g , o r when in  c o n f l i c t  
w ith  them, i t  r e v e r ts  to  a dangerous s u p e r s t i t i o n .  I  s h a l l  t r y  to  
show th a t  h i s  d e n ia l o f  th e  autonomy o f r e l ig io u s  ex p e rien c e , and 
th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  r a t io n a l  o rd ers  o th e r  th an  th e  moral on th e  one 
hand, and h is  concep tion  o f th e  needs of moral reaso n in g s on th e  
o th e r ,  a re  K a n t 's  g ra v e s t  m is tak e .
5) i . e .  B ed tirfn iss .
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judge th e  o rd er o f  th e  u n iv e rs e  in  r e s p e c t  o f i t s  purposes and i s  d riv en  
to  assume th e  e x is te n c e  o f an o rd e rin g  "cosmic" god) but because in  
p r a c t i c a l  q u e s tio n s  we m ust judge in  a c e r ta in  way. Indeed , th e  main
job o f p r a c t i c a l  reason  i s  to  fo rm u la te  m oral law s. A ll th e s e  laws
seem to  converge upon th e  id e a  of a supreme good to  be ach ieved  in  t h i s  
w orld by th e  e x e rc is e  o f freedom , i . e .  m o ra l ity . These laws a ls o  
converge upon a d i f f e r e n t  id e a  o f th e  supreme good, namely a supreme good 
which cannot be achieved  th rough  th e  e x e rc is e  o f freedom , but m ust be 
b rough t about by th e  p ro ce sse s  o f  n a tu re .  This supreme and indeed 
com plete (summum) good i s  th e  id e a  of th e  g r e a te s t  h a p p in e ss , but 
h ap p in ess  ap p o rtio n ed  in  e x ac t p ro p o r tio n  to  m o ra l ity . Reason i s  d riv en  
to  assume t h i s  com plete, though c o n d it io n a l  supreme good. In  o rd e r  to  
a s su re  i t s e l f  o f  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f t h i s  summum bonum, reason  i s  d riv en  
to  assume in  a d d it io n  a h ig h e s t  i n t e l l i g e n t  being as th e  supreme and 
u n c o n d itio n a l good. These two th in g s  reaso n  i s  d r iv e n  to  assume n o t, 
in d e e d , in  o rd e r to  d e riv e  th e  moral law , o r i t s  m otives in  o b ^ in g  th e  
m oral law from them ( fo r  p r a c t i c a l  reason  would p o ssess  no m oral w orth  ^
i f  i t  would be m o tiva ted  by an y th in g  save th e  m oral law o f whose r i g h t ­
n ess  and v a l i d i t y  reason  i s  so f u l ly  convinced) bu t in  o rd e r to  c o n fe r 
o b je c tiv e  r e a l i t y  on th e  id e a  o f  th e  supreme good. That i s ,  reason  
m ust needs assume th e  e x is te n c e  o f god, i f  i t  w ishes to  avoid t h a t  
to g e th e r  w ith  th e  g en e ra l id e a  o f m o ra l i ty ,  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a t t a in in g  
th e  supreme good to  be tak en  f o r  a mere id e a l  s in c e  he^^ whose id e a  i s
1) i . e .  God.
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in s e p a ra b le  from m o ra lity  e x is t s  n o t . .  Now th e  r a t io n a l  b e l i e f
(V e m u n ftg lau b e ) which i s  genera ted  by th e  requ irem en t o f reason  in  i t s
p r a c t i c a l  c a p a c ity , can be c a l le d  a p o s tu la te  o f re a so n , (n o t m ere ly  a
h y p o th e s is )  s in c e  t h i s  r a t io n a l  b e l i e f  ( in  m o ra lly  r ig h te o u s  peo p le ) even
though i t  does n o t s a t i s f y  a l l  th e  lo g ic a l  requ irem en ts o f o b je c tiv e
r e a l i t y  i s  y e t  so s tro n g  th a t  i t  does n o t  y ie ld  in  p o in t  o f c e r t a in ty  to
%
any o th e r  knowledge. T his o f  course does n o t  p rec lu d e  th a t  r a t io n a l  
b e l i e f s  rem ain e s s e n t ia l ly  d i f f e r e n t  from o b je c tiv e  knowledge . . .  The 
r a t io n a l  b e l i e f ,  whose o r ig in  in  th e  requ irem en ts o f p r a c t ic a l  reaso n  I 
have j u s t  d e sc rib e d  i s  a t  th e  bottom o f  a l l  r e l ig io u s  f a i t h ,  indeed  a l l  
r e l ig io u s  r e v e l a t i o n . . The concept o f god, and th e  convinced b e l i e f  in  
h i s  e x is te n c e  can only be grounded in  rea so n . They must be born in  
re a so n . For we cannot apprehend them by some im m ediate p e rc e p tio n , nor 
by h e a rsa y  however w ell a u th o r is e d .^ ^
In  th e  seq u el Kant t r i e s  to  prove t h a t  r e l ig io u s  ex p erien ce  as such 
i s  im p o ss ib le , by showing t h a t  God cannot be apprehended in  a d i r e c t
e x p e rie n c e : "Whoever c la im s d iv in e  i n s p i r a t io n  as a means o f g a in in g
*
knowledge th in k s  o f th e  c o n tra d ic to ry  concept o f a su p e rsen su a l ex p erien ce . 
Now th e  concept o f  su p e rsen su a l ex p erien ce  c o n tra d ic ts  i t s e l f  because t h a t
2 )which i s  tra n sc e n d e n t in  i t s  n a tu re  cannot be envisaged  as immanent".
1 ) Kant : Was h e i s s t  s ic h  im Denken o r i e n t ie r e n ? ( I 7 8 6 )
2 ) K an t: ^  cj/ol
^  I't • ^
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M oreover s in c e  to  apprehend god would be to  "ex p erien ce  th e  su p e rn a tu ra l"
i t  would be a l to g e th e r  im p o ssib le  to  prove t h a t  t h i s  experience  was
indeed  an ex p erien ce  and n o t m erely  a d r e a m . B e i n g  s u p e rn a tu ra l ,  th i s
ex p erien ce  could n o t be deduced from th e  workings and th e  n a tu re  o f  our
com prehension, and , th e r e fo re ,  would n o t be v in d ic a te d  by t h i s  d ed u c tio n .
I t  cou ld  a t  th e  u tm ost be regarded  as an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f c e r ta in
f e e l in g s ,  o f which one does n o t r ig h t ly  know w hether one ought to  reg a rd
them as being p a r t  o f our s to r e  o f  knowledge i . e .  as  p o sse ss in g  a r e a l
o b je c t  o r as se n tim e n ta l day dream s. In  any c a se , as th e  id e a  o f God
i s  grounded in  rea so n , and in  reason  o n ly , i t  seems bo th  presum ptions
and s e l f - c o n t r a d ic to r y  to  cla im  th a t  one had sensed h is  imm ediate p resence  
2)
and in f lu e n c e . But even i f  an im m ediate ex p erien ce  o f god were 
p o s s ib le  th e  main d i f f i c u l t y  would n o t have been removed. "To me i t  
seems a l to g e th e r  incom prehensib le  how a v is io n  can p ro v id e  me W ith some­
th in g  which can be th o u g h t but never d i r e c t l y  apprehended. However, 
t h a t  may be, i t  i s  obvious t h a t  in  o rd e r  to  be a b le  to  judge t h a t  what 
ap p ears  to  me i s  indeed  g o d .. I  must f i r s t  possess  a r a t io n a l  concept 
o f god to  which I  can r e f e r  my v is io n ,  and w ith  which I  can compare i t .
I  do n o t mean t h a t  I  expect a v is io n  to  be in  a l l  r e s p e c ts  adequate  to  
my r a t io n a l  concep t o f  g o d 's  n a tu re  (which o bv iously  i t  can never be) 
b u t t h a t  none o f i t s  f e a tu r e s  must c o n f l i c t  or c o n tr a d ic t  what I  know
1) Compare: Hobbes' " I f  god speaks to  a man in  a dream th en  t h i s
man has dreamt t h a t  God has spoken to  h im ".
2 ) K an t: S t r e i t  d e r F a k u ltâ te n , e t c . ,  Von R e lig io n sse k te n .
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(from h is  concep t) to  be e s s e n t ia l  to  g o d 's  n a tu re . In  any c a s e 't h i s
v i s io n ,  appearance , r e v e la t io n ,  o r w hatever e ls e  we may be p lea se d  to
c a l l  i t ,  can n ev er p rov ide  p ro o f fo r  th e  e x is te n c e  o f a being  whose
concept in c lu d e s  th e  a t t r i b u t e  o f  i n f i n i t y .  For th e  i n f i n i t e  can n o t
be g rasped  or p e rc e iv e d , i t  canno t be ex p erien ced . Hence, th e  e x is te n c e
o f an i n f i n i t e  be ing  can never be dem onstra ted . In  consequence, no one
can be a b s o lu te ly  c e r ta in  o f  g o d 's  e x is te n c e  on th e  ground o f a prim ary
p e rc e p tio n . A " ra t io n a l  b e l ie f "  must always precede " r e v e la t io n " .  Only
th u s  can we know w hether th e  rev ea led  and im m ediately  apprehended deserves
„ l )
to  coun t as a m a n ife s ta t io n  o f  th e  d iv in e  .
T his argum ent e n ta i l s  th e  th re e  fo llo w in g  r a th e r  w eighty 
c o n c lu s io n s . (a )  I f  r e l ig io u s  ex p erien ce  as such i s  im p o ss ib le , th en  
Kant i s  j u s t i f i e d  in  m a in ta in in g  t h a t  no r e l ig io u s  maxims, p o s tu la te s ,  
o r r u le s  can be deduced from i t ,  o r j u s t i f i e d  by i t .  M oreover, no 
s p e c i f i c  r e l ig io u s  ca teg o ry  o f  reason  can be d e f in e d , as p ro v id in g  a 
s p e c ia l  s t r u c tu r e  and d i s t i n c t  q u a l i ty  f o r  an autonomous r e l ig io u s  domain.
(b ) I f  th e re  i s  no s p e c i f i c a l ly  r e l ig io u s  ca tego ry  o f  rea so n , th en  reason  
has no s p e c if ic  r e l ig io u s  c a p a c ity  o r a p p lic a t io n  to  compare w ith  i t s  
p u re , p r a c t ic a l  o r a e s th e t ic  a s p e c ts .  In  consequence, r e l ig io u s  
co n ce p ts , maxims, r u l e s ,  e tc .  must have been d e fin ed  and c o n s t i tu te d  w ith  
th e  h e lp  o f c a te g o r ie s  o f  rea so n  borrowed from one o r th e  o th e r  o f  i t s  
o th e r  a s p e c ts .  (c )  F in a l ly ,  i f  i t  be indeed  t r u e  as Kant th in k s ,  t h a t  
th e  prim ary  o b je c t  o f  r e l ig io n  i s  t h a t  " c e r ta in  th in g s  should be done
1 ) Kant : Was h e i s s t  : s ic h  im Denken G ri e n t i e r  en?
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r a th e r  th a n  t h a t  c e r ta in  th in g s  should be be lieved"^^  ( f o r  i t  i s  " th e
2 )doing  n o t th e  b e lie v in g  which i s  m e r ito r io u s  in  r e l ig io n "  and th e  
u l t im a te  aim o f a l l  r e l ig io u s  te a c h in g s ) ,  th en  a l l  r e l ig io u s  m a n ife s t­
a t io n s ,  r e v e la t io n s ,  d o c tr in e s ,  e tc ,  ought to  be subm itted  to  th e  touch ­
s to n e  o f  m o ra lity  and th e  m oral law s.
T his i s  tan tam ount to  a demand t h a t  a l l  r e l ig io u s  m a n ife s ta t io n s ,
r e v e la t io n s ,  d o c tr in e s ,  t r a d i t i o n s ,  e t c . ,  which do n o t accord w ith  th e
requ irem en ts o f  th e  moral laws be regarded  as ip so  f a c to  in v a l id  and
d isc a rd e d  fo r th w ith , "Even i f  god speaks to  man, man can n ever be
c e r ta in  t h a t  i t  i s  indeed  god who sp eak s . For man i s  unab le  to  p e rc e iv e
th e  i n f i n i t e  w ith  h is  se n se s , unab le  to  d is t in g u is h  th e  i n f i n i t e  from
o th e r  b e in g s , and unab le  th e r e fo re  to  know th e  i n f i n i t e  being by t h i s
d i s t i n c t io n .  On th e  o th e r  hand in  some cases man can know f o r  c e r ta in
t h a t  i t  i s  n o t g o d 's  v o ice  which he h e a r s ,  namely when t h i s  v o ice  commands
som ething which i s  c o n tra ry  to  th e  m oral law . I f  t h i s  be th e  case , no
m a tte r  how m a je s tic  o r su p e rn a tu ra l th e  m a n ife s ta t io n  i t  i s  a d ecep tio n
5)
and m ust be regarded  as such" . . .  fo r  example in  th e  s to ry  o f  th e  
s a c r i f i c e  o f  I s a a c ,  Abraham th o u g h t he was obeying th e  commandment o f 
god ( th e  poor c h ild  c a r r ie d  th e  wood w ith o u t knowing th e  purpose) and 
th e re fo re  a c t in g  r i ^ t e o u s l y .  But th e  r ig h t  th in g  f o r  Abraham to  do 
was to  answer th e  seem ingly d iv in e  v o ice  and say : "That I  must never
1) Kant : S t r e i t  d e r Fakult& ten;
2) K an t: idem.
5) Kant : S t r e i t  d e r F a k u ltâ te n , e t c ,  , ,  Die A u th e n z itâ t d e r B ib e l.
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k i l l  ray good son o f t h i s  I  am c e r t a in .  But t h a t  thou who a p p e a re s t 
to  me a r t  indeed god o f  t h a t  I  am no t c e r t a in .  Nor, though th e  very  
heavens thunder i t  f o r th ,  can I ever be c e r t a in  o f  i t . "  M o ra lity  and 
th e  m oral law , however, (which a re  a ls o  en jo in ed  by r e l ig io n )  a re  
e q u iv a le n t to  th e  com plete ly  r a t io n a l  d e te rm in a tio n  o f  th e  w i l l .  There­
fo re  any r e l ig io u s  m a n ife s ta t io n , r e v e la t io n ,  d o c tr in e , e tc .  which i s  
c o n tra ry  to  rea so n , and th e  r a t io n a l ly  a c c e p ta b le  can and must be 
d is c a rd e d . "What i s  c o n tra ry  to  reason  in  th e  rev e a le d  s c r ip tu r e s ,  
reason  i s  e n t i t l e d  to  i n t e r p r e t  in  a way t h a t  conforms to  i t s  own m axim s.. 
Thus, f o r  exam ple, S t .  P a u l 's  d o c tr in e  o f  e le c t io n  by g r a c e . . .  o r ig in a l ly  
in c lu d ed  in  th e  b e l i e f s  o f th e  P ro te s ta n t  Church, has been d isc a rd e d  
su b seq u en tly  by a g re a t  p a r t  o f t h a t  church o r has been in te r p r e te d  in  
a n o th e r  way because reason  could n o t re c o n c i le  t h i s  d o c tr in e  w ith  th e  
id e a s  o f  freedom , and o f r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  and, hence , w ith  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  
o f m o r a l i t y " . A c c o r d a n c e  and conform ity  w ith  th e  m oral laws i . e .  w ith 
re a so n , i s  indeed th e  norm by which a l l  read in g s  and a l l  i n te r p r e ta t io n  
o f  th e  rev ea led  word, th e  s c r ip tu r e s ,  ought to  be e v a lu a te d . For " th e  
h o ly  w r i te r s  o f  th e  s c r ip tu r e s  were as men by no means exempt from c e r ta in  
e r r o r s  as evidenced by S t .  Paul and h is  d o c tr in e  o f  e le c t io n  by g r a c e . .
But th e  god who speaks th rougji our own (m o ra l-p ra c tic a l)  reaso n  i s  a 
com prehensible and an a l to g e th e r  i n f a l l i b l e  exponent o f  h is  own rev ea led  
w orld . There i s  no more a u th e n tic  and a u th o r ise d  ( f o r  in s ta n c e .
l )  Kant : S t r e i t  d e r F a k u ltâ te n ; d ie  A uthenzitA t d e r  B ib e l.
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h i s t o r i o a l l y  a u th o riz e d )  i n t e r p r e t e r  o f  g o d 's  commandments.. The d iv in e  
o r ig in  o f  any commandment en jo ined  by th e  B ib le  can be apprehended 
th rough  th e  concepts o f our own reason  as f a r  as i t  i s  p u re ly  m oral and 
th e r e f o r e  i n f a l l i b l e .  The on ly  g u a ran tee  fo r  th e  d iv in i ty  o f th e  B ib le . ,  
i s  th e  m oral co n ten t o f i t s  te a c h in g s  : d ie  G ô t t l ic h k e i t  ih r e s  m ora l-
isc h e n  I n h a l t s " . R e a s o n  in  o th e r  words i s  th e  t e s t  and th e  touchstone  
o f  r e l i g io n .  The very  n a tu re  o f  god i s  d e fin ed  and determ ined by th e  
req u irem en ts  o f p r a c t i c a l  rea so n , i . e .  m o ra l i ty .  In  s c h o la s t ic  term s : 
G od's essence  i s  p r io r  to  h i s  e x is te n c e  and to  h is  w i l l :  Deum ipsum non
p a sse  su p p le re  locum causae fo rm a lis . And g o d 's  e sse n ce , acco rd ing  to  
th e  requ irem en ts o f  m o ra l i ty ,  i s  h is  p e r f e c t  accord  w ith  th e  m oral law 
h is  com plete and p e r f e c t  r a t i o n a l i t y .  God, in  s h o r t ,  i s  m o ra lity  
p e r s o n if ie d .  As long as r e l ig io n  acknowledges and acc ep ts  i t s  dependence 
on and s u b je c tio n  to  th e  requ irem en ts o f  p r a c t ic a l  reaso n  (which 
acco rd in g  to  Kant i s  th e  o b je c tiv e  and t r u e  r e la t io n s h ip  between th e  two 
dom ains) and i s  c o n te n t to  h e lp  and f u r th e r  th e  r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  m oral laws 
c o n c e n tra tin g  a l l  i t s  e f f o r t s  on t h i s  t a s k ,  u n d e rs tan d in g  and m utual 
t o l e r a t i o n  can be m ain ta ined  as between th e  r e l ig io u s  camp and th e  moral 
camp. "Why indeed" w r ite s  Kant w ith  reg a rd  to  M endelssohn and Ja c o b i, 
" th i s  d isc o rd  between two p a r t i e s  w ith  bu t one aim , namely th e  aim o f 
making hum anity w ise r and more r ig h te o u s ? . . .  The v e i le d  goddess b e fo re  
whom we both k n ee l i s  th e  m oral law in  us in  a l l  i t s  in v io la b le  m a jes ty .
l )  Kant : S t r e i t  d er Fakult& ten; d ie  A u th e n z itâ t d e r B ibel
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We h e a r  h e r  v o ice  indeed and u nders tand  h e r command. But in  h e a r in g  
we h e s i t a t e  to  decide  w hether i t  i s  by th e  so v ere ig n  autonomy o f  our 
own rea so n , t h a t  she speaks to  Man, o r w hether by th e  in te rv e n ie n c e  o f 
a n o th e r , whose n a tu re  i s  unknown to  u s ,  and who speaks to  us by way o f  
our own rea so n . I t  m ight perhaps be b e t t e r  fo r  a l l  i f  we ceased  our 
e n q u ir ie s  a t  t h i s .p o i n t  s in c e  th e s e  a re  mere s p e c u la tio n s . P r a c t i c a l ly  
th e  m oral law rem ains th e  same, w hatever i t s  o r ig in .  But th e  d id a c t ic  
method by vdiich th e  m oral law i s  deduced from c le a r  concepts in  a lo g ic a l  
way i s  th e  only one a c c e p ta b le  to  p h ilo so p h y . The method o f  p e rso n ify in g  
t h a t  law , o f  tu rn in g  our m o ra lly  law -g iv in g  reason  in to  a v e i le d  I s i s  
(even i f  we do n o t a t t r i b u t e  any o th e r  q u a l i ty  to  h e r  bu t th o se  w arran ted  
by th e  m ethod ica l in q u iry ) i s  an a e s th e t ic  way o f  apprehension  o f th e  
o b je c t  p re v io u s ly  analysed  in  a m ethod ica l way. Subsequen tly  one may
u se  th e  second method ( i . e .  a f t e r  th e  p r in c ip le s  have been e lu c id a te d  by 
th e  f i r s t )  in  o rd e r  to  exp ress m oral id e a s  in  a more im ag in a tiv e  way.
But we must beware o f  th e  dangers o f  t h i s  method which i s  l i a b l e  to  
encourage th o se  id le  dreams which a re  th e  death  o f  a l l  Ph i l os ophy" . What 
had begun as a peace o v e rtu re  to  th e  r e l ig io u s  camp ends w ith  th e  
d e f i n i t e  r e j e c t io n  o f an autonomous r e l ig io u s  domain : "In  re s p e c t  o f
i t s  c o n te n t th e  r e l ig io u s  domain, be ing  a r e l ig io n  o f  reason  (V ern u n ft- 
r e l ig io n )  i s  id e n t i c a l  w ith  e th ic s  from which i t  d i f f e r s  only in  form, 
i . e .  p e r s o n i f ic a t io n .  But t h i s  form i t s e l f  i s  n o t p r im a r ily  a form o f
1 ) K ant: ITovi
I o'v\ hy ( p ^ t o
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th e  r e l ig io u s  domain. I t  i s  d e riv ed  from and re d u c ib le  to  a b a s ic  
a e s th e t i c  o p e ra tio n  o f  rea so n . The r e l i g io u s ,  in  K a n t 's  e x p o s itio n  
re p re s e n ts  th e re fo re  a new r e la t io n s h ip  between p re v io u s ly  d efin ed  and 
in d ep en d en tly  determ ined domains and f a c u l t i e s  o f reaso n  r a th e r  th an  a 
s e l f -c o n ta in e d  and autonomous domain o f i t s  o w n " O n  th e se  assum ptions 
Kant i s  j u s t i f i e d  in  demanding t h a t  r e l ig io n  c o n ta in  n o th in g  save what 
i s  a lre a d y  c o n ta in ed  in ,  and w arran ted  by, e th ic s ;  and th a t  i t s  fu n c tio n  
be l im ite d  to  h e lp in g  and fu r th e r in g  m o ra l i ty :  th e o lo g ia  a n c i l l a  e th ic a e .
In  s p i te  o f  th e s e  l im i ta t io n s  and sa fe g u a rd s , th e  r e l ig io u s  a t t i t u d e  
w i l l  alw ays re p re s e n t  a danger to  th e  lo v e rs  o f  re a so n , th e  r a t io n a l  and 
freedom . I t  i s  an i n t r i n s i c  f e a tu r e  o f th e  r e l ig io u s  to  regard  i t s e l f  
as th e  u l t im a te  ground o f e v e ry th in g : o f  m o ra l ity , o f  t r u th ,  even o f
reaso n  i t s e l f  whose fu n c tio n  and l im i ts  i t  a ttem p ts  to  d ic ta te  in  i t s  
tu r n .  No lo v e r  o f freedom must pe rm it o r in a d v e r te n t ly  he lp  r e l ig io n  
in  th e s e  a s p i r a t io n s ,  t h i s  i s  K a n t 's  re p ly  to  J a c o b i 's  concep tion  o f  f a i t h ,  
and Moses M endelssohn 's r e l ig io u s  p o s tu la te s :  "Freedom o f  though t"  he
warns th a n , " i s  th e  s u b je c tio n  o f rea so n  to  th e  laws imposed by i t s e l f  
on i t s e l f .  I t s  o p p o site  i s  th e  law le ss  o p e ra tio n  o f  reason  ( i n tu i t i o n s ,  
i n s ig h t s ,  r e v e la t io n s )  . . .  But reason  re fu s in g  to  obey i t s  own laws has 
to  obey laws fo rce d  upon i t  from o u t s id e , ,  fo r  reaso n  canno t work, o r even 
p la y , w ithou t r u le s .  Hence th e  so le  r e s u l t  o f  b reak in g  a l l  th e  ru le s  o f 
d is c ip l in e d  th in k in g  i s  th e  lo s s  o f th e  freedom o f  th o u g h t . ." T herefo re  
"F rien d s o f hum anity and o f  t h a t  Kdiich i s  most sac red  to  hum anity!
l )  C a s s i r e r :  Kants Leben und L ehre; p ,409 .
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M ain ta in  w hatever eeema m ost convincing  to  you a f t e r  c a re fu l  c o n s id e ra tio n , 
w hether i t  be some datum o f  ex p e rien c e , o r some r a t io n a l  ground, b u t do 
n o t d ep riv e  reason  o f  t h a t  which makes i t  th e  g r e a te s t  boon on e a r th ,  o f 
th e  p r iv i le g e  to  be th e  u l t im a te  to u ch s to n e  o f  t r u t h .  I f  you do, being  
unw orthy o f  freedom , you w i l l  indeed lo s e  i t ,  and you w i l l  b r in g  t h i s  
m is fo r tu n e  over th o se  who in n o c e n tly  p lanned  to  make a good and law fu l 
u se  o f  t h e i r  freedom , in  th e  s e rv ic e  o f  hum anity I"^^
2 ) 'W ith t h i s  w arning v o ice  in  our e a r  and m indfu l o f  th e  re c e n t  
b a rb a r ic  trium phs o f  th e  i r r a t i o n a l ,  we must y e t  i n s i s t  on our c o n te n tio n s  
a g a in s t  K a n t 's  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  r a t io n a l  and th e  m oral. We hope 
th e re b y  l e a s t  d e v ia te  from th e  devoted s e rv ic e  to  re a so n .
To sum up K a n t 's  argum ent and i t s  im p lic a tio n s  f o r  th e  m oral s ta tu s  
o f th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  : There i s  no s p e c i f ic  r e l ig io u s  ex p erien ce .
There i s  no s p e c i f i c  ca teg o ry  o f  " r e l ig io u s "  re a so n . There i s  no d i s t i n c t  
r a t i o n a l  fu n c tio n  which de term ines a  d i s t i n c t  r a t io n a l  law fo r  " re l ig io u s "  
judgments o r in ju n c t io n s .  (Kant a ls o  ig n o re s  th e  "m axim alist" 
e x p erien ce  and i t s  s p e c i f ic  la w s) . In  consequence, th e  m oral law i s  
confirm ed as th e  only  co nce ivab le  r a t io n a l  law to  govern th e  human w i l l .  
Hence th e  w i l l  governed e x c lu s iv e ly  and w holly  by r a t io n a l  c o n s id e ra tio n s  
i s  w holly  and p e r f e c t ly  m o ra l. The good w i l l  i s  th e  w holly r a t io n a l  w i l l .
1 ) K an t: Was h e i s s t  s ic h  im Denken o r ie n t ie r e n ? ;  c lo s in g  p assag e .
2 ) Compare V o l t a i r e 's :  "Sur ce v a s te  U nivers une grande v o i le  e s t  
j e t e :  Mais dans l e s  p ro fondeu rs de c e t t e  o b s c u r i té
S i l a  ra is o n  nous l u i t ,  q u ' avons nous \  nous p la in d re ?
Nous n 'av o n s  q u 'u n  flam beau, gainons nous de l 'é t e i n d r e .
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The r a t io n a l  i s  i n  a l l  re s p e c ts  coterm inous w ith  th e  m oral. E v il i s  
im p e rfe c t government o f th e  r a t i o n a l .  Reason as such i s  always good, 
i t  i s  m o ra lly  in c o r r u p t ib le .  The c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  in  i t s  empty , 
fo rm a lity  as th e  u n a d u lte ra te d  embodiment o f  th e  r a t io n a l  law , i s  th e  
c r i t e r i o n  o f  m o ra lity  and th e  p r in c ip le  o f  th e  good w i l l .
But i s  t h i s  r e a l ly  so? I s  th e  r a t io n a l  r e a l ly  coterm inous w ith  
th e  m oral? I s  reason  r e a l ly  in c o r ru p t ib le ?  Above a l l  i s  th e  
c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  r e a l ly  th e  to u ch s to n e  o f th e  m oral? I  must g ive  
w arning th a t  th e  re s e rv a tio n s  I  w ish hereb y  to  make a g a in s t  th e  empty . 
fo rm a lity  o f  K a n t 's  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  i s  in  no way e q u iv a le n t to  
th e  o b je c tio n  u s u a l ly  ra is e d  a t  t h i s  p o in t  a g a in s t  K en t, namely th e  
o b je c tio n  t h a t  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  in  i t s  empty fo rm a lity  f a i l s  
to  supp ly  us w ith  a l i s t  o f  co n c re te  p a r t i c u l a r  d u t ie s ,  f a i l s  to  t e l l  us 
e x a c tly  what to  do, when where and how. T his l a t t e r  c r i t ic i s m  i s  
in v a l id a te d  by an i n i t i a l  m is tak e  in  what i t  supposes to  be th e  fu n c tio n  
and th e  purpose o f a th e o ry  o f  e th ic s .  " E th ic s " , as N ic o la r  Hartmann 
w rote " i s  n o t c a s u is t r y  -  n o t only in s o f a r  as i t  may n o t f o r e s t a l l  th e  
f r e e  c r e a t iv e  r e s o l u t i o n , , b u t a ls o  in s o f a r  as i t  has no c a p a c ity  f o r  so 
d o i n g " . T h e  te n o r  o f  th e  r e s e rv a tio n  I  w ish to  make i s  indeed  th e  
v e ry  o p p o s ite . For I contend th a t  th e  empty fo rm a lity  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  
im p e ra tiv e  in s te a d  o f a s c e r ta in in g  th e  u n iv e r s a l  (a d m itt in g -o f-n o -  *
ex cep tio n ) a p p lic a t io n  and th e  o b je c tiv e  a b so lu te  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  m oral
1 ) N ic o la r  Hartmann : E th ic s , Vol. 1. p . 65.
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law , p e rm its  th e  in frin g em en t o f th e  u n iv e r s a l i ty  o f  th e  im p e ra tiv e  
and i t s  o b je c t iv i ty  in  th e  sense  t h a t  m a tte rs  m ost, w ith o u t re n d e rin g  
such in frin g em en t ip so  fa c to  s e l f - c o n t r a d ic to r y .  In  o th e r  w ords, an 
a c t io n  which acco rds w ith  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e , even i f  perform ed 
f o r  th e  sake o f th e  law d e fin ed  th rough  th e  im p e ra tiv e , i s  n o t 
n e c e s s a r i ly  a m o ra lly  r ig h t  a c t io n .  That i s ,  th e  form ulas  ^ o f  th e  
c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  a re  n o t by them selves s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d itio n s  fo r  th e  
m oral r ig h tn e s s  o f  an a c t io n  which th ey  d e te rm in e . They only appear so 
a g a in s t  th e  background o f th o se  a d d it io n a l  id e a s  and co n cep ts , which we 
have l i s t e d  above, (a s  assum ptions made by Kant w ith o u t s u f f i c i e n t
j u s t i f i c a t i o n )  and which keep th e  form ulas from ever be ing  r e a l ly  empty
in  th e  K antian  a p p l ic a t io n .  As we have seen th e se  a d d it io n a l  id e a s  and 
concep ts were n o t deduced from th e  d a ta  o f  m oral ex p erien ce  by th e  
c r i t i c a l  method o f  deduction  ( a t  l e a s t  n o t  by Kant) and th e re fo re  th ey  do 
n o t ,  s t r i c t l y  sp eak ing , be long  in to  th e  th e o ry  o f  e th ic s  as Kant 
env isaged  i t .  We a re  th e r e f o re  e n t i t l e d  to  d is re g a rd  them in  our
in v e s t ig a t io n  in to  th e  im p lic a tio n s  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e . On
th e  o th e r  hand i f  i t  were c o n c lu s iv e ly  shown t h a t  w ith  th e  e lim in a tio n
'
o f  th e s e  id ea s  and concep ts th e  K antian  system  o f  e th ic s  would be 
d e sp o ile d  o f i t s  m oral s ig n i f ic a n c e ,  th e n  i t  would be c le a r  t h a t  th e  
grounds and sou rce  o f  e th ic s ,  and e th ic a l  p r in c ip le s  m ust be sought in
l )  I  exempt th e  second fo rm u la tio n  o f  th e  C a te g o ric a l Im p era tiv e  fo r  
reaso n s which w i l l  become ap p aren t in  th e  course  o f  th e  argum ent. 
However, even t h i s  form i s  open to  one v a lid  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  which 
would s u b je c t  i t  to  th e  same c r i t i c i s m  p a r i  passu  w ith  th e  o th e r  
fo rm u la tio n s . '
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th o se  id ea s  and concep ts and n o t in  th e  form al s t r u c tu r e  o f  r a t io n a l  law s. 
These id e a s  and concepts would th e re fo re  have to  be examined m ost 
c a r e f u l ly  in  o rd e r  to  a s c e r ta in  which among them, and why and how,
p ro v id es  th e  b a s is  o f e th ic s .  -
Now th e  v a r io u s ,  fo rm u la tio n s  o f  th e  C a te g o ric a l Im p era tiv e  a r e :
I . Act only on t h a t  maxim whereby thou can s t a t  ,the same tim e 
w il l  t h a t  i t  should become a u n iv e r s a l  law .
I I .  Act as i f  th e  maxim o f th y  a c t io n  were to  become by th y  w i l l  
a U n iv e rsa l Law o f  n a tu re .
I I I .  Act as i f  by th y  maxim thou w e re s t to  l e g i s l a t e  u n iv e r s a l ly  
in  th e  kingdom o f ends.
These fo rm u la tio n s  I  contend a s su re  us o f  th e  c o n s is te n c y , freedom , 
autonomy, r a t io n a l  c o m p re h e n s ib ility  o f  th e  c o r r e la te d  a c tio n s  th ey  
m o tiv a te . They a ls o  a s su re  th e  u n iv e r s a l i ty  and o b je c t iv i ty  o f  th e  
manner o f  w i l l in g .  But th ey  do n o t a s s u re  th e  m oral r ig h tn e s s  o f  what 
i s  w i l le d  no r th e  m oral goodness o f th e  w i l l  w i l l in g  i t .  In  o th e r  words, 
K a n t 's  p ro p o s i t io n  "The w i l l  i s  a law u n to  i t s e l f  means n o th in g  e ls e  but
a p r in c ip le  n o t to  a c t  on any o th e r  maxim th an  th a t  which can a ls o  accep t
i t s e l f  as u n iv e r s a l  law. But t h i s  i s  th e  form ula o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  
im p e ra tiv e  and th e  b a s ic  p r in c ip le  o f  m o ra lity  : th e r e fo re  a f r e e  w il l  and
a w il l  under m oral law a re  one"^^ does n o t h o ld . For t h o u ^  i t  i s  t r u e  
t h a t  a w il l  in  o rd e r to  be capab le  o f  m o ra l ity  m ust needs be f r e e ,  i . e .
1 ) Kant* Grundlegung zur M etaphysik d e r B i t te n ,  Z w eiter A b sc h n itt.
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freedom  i s  a n e ce ssa ry  p re c o n d itio n  o f m o ra l ity ;  a f r e e  w i l l  i s  n o t
n e c e s s a r i ly  m o ra l; i . e .  freedom i s  n o t a s u f f i c i e n t  co n d itio n  o f
m o ra l i ty ,  and a d d it io n a l  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  o f  th e  w i l l  a re  re q u ire d . Even
1 )th e  connec ting  l in k  o f  r a t i o n a l i t y  . f o r  t h i s  i s  in  e f f e c t  what Kant had 
in  m ind, does n o t a s su re  us as Kant though t o f  th e  m oral goodness o f th e  
w il l  so q u a l i f ie d .
To i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  p o in t  I  quote from P ro f , van H o ik 's  L e c tu re : 
F ore ign  occupation  as an E th ic a l  Problem : "L et us acknowledge th a t
however n ecessa ry  and g lo r io u s  i t  was a l l  war a c t i v i t y  re p re s e n ts  a 
d e p lo ra b le  item  in  h u m an ity 's  c i v i l i s a t i o n  budget. That i s  th e  very  
l e a s t  we can say from an e th ic a l  p o in t o f  view . . .  The w orst d isad v an tag es 
o f  occupation  tim e m o r a l i t y . . .  was m an ifes ted  in  an o th e r  phenomenon :
The s p l i t t i n g  up o f  moral judganent acco rd in g  to  f r ie n d  o r fo e , a h ig h ly  
u n fav o u rab le  double s tan d a rd  o f  good and bad . . .  Fran a c e r ta in  p o in t o f 
view t h i s  m ight be co n sid ered  a recandescence  o f p r im it iv e  m o ra ls , o f  c la n  
l i f e .  Q uite  so , bu t th e  d if fe re n c e  i s  t h a t  in  p r im it iv e  c lan  l i f e  th e re  
i s  no h ig jie r  s ta n d a rd  known, t h a t  in  advancing  s o c ie t ie s  th e re  dawns th e  
p o s s ib i l i t y  o f h ig h e r and w ider range o f  moral, v a lu e s , whence we had
c o n sc io u s ly  and w i l l in g ly  to  go down to  a s t r a t a  we knew to  be i n f e r i o r m2)
1 ) The argument moves in  two s te p s :  th e  f r e e  w i l l  i s  one w ith  th e  moral 
w i l l  because i t  i s  determ ined by re a so n , and so i s  th e  m oral w i l l .  
That i s ,  to  be f r e e  i s  to  be w holly r a t io n a l  ; to  be w holly r a t io n a l  
i s  to  be m ora lly  good. The v a l id i ty  o f both  s te p s  as I  have a lre ad y  
p o in te d  ou t seems d o u b tfu l in  th e  extrem e.
2) L . J ,  Van H oik: Foreign  O ccupation as an E th ic a l  Problem ; Essex
H a ll  L e c tu re , p . 9 . ( I 946 ) .
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Now a double stan d ard  o f m o ra l ity  i s  n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  incom patib le  w ith  
th e  form ulas o f th e  C a te g o r ic a l Im p e ra tiv e . For no doubt any member 
o f th e  'r e s is ta n c e *  could have wished h is  maxims to  become u n iv e r s a l  
law , and c e r ta in ly  saw h im se lf  by h is  maxims as l e g i s l a t i n g  in  a 
"Kingdom of Ends". That i s ,  he wished h is  maxims to  be adopted by a l l . . 
Dutchmen. The v i t a l  p o in t  h e re  i s ,  who i s  and who i s  n o t  co n sid ered  as 
a member o f  th e  "Kingdom o f Ends". The u l t im a te  rea so n  fo r  d is t in g u is h ­
in g  a "lower" or c lan  m o ra lity  from a "h igher"  o r t o t a l  m o ra lity  i s  th e  
p o s tu la te  t h a t  no human be ing  be excluded from membership in  th e  Kingdom 
o f  Ends. T h is , i t  seems to  me, i s  th e  u l t im a te  norm by which we ev a lu a te  
low er and h ig h e r m oral codes, indeed  th e  b a s ic  c r i t e r i o n  o f M o ra lity  
i t s e l f .
Once t h i s  i s  c le a r ly  g rasp ed , a g re a t  d ea l o f  complex and confused 
a rgum en ta tion  and th in k in g  could be avo ided . An argum ent l ik e  th e  
fo llo w in g  w ith  i t s  con fusion  as to  i t s  own r a t io n a l  grounds would no 
lo n g e r  be p o s s ib le :  "The d if fe re n c e  between low er and h ig h e r m oral codes 
cannot be l ig h t l y  brushed a s i d e . . .  Of cou rse  we cannot when d eb a tin g  what 
c r i t e r i o n  to  u se  fo r  m oral g rad in g , grade th e  c r i t e r i o n  m o ra lly . But we 
can grade them by en ligh tenm en t p rov ided  t h a t  th e  d isp u ta n ts  have an 
agreed  s e t  o f  c r i t e r i a  o f en lig ih tenm en t,. .  Now th e  m isery  o f s la v e s  fo r  
example i s  s u re ly  a p o te n t cause fo r  th e  r e je c t io n  o f  a m oral code as 
en lig h te n e d  in  which a slaveow ner o r a t r a d e r  i s  a good man. The H ealth , 
W ealth and H appiness o f  peop le  l iv in g  under d i f f e r e n t  moral codes cannot 
prove th e  s u p e r io r i ty  o f  one code over a n o th e r , bu t i t  does seem a
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c r i t e r i o n  of en lig h ten m en t" ,^ ^  Now, in  th e  f i r s t  p la c e  i t  i s  obvious 
t h a t  m oral codes could never be graded by en ligh tenm en t i f  th e  c r i t e r io n  
o f  en lig jitenm en t, i . e .  "H ea lth , W ealth and H appiness" does n o t a s su re  a 
s u p e r io r i ty  o f  m oral goodness. Secondly i t  i s  obvious t h a t  th e  w r i te r  
does n o t th in k  th e  s lav eo w n er 's  m oral code le s s  e n lig h ten e d  sim ply 
because th e re  i s  l e s s  "H ea lth , W ealth and H appiness" in  a  slave-ow ning 
S o c ie ty  than  in  a non-slave-ow ning  S o c ie ty , ( f o r  a l l  we know th e r e  may be 
more) bu t because t h i s  "H ea lth , W ealth and Happiness" i s  n o t d i s t r ib u te d  
( th e  m isery  o f  s la v e s ! )  in  a manner f i t t i n g  th e  p o s tu la te  o f  th e  t o t a l i l y  
o f membership in  th e  Kingdon o f Ends.
Now th e  p o s tu la te  t h a t  no human being  i s  to  be excluded from th e
Kingdom o f Ends, i s  n o t  co n ta in ed  in  th e  form ulas o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l
im p e ra tiv e . I t  cannot be deduced by a n a ly s is  from th e  concept o f
o b l ig a t io n .  More th an  t h a t ,  t h i s  p o s tu la te  i s  n o t (c o n tra ry  to  K a n t 's
view ) a n e ce ssa ry  id ea  o f re a s o n , i . e .  a n ecessa ry  mode o f conscious and
r e f l e c t i v e  th o u g h t. The p ro o f  fo r  t h i s  l a s t  c o n te n tio n  must be l e f t  to
a l a t e r  o ccasio n . But a few comments seem a p p ro p r ia te  a t  t h i s  p o in t :
The a c t  o f r e f l e c t iv e ly  p e rc e iv in g  m yse lf as a r a t io n a l  and f r e e  be ing ,
a be ing  whose w orth i s  g iven  in  i t s  very  e x is te n c e , though i t  may lead
me to  su sp ec t t h a t  o th e r  peop le  regard  t h e i r  be ing  in  a l ik e  m anner, does
n o t in v o lv e  a r a t io n a l  n e c e s s i ty  fo r  me to  th in k  o f  o th e rs  in  th e  same way,
o r to  endorse t h e i r  s e l f - e v a lu a t io n .  T his I  must choose to  do f r e e ly  and 
2 )d e l ib e r a te ly .  In  o th e r  words th e  " to ta l "  a p p lic a t io n  o f  th e
1) J .O . Urmson: On G rading : Mind, 1950, p . 168.
2) How and why a re  q u e s tio n s  to  be co n sid ered  l a t e r .
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c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  i s  n o t g iven in  th e  id e a  o f  th e  im p era tiv e  i t s e l f ,  
n o r i s  i t  a ca teg o ry  o f re a so n . R ather i s  i t  an appeal which one may 
choose n o t to  fo llo w , w ith o u t th e  l e a s t  r i s k  o f f r i c t i o n  w ith  o n e 's  
reaso n  or o n e 's  freedom .
The f i r s t  c o n te n tio n  however -  th e  co n te n tio n  t h a t  th e  form ulas o f
th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  and th e  concep t o f o b l ig a t io n  do n o t c o n ta in
th e  p o s tu la te  o f  t o t a l i t y  and in  consequence, cannot se rv e  as c r i t e r i a
o f  m oral rig jh tness -  m ight be s u b s ta n t ia te d  by th e  fo llo w in g  r e f le c t io n s  :
A ccording to  K ant, th e  e s s e n t ia l  and d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  q u a l i ty  o f  th e  good
w i l l  i s  i t s  e x c lu s iv e  d e te rm in a tio n  by th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e , i . e .
i t s  u t t e r  r a t i o n a l i t y .  A gain, acco rd in g  to  K ant, th e  u t t e r  r a t i o n a l i t y
o f th e  w i l l  e n ta i l s  th e  c o n s is te n c y , freedom and autonomy o f th e  w i l l ,
as w e ll as th e  u n iv e r s a l i ty ^   ^ o f  what i s  w ille d  and i t s  c a p a c ity  to  impose
a d e f i n i t e  r a t io n a l  o rd er on th e  p r a c t ic a l  w orld ( i . e .  s o c ie ty ) .  Now i f
we could  show t h a t  a w i l l  b en t on e v il  could p o ssess  th e  same q u a l i t i e s
we would have adduced p ro o f a g a in s t  K a n t 's  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  r a t io n a l
and th e  m oral. That i s ,  we should  have shown t h a t  th e  a s s e r t io n  : " i f
r a t i o n a l . . .  th e n  m o r a l . . ."  i s  n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  t r u e .  T his we s h a l l  t r y
to  do in  two s te p s .  The f i r s t  s te p  w i l l  be to  show t h a t  a w i l l  ben t on
e v i l  can be c o n s is te n t ,  f r e e ,  autonomous, u n iv e r s a l  in  a p p l ic a t io n ,  and
cosmic in  i t s  e f f e c t s .  The second s te p  w il l  be to  show t h a t ,  c o n tra ry
2 )
to  K a n t 's  view on th e  m a tte r ,  a d e l ib e r a te  and p u re ly  r a t io n a l   ^ choice  of
1) T his u n iv e r s a l i ty  i s  u s u a l ly  m istaken  f o r  th e  p o s tu la te  o f t o t a l i t y .  
That th e  two a re  n o t id e n t i c a l  w i l l  be seen in  th e  course o f  t h i s  
argum ent.
2) Compare S o c ra te s ' view t h a t  e v i l  i s  ig n o ran ce , knowledge v i r tu e  and 
t h a t  nobody knowingly chooses th e  bad.
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"wrong" i s  p o s s ib le .  T hat i s ,  t h a t  e v i l  and r a t io n a l  a re  n o t m utua lly  
e x c lu s iv e  co n cep ts .
For th e  purpose o f  t h i s  argument l e t  us d e fin e  th e  w i l l  o f  a man who 
seeks to  e s ta b l i s h  a w orld d ic ta to r s h ip  f o r  th e  sake o f th e  id e a l  o f  
a b so lu te  power, as an e s s e n t ia l l y  e v i l  w i l l .  A w i l l  so d e fin ed  would be 
determ ined  by r a t io n a l  c o n s id e ra tio n s  to  th e  same deg ree  and e x te n t as a 
w i l l  choosing  to  perform  i t s  duty f o r  th e  sake o f th e  m oral law . The 
id e a  o f a b so lu te  power i s  a p u re ly  r a t io n a l  id e a . I t s  form al and 
fu n c t io n a l  d e te rm in a tio n s  as a r e g u la t iv e  id e a  o f rea so n  d i f f e r  in  n o th in g  
from th e  form al and fu n c tio n a l  d e te rm in a tio n s  o f th e  m oral law as a 
r e g u la t iv e  id e a  o f  rea so n . Even th e  n a tu re  o f th e  " in te r e s t"  i t  evokes 
in  human h e a r ts  i s  n o t d i f f e r e n t  from th e  " d i s in te r e s te d  i n te r e s t "  in  th e  
m oral law . A man who w i l l s  a b so lu te  power f o r  i t s  own sake i s  n o t moved 
by b a se r  m a te r ia l  i n t e r e s t s  o r  d e s i r e s . A n d  i f  th e re  be some " n a tu ra l 
in c l in a t io n  o r  d e s ire "  f o r  a b so lu te  power i t  i s  o f  no d i f f e r e n t  o rd er 
th a n  th e  " n a tu ra l  i n c l in a t io n  and d e s ire "  f o r  m o ra l i ty .  A w i l l  choosing 
a b s o lu te  power in  p re fe re n c e  to  ev e ry th in g  e ls e ,  would th e re fo re  possess  
e x a c tly  th e  same o rd e r and degree  o f r a t i o n a l i t y  as  th e  w i l l  choosing 
i t s  m oral du ty  in  p re fe re n c e  to  a l l  i t s  n a tu r a l  d e s i r e s .  The r a t i o n a l i t y  
o f  th e  id ea  o f a b so lu te  power, I  s h a l l  assum e, i s  p la u s ib le  enough fo r  
th e  requ irem en ts  o f th e  f i r s t  argum ent.
1 )
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I t  can be shown t h a t  a w i l l  to  a b so lu te  power, i . e .  a , by d e f in i t io n ,  
e v i l  w i l l ,  i s  a ls o  (a )  c o n s is te n t ,  (b) f r e e ,  (c ) autonomous, (d) o f 
u n iv e rs a l  v a l i d i ty ,  (e ) capab le  o f  im posing a d e f in i t e ,  r a t io n a l ly  
c o n s is te n t  o rd e r on th e  w orld . In  s h o r t ,  i t  i s  p e r f e c t ly  f i t  to  comply 
w ith  th e  form al requ irem ents o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  : "Act only on
t h a t  maxim whereby thou  c an s t a t  th e  same tim e w i l l  t h a t  i t  should  become 
by th y  w il l  a u n iv e r s a l  law o f n a tu r e " ; "Act as i f  by th y  maxim thou 
w e re s t to  l e g i s l a t e  u n iv e r s a l ly  in  th e  Kingdom o f Ends."
(a )  The w i l l  to  power need never c o n tra d ic t  i t s e l f ,  and can remain 
c o n s is te n t  w ith  i t s e l f  in  a l l  i t s  m a n ife s ta t io n s . I t  need n o t swerve 
w ith  every  a c c id e n ta l  and p a r t i c u l a r  d e s ir e  bu t c o n s id e rin g  th e  t o t a l i t y  
o f  a l l  i t s  p o s s ib le  d e te rm in a tio n s  and t h e i r  m utual c o m p a tib ili ty  imposes 
a p re v a i l in g  conform ity . The o rder such an unsw erving w i l l  to  power
l )imposes in  th e  l i f e  o f  th e  man who w i l l s ,  i s  o b je c tiv e  and homogeneous. 
C on sis ten cy , however, i s  n o t a q u a l i ty  rese rv ed  to  f r e e  and autonomous 
w i l l in g .  I t  i s  a q u a l i f ic a t io n  o f  every  w i l l ,  in s o fa r  as i t  i s  a w il l  
and n o t ju s t  a p a ss in g  whim.
(b) The w i l l  to  power i s  a f r e e  w i l l .  I t  i s  f r e e  in  th e  f i r s t  
sense  o f freedom because i t  has f r e e ly  chosen i t s  purpose in  p re fe re n c e  
to  a l l  o th e r p o s s ib le  c h o ic e s , and p a r t i c u la r ly  in  p re fe re n c e  to  th e  m oral 
c h o ic e . I t  i s  f r e e  in  th e  second sense because i t  was determ ined in  i t s
1 ) Compare E. C a s s ire r :  " So Q)
(dit 'lul'cÂj'
eu^
W ^  ^  tdêcxytf'l,
• O u  o l o u A ^ h
•^UA,  ^ JU^O
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c h o ice  by none b u t r a t io n a l  c o n s id e ra tio n s , namely i t s  re s p e c t  f o r  and 
i t s  " d i s in te r e s te d  in t e r e s t "  in  th e  id e a  o f a b so lu te  power fo r  i t s  own 
sa k e . I t  i s  f r e e  o f a l l  se n su a l d e te rm in a tio n s  su b o rd in a tin g  them and 
s a c r i f i c i n g  them f o r  th e  sake o f  i t s  id e a .  I t  i s  th u s  a w holly r a t i o n a l ,  
and th e r e f o re  w holly f r e e  w i l l .  But to  be w holly r a t i o n a l ,  and w holly 
f r e e  acco rd in g  to  Kant i s  to  be w holly m o ra l. The w i l l  which i s  w holly 
f r e e  ( i . e .  e x c lu s iv e ly  governed by reaso n ) i s  th e  good w i l l .  I t  fo llow s 
t h a t  th e  w il l  to  power, th e  e v i l  w i l l  i s  a t  th e  same tim e a good w i l l ,  
which c o n tr a d ic ts  i t s e l f .
W hether Kant was j u s t i f i e d  to  i d e n t i f y  th e  r a t io n a l  and th e  m oral 
i s  our main problem  whose s o lu t io n  cannot be p re c lu d e d . I  s h a l l  th e r e ­
fo re  t r y  to  so lv e  th e  p re s e n t  im passe by le a v in g  th e  la r g e r  i s s u e  fo r  
th e  moment and by c o n c e n tra tin g  on th e  m ed ia tin g  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  o f 
freedom and r a t i o n a l i t y ,  and freed an  and m o ra lity  which have come up in  
th e  l a s t  p a ssag e . A s h o r t  excu rsus on freedom seems in d ic a te d  a t  t h i s  
p o in t .
X X X  X X
Some a sp e c ts  o f th e  n a tu re  and fu n c t io n  
o f  freedom in  Kant*s th e o ry  o f e th ic s T
K ant, as we have seen , h a b i tu a l ly  u se s  th e  n o tio n  of freedom  in  two 
w ide ly  d i f f e r e n t  se n se s . The f i r s t  sen se  i s  d e fin e d  by th e  t r a n s ­
c en d e n ta l d ed u c tio n  o f m oral e x p e rie n c e s . Freedom i s  d e fin ed  as th e  
c a te g o ry  o f  p r a c t i c a l  re a so n , th e  supreme p re -c o n d it io n  f o r  th e  la c k  o f 
which m oral o b l ig a t io n  would be n e i th e r  p o s s ib le  nor com prehensib le . 
I n c id e n ta l ly ,  t h i s  d e f in i t io n  o f freedom i s  in co m p a tib le  w ith  th e  second
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sens© o f freedom . The second sense  i s  a r r iv e d  a t  by a d e f in i t io n  o f  
freedom  as freedom from n a tu r a l  m o tiv a tio n  and as w holly  r a t io n a l  
d e te rm in a tio n . T his l a t t e r  d e f in i t io n  seems r a th e r  q u e s tio n a b le . I t  
i s  q u e s tio n a b le  on th e o r e t i c a l  grounds : i f  freedom i s  th e  n e c e ssa ry  p re ­
c o n d it io n  o f  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  m oral o b l ig a t io n  i t  cannot a t  th e  same 
tim e be th e  c o n te n t o f  m oral o b l ig a t io n .  I f  freedom i s  th e  c a teg o ry  o f  
p r a c t i c a l  re a so n , i . e .  th e  w i l l  i t  cannot a t  th e  same tim e be th e  
c r i t e r i o n  o f  th e  good w i l l  o r  i t s  d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  q u a l i t y . T h e  second 
d e f in i t i o n  o f  freedom , a ls o  p re s e n ts  c e r t a in  p r a c t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  As 
O tto  has p o in te d  o u t:  "Moral d e c is io n s  a re  p o s s ib le  only  on th e  c o n d itio n
o f  freedom . However a c e r t a in  amount o f  freedcan seems in d isp e n sa b le  even 
to  d e c is io n s  m o tiv a ted  by d e s i r e s .  Not only  th e  m oral w i l l ,  bu t a l l  w i l l  
in s o f a r  as i t  i s  w i l l  c o n ta in s  a moment o f  freedom . T his becomes 
com prehensib le  enough when we s to p  to  c o n s id e r  t h a t  d e s i r e s  as w ell as 
m oral o b l ig a t io n s  a re  ways o f  d e te rm in in g  th e  w i l l  in  th e  cho ice  o f  i t s  
a c t s ,  though n e i th e r  a re  s u f f i c i e n t  d e te rm in a tio n s . In  t h e i r
2 )in s u f f ic ie n c y  l i e s  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  what we c a l l  freedom ". I f  in  
a d d i t io n  and f o r  th e  moment we a llow  o f  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  r a t io n a l  id e a s  
o th e r  th a n  th e  m oral law , th e  f i e l d  o f  freedom  i s  f u r th e r  e n la rg e d . The 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  cho ice  a re  no lo n g er l im ite d  to  a c t io n s  under m oral id ea s  
and a c t io n s  under d e s i r e s ,  b u t w i l l  in c lu d e  cho ices between a c t io n  under
1 ) T h is has been d isc u sse d  a lre a d y  v iz .  pp./^& - And I s h a l l  n o t 
d isc u ss  i t  h e re  a g a in , b u t proceed to  d isc u ss  c e r t a in  o th e r  a sp e c ts  
o f K a n t 's  concep t o f  freedom .
2 ) R. O tto : N otes to  K a n t 's  "G rundlegung. . p . 6 .
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m oral id e a s  and a c tio n s  under o th e r  id e a s .  This new s i t u a t io n  i s  by no 
means unwelcome, from a m oral p o in t  o f  view . For i t  in c re a s e s  th e  odds ' \ 
a g a in s t  th e  m oral cho ice  and th e re b y  enhances i t s  m e r i t .
We a re  th e r e f o r e  w ell in s id e  th e  c r i t i c a l  th e o ry  o f  m orals n o r do 
we t r a n s g re s s  a g a in s t  any b a s ic  m oral p r in c ip le  o r i n t e r e s t  by d e f in in g  
freedom as th e  u l t im a te  independence o f  th e  human w i l l  face  to  fa c e  w ith  
a l l  o b je c ts ,  ( s e n s u a l ,  em otional o r r a t i o n a l )  \diich a re  capab le  o f  swaying 
i t  (a s  m o tiv e s , ends, or p r i n c i p le s ) .  Man must be f r e e  n o t to  fo llo w  th e   ^
o b l ig a t io n s  o f" th e  m oral law , n o t s o le ly  because he  i s  p rev en ted  hy h is  
se n su a l n a tu re ,  b u t ou t o f  a  f r e e ,  d e l ib e r a te ,  and r a t io n a l  d e c is io n  to
d is re g a rd  th e  in ju n c t io n s  o f  th e  m oral law . Only in  t h i s  way can r e a l
m oral m e r it  be a t t r ib u t e d  to  th e  choosing  to  do o n e 's  m oral du ty  in  - 
p re fe re n c e  to  a l l  o th e r  p o s s ib le  a c t io n s . In  t h i s  view o r in  i t s  
c o n c lu sio n s  we do n o t d e v ia te  too w idely from K a n t's  own stan d  in  t h i s  
m a t te r .  Except fo r  th e  a d d it io n  o f r a t i o n a l  m otives o th e r  th a n  th e  m oral 
to  th e  l i s t  o f m otives which determ ine m a n 's 'w i l l ,  we do n o t a l t e r  th e
f I
co n cep tio n  no r th e  manner o f  o p e ra tio n  o f  freedom as expounded by K ant.
T his a d d it io n  however i s  im m ate ria l to  th e  p re s e n t  argum ent.
Now Kant h o ld s  t h a t  though i t  would be absurd  to  h o ld  man
\
r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  h is  m otives i . e .  f o r  t h e i r  e x is te n c e , we m ust, i f  m o ra lity  
i s  to  have any m eaning, h o ld  him re s p o n s ib le  fo r  a c t in g  upon t h e i r  
i n s t i g a t io n .  T hat i s ,  though man i s  n o t f r e e  to  choose h is  m o tives as 
he p le a s e s  he ^  f r e e  to  a c t  upon them . Freedom, th e n , i s  th e  f a c u l ty
l )  T his p o in t  Kant m a in ta in s  m ost e m p h a tic a lly  a g a in s t  th e  d o c tr in e  o f 
th e  need f o r  d iv in e  g race  a s  a n e c e ssa ry  c o n d itio n  fo r  th e  e x e r t io n  
o f  a good w i l l .
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o f  th e  himan w i l l  to  d is re g a rd  i t s  own m o tiv e s . T h is f a c u l ty  i s
I
a b s o lu te .  I t  i s  never im p a ired , never dorm ant, and always e f f ic a c io u s .
C o n eo m ittan tly , Kant h o ld s , t h a t  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  i s  a b s o lu te ,  
in e s c a p a b le , u n ab ro g a ted , sans excuse. - To th e  th e o ry  o f m orals 
in v io la b le  l i b e r t y  and t o t a l  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  a re  th e  e s s e n t ia l  f e a tu r e s  
o f  man in  h is  r o le  o f  m oral a g e n t, whose w ille d  a c ts  a re  th e  o b je c ts  o f  
m oral j u d g m e n t s " O n  exam ining i t s  r a t io n a l  o r ig in s  every m o ra lly  
wrong a c t io n  must be viewed as though man had f a l l e n  in to  i t  d i r e c t l y  
from th e  s t a t e  o f  innocence . W hatever h is  p rev io u s  conduct, w hatever 
th e  n a tu r a l  causes which in f lu e n c e  a m an 's conduct, be th ey  in te r n a l  o r 
e x te r n a l ,  h is  a c t io n  i s  s t i l l  f r e e  and n o t determ ined by any c au se s . 
T h e re fo re  i t  bo th  can and m ust be judged as an o r ig in a l  e x e rc is e  o f  th e  
w i l l .  He ought to  have l e f t  i t  undone, in  w hatever c ircum stances he may 
have been , fo r  no cause in  th e  w orld can stop  a man from being  a f r e e  
a g e n t . . .  I f  a man never had been sober up to  th e  v e ry  moment o f  an 
im pending f r e e  a c t io n  (even so t h a t  custom had become second n a tu r e ) ,  n o t 
only  has i t  been h i s  duty  to  be b e t t e r  in  th e  p a s t  b u t i t  s t i l l  i s  h is  
du ty  to  improve h im se lf  in  th e  p re s e n t .  T h ere fo re  man must a ls o  be a b le  
to  do so a t  any moment. I f  he f a i l s ,  he i s  as a cc o u n ta b le  a t  th e  moment 
o f  a c t in g  as i f ,  endowed w ith  th e  n a tu r a l  c a p a c ity  fo r  good (which i s  
in s e p a ra b le  from freedom) he had stepped  in to  e v i l  s t r a i g h t  frcsn th e  s t a t e  
o f innocence . We in q u ire  n o t in to  th e  tem poral b u t in to  th e  r a t io n a l
l )  In  h i s  ro le  o f e n d - i n - i t s e l f , and member in  th e  kingdom of ends, man 
i s  allow ed a more v a r ie g a te d , com prehensive and c o n c re te  n a tu re .
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o r ig in  o f t h i s  a c t . . . " ^ ^
The d ru nkard , whom A r i s t o t l e  c o n s id e rs  m erely in d i r e c t ly  re sp o n s ib le  
f o r  h is  drunken a c tio n s  because he ought n o t to  have tak en  to  d r in k  in  
th e  f i r s t  p la c e , Kant c o n s id e rs  d i r e c t l y  and s im u ltan eo u s ly  re s p o n s ib le  
f o r  h is  i n i t i a l  cho ice  o f ta k in g  to  d r in k , f o r  a l l  subsequent 
r e p e t i t io n s  and (hence) co n firm a tio n s  o f  t h a t  i n i t i a l  ch o ic e , and fo r  a l l  
a c t io n s  committed in  h is  in e b r ia te d  s t a t e .  As f a r  as m o ra lity  i s  
concerned , Kant h o ld s  man can n ev er be dep rived  (o r  sav ed I) from th e  
e f f ic a c io u s  i n t e g r i t y  o f  h is  w i l l , h is  freedom , o r h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
So f a r  so good. But t h i s  view o f  freedom , i f  m ain ta in ed  w ith  a 
modicum o f c o n s is te n c y  in e v i ta b ly  lea d s  to  a p o s i t io n  n o t e s s e n t ia l ly  
d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  o f  S prenger and Kremer, th e  c e le b ra te d  w it'ch -h u n te rs . 
I t  may even ( in e v i ta b ly l? )  le a d  to  co n c lu sio n s  n o t l e s s  inhuman, though 
le s s  d r a s t i c a l l y  c o n c re te , th a n  th e  i n q u i s i t o r i a l  s ta k e .
L et us examine th e  Sprenger-K rem er p o s i t io n  more c lo s e ly .  Our
i n t e r e s t  w i l l  n o t  seem e n t i r e l y  m isp laced  when we remember t h a t  r e l ig io u s
2 ) 5 ) 
d o c tr in e ,  f ig h te r s  in  th e  cause  o f  human d ig n ity  and l a t e l y
T) Kant : Die R e lig io n  in n e r h a l t ,  e t c . . . .  I ,  & I I .
2 ) T hat i s  in  i t s  more c h e e rfu l  c a th o lic  a s p e c ts .  In  i t s  more sombre 
(P r o te s ta n t )  moments r e l ig io u s  d o c tr in e  ho lds t h a t  m an's w i l l  be ing  
c o rru p t s in c e  o r ig in a l  s in s  man canno t f r e e ly  determ ine  h im se lf  
tow ards th e  good u n le s s  he lped  by th e  e f f ic a c io u s  grace  o f God. v iz .  
C a lv in 's  I n s t i t u t i o n e s , C h .I I ,  A rt.IX  & X II. W ithout t h i s ,  g race  he 
would n o t be capab le  even o f  th e  w ish to  d i r e c t  h im s e lf  tow ards th e  
good. Compare S t ,  P a u l, P h i l l i p i a n s ,  I I ,  15, c i te d  on page . 
However, as a descendan t o f  Adam, man i s  s t i l l  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  every­
th in g  in c lu d in g  th e  g race  n o t accorded  to  him, and th e  o r ig in a l  s in  o f 
h i s  g ra n d s ire .  Both a sp e c ts  a re  m ost f o r c e f u l ly  brough t to  l i g h t  in  
Je an  B od in 's  simple-m&*éed e x p o s itio n  in  De Magorum daimonomania, 
w hich I s h a l l  quote a t  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  p o in t .
5) From P ico  de M iran d o lla  to  K ant.
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e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  th in k e rs^ ^  do n o t d i f f e r  fundam entally  in  t h e i r  te n e ts  
from th e  i n q u i s i t o r i a l  view o f human freedom . In  p e r f e c t  accord w ith  v -
2 )K a n t's  view t h a t  man i s  always f r e e  n o t to  a c t  upon h is  m o tiv es, and
t *
t h a t ,  no m a tte r  what h is  a c tu a l  s t a te  o f d ep rav a tio n  (and i t s  concom­
i t t a n t  i n a b i l i t i e s  and d e lu s io n s )  every bad a c tio n  i s  to  be judged as
though he had committed i t  s t r a ig h t  from a s t a te  o f  innocence^^ -  Sprenger
V yh'
an^K rem er argue th u s  : Some people th in k  " /V
y>^u'uÀo IK A.OW uu'Kx w o ,
>?vi  ^ ^^0^ ^OU^ O gV&i'
DcLtcaîrv^. e / i  e x  t ' u ^ J S L ^ ' U J O ^
tu x iiK u A v  Da£K^jv<Lo cn^oc,’ sstH t>/euc^
îfCd (tofeA. 6^ 'uid (xof 2^ejc^u.ux \M-q£ ^ - o Y
d v'A Xou,c<  ^ CcTKOe^ L’  ^ C^ ytrpejL.'QJU
Ai/t OlXcc'UX, JjcJ f^'ctx let . 4 ^ ^  (XXX) (2.fKy44ULt(jLl^
(IfK o W o ^  \,€X| J m £æ^ <lSlCu, JIulH ôI C_ô^^eCû>U " t )
A ll views which t r y  to  e x p la in  w itc h c ra f t  as a figm ent o f  im ag ination
can be proved f a l s e  on th e  a u th o r i ty  o f  th e  S c r ip tu re s  and th e  F a th e rs . ^
But g ran ted  even th a t  in  some cases women s u f fe r in g  from d e lu s io n s
/
im agine them selves to  perform  a c tio n s  which in  r e a l i t y  they  never
1 ) Those who a re  r e l ig io u s ly  in c lin e d  l ik e  L av e lle  no le s s  th an  th e
i r r e l ig i o u s  l ik e  S a r t r e .
2 ) Kant : Die R e lig io n  . . .  1 t e i l  & 1 1 .
5 ) Kant % idem.
4 ) M alleus M aleficarum , F ra n k fu r t e d i t io n  o f 1580; p p .5 -^ .
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p e rfo ra e d , th e  v e ry  f a c t  t h a t  th e s e  women have such d e lu s io n s  stamps 
them as w itc h e s . W itches a re  a ls o :  " ^  t j /  ^
V U x U y W  t X ^ - v o i  f & A J L  CUx^  * O ^ ’û / ^ ô ^  {  E y x c '  }f-
iji Wbtxx/ j  ... / ikvAouS. ^  u e gL^ h'cL
ptA. ?*-u^ 4J p j^  ho f ^4»'
uof SjVL  ^ j^ 'tSLcC^  Cyi^d^SL£'/iA .CXXX3i'i(.a<AcJL " ^
T hat i s ,  even d e lu s io n s  reco g n ised  as such do n o t excuse th e  women
V
concerned from being  t r e a te d  as w itch es i . e .  from being  he ld  re s p o n s ib le  
fo r  th e  very  p e rv e rs io n s  o f  t h e i r  mind. The b e l i e f  in  th e  f r e e  w il l  is* 
h e re  b rough t to  i t s  m ost t e r r i f y i n g ,  b u t c o n s is te n t  and in e sc a p a b le
k
c o n c lu s io n s . Man, w hatever he does, even i f  he "succumbs to  an i l l n e s s
which p e rv e r ts  h is  p e rc e p tio n s , im a g in a tio n , i n t e l l e c t u a l  fu n c tio n s  does
i t  o f  h i s  own f r e e  w i l l .  He v o lu n ta r i ly  bows to  th e  w ishes o f  S a tan .
The d e v il  does n o t  lu r e  and t r a p  man. Man chooses to  succumb to  th e
2 ^d e v il  and he m ust be h e ld  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  h is  f r e e  c h o ic e " . '  In  le s s
/
m ediaeval term s th e  same view i s  expressed  by e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s  in  such 
s ta te m e n ts  as : " l a  l i b e r t é  e s t  un f a i t .  I l  f a u t  y d éd u ire  l é s
5)consequences C. l'homme e s t  sa  c h o ix . . 1 'homme e s t  ce q u ' i l  se  v eu t . . .  
l e  p ro p re  de l a  r e a l i t e  humaine c 'e s t  q u 'e l l e  e s t  sans excuse . . .  l'homme
r )  M alleus m aleficaru m , pp. 4 ;  11,
2) G .Z ilb o o rg : H is to ry  o f M edical Psychology , p . 156.
5) Compare P ico  de M ira n d o lla 's  : O ra tio  de d ig n i t a te  h o m in i: "0 . . .
summam e t  admirandam hom inis f e l i c i t a t e m  cu i datum id  habere  quod
o p ta t ,  e sse  quod v e l i t ."
It;;/
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e s t  re sp o n sa b le  de to u t  ce q u ' i l  f a i t  meme de sa  p a s s io n . ." As we have 
seen i t  a ls o  acco rd s w ith  K a n t 's  view in  t h i s  m a tte r .  Are we th en  by 
th e  same in e x o ra b le  lo g ic  d riv e n  to  a c c e p t th e  l a s t  in e v i ta b le  con­
c lu s io n s  of our b e l i e f  in  f r e e  w i l l ,  th e  s ta k e  o r w hatever i t s  modem 
e q u iv a le n t  may be? I t  seems so . For i f  we ho ld  t h a t  man i s  f r e e  n o t 
to  a c t  upon h is  n a tu r a l  m o tiv e s , and th e r e fo re  re s p o n s ib le  when he a c ts  
upon them , we obv iously  ho ld  him re s p o n s ib le  f o r  succumbing to  harm ful 
d e lu s io n s . But i f  he i s  re s p o n s ib le  fo r  succumbing’ to  harm ful d e lu s io n s
he ought a ls o  to  be punished f o r  i t .  Now h is  d e lu s io n s  a re  p r im a r ily
/
harm fu l to  h im s e lf ,  to  h i s  s o u l ,  though th e y  m ight by co n tag io n  a ls o  be 
harm ful to  th e  community. T h ere fo re  h is  sou l must be p ro te c te d  and 
saved from th e  con tam ina tion  to  which man s u b je c ts  i t ,  w h ils t  i t  i s  s t i l l  
in  h i s  body "h e ld  in  s in f u l  c a p t iv i ty  by h i s  c o rru p te d  w i l l " .  This can 
be done only by l ib e r a t i n g  th e  soul from i t s  c a p t iv i ty .  In  o th e r  w ords, 
by burn ing  th e  body. The s ta k e ,  o r i t s  modem e q u iv a le n t , i s  th e  
l o g i c a l ,  th e  in e v i t a b le ,  th e  ju s t  c o n c lu s io n  o f  th e  b e l i e f  in  f r e e  w i l l .
I
I t  rem ains, however, a repugnant co n c lu s io n . There i s  th e  a c tu a l  
h o r ro r  o f  b u m t f l e s h .  There i s  M o n ta ig n e 's  g e n tle  rem inder t h a t  "A fte r 
a l l  i t  i s  s e t t i n g  a h ig h  v a lu e  on o n e 's  c o n je c tu re s  i f  f o r  t h e i r  sake
P \
one i s  w i l l in g  to  bum  a human being  a l i v e " .  '  There a re  a ls o  th e  v o ices  
o f  men l ik e  S . who a lre a d y  a t  th e  beg inn ing  o f  th e  s ix te e n th  c en tu ry
1) The q u o ta tio n s  a re  from L a v a lle  and S a r t r e  a l t e r n a t e l y .
2) M ontaigne : E s s a is ;  Bk. I l l ;  Ch.XI, p . 171. P a r i s  e d i t io n  o f  1595. 
"Après to u t  c 'e s t  m e ttre  se s  c o n je c tu re s  a b ien  h a u t p r ix ,  que 
d 'e n  f a i r e  c u ire  un homme to u t  v i f . "
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argued : "Quod s i  q u is  c o n te n tio  se  v o lu n ta ta n  s e v e r iu s  puniendam
d e fe n d a t i s  primum d is t in g u â t  i n t e r  vo lun ta tem  hom in i, sa n i perfectum  
quae in  a c tu  v e re  d i r i g i  c o e p e r i t  e t  i n t e r  v i tia ta m  m en tis  sen su m ...
I f  th e r e  i s  anyone who contends t h a t  e r r a t i c  a c ts  m ust be punished  y e t  
more se v e re ly  I  would ask  him to  bear in  mind th e  d i s t in c t io n  between th e  
p e r f e c t ly  v o lu n ta ry  a c t  o f  a sane person  who behaves w ith  a f e e l in g  t h a t  
h i s  mind i s  tro u b le d  and th e  a c t  o f a p e rso n  whose w i l l  i f  you p e rm it me 
to  say so , i s  so co rru p te d  and ou t o f c o n tro l  t h a t  th e  d e v il  can p la y  
w ith  i t ,  g iv in g  th e  in d iv id u a l  th e  appearance o f  b e in g  under some o u ts id e  
pow er. Such a d is tu rb a n c e  (o r  d e fe c t) , o f o n e 's  w i l l  can a ls o  be imputed 
to  m élan co lie  in d iv id u a ls  and l i t t l e  c h i l d r e n . . .  The Lord who knows 
th e  k idney  and th e  h e a r t  does n o t  p e rm it t h a t  th ey  be punished to  th e  
same e x te n t  as th o se  whose minds a re  f r e e  (san e ) so much th e  l e s s  r i g h t  
has man to  m ete ou t punishm ent on such p e o p le . . .
The id e a  o f f r e e  w il l  so e n c h a n tin g ly  f u l l  o f  prom ise a t  f i r s t
\
s i g h t ,  seems to  e n ta i l  some rem arkably  b i t t e r  and u n p a la ta b le  c o n c lu s io n s . 
We can h a rd ly  be blamed f o r  h e s i t a t i n g  to  a ccep t i t  (so  l ik e  th e  T ro jan  
h o rse )  amongst our ch e rish e d  b e l i e f s .  On th e  o th e r  heind, u n le s s  we e r e  
p rep a red  to  g iv e  up a l l  a tte m p ts  a t  e x p la in in g  th e  phenomena o f  m oral 
e x p e rien c e  we cannot but'com m it o u rse lv e s  to  th e  id e a s  o f f r e e  w i l l  and 
human r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .  M oreover as long  as we a re  n o t p rep ared  to  adm it 
t h a t  a l l  m oral o b l ig a t io n  i s  a d e lu s io n  we a re  bound to  uphold th e  id e a  
o f  f r e e  w il l  in  s p i t e  o f i t s  more extrem e im p lic a tio n s .
l )  I t .  W eir, L ib . 6 . Cap.25, p p .740-4 1 . B asel e d i t io n  o f  1585
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A good chance o f eschew ing th e  fangs o f our p a r t i c u l a r  S cy lda and 
C harybdis i s  p rov ided  by th e  r e f l e c t io n  t h a t  th e  id e a  o f  f r e e  w i l l  can 
be conceived  in  d i f f e r e n t  modes. In  fo u r  d i f f e r e n t  modes to  be e x a c t.
In  th e  f i r s t  p la c e  th e  id e a  o f  f r e e  w il l  can be th o u g h t o f  as a
d e c e p tiv e  i l l u s i o n ,  whose o b je c tiv e  im p o s s ib i l i ty  mark i t  as s u i ta b le  fo r  
banishm ent to  th e  realm  o f  m etap h y sica l phantom s. Secondly i t  can be 
conceived  as th e  datum o f  a s p e c i f ic  e x p e rie n c e : th e  d i r e c t  ex p erien ce
o f freedom . T h ird ly  i t  can be conceived as a  r e a l  q u a l i ty  o f human 
n a tu r e .  And f o u r th ly  and f i n a l l y  i t  can be conceived  a s .a  r e g u la t iv e  " ; 
id e a ,  a p o in t o f  view , o r a c a teg o ry  o f  rea so n .
Now th e  f i r s t  concep tion  o f  freedom , e n ta i l s  th e  co n c lu sio n  t h a t  
m oral ex p erien ces  as su c h ,a re  a d e lu s io n  and m oral judgments and 
o b l ig a t io n s  m erely  i l l u s o r y .  We have been mocked a l l  a long  by th e  
t r i c k s  played upon us by th e  p h y s ic a l u n iv e rs e  in  o rd e r to  make us p l i a n t
to  N a tu re 's  h idden  p u rp o ses . I f  one has th e  good fo r tu n e  to  be in
harmony w ith  th e  in e x o ra b le  purposes o f  n a tu re  one can d isp en se  w ith  
th e  i l l u s i o n s  o f  f r e e  w i l l  and enjoy  a t  one and th e  same tim e th e  s e c u r i ty  
c o n fe rre d  by n e c e ssa ry  d e te rm in a tio n  and th e  sense  o f  freedom which th e  
absence  o f a l l  r e s t r a i n t  g iv es  one. I t  i s  even p ro b ab le  t h a t  d i r e c t  
ex p erien ce  o f  freedom which i s  claim ed by th o se  who ho ld  th e  second 
co n cep tio n  o f freedom has i t s  deeper ro o ts  in  t h i s  harm onious
l )  Isy n c h ro n isa tio n  o f  th e  in d iv id u a l  and th e  u n iv e rs e .
l )  At l e a s t  in  th o se c a se s  in  which i t  i s  a p le a s a n t  ex p e rien c e .
In  some cgees th e  d i r e c t  ex p erien ce  o f  freedom i s  d e sc rib e d  as 
ex trem ely  p a in fu l  and f u l l  o f  a n g u ish . Compare S a r t r e ,  K irk eg aard , 
H eidegger.
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Napoleon B onaparte  and Goethe a re  th e  m ost c e le b ra te d  examples o f  
t h i s  a t t i t u d e ,  Goethe indeed  found h is  d eep est e th ic a l  i n s p i r a t io n  in  
th e  th o u g h t:  "So m usst Du s e in .  D ir k an n s t Du n ic h t  e n t f  l ic h e n " . The
in e sc a p a b le  n e c e s s i ty  to  be h im se lf  alw ays a source  o f  joy and power to  
G oethe, seems a sou rce  o f gloom and d is g u s t  to  S a r t r e  and many o th e r s .
But th en  th ey  m ight n o t have G o e th e 's  reaso n s fo r  l ik in g  to  be what th ey  
a r e .  -  On th e  o th e r  hand some th in k e rs  thougji n o t in  d i r e c t  and m y sterious 
r a p p o r t  w ith  th e  purposes o f  n a tu re ,  a p p re c ia te  th o se  purposes so deeply  
t h a t  d isp e n s in g  w ith  th e  id e a  o f  f r e e  w i l l  in  i t s  u su a l sense  th e y  seek 
t h e i r  freedom and t h e i r  m oral purpose in  th e  ad o p tio n  o f  th o se  h idden  
pu rposes o f  n a tu r e ,  and were i t  only  by a w il l in g  acq u iescen ce  in  th e  
cou rse  o f ev en ts  which th ey  may n o t and cannot change. The S to ic s  and 
Spinoza h e ld  th e s e  v iew s. O thers ag a in  a c t iv e ly  seek  to  f u r th e r  th e  
pu rposes o f n a tu r e ,  by a c c e p tin g  what th ey  c o n s id e r  th e  d e ce p tiv e  
i l l u s o r i n e s s  o f  m oral ex p e rien ce  a t  i t s  fa c e  v a lu e  f o r  th e  sake o f  th e  
p u rposes which th o se  d e ce p tio n s  se rv e  and o f  which th ey  approve. Many 
s o c io lo g i s t s ,  h i s t o r i a n s ,  p r a c t i s in g  p o l i t i c i a n s  ho ld  t h i s  view . Some 
w r i te r s  however, once th ey  have reached  th e  co n c lu sio n  t h a t  f r e e  w il l  
i s  im p o ssib le  and th e r e fo re  a l l  m oral e x p erien ce  m erely  i l l u s o r y ,  make 
t h i s  an excuse to  deny a l l  m oral o b l ig a t io n ,  to  debunk m oral v a lu e s , 
to  re n d e r  m oral sen tim en ts  r e p u ls iv e . T h is view h e ld  by many 
s c i e n t i s t s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  by s o c io lo g is t s  and p r a c t i s in g  p sy c h o lo g is ts  
i s  I  b e lie v e  r a p id ly  lo s in g  i t s  a d h e re n ts . I t  i s  m ain ly  th e  re fu g e  o f 
th o se  who hav ing  d e c lin e d  (on good grounds) to  c o n s id e r  f r e e  w il l  as  a
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r e a l  q u a l i ty  o f  human n a tu r e ,  have n o t y e t  found t h e i r  way to  th e  
K an tian  d e f in i t i o n  o f  freedom as a ca teg o ry  and r e g u la t iv e  id e a  o f  
p r a c t i c a l  re a so n .
Those who uphold  th e  second view o f  freedom c la im  t h a t  freedom as 
such and a p a r t  frcm i t s  r o le  in  m oral ex p erien ce  can be apprehended as 
an o b je c tiv e  e n t i t y .  A ccording to  t h e i r  d e s c r ip t io n  i t  i s  v e ry  
d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  freedom o f  th e  w i l l  which i s  th e  s in e  qua non o f  
d e l ib e r a t e  d e c is io n s . "When we do an a c t io n  th row ing  o u rse lv e s  h e a r t  
and so u l in to  i t  and doing i t  w ith  our whole being  we may s a f e ly  say
a fte rw a rd s  8 'No I  could  n o t have done o th e rw ise  f o r  th e r e  was n o th in g
\
o f  me l e f t  ou t in  th e  a c t in g .  No ag en t no r any m otive urged me, I  was
)
f r e e * . On th e  o th e r  hand i f  we were moved by one p a r t  o f  us o n ly , 
w hether by a  d e s i r e  o r an em otion t h a t  was s e l f i s h  o r a l t r u i s t i c  o r 
w he ther by sh e e r reaso n  o r by a sense  o f du ty  th en  th e  answer m ust be : 
*Yes I m ight have done o th erw ise  f o r  i f  n o t I  should ' have ac ted  w ith  th e  
whole o f  m yself and as i t  was I  a c te d  on ly  w ith  p a r t  o f  m yse lf I  was n o t 
e n t i r e l y  free*  . . .  I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t i a t  one would have expected  t h a t  
when th e  q u e s tio n  to  th e  answ er 'C ould I  have done o th e rw ise ? ' was 
n e g a tiv e  then  we should n o t have experienced  any freedom and when 
a f f i rm a t iv e  th e n  we should  have been f r e e .  I t  does n o t o f course  
fo llo w  th a t  because th e  co n c lu sio n  i s  unexpected  th e r e f o r e  i t  i s  
u n a c c e p ta b le . I t  must be judged on i t s  own m e r i t s . . . "  In  a d d it io n
l )  G r. Z ilb o o rg : Mind, Man and M ed ic ine; p . 115.
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th e r e  i s  th e  tes tim o n y  o f  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  th in k e rs  t h a t  freedom i s  
ex p erien ced  d i r e c t l y  im m ediately  : "L 'homme se  tro u v e  fa c e  a fa c e  avàc 
sa  l i b e r t é . . . " ^ )  e tc .  However t h a t  may be , and an exam ination  o f  th e s e  
phenomena and ex p erien ces  w i l l  c e r t a in ly  n o t prove w ith o u t i n t e r e s t  -  
f o r  ou r purpose i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  n o te  t h a t  w hatever o th e r  co n c lu sio n s  
i t  m ight e n ta i l  f u l l  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  th e  agen t f o r  a l l  h is  a c t io n s  
even th o se  'h e  could n o t h e lp ' i s  always im p lied  in  t h i s  a t t i t u d e .
N e v e rth e le ss  t h i s  a t t i t u d e  ho lds some danger to  m o ra l i ty .  For 
i f  freedom can be experienced  im m ediately  and d i r e c t l y  i t  i s  co nce ivab le  
t h a t  freedom m ight become th e  c o n s t i tu t iv e  e la n e n t o f  some new domain 
w ith  i t s  own law s and i t s  own v a l i d i t y .  T his m ight s e r io u s ly  a f f e c t  
th e  autonomy o f th e  e th ic a l  domain, s in c e  i t  would su b o rd in a te  th e  
p rim ary  d a ta  o f  th is 'd o m a in  in  which freedom i s  ex p erien ced  only  th rough  
th e  medium o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  and o b l ig a t io n ,  to  th o se  in  which freedom 
i s  ex p erien ced  d i r e c t l y .  The p r a c t ic a l  im portance o f  t h i s  w i l l  be 
seen  c le a r ly  when in  th e  co u rse  o f our argum ent we s h a l l  have occasio n  
to  examine M ax im alis t th e o r ie s  and t h e i r  c o n f l i c t s  w ith  K a n t's  e th ic a l  
th e o ry .
l )  Compare S a r t r e :  I t  seems to  me t h a t  Z ilb o o rg  d e s c r ip t io n
approxim ates to  what S t .  A ugustine m eant by say in g  : p eccare  non
posse  maxima l i b e r t a s  e s t ,  i . e .  th e  sen se  o f  freedom  which comes 
from u t t e r  d e te rm in a tio n , w h ils t  S a r t r e  obv iously  means th e  freedom  
o f  u t t e r  in d e te rm in a tio n . The p le a s a n tn e s s  o f  th e  one and th e  
u n p le a sa n tn e ss  o f  th e  o th e r  a re  i n t e r e s t i n g  f e a tu r e s  which m i ^ t  
be w orth exam ining. Compare a ls o  Bergson : E ssa i su r  le s  données
im m édiates de l a  c o n sc ien ce ; C h .I I I .  (La L ib e r té )  p . 151.
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The th i r d  co n cep tio n  o f  f r e e  w i l l , reg a rd s  freedom as an
o b je c t iv e  and r e a l  q u a l i ty  o f  human n a tu re .  This view i s  advocated
by r e l ig io u s  d o c tr in e  on th e  a u th o r i ty  o f  th e  S c r ip tu r e s ,  by sundry
f i g h te r s  f o r  th e  d ig n ity  o f man and th e  w e lfa re  of hum anity on v a rio u s  
1)
g rounds, and by th e  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  school o f  th o u g h t on th e  b a s is  o f 
i t s  m e tap h y sica l assum ptions o r on th e  b a s is  o f  an im m ediate ex p erien ce  ‘ 
o f  freedom as d e sc rib e d  in  th e  p reced in g  p a rag rap h .
The b e s t  exam ple, f o r  a l l  i t s  s im p lic i ty  o f th o u g h t, fo r  th e  
r e l ig io u s  d o c tr in e  i s  p re sen te d  by Jean  B odin. I  p r e f e r  indeed  to  
u se  t h i s  e x p o s itio n  to  l a t e r  and more s tre am lin e d  ones, because Bodin 
p re s e n ts  th e  two w arring  and d i r e c t l y  o p p o s ite  d o c tr in e s  which a re  
n e v e r th e le s s  s im u lta n eo u s ly  h e ld  hy th e  church  in  t h e i r  f u l l  c o n tr a -  
d i c to r in e s s .  He sim ply p u ts  them s id e  by s id e .  Crude as h is  
e x p o s itio n  may be i t  c o n ta in s  th e  k e rn e l o f  a l l  t h a t  r e l ig io u s  d o c tr in e  
has to  o f f e r  on t h i s  p o in t u n a d u lte ra te d  by any c o n c i l ia to r y  e x p la n a tio n s  : 
"As th e  an g e ls  a re  good and th e  d e v il  e v i l ,  so men have th e  freedom  to  
be e i t h e r  good o r e v i l .  For God has s a id  to  them in  h i s  law , I  have 
g iven  you th e  cho ice  between good and e v i l ,  between l i f e  and d e a th , 
choose ye th e  good and ye s h a l l  l i v e . . .  Even more c le a r ly  i t  i s  s a id  
a t  a n o th e r  p o in t :  When God c re a te d  man he l e f t  him h is  f r e e  w i l l  and
s a id  to  him : I f  ye w i l l  keep my laws by them s h a l l  ye be k e p t. I
have g iven  th e e  w a te r and th e  f i r e .  And i t ' s  in  th y  power t o  p u t th y
l )  Rousseau : "Man i s  bom  f r e e  and everywhere he l i e s  in  C h a in s . . ."
e tc .  e tc .
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o'
hand in  t h i s  o r in  t h a t .  Ye have good and e v i l ,  l i f e  and death  
b e fo re  you, you can be what you w i l l . . .
And so t h a t  peop le  should  know t h a t  a f t e r  Adam's f a l l  man s t i l l
k e p t h i s  f r e e  w i l l ,  th e  fo llo w in g  say in g  i s  p u t in  G od's law , and i t  i s
s a id  th e r e  o f Cain t h a t  he had power to  do good o r e v i l .  T here to
w r i te s  Moses Maimon t h a t  th e  Hebrews a l l  ag ree  t h a t  man has a f r e e  w il l
and t h a t  nobody ev er doubts t h i s  and t h a t  th e r e fo re  th e y  g ive  thanks
to  G o d . . . .  The re a d e r  i s  rem inded to  keep w ell in  h i s  h e a r t  th e
sa y in g s  c o lle c te d  by th e  a u th o r  fo r  th e  c o n te n tio n  o f  th e  freedom o f
th e  w i l l .  For to  fo llo w  Holy S c r ip tu r e ,  how can f a l l e n  man s ta n d  up
by h im se lf?  What good can he choose who i s  e v i l  in  a l l  h i s  pu rposes
and in c l in a t io n s ?  How can f l e s h  comprehend s p i r i t ,  how can reaso n
judge th o se  who a re  bound and w alk in  th e  v a n ity  o f  t h e i r  senses?  How-
can he judge what i s  j u s t  vdio lac k s  o r ig in a l ly  c re a te d  ju s t ic e  and
n ev er knows what i s  ju s t  b e fo re  God? They say th ey  know God bu t in
t h e i r  deeds th e y  deny Him. T h ere fo re  we must d i s t in g u is h  th e  Old man
from th e  New, Saul from P a u l . . .  In  s h o r t  man must be reborn  t h r o u ^
F a ith  by Grace be c re a te d  w ith  th e  Holy G host, and t r a n s f ig u r e d  and
reb o rn  in  th e  Image o f  God and become w ise in  t h i s  m anner. For how
can he answer who i s  n o t c a lle d ?  S t .  Paul sa id  to  th e  P h i l l ip i a n s :
I t  i s  God who works both th e s e  th in g s  in  you : th e  w i l l in g  and th e
do ing  a s  he p le a s e s .  He ta k e s  our h e a r t  and our w i l l  under th e
tu te la g e  o f F a i th ,  and im prisons them t h e r e :  fo r  what husbandman
1)w il l  reap  who has n o t sown b e fo re " .
T) Je an  B odin : De magorum daemonomania, S tra s sb u rg  e d i t io n  o f  1586.
( in  ) ,  p p .62-65.
A ccording to  t h i s  view freedom i s  a dem onstrab le  d ed u c ib le  r e a l  
q u a l i ty  which i s  n o t produced bu t p e rc e iv e d  by o r announced to  reason  by 
th e  S c r ip tu r e s .  As f a r  as man i s  concerned he lab o u rs  under th e  
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  th e  p o sse ss io n  o f  freedom imposes on him , w ith o u t th e  
advan tage  o f  be ing  a b le  to  a c q u ire  m e r it  by i t s  e x e rc is e  in  th e  choosing 
o f  th e  good. S ince  he has l o s t  th e  power to  choose th e  good in  h is  
own r i g h t  man i s  dependent on God's g race  f o r  h is  v e ry  c a p a b i l i ty  even to  
w i l l  th e  good much more to  do i t .  Freedom th u s l a s t s  on m an 's sh o u ld e rs  
l ik e  an in e sc a p a b le  doom, a g u i l t  he m ust b e a r  fo re v e r ,  a r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  
he can tu rn  to  good only  by th e  c a p r ic io u s  g race  o f  God never by h i s  own 
e f f o r t s .
Something o f th e  gloomy u n d erto n es o f  t h i s  view p e r s i s t s  in  
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  th e o r i e s .  Here too  man lab o u rs  un d er th e  w eight o f  h is  
freedom , he i s  condemned to  be f r e e ,  alw ays f u l l  o f  angu ish  t r y in g  to  
make th e  r i g h t ,  th e  f r e e  c h o ic e , always on th e  b r in k  o f in e sca p ab le  
g u i l t ,  always thrown back on h im s e lf ,  alw ays f u l ly  and t o t a l l y  re s p o n s ib le . 
There i s  no God bu t t h i s  does n o t improve th e  s i t u a t i o n ,  i t  makes i t  
w orse. "Puisque Dieu n 'e x i s t e  pas to u t  e s t  p e rm i.." S a r t r e  quo tes 
from D ostoyevski and adds " . . .  p a r ta n t  de so i on ne tro u v e  jam ais que 
s o i  h o rs  de s o i . . .  on e s t  r é d u i t  a e t r e  a s o i  meme sa  p ro p re  tra n s c e n ­
d e n c e . . .  e tc ."  I t  fo llo w s t h a t  " la  l i b e r t é  e s t  un f a i t ,  i l  f a u t  y 
d é d u ire  le s  c o n se q u e n c e s ... l'homme e s t  re sp o n sa b le  de t o u t . ,  le  p ro p re  
de l a  r e a l i t e  humain c 'e s t  q u 'e l l e  e s t  sans excuse e tc .  e tc ."  .
The whole argum ent o f cou rse  le a d s  s t r a ig h t  back to  th e  
i n q u i s i t o r i a l  s ta k e  whence we s t a r t e d .
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There s t i l l  rem ains, how ever, th e  fo u r th  co n cep tio n  o f  th e  id e a
o f freedom , K a n t 's  co n ce p tio n . A ccording to  t h i s  v iew , freedom i s ,
th e  ca teg o ry  o f  p r a c t i c a l  rea so n . I t  i s  th e  supreme c o n d itio n  o f  th e
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f m oral o b l ig a t io n .  I t  i s  th e  one c o n d it io n  w hich makes
m oral o b l ig a t io n  p o s s ib le .  I t  i s  a  p o in t  o f  view which enab les us to
o rd e r  th e  d a ta  o f  our ex p e rien ce  so as t o  make them i n t e l l i g i b l e ,  in
s h o r t  a r e g u la t iv e  id e a . I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  as a r e g u la t iv e  id e a ,
freedom in  a c e r ta in  sense  e n la rg e s  th e  domain o f  p r a c t i c a l  reaso n
beyond i t s  o r ig in a l  b o u n d a rie s . In s p ire d  by th e  id e a  o f  freedom we
sometimes perform  a c tio n s  we would n ev er have a ttem p ted  o th e rw ise .
Thus, in  a way, from being  m erely  r e g u la t iv e  th e  id e a  o f  freedom
becomes c o n s t i tu t iv e  and i s  p a r t i a l l y  r e a l is e d  th ro u g h  m an 's a c t io n s .
That i s ,  i n  p e r s i s t e n t ly  assum ing o u rse lv e s  to  be f r e e  we in  th e  end
succeed to  a c t  as t h o u ^  we were indeed  f r e e .  T his freedom however
l )i s  m ost p re c a r io u s  and n ev er assumes th e  c h a ra c te r  o f  o b je c tiv e  r e a l i t y .  
Indeed  i t  c o n tr a d ic ts  a l l  th e  known laws o f  o b je c tiv e  r e a l i t y ,  i . e .  
p h y s ic a l  c a u s a l i ty  and lo g ic a l  n e c e s s i ty ,  and i t s  v e ry  p o s s ib i l i t y  rem ains 
fo re v e r  in c o n p re h e n s ib le . We must n ev er presume to  deduce o r 
dem onstra te  th e  o b je c tiv e  r e a l i t y  o f freedom from i t s  p r a c t i c a l  u se .
For "The p r a c t i c a l  concept o f freedom has n o th in g  in  common w ith  th e
l )  i . e .  in  th e  sense  o f Raym ond'sî "ce qu i e s t  p r e c a i r e  dans c e r ta in e s  
v a le u rs  c 'e s t  l e u r  r e a l i s a t i o n ."  /
—284—
s p e c u la tiv e  concept o f freedom which indeed  must be l e f t  to  th e  
M e tap h y s ic ia n s" .^ )  In  th e  C r i t iq u e  o f  P r a c t i c a l  Reason Kant e x p re ss ly  
w arns a g a in s t  draw ing any m etap h y sica l o r  s p e c u la tiv e  in fe re n c e s  from 
th e  id e a  o f  freedom  in  i t s  m oral fu n c tio n  in  a s e c t io n  most a p p ro p r ia te ly  
e n t i t l e d :  "How i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  conce ive  o f  e n la rg in g  th e  domain o f
p u re  reaso n  f o r  i t s  p r a c t i c a l  purposes w ith o u t a t  th e  same tim e 
e n la rg in g  i t s  knowledge in  s p e c u la tiv e  m a t t e r s . . .  ( th e  id e a  o f  freedom ) ' 
becomes immanent and c o n s t i tu t iv e  be ing  th e  source  o f  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  
o f  r e a l i s in g  th e  n e ce ssa ry  purposes o f  pure  p r a c t i c a l  reaso n  . . .  whereas 
a p a r t  from t h i s  i t  rem ains a tra n s c e n d e n t and m erely  r e g u la t iv e  
p r in c ip le  . . .  i t  does n o t n e c e s s i t a t e  reaso n  to  assume a new o b je c t  
beyond ex p erien ce  b u t only to  b rin g  i t s  u se  in  ex p erien ce  n e a re r  to  
co m p le ten ess . But when once reason  i s  in  p o sse ss io n  o f t h i s  a c c e ss io n  
. . . .  i t  w i l l  app ly  th e  id e a  ( o f  freedom ) in  a  n e g a tiv e  m anner, t h a t  i s  
n o t  ex tend ing  b u t c le a r in g  up i t s  knowledge so as to  keep o f f  
anthropom orphism  as th e  sou rce  o f s u p e r s t i t io n  o r seem ing e x te n s io n  o f  
th e  concept o f  freedom by supposed e x p e rie n c e ; and s im ila r ly  to  keep 
o f f  fa n a tic ism  which prom ises th e  same ( i . e .  th e  r e a l i t y  o f  freedom ) by 
means o f  su p e rse n s ib le  i n tu i t i o n s  re v e a le d  a u th o r i ty  e t c . . . "
l )  K an t: \/ex/)u_cA
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The so le  p o in t  in  p u rsu in g  t h i s  seeming f u t i l e  argument i s  
t h a t  some very  p r a c t i c a l  r e s u l t s  fo llow  from t h i s  s p l i t t i n g  o f  m eta­
p h y s ic a l  h a i r s . T h e r e  i s  f i r s t  o f  a l l  th e  c o n s id e ra b le  d if f e re n c e  
in  em otional c lim a te  g en era ted  by th e s e  s e v e ra l d o c tr in e s  : th ey  make
men a c t  and r e a c t  d i f f e r e n t l y .  Secondly i f  we conceive  freedom as a 
r e a l  o b je c tiv e  q u a l i ty  o f  our human n a tu re  o f  which we a re  a ssu re d  by 
some u n iv e r s a l  law , in  o th e r  w ords, as a hard  in d u b ita b le  f a c t ,  we 
s h a l l  be in c l in e d  to  r e t a l i a t e  f o r  every  abuse o f freedom , by m eting  
o u t punishm ent in  k in d , i . e .  in  hard  f a c t .  But i f  we co n s id e r freedom 
m ere ly  a r e g u la t iv e  id e a  o f  w i l l ,  a n e c e ssa ry  p re -assu m p tio n  o f  m oral 
o b l ig a t io n ,  we s h a l l  n o t h a s te n  to  condemn people  o r h a rsh ly  p u n ish  
them in  f a c t  fo r  n o t  hav ing  made th e  p ro p e r u se  o f what we know m erely 
as th e  p re ro g a t iv e  o f  th e  co n cep tio n  men have o f t h e i r  own p e rso n s .
We s h a l l  r a th e r  be in c l in e d  to  rem o n s tra te  and e x h o rt. We s h a l l  t r y  
to  persu ad e  peop le  to  reg a rd  them selves a s  f r e e  and m o ra lly  resp& nsib le  
b e in g s , and th u s  to  be f r e e .  Such p e rsu a s io n  i s  e f f e c t iv e  as a m a tte r
l )  i . e .  we have only  co n sid ered  freedom in  i t s  p r a c t i c a l  a p p lic a t io n
and a t  th e  p o in ts , where we can be sa id  most n e a r ly  to  touch  i t
in  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  and in  o b l ig a t io n ,  bu t we have n o t m entioned
i t s  m iddle l in k s  in  B o s s u e t 's  sense  "La l i b e r t é  e s t  un c h a in s  
d o n t on t i e n n e . l e s  deux bou ts sans en v o i r  l e  m il ie u ."  On 
th e s e  m iddle l in k s ,  on th e  n a tu re  and manner o f  e x is te n c e  of 
freedom when i t  d isa p p e a rs  from our view rev o lv e  th e  main 
m etap h y sica l d is c u s s io n s . The problem  o f  how to  re c o n c ile  
p r e d e s t in a t io n ,  p rov idence  and f r e e  w i l l  a p p lie s  to  th o se  m iddle 
l in k s  o f  which th e  problem  d e c la re d  by Kant to  be in s o lu b le ,  
namely how to  r e c o n c i le  p h y s ic a l c a u s a l i ty  and freedom , i s  bu t a 
c o ro l la r y .
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o f  f a c t  only  t h r o u ^  a p ro longed  p ro cess  o f  t r a in in g  and e d u c a tio n .^ )
Freedom being  a manner o f conce iv ing  o n e s e lf  cannot be brought about
by d r a s t i c  m easures from th e  o u ts id e . Only i f  freedom  i s  an o b je c tiv e  '
r e a l  q u a l i ty  o f  human n a tu re  can i t  be fo rc e d  to  l i g h t .  F ana tic ism
i s  t h i s  m a tte r  i s  th e r e f o re  on ly  p o s s ib le  on th e  l a t t e r  assum ption  fo r
on ly  on th e  l a t t e r  assum ption  can men be fo rced  to  be f r e e . T his i s ,
I b e lie v e  th e  te n o r  o f  K a n t 's  w arning a g a in s t  th e  dangers o f an
o b je c t iv a t io n  (V erd ing lichung ) o f th e  id e a  o f  f r e e  w i l l .  Thus, though '
th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  freedom as a r e g u la t iv e  id e a  o f rea so n  covers fo r
p r a c t i c a l  purposes much th e  same ground as th e  m etap h y sica l d o c tr in e  o f
freedom , th e  m oral extrem e and repugnant im p lic a tio n  o f  th e  l a t t e r  a re
2 )eschewed. '
Now i t  i s  obvious t h a t  to  conceive freedom as a r e g u la t iv e  id e a  
o f  re a so n  i s  to  conceive i t  in  i t s  f i r s t  se n se . I f  I  cannot f u l f i l  
my m oral o b l ig a t io n s  u n le s s  I  p resuppose  m yse lf f r e e  o f a l l  my d e c is io n s ,  
th e n  to  be f r e e  in  a l l  my d e c is io n s  canno t be one o f  my m oral o b l ig a t io n s .  
In  o th e r  words when I  conce ive  m yself as a f r e e  ag en t and when I conceive 
m y se lf  as a m oral ag en t I  do n o t connote th e  i d e n t i c a l  n o t io n s .  W h ils t 
I  canno t th in k  o f m yse lf a s  a m oral ag en t w ithou t th in k in g  o f  m y se lf 
as a f r e e  a g e n t, I  can th in k ^ )  o f  m yse lf as a f re e  a g en t w ith o u t th in k in g
1) Compare Kant : K r i t ik  d e r p ra k tis c h e n  V e rn u n ft:
2) M ethodik d e r p ra k . V ern u n ft.
5) Indeed m u st, f o r  freedom to  choose an y th in g  cannot be id e n t i c a l  
w ith  th e  com pulsion to  choose one th in g .
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o f  m y se lf  as a m oral a g e n t. I t  seems th e re fo re  p ro b ab le  t h a t  freedom 
and m o ra lity  cannot be equated  w ithou t f u r th e r  ado.
But as Kant does m a in ta in  t h i s  eq u a tio n  ( fo r  he contends t h a t  a 
f r e e  w i l l  and a w i l l  under m oral law a re  th e  same) we must t r y  to  
so lv e  t h i s  im passe by an in d i r e c t  p ro o f . That i s ,  I  s h a l l  a c c e p t 
freedom  = m o ra lity  as my m ajo r prem iss and t r y  to  show t h a t  th e  con­
c lu s io n s  i t  e n t a i l s  a re  s e l f - c o n t r a d ic to r y .
In  i t s  b r i e f e s t  o u t l in e  t h i s  argum ent runs as fo llo w s :
Assume t h a t  freedom  r  m o ra l i ty .  Then s in c e  freedom i s  th e  power man
h a s , n o t  indeed  to  choose h is  m otives b u t to  dom inate them , ( i . e .  th e  
a b i l i t y  n o t to  a c t  upon h i s  m o tiv e s ) , m o ra l ity  i s  th e  a b i l i t y  ( o f  man) 
n o t to  a c t  upon h i s  m o tiv es . E v il th e  o p p o site  o f  m o ra lity  i s  th e re ­
fo re  m an 's i n a b i l i t y  to  d is re g a rd  h is  m o tiv e s , m an 's bondage to  h is  
m o tiv e s . But e v i l ,  acco rd in g  to  K ant, i s  th e  su b o rd in a tio n  o f  th e  
r a t i o n a l  to  th e  s e n su a l, i . e .  m an 's bondage to  th e  s e n su a l . M o ra lity  
i s  th e r e f o r e  th e  dom ination  o f  th e  r a t i o n a l .  M o ra lity , however, i s  
th e  same as freedom , by hy p o th . T h ere fo re  a f r e e  w i l l  and a  r a t io n a l
w i l l  a re  th e  same. That i s  freedom « r a t i o n a l i t y .
The b a s ic  f a l l a c y  o f t h i s  argum ent l i e s  in  K a n t 's  m istake  as to  
th e  n a tu re  o f e v i l .  A mere predcxninance o f  th e  se n su a l over reaso n  
can n ev er e x p la in  th e  tem p tin g n e ss , th e  fa s c in a n s  o f  e v i l .  E v il i s  
more th a n  ju s t  a weakness ; a "video m e lio ra  proboque d é té r io r a  sequor" 
I t  i s ,  as we have l e a r n t  from th e  b i t t e r  ex p erien ce  o f  re c e n t h i s to r y ,  
p r im a r i ly  a c o rru p tio n  o f  mind by id e a s .  The sen su a l w eaknesses o f
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th e  l i b e r t i n e  appear am iable and harm less in  com parison w ith  th e  
d e v a s ta t io n s  which th e  s e l f l e s s  s e rv ic e  o f  men d e d ic a te d  to  r a t io n a l  
id e a s  o th e r  th an  th e  m oral law , have b rough t over th e  w orld . And 
i t  i s  a commonplace o f  h i s to r y ,  t h a t  th e  more s e lf - a b n e g a t in g , th e  
more a -s e n su a l th e  t y r a n t ,  th e  c r u e l le r  and more e v i l  h i s  o p p ress io n  
o f  men. The d e v il  tem pted on ly  th e  l e s s e r  s a in ts  w ith  th e  images o f  
lo v e ly  women, Christum  he tem pted w ith  a l l  th e  kingdoms o f  th e  w orld . 
Even Kant h im s e lf  s t a t e s  t h a t  th e  P a u lin e  d o c tr in e  o f  e le c t io n  i s  a 
m o ra lly  e v i l  d o c tr in e .  And though Kant m a in ta in s  t h a t  i t  i s  so 
because i t  i s  "repugnan t to  reason" he does n o t ,  and indeed  canno t 
accuse  th e  d o c tr in e  o f  e le c t io n  to  be o f  a sen su a l r a th e r  th an  a 
r a t i o n a l  o r ig in .  E v il ,  th e r e f o r e ,  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i ly  th e  su b o rd in a tio n  
o f  th e  r a t io n a l  to  th e  s e n s u a l . M o r a l i t y  in  consequence i s  n o t 
n e c e s s a r i ly  th e  dom ination  o f  th e  se n su a l by th e  r a t i o n a l .  But as 
m o ra l i ty  -  freedom by h y p .; freedom i t  fo llo w s , i s  n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  
th e  same as r a t i o n a l i t y :  freedom  -f r a t i o n a l i t y .
In  K a n t 's  e x p o s itio n  freedom  * m o ra lity  because m o ra lity  » 
r a t i o n a l i t y  and r a t i o n a l i t y  ■ freedom . But as we have ju s t  seen 
freedom  r a t i o n a l i t y .  T h e re fo re  in  o rd e r  to  m a in ta in  our m ajo r 
p rem iss we must assume t h a t  m o ra lity  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  and s t a r t  a g a in , 
b e a r in g  t h i s  c o n d it io n  in  m ind.
l )  In  o th e r  words on K a n t 's  own ev idence  and in  o p p o s itio n  to  h i s  
e x p l i c i t  t h e o r i e s ,  v i z .  " R e l ig io n . . . " ,  a c e r t a in  " c o rru p tio n  
o f  reason" i s  p o s s ib le .
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Assume freedom 0  m o ra l i ty .  Then s in c e  m o ra lity  i s  th e  o p p o s ite  
o f e v i l ,  freedom to o  w i l l  exclude th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  e v i l :  "p eccare
non p a sse  maxima l i b e r t a  e s t " . But freedom  i s  th e  o p p o s ite  o f  
n e c e s s i ty ;  and s in c e  freedom th e  o p p o s ite  o f  n e c e s s i ty ,  and m o ra l i ty ,  
th e  o p p o s ite  o f  e v i l ,  a re  e q u iv a le n t by h y p ., e v i l  i s  e q u iv a le n t to  
n e c e s s i ty  or com pulsion. T hat i s  e v i l  i s  n o t a f r e e  cho ice  f o r  man, 
man commits e v i l  under th e  com pulsion o f h i s  n a tu re . But th e  e s s e n t ia l  
f e a tu r e  o f m an 's n a tu re  i s  h is  r a t i o n a l i t y . T h ere fo re  e v i l  i s  a 
n e c e ssa ry  e x p re ss io n  o f  m an 's r a t io n a l  n a tu r e ,  a r a t io n a l  n e c e s s i ty . f  
M o ra lity  i s  th e  d is ru p t io n  o f  t h i s  n e c e s s i ty  by an i r r a t i o n a l  power, 
th e  su p e rn a tu ra l  g race  o f  god, fo r  i n s t a n c e . . .  I t  fo llo w s t h a t  
m o ra l i ty  i s  n o t  a c a p a c ity  o f  man a t  a l l ,  t h a t  man can  be n e i th e r  m oral 
n o r f r e e  by h i s  own e f f o r t  and d e c is io n s .  T his i s  a  r e s u l t ,  K ant o r 
any o th e r  m oral p h ilo so p h e r , cannot le a v e  u n c h a lle n g ed . I t  can how­
ev er be ch a llen g ed  only  on c o n d itio n  t h a t  e v i l  be ad m itted  to  be a 
f r e e  c h o ic e . But i f  e v i l  i s  a f r e e  cho ice  th e n  m o ra l i ty  and freedon  
a re  n o t  e q u iv a le n t .  Freedom j  m o ra l i ty .
Now s in c e  man i s  n o t f r e e  in  th e  ch o ice  o f h i s  m o tiv e s , s in c e  
n e i th e r  t h e i r  n a tu re  n o r t h e i r  e x is te n c e  a re  s u b je c t  to  h is  d e c is io n , 
freedom  can only  be d e fin e d  as we have se en , as th e  a b i l i t y  o f  man to  
r i s e  above h is  m o tiv e s , to  check and r e g u la te  h is  m otives and a c t io n s  
as he choose, and acco rd in g  to  w hatever p r in c ip le  he chooses. He can 
choose to  check and re g u la te  h is  a c t io n s  acco rd ing  to  m oral p r in c ip le s ,  
o r a cco rd in g  to  r e l i g io u s ,  m ax im alis t e t c .  p r in c ip le s .  W hatever th e
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p r in c ip le  th e  e f f ic a c io u s  e x e r t io n  o f  human f r e e  w i l l  r e ta in s  i t s  
r e g u la t iv e ,  l im i t in g ,  i . e .  "n eg a tiv e"  c h a ra c te r .  Nor does th e  cho ice  
o f  one p r in c ip le  r a th e r  th an  an o th e r  a f f e c t  th e  q u a l i ty  o r th e  degree 
o f freedom . T hat i s  th e  cho ice  o f  th e  m oral p r in c ip le  does n o t make 
th e  man who chooses to  r e g u la te  h is  a c t io n s  hy i t s  in ju n c t io n s  p e r f e c t ly  
f r e e  in  c o n tr a s t  to  th e  im p e rfe c t freedom  o f  th e  man who chooses to  
r e g u la te  h is  conduct by some o th e r  p r in c ip le ,  o r who chooses n o t  to  
r e g u la te  h is  a c t io n s  a t  a l l  (a s  f a r  as t h i s  i s  p r a c t ic a b le )  which in  
i t s e l f  i s  a ls o  a r a t io n a l  p r in c ip le  o f  conduct.
To sum up : T here i s  no p e r f e c t  o r im p e rfe c t freedom , only  th e
r e g u la t iv e  e x e rc is e  o f  f r e e  w i l l .  T his r e g u la t iv e ,  (ch eck in g , 
l im i t in g )  manner o f  o p e ra tio n  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f a l l  p r a c t i c a l  
e x e r t io n s  o f  f r e e  w i l l .  I t  i s  a m is tak e  to  m onopolise i t  f o r  th e  
e x e r t io n  o f  f r e e  w i l l  in  fav o u r o f ,  o r in  accordance w ith , th e  m oral 
p r in c ip le s .  F in a l ly ,  f r e e  w i l l  in  a l l  i t s  e x e r t io n s  fo r  p r a c t i c a l  
pu rposes i s  to  be regarded  as a r e g u la t iv e  id e a , a  ca teg o ry  o f  re a so n , 
r a th e r  th an  as a r e a l  q u a l i ty  o r  m o d ality  o f  human e x is te n c e .
A w i l l  to  a b so lu te  power, we can now conclude in  a c o ro l la r y  to  
th e  p reced in g  r e f l e c t io n s  on freedom , can be regarded  as a f r e e  w i l l  
w ith o u t th e r e fo re  hav ing  to  be co n sid ered  a good w i l l .  In  o th e r  
words a w i l l  to  a b so lu te  power, i . e .  a  by d e f in i t io n  e v i l  w i l l ,  can 
b e a r th e  a t t r i b u t e s  o f  a f r e e  w il l  a t  th e  same tim e and w ith o u t s e l f -  
c o n tr a d ic t io n .
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(c )  An e v i l  w i l l ,  a w i l l  to  a b so lu te  power f o r  th e  sake o f  
a b s o lu te  power can be n o t m erely  a f r e e  w i l l ,  bu t a ls o  an autonomous 
w i l l ;  i . e .  a w i l l  which i s  a law un to  i t s e l f .
Autonomy in  K a n t's  th e o ry  o f  e th ic s  s ig n i f i e s  som ething more th a n
freedom , i . e .  th e  freedom o f ch o ice . I t  s i g n i f i e s  t h a t  th e  law which
th e  w i l l  (a s  p r a c t i c a l  rea so n ) adop ts as i t s  maxim, i s  a ls o  fo rm u la ted
and c r e a t iv e ly  produced in  i t s  id e a  by th e  same rea so n  in  i t s  pure
o r t h e o r e t i c a l  c a p a c ity . T hat i s ,  i t  i s  n o t d isco v e red  as an id ea
g e n e ra te d  by some e x te rn a l  agency. Now an e v i l  w i l l ,  a w i l l  to
a b s o lu te  power f o r  th e  sake o f a b so lu te  power has been d e fin ed  as a
w holly  r a t io n a l  w i l l .  T h ro u ^  i t  reaso n  a cc ep ts  th e  maxim o f  a b so lu te
power, whose v ery  id e a  reason  c re a t iv e ly  produced and whose laws
reaso n  fo rm u la ted  a t  th e  same tim e as i t  imposed th o se  laws on i t s e l f .
T his however does n o t y e t  make th e  w i l l  to  power a good w i l l .  Autonomy,
t h a t  i s ,  i s  n o t in  i t s e l f  a g u a ran tee  o f  m oral r ig h tn e s s .  On th e
c o n tra ry , i t  i s  a commonplace o f h i s t o r i c a l  e x p e rien c e , t h a t  th e  main
«
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  ty ran n y  i s  n o t i t s  la w -le s sn e ss  bu t t h a t  i t  i s  a law 
u n to  i t s e l f .
(d ) An e v i l  w i l l ,  can w i l l  i t s  maxim to  become u n iv e r s a l  law , 
w ith o u t th e reb y  c o n tr a d ic t in g  i t s e l f .  A w i l l  to  a b so lu te  power, f o r  
in s ta n c e ,  can w i l l  i t s  maxims to  become u n iv e rs a l  law . Indeed i t s  
supreme w ish , i s  t h a t  i t s  maxim should be regarded  as thougJi i t  were 
a U n iv e rsa l Law o f  N a tu re . F o r, by d e f in i t i o n ,  th e  e v i l  w i l l  w i l l s
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a b s o lu te  d i c t a to r s h ip ,  i . e .  a b so lu te  power. I t  w i l l s  to  impose 
t h a t  power on everybody e l s e ,  i . e .  i t  w ishes to  apply  i t s  maxim 
u n iv e r s a l ly .  I t  w ishes to  impose t h a t  power so t o t a l l y  and so se c u re ly  
as  though i t  were an in e sc a p a b le  Law o f  N a tu re . In  s h o r t ,  i t  c o u ld n 't  
ag ree  more w ith  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e . I t  a ls o  accords w ith  th e  
fo rm ula  c o n ta in in g  th e  concept o f  th e  kingdom o f  en d s. T his kingdom, 
how ever, i s  r e s t r i c t e d  to  i t s  low est l i m i t ,  to  one member -  th e  man 
who w i l l s  a b s o lu te  power : " I ' e t a t  c 'e s t  m oi." In  o th e r  w ords,
u n iv e r s a l i t y  in  th e  a p p lic a t io n  o f a  w il le d  p r in c ip le  does n o t 
n e c e s s a r i ly  im ply u n iv e r s a l i t y ,  o r r a th e r  t o t a l i t y  o f  in c lu s io n ,  o f  
s u b je c ts  ap p ly in g  i t .  N e ith e r  do th e  empty form ulas o f  th e  
c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  n e c e s s i t a t e  t h i s  s p e c i f i c  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  
u n i v e r s a l i t y .  They a re  p e r f e c t ly  s a t i s f i e d  by p r a c t i c a l  maxims which 
p o sse ss  th e  q u a l i f i c a t io n  o f  u n iv e r s a l i ty  in  th e  f i r s t  sen se .
I f  th e  second meaning i s  in te n d e d , o r  i f  th e  "kingdom o f Ends" 
i s  to  be extended beyond th e  l im i t  o f  one, and every  tim e i t  i s  so 
extended  ( f o r  in s ta n c e  from c la n s  to  t r i b e s ,  t r i b e s  to  n a tio n s ,  e tc .  
e t c . . )  t h i s  must be e x p l i c i t l y  and s e p a ra te ly  p o s tu la te d .
(e )  An e v i l  w i l l ,  a w i l l  to  a b so lu te  power, im poses a p e rv a s iv e , 
th o ro u g h  and s e l f - c o n s i s t e n t  o rd e r  on th e  w orld , shap ing  th e  chaos o f 
s e p a ra te  and p a r t i c u l a r  d e te rm in a tio n s  in to  a  Kosmos ordered  un d er th e  
» " id e a  o f  law f o r  th e  sake o f  t h a t  l a w " , . .  M oreover, i t  i s  obvious t h a t  
an e v i l  w i l l  b e ing  so le  l e g i s l a t o r  w i l l  c re a te  a f a r  more thorough and 
homogenous o rd e r , th an  an in d e f in i t e  number o f  l e g i s l a t i n g  w i l l s  no
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m a tte r  how much in  harmony w ith  each o th e r .
A w il l  to  a b so lu te  power, an i n t r i n s i c a l l y  e v i l  w i l l  p o sse sse s  as 
we have seen th e  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  o f  c o n s is te n c y , f r e e  c h o ic e , autonomy, 
u n iv e r s a l i t y  and c a p a c ity  o f  im posing a d e f in i t e  and homogenous o rd e r  
on th e  p r a c t i c a l  u n iv e rs e . An i n t r i n s i c a l l y  e v i l  w i l l ,  has been 
shown to  p o ssess  a l l  th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f a w i l l  determ ined by th e  
c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e , in s o f a r  as t h i s  d e te rm in a tio n  i t s e l f  i s  
concerned . I t  fo llo w s , t h a t  to  be so determ ined  i s  n o t  a s u f f i c i e n t  
ground f o r  th e  m oral goodness o f  th e  w i l l .  The form al fo rm u la tio n s  
o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e  a re  th e r e f o re  n o t s u f f i c i e n t  grounds 
o r  c r i t e r i a  o f  m oral goodness. R a t io n a l i ty  and l e g a l i t y  i t  fo llo w s 
(which a re  th e  e s s e n t ia l  f e a tu r e s  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p e ra tiv e )  a re  
n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  grounds o r c r i t e r i a  o f  m oral goodness.
To i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  p o in t  : The a u to c r a t i c  so lip ism  o f  a mad C aesar,
th e  se lf-im p o se d  d i s c ip l in e  o f  a band o f  g a n g s te rs , th e  double s ta n d a rd  
o f  m o ra lity  o f  a peop le  a t  w ar, a re  a l l  w ille d  th rough  maxims which 
th e  peop le  concerned could w i l l  as u n iv e r s a l  law s, and w i l l ,  i f  th ey  
w ere l e g i s l a t i n g  in  a kingdom o f  ends. I t  i s  n o t  t r u e  t h a t  he who 
c h e a ts  th e re b y  su b sc r ib e s  to  th e  m oral law : Thou s h a l t  n o t l i e . . .
s in c e  w ith o u t i t  c h e a tin g  would n o t be p r o f i t a b le .  He sim ply does 
n o t in c lu d e  th o se  whom he w ishes to  c h e a t,  as eq u als  to  whom he owes 
th e  t r u t h  as he owes i t  to  h im s e lf  ( i f  he d id  n o t owe i t  to  h im s e lf  
he would n o t be conscious o f  c h e a tin g ) . In  o th e r  words th e  
c h e a te r  t r e a t s  th e  peop le  he ch ea ts  as mere m eans, and does n o t  
acco rd  them th e  s ta tu s  o f  p e rso n s o r ends in  t h e i r  own r ig h t .
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I f  he i s  not ju s t  an o c c a s io n a l h a lf -h e a r te d  c h e a t , he  
p rob ab ly  has some p r in c ip le  or th eo ry  which p roves th a t  
th e  p eo p le  he c h e a ts  have no r ig h t  to  f ig u r e  as ends, or  
a s p ir e  to  th a t  s t a t u s .  A very  in t e r e s t in g  example fo r  
t h i s  a t t i t u d e  i s  found amongst th e  Documents o f  German N ation ­
a l - S o c i a l i s t i c  d o c tr in e  d isc o v e r e d  and p u b lish e d  by th e  
American S ta te  Department: "The tw e lv e  N a t io n a l-S o c ia l is t*
commandments: commandment number n in e : T reat your r a c ia l
comrades as you v/ould be tr e a te d  by them"^^ The p o s it io n  
i s  b e s t  summed up in  th e  fo rm u la tio n  which F ic h te  proposed  
fo r  K ant’ s c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e : "Act o n ly  on th a t  maxim
which thou c o u ld s t  v / i l l  as an e te r n a l law to  t h y s e l f  
A Form ulation  f i t  in d eed  to  ser v e  as th e  d e v ic e  o f  Maximal- 
ism*"^ ' b ut n o t as a moral p r in c ip le ,  n ot even as th e  moral 
p r in c ip le  o f  th e  lo w e s t  form o f  c la n  m o r a lity .
1 ) Department o f  S ta te  P u b lic a t io n  1864, p . 194 .
The f i r s t  and th e  second  commandment read: The Fuehrer
i s  alw ays r ig h t  and: Never go a g a in s t  d i s c ip l i n e .  The
tw e lf th :  That which prom otes th e  movement, Germany
and your p eo p le  i s  r ig h t  ;
2) i . e .  "Handle so dass du d ie  Maxime d e in es  W ille n s  a l s  
ew iges G ese tz fu e r  d ich  denken koe n n e s t ." With a p o lo g ie s  
to  F ic h t e ’ s m etap h ysica l th e o r y .
3) From th e  a lrea d y  quoted p a ssa g e  o f  B a s tid e :  "L’ im p é r a t if
de l a  c o n sc ie n c e  m orale e s t :  s o i s  au maximum une p erso n ,
c ’ e s t  a d ir e ,  s o i s  au maximum de v a leu r" , v iz  page 231 .
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The r a t io n a l i t y  and l e g a l  c o n s is te n c y  o f  a p r in c ip le ,  
and in  p a r t ic u la r  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  do n ot make 
th a t  p r in c ip le  f i t  to  d e f in e  th o se  moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
and o b l ig a t io n s  to  humanity in  g en era l which Kant had thought 
th e y  in su r e d . Crimes and tr a n s g r e s s io n s  are  n ot p reven ted  
by adherence to  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  in  i t s  empty 
fo r m a lity . I t  le a v e s  th e  f i e l d  open to  th e  most f la g r a n t  
a b u ses . In  sh o r t i t  i s  n o t f i t  to  se r v e  as th e  b a s is  o f  
e t h ic s .
(B) In  K ant’ s d e fen ce  i t  must be s a id  th a t  Kant h im se lf  
n e v e r ‘ en v isa g ed  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  n ever im agined th a t  th e  
moral ch a ra c ter  o f  th e  c a t e g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  co u ld  be im­
p e r i l l e d  in  any way. For a t th e  back o f  Kant’ s mind th e r e  
were alw ays th e  id e a s  which we have term ed th e  "hum anitarian  
s u p e r s t it io n s "  o f  th e  e ig h te e n th  cen tu ry: namely
1) th e  in c o r r u p t ib i l i t y  o f  r e a so n , or  th e  moral 
goodness o f  th e  r a t io n a l ,
2 ) th e  t e l e o lo g i c a l  v iew  o f  th e  u n iv e r se  in c lu d in g  
th e  assum ption o f  a human d e s t in y  which i s  in  
harmony w ith  th e  u n iv e r sa l o rd er , and
5) th e  i n t r i n s i c  worth and d ig n ity  o f  th e  human 
p erso n .
Only in  r e la t io n  to  th e s e  id e a s ,  in  t h e ir  framework, 
a g a in s t  th e  background which th ey  p rov id ed  to  a l l  h is  
th o u g h ts , cou ld  Kant have form u lated  th e  c a t e g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  
in  i t s  empty fo r m a lity  and n ever doubt but th a t  i t s  a p p lic a t io n
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would ensure th e  moral r ig h tn e s s  o f  a c t io n s  done in  accordance  
w ith  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  and fo r  th e  sa k e  o f  th e  
c a t  e g o r ic a l  imp e r a t iv e .
We have a lrea d y  n oted  th a t  Kant had n ot e x p l i c i t l y  
s ta t e d  th a t  he was p rop osin g  to  u se  th e s e  i d e a s . W e  
have a ls o  co n je c tu red  th a t  th e  moral co n ten t o f  K ant’ s 
th eo ry  m ight be grounded in  one o f  th e s e  id e a s  th a t  i t  would  
be w o rth -w h ile  to  determ in e in  w hich , so th a t  th e  b a s ic  
con cep t o f  Kant’ s w ith o u t doubt a u th e n t ic a l ly  moral te a c h in g s  
m ight be c le a r ly  d e f in e d . Kant had f a i l e d  to  do th o se  
b ecau se he had n ot been aware th a t  h is  b a s ic  t e n e t s  e s p e c ia l ly  
th e  in c o r r u p t ib le  goodness o f  reason  cou ld  be q u estio n ed  
by any lu c id  and c o n s c ie n t io u s  th in k e r . Those id e a s  were 
so much a p a rt o f  th e  s p ir i t u a l  c l im a te , one cou ld  even  
sa y , th e  s p ir i t u a l  element^^ o f  h is  a ge , th a t  Kant u sed  
them w ith o u t b ein g  aware o f  th e  ex ten t and th e  im portance  
o f  t h i s  u se .
1 ) E xcept when Kant announces th a t  he i s  u s in g  th e  t e l e o ­
l o g i c a l  v iew  o f  th e  u n iv e r se  in  a c e r ta in  argument in  
"D ie Grundlegung . . . "
2 ) E lem ent, in  th e  se n se  in  which w ater i s  " the elem ent 
o f  f i s h e s  ou t o f  which th ey  cannot b rea th e ."
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However, tem pera mutantur e t  nos mutamur in  i l l i s .
The a ccep ted  u n con sc iou s id e a s ,  th e  s p ir i t u a l  elem ent o f  
one a g e , are  th e  co n sc io u s  problem s o f  an oth er a g e . The 
framework and background o f  one age are brought in to  th e  
l im e l ig h t  and q u estio n ed  by th e  n e x t . They are q u estio n ed  
n ot o n ly  t h e o r e t i c a l ly ,  r a t io n a l ly  in  th e  name o f  s c i e n t i f i c  
and p h ilo s o p h ic a l  in t e g r i t y ,  but a ls o  e m o tio n a lly , as a p o in t  
o f  f a i t h .  Those who came a f t e r  Kant, w ere no lo n g e r  unaware 
o f  th e  prob lem s, w hich had n ever been p rob lem atic  to  Kant, 
o f  th e  r e la t io n s  h o ld in g  betw een th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  
and th e  "hum anitarian id ea s"  and t h e ir  r e s p e c t iv e  im portance  
as elem en ts o f  th e  K antian system  o f  e t h ic s .  O pinion was 
soon d iv id e d  amongst th e  ep igon es as to  w hether th e  c a te g o r ic a l  
im p era tiv e  (a s  th e  e sse n c e  o f  l e g a l i t y  a n d r a t io n a lity )  or 
th e  hum anitarian  id e a s  r e p r esen ted  th e  tr u e  sou rce  o f  K ant’ s  
view  o f  m o r a lity .
Those o f  K ant’ s ep ig o n es , who in  th e  name o f  r a t io n a l  
c o n s is te n c y  and in  t h e ir  s im p l ic i t y ,  accep ted  K ant’ s e x p l i c i t  
th eo ry  o f  th e  empty fo r m a lity  o f  th e  c a t e g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  
a t i t s  f a c e  v a lu e  and fo llo w e d  i t  up w ith o u t making a llo w ­
ances fo r  th e  t a c i t l y  im p lie d  hum anitarian id e a s  which gave  
d ir e c t io n  and o r ie n ta t io n  to  th e  a p p lic a t io n  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  
im p e r a tiv e , soon found t h e ir  e t h ic a l  system s d e sp o ile d  o f  
th a t  a u th e n tic  moral s ig n i f ic a n c e  which had d is t in g u is h e d
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K ant’ s th e o r y , and t h e ir  in t e r p r e ta t io n s  o f  Kant s tr a n g e ly  
a t  v a r ia n ce  w ith  K ant’ s own d e c is io n s  in  some c o n cr e te  moral 
in s t a n c e s .  C h ief in  t h i s  group can be counted  F ic h te ,  H egel 
and Hermann Cohen.
O thers among h is  su c c e sso r s  however, were a l iv e  to  th e  
d e c is iv e  in f lu e n c e  o f  th e  t a c i t  background id e a s  on Kant’ s  
moral system  and in te r p r e te d  h is  th eo ry  a c c o r d in g ly . Most 
o f  them plumped fo r  th e  t e l e o lo g i c a l  co n cep tio n  o f  th e  u n iv e r se  
and o f  human d e s t in y  as th e  tr u e  so u rce  o f  K ant’ s th e o r y , 
encouraged th e r e to  perhaps by th e  f a c t  th a t  i t  i s  th e  s in g le  
one which Kant e x p r e s s ly  adm its to  have u sed .
E rn st Cassicer, one o f  th e  most o u tsta n d in g  o f  K antian  
in t e r p r e t e r s ,  f o r  in s ta n c e  sums up h is  e x p o s it io n  o f  K ant’ s  
E th ic a l  Gbeory in  th e  fo llo w in g  manner: "To Kant th e  c a te g o r ic a l
im p era tiv e , i s  in  th e  l a s t  r e s o r t  analogous to  th e  law s o f  
n a tu r e . At t h i s  p o in t  Kant u ses  th e  term "n atu rë’ to  in d ic a t e  
not th e  p h y s ic a l e x is te n c e  o f  o b je c ts  but th e  sy s te m a tic  
c o r r e la t io n  o f  p a r t ic u la r  o b je c t s  to  each o th e r  and t h e ir  
harmonious in teg ra tio n .jL n  one f i n a l  and c o l l e c t i v e  a ia w ..
An o rd er , l i k e  th a t  e x is t in g  in  th e  p h y s ic a l u n iv e r s e , r e ig n s  
in  th e  moral sp h ere .
But whereas in  th e  p h y s ic a l u n iv e r se  we view  t h i s  order  
as som ething g iv e n  and beyond our power to  change, s to p ,  
in f lu e n c e ,  or fu r th e r , in  th e  moral sphere t h i s  ord er assumes
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th e  ch a ra c ter  o f  a p r a c t ic a l  t a s k . A p r a c t ic a l  ta s k , th a t
means som ething which can , and which i s  to  be a ch iev ed , and
r e a l i s e d  by human e f f o r t s ,  through c o n s is t e n t  moral a c t i v i t y
under moral law s a t  some p o in t  in  th e  fu tu r e  . . .  In  t h i s
way, even th e  "kingdom o f  ends" lo o s e s  some o f  i t s  fo r b id d in g
tr a n sc e n d e n ta l and u n a tta in a b le  c h a r a c te r , and i s  seen  to
p o in t  to  a fu tu r e  in  which i t s  a c tu a l r e a l i s a t io n  has been
brought about as mankind i s  f u l f i l l i n g  i t s  p r a c t ic a l  ta sk
o f  a ch iev in g  moral p e r f e c t io n .  Thus th e  same a c t io n s  which
under one a sp ec t are co n sid e red  as l in k s  in  th e  ch a in  o f
p h y s ic a l cau se  and e f f e c t ,  are now co n s id e red  under th e  a sp e c t
o f  t h e ir  u lt im a te  p urpose, t h e ir  t e lo s ;  namely th e  coming
g l o r i f i c a t i o n  o f  h ^ a n i t y  th e  r e a l i s a t io n  o f  th e  himan
d e s t in y  to  i t s  f u l l ,  i . e .  th e  a tta in m en t o f  moral p e r f e c t io n
by a l l  members o f  th e  human r a c e " ^ \
The t e l e o g ic a l  v iew  o f  th e  u n iv e r se  i s  th u s shown to
b e th e  u lt im a te  ground o f  th e  K antian th eo ry  o f  e t h ic s .
A t e l e o l o g i c a l  v iew  o f  th eu u n iv er se  can be c o n s is t e n t ly
2 )argued o n ly  on c o n d it io n  th a t  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a f i r s t
1 )  Thus fa r  B. C a ss ir e r  in  Kants Iifehen und L eh re; pp.
274 -  277» who p ru d en tly  s to p s  a t t h i s  p o in t  and so 
rem ains tr u e  to  K ant’ s in te n t io n  and w e ll  in s id e  th e  
c r i t i c a l  th eory  o f  e t h ic s .
2) That i s ,  dem onstrated , n ot m erely  in d u lg ed  in  on em otional 
prom ptings f o r t i f i e d  by u n con sc iou s assu m p tion s.
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cau se  ( in c lu s iv e  o f  th e  law r e g u la t in g  i t s  r e la t io n  to  i t s  
e f f e c t )  be p o s tu la te d  a t th e  same tim e or on c o n d it io n  th a t  
th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a so v e r e ig n  (p r o v id e n t)  i n t e l l i g e n c e  be 
p o s tu la te d  a t the same tim e . Two d i f f e r e n t  in te r p r e ta t io n s  
o f  K ant’ s th eo ry  o f  e t h ic s  are put forw ard to  remedy Kant’ s 
( in t e n t io n a l? ! )  in con seq u en ce by H arold H oeffd in g  and Rudolph 
O tto r e s p e c t iv e ly .
H oeffd in g  d ec id es  in  favou r o f  th e  f i r s t  a l t e r n a t iv e  
in  an argument th a t  runs somewhat as fo l lo w s :  The e x is te n c e
o f  a f i r s t  cau se and a s ta b le  law  govern in g i t s  r e la t io n  
to  i t s  e f f e c t s ,  would p ro v id e  a firm  b a s i s ,  fo r  a t e l e o lo g i c a l  
order in  th e  u n iv e r s e . K ant’ s c a t e g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  would  
make se n se  and be j u s t i f i e d  o n ly  a g a in s t  th e  background o f  
such a f ir m ly  e s ta b l is h e d  " n atu ral t e le o lo g y " . Kant h im se lf  
went a l i t t l e  way tow ards t h i s  co n cep tio n  but f a i l e d  to  
draw th e  f i n a l  c o n c lu s io n . That i s  th e  reason  why Kant 
d ec la re d  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  an, 
in  th e  l a s t  r e s o r t ,  in e x p l ic a b le  phenomenon. T his c o n c lu s io n  
which a lo n e  h e lp s  us to  understand  f u l l y  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  
c a t e g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  and to  ex p la in  i t s  v a l i d i t y ,  can 
however be drawn on th e  b a s is  o f  a com prehensive v iew  o f  
K ant’ s p h ilo so p h y . In  t h i s  com prehensive v iew  a t te n t io n  
sh ou ld  be p a id  to  th e  u n d er ly in g  id e a s  ra th e r  than to  th e
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su r fa c e  argum entation . H oeffd in g  th en  p roceed s to  show 
how t h i s  can be done by doing i t .  H is argument i s  as fo l lo w s
1 ) In  th e  f i r s t  p la c e ,  he rem inds us th a t  in  "O u tlin e  
o f  a u n iv e r s a l  h is t o r y  from a cosm op olitan  p o in t  o f  view"^^ 
Kant expounds th e  fo llo w in g  id ea : The stu d y  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  
ev en ts  i s  o f  v a lu e , and th e  co u rse  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  ev e n ts  
i n t e l l i g i b l e ,  o n ly  in  so fa r  as i t  may be ex p la in ed  as a 
gradual and ^steady e v o lu t io n  (tow ards moral p e r fe c t io n )  o f  
th e  human r a c e . Viewed under th e  a sp e c t o f  in d iv id u a l or  
n a tio n a l advantage h is t o r y  i s  a m ean in g less jumble o f  m o stly  
b r u ta l f a c t s  w ith o u t p a r t ic u la r  p h ilo s o p h ic a l  i n t e r e s t .
2) In  th e  second  p la c e ,  in  h is  th eo ry  o f  e t h ic s  Kant 
holds th a t  a demand i s  v o ic e d  in  th e  h ea rt o f  each in d iv id u a l  
human b e in g , th e  demand to  examine a l l  h i s  a c t io n s  as to  
w hether t h e ir  maxims are f i t  to  s e r v e  a s  law s in  a u n iv e r sa l  
a c t  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n .
3) In th e  th ir d  p la c e , in  th e  " P r in c ip le s  o f  j u r i s ­
prudence"^^ and in  th e  paper ”0n E tern a l Peace"^^ Kant 
d e c la r e s  i t  th e  m oral'd u ty  o f  every  human b ein g  to  do h is
1 )  v iz  Kant: Id ee  zu e in e r  a llg em ein en  G esch ich te  in
W eltb u erg e r lic h e r  A b s ic h t . (1784)
2) v iz  Kant: . . .  m etaph ysisch en  P r in z ip ie n  der R e c te le h r e
(1 7 9 7 )
3) v iz  Kant: Zum ewigen P ried en  (1795)
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utm ost to  f o s t e r  and encourage th e  form u la tion  o f  th e  
fundam ental id e a s  o f  a World C o n s t itu t io n . This, con­
s t i t u t i o n ,  Kant th in k s , would make U n iv ersa l P eace ( i . e .  
a harmonious accord  between th e  sep a ra te  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  
va r io u s  n a tio n s )  p o s s ib le  a t l a s t .
4 ) In  th e  fo u r th  p la c e , Kant h o ld s th a t  th e  form­
u la t io n  and a tta in m en t o f  such a c o n s t i tu t io n  i s  th e  
u lt im a te  aim o f  h is t o r y ,  (v iew ed  as in  p o in t 1) as a 
gradual and stea d y  e v o lu tio n  (tow ards moral p e r fe c t io n )  
o f  th e  human r a c e ) ,  i t s  d ir e c t iv e  id e a .
Now, H oeffd in g  argu es, what Kant regarded  as th e  
u lt im a te  aim o f  h is t o r y ,  i . e .  U n iv ersa l P ea ce , can be  
ach iev ed  o n ly  when i t  i s  a n t ic ip a te d  as i t  w ere, or p ro lep ted , 
to  u se  th e  term proposed by De Burgh, in  th e  w i l l  o f  men. 
Moral awareness i s  n o th in g  but t h i s  a n t ic ip a t io n , t h i s  
p r o le p tio n  o f  th e  u lt im a te  purpose o f  th e  human r a c e ^ \
Thus, H oeffd in g  co n c lu d es , a com prehensive v iew  o f  
Kantt-s p h ilo so p h y , esp . o f  h is  e t h ic a l  th eory  and h is  
p h ilo s o p h ic a l th eory  o f  h is t o r y ,  y ie ld s  th e  ex p la n a tio n  
fo r  what Kant h im se lf  had thought in e x p l ic a b le ,  nam ely,
1 )  I  have condensed H o effd in g ’ s argument from pages
14 -  20 o f  h is  paper on Rouseau’ s in f lu e n c e  on Kant: 
R ousseaus E in f lu s s  au f d ie  d e f in i t i v e  Form der 
K antischen  E th ik ; K antstud ien  1898, Bd. I I .
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th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f t t h e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e . The 
in ju n c t io n  (e x p r essed  in  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e ) to  
judge a l l  on e’ s a c t io n s  n ot from an in d iv id u a l p o in t o f  
v iew , but from a u n iv e r sa l p o in t  o f  v iew , rem ains in e x p lic a b le  
as lon g  as we tr y  to  r e f e r  i t  back to  th e  n a tu re  o f  man 
th e  in d iv id u a l .  T his i s  so b ecau se th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im perat­
iv e  i s  ’’au fond  n oth in g  but th e  p r o le p t io n  o f  th e  u lt im a te  ' 
purpose o f  h i s t o r i c a l  e v o lu t io n , th e  v o ic e  o f  th e  ra ce  in  
th e  in d iv id u a l* * ^ \ T his co n cep tio n  both  ex p la in s  and 
p roves th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e .
Rudolf O tto b ases h is  argument fo r  th e  assum ption o f  
th e  second a l t e r n a t iv e  ( th e  assum ption o f  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  
a so v er e ig n  p rov id en t in t e l l ig e n c e )  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  K ant’s  
e t h ic a l  th eory  on Kant’ s d i s t in c t io n  o f  p e r fe c t  and im­
p erfect^ ^  ( i . e .  n e g a t iv e  and p o s i t iv e )  d u t ie s .  Through 
th e  n o tio n  o f  im p erfec t or p o s i t iv e  d u t ie s ,  a new meaning* 
a new l i f e  i s  in j e c t e d  in to  th e  Kingdom o f  Ends. What 
had a t  f i r s t  been m erely an e x is te n c e  ’’n e x t - to  each -o th er" , 
a community whose members p a s s iv e ly  bore w ith  each
1 ) H. H oeffd in g: Rousseaus E in f lu s s  au f d ie  d e f in i t i v e
Form der K antischen  E th ik : K antstud ien  1898, Bk I I ,
p . 15 .
2) I s h a l l  d isc u s s  th e  problem s o f  im p erfect duty a t  a 
l a t e r  p o in t .
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o th e r , each one l im it in g  h is  own in t e r e s t  and l i b e r t y  so 
as n ot to  in t e r f e r e  w ith  th e  in t e r e s t s  and l ib e r t y  o f  o th e r s;  
a community headed by a d e ity  who i s  but th e  e x te r io r is e d  
and p e r s o n if ie d  o b lig a t io n  to  l im i t  o n e ’s purposes in  th e  
manner d escr ib ed , -  becomes thanks to  th e  n o tio n  o f  
p o s i t iv e  d u t ie s ,  an e x is te n c e  " fo r -e a c h -o th e r " , a community 
whose members a c t iv e ly  seek  to  fu r th e r  each o th er s  in t e r e s t s  
and p u rp oses, by adopting them, as i t  w ere, as t h e ir  own; 
a community over whom a benignant d e ity  p r e s id e s ,  sm ilin g  
upon t h e ir  g o o d -w ille d  e f f o r t s  and a ssu r in g  t h e ir  su c c e ss  
(b y  th e  p o s tu la te s  o f  p r a c t ic a l  r e a s o n ) .
Thus fa r  Otto but fo llo w s  Kant’ s e x p l i c i t  v iew s . But 
Otto argues i t  i s  im p o ss ib le  to  stop  a t  t h i s  p o in t w ith  
any c o n s is te n c y . One must draw th e  consequences im p lied  
in  K ant’ s p o s it io n  even where Kant in a d v e r te n t ly  or in te n t io n ­
a l l y  om itted  to  do s o . The n a tu r a l, in e v i t a b le  seq u el 
to  th e  n o tio n  o f  th e  kingdom o f  ends as an e x is te n c e  " fo r -  
ea ch -o th er" , i s  th e  n o tio n  o f  th e  kingdom o f  ends as an 
e x is te n c e  " w ith -ea ch -o th er" . The kingdom o f  ends in  i t s  
th ir d  form i s  en v isaged  by O tto as a community whose members 
combine t h e ir  e f f o r t s  to  a ch iev e  c o l l e c t i v e  ends lil^ e  th o se  
o f  th e  fa m ily , th e  g u i ld ,  th e  c l a s s ,  th e  n a t io n , and f i n a l l y  
th e  human r a c e . "In t h i s  com prehensive l i v in g  v is io n  o f  
humanity harm oniously w ie ld ed  in to  one k ingdom -of-ends
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K ant’ s g re a t d isc o v ery  a ch iev es  i t s  n a tu ra l consummation.
Kant never exp ressed  t h i s  v i s io n  in  so many w ords. But 
he i s  hum anity’ s torch b earer  on t h i s  path  to  p er fe c tio n " ^ ^ .
In  a d d it io n , O tto argu es, th a t  Kant’ s co n cep tio n  o f  
d e ity  i s  u n ten ab le  and in d e fe n s ib le .  One must n ot c a l l  
upon a God fo r  n o th in g . One ought not to  p o s tu la te  a god 
i f  he has n oth in g  to  do. A deus o t io s u s  i s  an in d e fe n s ib le  
h y p o th esis^ ^ . A deus tâ^um rep en san s^  ^ on th e  o th er
Zl')
hand i s  an u n ten ab le  h y p o th e s is  ^ . I t  makes no sen se
1 )  R. O tto: N otes to  Kant "Grundlegung . . . "  p.  205*
2) As th e  d e ity  i s  con ce iv ed  by Kant in  P ie  Grundlegung. .
3 ) The term i s  borrowed from L a c ta n tiu s . ‘
4 )  As th e  d e ity  i s  co n ce iv ed  by Kant in  "D ie K r it ik  der
p ra k tisch en  Vernunft" v iz  book I I ,  ch . Ï I  & 5 . .  ^*ït 
IS m ora lly  n ece ssa r y  to  assume th e  e x is te n c e  o f  God.
I t  must be n oted  however, th a t  t h i s  moral n e c e s s i t y  
i s  s u b je c t iv e  i . e .  a need (B ed u er fn iss )  and n ot 
o b je c t iv e  i . e .  i t s e l f  a duty , fo r  th e r e  cannot be a 
duty to  suppose th e  e x is te n c e  o f  anyth ing . . .  More­
over I  do not mean by t h i s  th a t  i t  i s  n ece ssa r y  to  
suppose th e  e x is te n c e  o f  god as a b a s is  o f  a l l  o b lig a t io n  
in  g en era l ( fo r  t h i s  r e s t s  as has been s u f f i c i e n t l y  
proved on th e  autonomy o f  reason  i t s e l f ) .  What i s
a m atter o f  duty h ere i s  th e  endeavour to  r e a l i s e  and 
promote th e  summum bonum . . .  ( p o s i t iv e  d u t ie s ! )  in  
th e  w orld , th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  which prom otion can 
th e r e fo r e  be p o s tu la te d . S in c e  our reason  cannot 
co n ce iv e  t h i s  p o ssib ilit;)'- excep t on th e  su p p o s it io n  
o f  a supreme i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  th e  adm ission  o f  th e  e x i s t ­
ence o f  t h i s  supreme i n t e l l ig e n c e  i s  con n ected  w ith  
th e  c o n sc io u sn e ss  o f  our d uty , a lth ough  th e  adm ission
i t s e l f  b elon gs to  th e  domain o f  s p e c u la t iv e  reason ft ..
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and i t  i s  a s e l f - c o n tr a d ic to r y  con cep t. For, i f  th e  
e x is te n c e  o f  god makes th e  achievem ent o f  th e  summum bonum 
p o s s ib le ,  and i f  th e  atta ih m en t o f  t h i s  summum bonum (ap a rt  
from h ap p in ess p rop ortion ed  to  moral m e r it , i t  co n ta in s  
th e  prom ise o f  in d iv id u a l im m orta lity  which each man needs  
in  order to  work out h is  moral p e r f e c t io n ) i s  hum anity’ s 
u lt im a te  purpose, then  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  god can be a '
guarantee f^or th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a ch iev in g  th a t  purpose  
o n ly  i f  god h im se lf  had o r ig in a l ly  in v en ted  and s e t  t h i s  
purpose fo r  hum anity, and in  a d d itio n  had so ordered  th e  
u n iv e r se  as to  make th e  achievem ent o f  t h i s  purpose p o s s ib l e ^ \  
For o th er w ise  god would be co n ce ived  as th e  guarantor or  
th e  execu tor  o f  a purpose n ot h is  own, i . e .  as ser v in g  th e  
purposes o f  a G odless U n iv erse , which i s  absurd. But 
God cannot be co n ce ived  as th e  in v en to r  o f  such a d e s t in y ,  
u n le s s  he i s  a t  th e  same tim e co n ce iv ed  as c r e a t in g  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t h i s  d e s t in y , i . e .  c r e a t in g  b e in g s which  
are cap ab le o f  having such a d e s t in y . Now o n ly  f r e e  and 
r a t io n a l  b e in g s , b e in g s  who are e n d s-in -th em se lv es  are  
cap ab le  o f  t h i s  d e s t in y . T h erefore God must be con ce iv ed  
as th e  u lt im a te  ground fo r  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  e n d s -in -th e m se lv e s ,
1 )  Kant as we have seen  p o s tu la te s  God’s e x is te n c e  on ly  
fo r  th e  second fu n c t io n .
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t h e ir  freedom , and th e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e ir  w i l l s  to  be determ ined  
s o l e l y  by t h e ir  rea so n . That i s ,  God i s  th e  u lt im a te
ground o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e , and h is  e x is te n c e  
e x p la in s  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i t s  e x is te n c e . "Thus th e  
Autonomy o f  E th ic s  o f  an in n er  n e c e s s i t y  becomes a Theonomy"^\ 
Hence th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a f i r s t  cause or a so v er e ig n  
i n t e l l ig e n c e  whilst no doubt n ece ssa r y  su p p o s it io n s  fo r  a 
c o n s is t e n t  and sy ste m a tic  t e l e o lo g i c a l  v iew  o f  th e  U n iv erse , 
d e tr a c t  from th e  Autonomy o f  E th ic s ,  nay d estro y  th e  very  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  such an Autonomy w ith in  th e  t e l e o lo g i c a l  
framework. By p ro v id in g  an ex p la n a tio n  or even a p roof  
fo r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e , th e se  
assum ptio ns annul i t s  c a te g o r ic a l  ch a ra c ter  and render i t  
m erely  h y p o th e tic a l^ ^ , an outcome which o b v io u s ly  c o n f l i c t s  
w ith  th e  avowed p o s it io n  o f  Kant and which Kant would never  
a c c e p t. We must th e r e fo r e  con clu d e th a t  a t some p o in t  th e  
c i t e d  in te r p r e te r s  m istook  K ant’s m eaning, s in c e  i t  i s  
a lto g e th e r  in c o n c e iv a b le  th a t  Kant d id  n ot s e e  th a t  th e  
th a t  th e  above m entioned h yp oth eses were p r e su p o s it io n s
1 ) R. O tto: N ote to  th e  "Grundlegung . . . " ;  p.  206 .
2) To a c e r ta in  ex ten t th ey  thus p rov id e  p ro o f o f  th e  
i l lu s o r i n e s s  o f  moral ex p er ien ce .
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n ece ssa r y  to  any t e l e o lo g i c a l  v iew . The ro o t o f th e  H oeffd in g  
-O tto  m istak e i s  to  be sought in  an e x c e s s iv e  emphasis o f  th e  
t e l e o lo g i c a l  id e a , amongst a l l  o th er  ideas^^ o f  th e  frame­
work. P o s s ib ly  a lso  in  an unduly o b je c t iv a t in g  (v e r d in g -  
l ic h e n d e )  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f t t h e  t e l e o lo g i c a l  id e a  common to  
both  H oeffd in g  and O tto .
So doubt, H oeffd in g  as w e ll  as O tto , i f  p r e sse d  cou ld  
produce ample support (each  fo r  h is  own v iew s) from th e  
w r it in g s  o f  Kant. C erta in  p a ssa g es  o f  Kant are however m is­
le a d in g  i f  undue im portance be a tta ch ed  to  them. C erta in  
p a ssa g es in  Kant, ( e s p e c ia l ly  as i s  but n a tu ra l th o se  which
have as t h e ir  theme one o f  th e  ‘'hum anitarian s u p e r s t it io n s " )
o ' )
sh ould  be read  as id e a t ic  '  cod as, or em otional cadenzes to  
h is  m eth od o log ica l e n q u ir ie s  and c o n c lu s io n s . One must be 
c a r e fu l n ot to  p ress  them too  much, or in f e r  more from them 
than i s  com patib le  w ith  Kant’ s fundam ental p o s i t io n .  E s p e c ia l­
l y  one sh ou ld  be wary n ot to  draw any c o n c lu s io n s  or b u ild  
any th e o r ie s  which m ight afterw ards c o n f l i c t  w ith  K ant’ s  
b a s ic  t e n e t :  th e  p u r ity  and autonomy o f  E th ic s .  I t  i s  v ery
tem p tin g , once th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  in  i t s  empty
1 ) There i s  one id e a  among them which by i t s e l f  e x p la in s  
th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e  p rese rv es  i t s  c a te g o r ic a l  
ch a ra c ter  and does n ot n e c e s s i t a t e  uniform  t e l e o lo g i c a l  
view  o f  th e  u n iv e r se .
2) i . e .  id e a t ic  from id e a  l i k e  o p e r a t ic  from opera .
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fo r m a lity  has been r e co g n ise d  as an in s u f f i c i e n t  c r i t e r io n  
and ground o f  moral r ig h tn e s s ,  to  ta k e  one o f  th e  co n cr e te  
elem ents in  K ant’ s E th ic a l Theory, ( i . e .  one o f  th e  "human­
i t a r ia n  s u p e r s t it io n s " )  l i k e  th e  id e a  o f  a t e l e o lo g i c a l  order  
o f  th e  u n iv e r se , and tr y  to  d er iv e  th e w hole o f  K antian e th ic s
from t h i s  one id e a . A ll  such attem pts however w i l l  be found
)to  be s e l f - d e s t r u c t iv e
The p u r ity  and autonomy o f  K ant’ s c r i t i c a l  th eory  o f  
e t h ic s  as we must bear in  mind, i s  p reserv ed  by v ir tu e  o f  
th e  d e l i c a t e  suspended b a lan ce  between (h is  e x p l i c i t  th eo ry )
th e  empty fo r m a lity  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im perative^^ and ( th e
t a c i t  and a t tim es u ncon sciou s p r e su p p o s it io n s  o f  th e  frame­
work in  which he a p p lie s  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e ) th e  
c o n cr e te  co n ten t o f  th e  "hum anitarian su p e rstit io n s" ^ ^  in  th e
I L )
fa c e  o f  i t s  many d i f f i c u l t i e s  and erro rs Perhaps b ecau se
1 ) inasmuch as th e  Autonomy o f  E th ic s  i s  th ereb y  reduced to  
Heteronomy.
2) W ithout which th e  system  would be heteronom ous.
5 ) w ith o u t which th e  system  would be d evoid  o f  moral
s ig n i f ic a n c e .
4 ) L ike th e  d i f f i c u l t y  in h e ren t in  th e  id e a  o f  t e le o lo g y  fo r  
in s ta n c e , which Kant p re ferre d  to  p a ss-o v e r  and d isreg a rd  
s in c e  he in ten d ed  to  make o n ly  a p a r t ia l  u se  o f  i t ,  and 
even so n ever e x p l i c i t e l y  ad m itted  i t  in to  th e  core o f  
th e  c r i t i c a l  a n a ly s is  o f  moral ex p er ie n c e . Other d i f f f i c -  
u l t i e s  are th o se  in h eren t in  th e  n o tio n s  o f  th e  in co rru p t­
i b i l i t y  o f  rea so n , th e  d ig n ity  o f  man, e t c .
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o f  th e in ^ \ T his p a r t ic u la r  b a lan ce i s  no lo n g er  p o s s ib le  
to  us once i t s  t a c i t  p r e su p p o s it io n s  and i t s  im p lic a t io n s  
have been p o in te d  o u t.
To r e s o lv e  t h i s  im passe we would need to  d e fin e  a system  
o f  e t h ic s  f u l f i l l i n g  th e  fo llo v /in g  th r e e  c o n d it io n s :
I t  would have to  p rese rv e  th e  autonomous ch a ra c ter  o f  
e t h ic s ,  in s p i t e  o f  and a t th e  same tim e , as i t  d e f in e s  a 
co n cr e te  con cept to  ser v e  as i t s  in n er  core and u lt im a te  
ground.
I t  would have to  f in d  a c o n cr e te  con cept which would  
se r v e  as th e  u lt im a te  ground o f  e t h ic s  w ith ou t d estro y in g  
i t s  autonomous c h a r a c te r .
I t  would have to  avo id  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and errors o f  
th e  K antian system  from which i t  d ir e c t ly  d e r iv e s .
The id e a  o f  t e l e o lo g i c a l  order o f  th e  u n iv e r s e , a s  we 
have seen  i s  p a r t ic u la r ly  u n su ite d  fo r  ser v in g  as th e  u lt im a te  
ground o f  E th ic s .  For by i t  E th ic s  wo h id  be d e fin d  e ith e r  
as Theonomy or as Bionomy (a s  in  N ie tz s c h e , Darwin, Spencer, 
e t c . ) .  Thus th e  id e a  chosen and s t r e s s e d  by d i s c ip le s  and 
in te r p r e te r s  w ish in g  to  pay hommage to  Kant as th e  d ir e c t iv e
1 ) i . e .  by m istak in g  th e  ex ten t o f  t h e ir  im portance Kant 
managed to  d isreg a rd  them.
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o f  h is  s y s t e m i s  th e  id ea  most l i k e l y  to  prove f a t a l  to  
E th ic s  as Kant conceived  i t .
We must th e r e fo r e  r u le  i t  ou t, and s in c e  we can hope
fo r  no fu r th er  help  in  t h i s  m atter from Kant’ s d is c ip le s  we
must turn to  h is  d e tr a c to r s , to  th o se  who most fu r io u s ly
2 )a tta ck  h is  e th ic a l  p o s it io n  The view s o f  opponents are
a t tim es most in s t r u c t iv e .  Thus, we f in d  th a t as fa r  as Kant 
opponents are concerned th e  cen tre  o f th e  s ta g e  i s  occupied  
not by th e  T e le o lo g ic a l  order o f  th e  u n iv e rse , but by what. 
Thomas Mann once c a l le d  th e  "Ideal o f W ell-fare"  and graded  
"second-rate""^^ th e  v ir tu e s   ^ by whose e x e r c ise  t h i s  id e a l  
i s  a tta in e d , and th e  b a s ic  id ea  on^^ which i t  i s  grounded.
1 ) Probably because i t  i s  th e  most com prehensive and in c lu d es  
a l l  th e  o th e r s .
2) By d e tr a c to rs  I do not r e fe r  to  c r i t i c s  o f Kant’ s method in  
E th ic s  and th e  c a te g o r ic a l im p erative , on p h ilo so p h ic a l  
grounds. I r e fe r  to  th o se  who oppose Kant’ s e th ic a l  
v iew s, and a t t i tu d e ,  from th e  s id e  o f th e  "humanitarian  
id ea s" . Enemies are u su a lly  more a cu te ly  s e n s i t iv e  than  
d i s c i p l e s , and more l i k e l y  to  be aware o f  th e  tru e  b a s is
o f  a s p ir i tu a l  or a moral a t t i t u d e ,  because t h i s  a t t itu d e  
g e ts  them "on th e  raw" a t th e  v i t a l  p o in t . This i s  
e s p e c ia l ly  tr u e  o f  ’ emotional* enem ies, i . e .  opponents 
because o f em otional rea so n s, who a lso  j u s t i f y  th e ir  
o p p o s itio n  by th e  same em otional rea so n s.
3) "Das W oh lfah rtsid ea l i s t  e in  Id ea l zw eiten  Ranges," Th. 
Mann; Der Zauberberg.
4 ) J u s t ic e ,  u p r ig h tn ess , fa i th fu ln e s s  e t c .
5) i . e .  th e  eq u a lity  o f c la im s , and th e  va lu e  which i s  th e  
a ttr ib u te  o f  men qua men.
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"The v ir tu e s  Kant i s  o fte n  p ra ised  fo r  having p o ssessed  
in  h is  l i f e ,  namely th o se  o f u n con d ition a l j u s t ic e ,  r ig h t -  i 
eousness and tr u th fu ln e ss  are no doubt to  a grea t ex ten t  
th e  outcome o f  h is  n a tiv e  t im id ity .  For a l l  th e  p r a ise  one 
may bestow on such q u a l i t ie s  one cannot overlook  th e  f a c t ,  
th a t th ey  do not f i t  a l i f e  l iv e d  g r e a t ly  in  th e  m idst o f  th e  
b a t t le  fo r  power. They cannot be ch er ish ed  u n in terru p ted ly , 
th ey  must o fte n  be d iscard ed  . . . .  "The daimonic moral
power o f F rederick  o f  P r u ss ia , or o f  Bismarck, which over­
r id in g  a l l  p e tty  bourgeois moral o b je c t io n s , male es ward and 
endangers th e  l i f e  o f  many fo r  the sake o f  a g rea t id e a , i s  
not to  be measured by the m o ra lity  o f  a Kant. When Kant 
speaks o f  freedom he means not th e  freedom ^of.the a u to cr a tic  
p e r so n a lity  making i t s  own law s and breaking th o se  o f  o th e r s , 
no, by freedom Kant understands th e  same as by m o ra lity , i . e .  
th e  reverence and th e  obed ience towards th e  law . Kant needs 
th e  concept o f  Freedom on ly  in so fa r  as i t  i s .  a n ecessary  
co n d itio n  o f moral o b lig a t io n , fo r  w ithout i t  th ere  would be 
fo r  Kant no moral co n sc iou sn ess and no moral r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .  
N eith er  th e  coirept o f  th e  *1* nor th a t o f Freedom as d efin ed
by Kant are ev idence fo r  a stro n g , co n fid en t m ora lity  bom
2 )out o f  a stron g  and co n fid en t se lf-aw aren ess"  \
1) Richard M u e lle r -F r e ie n fe ls :  P e r so e n lic h k e it  und W elt­
anschauung; Kant; p . 264.
2) Richard M u e lle r -F r e ie n fe ls :  idem; p . 268.
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A s im ila r  a tu itu d e  inform s th e  fo llo w in g  q u otation :
** . . . .  he s t i l l  a llo w s h im se lf  to  be in tim id a te d  by th e  m ention
o f  V i r t u e  The p o in t in  q u estio n  i s  th e  r e la t io n  o f  th e
Knighthood o f  th e  S p ir i t  to  th e  commonplace m a jo r ity . A 
r e la t io n  which h e r e to fo r e  was com p lete ly  unknown, and whose 
very  emergence i s  c h a r a c te r is t ic  fo r  our e ffem in a te  g en er a tio n . 
For i t  consummates i t s e l f  in  such a way th a t  th e  Knighthood 
o f  th e  S p ir i t ,  perturbed  to  i t s  inm ost by some n i h i l i s t i c  
ex p er ien ce , d isc o v e r s  th e  commonplace and ord inary  as a ta sk ,  
an aim to  be a t ta in e d , and in  th e  p rocess  o f  s t r iv in g  fo r  th e  
commonplace, th e  Knighthood o f  th e  S p ir i t ,  fo r g e ts  th e  S p ir i t ,  
d en ies  i t ,  b e tra y s  it" ^ ^ .
T his a tta c k  c u r io u s ly  enough i s  d ir e c te d  a g a in st  Thomas 
Mann, who no doubt h im se lf  sym path ises not a l i t t l e  w ith  th e  
a t t i t u d e  exp ressed  in' i t .  I  have quoted i t  because i t  so 
e x c e l le n t ly  c h a r a c te r is e s  th e  a tta ck  on Kant and r e v e a ls  i t s  
deeper r e a so n s . E v id en tly  i f  Kant had been n oth in g  but a 
t im id  l i t t l e  tea ch er  o f p h ilo sop h y  in  K oenigsberg i t  would  
be h ig h ly  absurd and h ard ly  worth anyone’ s w h ile  to  accuse  
him o f  not p o s se s s in g  th e  fo r c e fu l  e g o t i s t i c  grandeur which 
c h a r a c te r is e s  th e  ’great* l i k e  F red er ick , Bism arck, Napoleon.
1) Rudolph T h ie l:  D ie G eneration  ohne Maenner; Thomas
Mann oder d ie  I r o n ie  aus Mangel an S to lz ;  p . 338.
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But Kant h im se lf  i s  one o f th e  g rea t (o n ly  a g a in st  t h i s  f a c t  
can th e  a tta c k  a g a in st  him be understood) and being o f  t h is  
s ta tu r e  has d e l ib e r a te ly  den ied  th e  ex c ep tio n a l r ig h ts  o f  
th e  ou tstan d in g  p e r s o n a lity , surrendering  th e  ’ f o r t r e s s  o f  
th e  S p i r i t ’ from w ith in , as i t  w e r e ^ \
T his th en , t h i s  d en ia l and in v a lid a t io n  o f  th e  ex cep tio n a l  
r ig h t s  o f  th e ex c ep tio n a l p e r s o n a lity  i s ,  to  judge by th e  
v a lu a b le  testim on y  o f  h is  opponents, th e  v i t a l  c e n tr e  o f  
Kant’ s e th ic a l  system . P o s i t iv e ly  exp ressed , t h i s  centrum  
v i t a l i s  i s  b e s t  c ircu m scrib ed  by th e  p r o p o s it io n  th a t in  th e  
moral domain a l l  members o f  th e  human ra ce  enjoy e q u a lity  o f  
s ta tu s  and hence p o sse s s  a c e r ta in  in t r in s ic  worth qua human 
b e in g s .
I  propose to  show that t h i s  id e a , th e  id e a  o f  th e  
i n t r in s ic  worth o f  human bangs qua human b ein g  i s  capab le o f  
supp ly ing  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p erative w ith  th e  n ecessa ry  moral 
c o n te n t, and i s  capab le o f p rov id in g  e th ic s  w ith  a s ta b le  
b a s is  and ground o f  v a l id i t y  w ith ou t d ep riv in g  i t  o f  i t s  
autonomy.
1 ) Compare H. J . P aton’ s: "We s h a l l  n ever understand Kant
a r ig h t u n le ss  we se e  him as th e  a p o s t le  o f  human freedom, 
and th e  champion o f  th e  common man". H. J . Paton:
The c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tive; p . 171.
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F ir s t  then I ’d l i k e  to  p o in t out th a t t h i s  id ea  i s  th e  
s o l e  h y p o th esis  to  a ssu re  u n iv e r s a l i t y  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  
im p erative  in  th e  d is t r ib u t iv e  se n se , and to  exclude a l l  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  "double standards" , so lip s ism  e t c .  In  
oth er  words i t  f u l f i l s  th e  fu n c tio n  fo r  which i t  has been  
evoked in  th e  f i r s t  p la c e , i t  in v a lid a te s  any cla im  to  
ex cep tio n a l treatm ent fo r  th e  ex c ep tio n a l p e r s o n a lity .
Ther u n iv e r s a l i t y  o f th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e , then  
l i e s  not in  i t s  form al s tr u c tu r e , but in  th e  u n iv e r sa l a p p lic ­
a t io n  o f  th e  concept o f  th e  inner worth o f  human b e in g s  qua 
human b e in g s , and v a r ie s  in  d ir e c t  p rop ortion  w ith
How can we v in d ic a te  t h i s  u n iv e r sa l a p p lic a t io n  o f  th e  
concept o f  t h e in t r in s ic  worth o f  human b ein g s qua human b eings?
T his concept we must bear in  mind, has i t s  o r ig in s ,
( in  common w ith  most o f  th e  o th er b a s ic  con cep ts o f  Kant’ s 
id e a t ic  p rop erty ) in  th e  "hum anitarian s u p e r s t it io n s"  o f  
th e  E igh teen th  cen tu ry , and i s  s tr o n g ly  co lou red  by th e  
R ousseau’ ean v e r s io n  o f  th e s e  id e a s . Now accord ing to
1) When th e  concept i s  r e s t r i c t e d  in  i t s  a p p lic a t io n  so as 
to  exclude s la v e s ,  n eg ro es. H e r e t ic s ,  C a th o lic s , Jews, 
enemies e t c . ,  th e  v a l id i t y  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p erative  
i s  a u to m a tic a lly  r e s t r ic t e d  w ith  i t ,  and to  e x a c t ly  th e  
same e x te n t .
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Rousseau th e  i n t r in s ic  v/orth o f a human b ein g  qua human b ein g ,
which fo r  sh o rt we s h a l l  term th e  d ig n ity  o f  man -  qua man,
i s  p art o f  man’ s in n a te  n a tu re . By th e  in n a te  q u a l i f ic a t io n s
o f  t h e ir  natu re human b ein gs are endowed w ith  freedom o f  w i l l
and hence are capable o f  V irtue^ ^ . Man’ s in n a te  c a p a b il i ty  
O')o f  v ir tu e  '  i s ,  o b j e c t iv e ly ,  th e  reason  fo r  th e  worth and 
d ig n ity  o f  human b e in g s . S u b je c t iv e ly  i t  i s  f e l t  and valu ed  
by a corresponding sen tim en t, i t s e l f  in n a te  in  human nature: 
th e  n a tu ra l lo v e  o f  man fo r  hum anity.
In  h is  p r e - c r i t i c a l  w r it in g s  Kant fo llo w e d  - tu s se a u  
very  c lo se ly ^ ^ : "True v ir tu e " , he w r it e s ,  "can be grown on ly
on p r in c ip le s ;  th e  more u n iv e r sa l th e se  p r in c ip le s  th e  
n ob ler  and more e le v a te d  th e  v ir tu e .  These p r in c ip le s  are  
n ot s p e c u la t iv e  r u le s  o f  rea so n , but th e  awareness o f  a f e e l in g
1 ) " . .  l a  l i b e r t é  m orale . .  s e u l rend 1 ’homme vraim ent 
m aitre  de l u i ,  car 1 ’ im pulsion  du se u l ape>étit e s t  
e sc la v a g e  e t  1*o b eisa n ce  a l a  l o i  qu’on s e  p rése n te  
e s t  l i b e r t é  . .  l a  v ertu  n ’ e s t  que l a  l i b e r t é  m orale."
2) I t  i s  on ly  a c a p a b i l i t y f ) f  "v irtue"  i . e .  to  be pursued  
in  th e  f a c e  o f  o b je c t io n , fo r  accord ing to  Rousseau, 
th e  a c tu a l n a tu ra l goodness o f  man has been v i t i a t e d
by th e  im p o sitio n s  o f  c u ltu r e , and needs to  be r e in s ta te d  
by p erseveran ce in  m erely v ir tu o u s  a c t io n s  " u n til p e r fe c t  
a r t i f i c i a l i t y  becomes nature again" . (Rousseaui- L e ttr e s  
sur l a  v er tu e  e t  l e  bonheur."
5) At l e a s t  in s o fa r  as th e  manner o f  th e  r e c o g n it io n  o f  th e  
d ig n ity  o f  human b ein gs i s  concerned, fo r  he never 
shared R ousseau’s m is tr u st  o f  Reason, and d i s t a s t e  fo r  
c u ltu r a l ach ievem ents.
317
which d w ells  in  every human h eart and which i s  more than mere 
p it y  and h e lp fu ln e s s . I th in k  t h i s  sen tim ent i s  b e s t  d escr ib ed  
as a f e e l in g  fo r  th e  Beauty and D ig n ity  o f  human nature . . .
Das G efuehl von der S ch oen heit und Wuerde der m enschlichen  
N atur"^^•
To be capable o f  V ir tu e , accord ing to  Kant, one must 
p o sse ss  t h i s  f e e l in g .  T his f e e l in g ,  however, i s  in n a te  
and th e r e fo r e  u n iv e r s a l .  On th e  o th er  hand ’Beauty and 
D ig n ity ’ are a lso  in n a te  q u a l i t i e s  o f human nature as such.
But in  d i s t in c t io n  from Rousseau, Kant h o ld s th a t  t h i s  ’Beauty  
and D ign ity* are grounded p r im a r ily  in  th e  r a t io n a l q u a lity  
o f  human n a tu re . Kant a lso  h o ld s , th a t what we c a l l  th e  
’Beauty and D ig n ity  o f  Human N atu re’ r e fe r s  to  and com prises 
more than th e  s o le  c a p a b ili ty o o f  moral v ir tu e ,  namely 
c a p a b i l i t i e s  fo r  s c i e n t i f i c  r e se a r c h , p h ilo so p h ic a l sp e c u la t io n ,  
a r t i s t i c  c r e a t io n , r e l ig io u s  in s p ir a t io n ,  e t c .
At t h i s  p a r t ic u la r  p o in t in  Kant’ s p h ilo so p h ic a l ev o lu tio n  
n e ith e r  th e  concept o f  th e  ’ d ig n ity  o f  man’ nor i t s  (assumed) 
u n iv e r sa l v a l id i t y  p resen t a n y & iff ic u lty . Both are con ta in ed  
in  th e  d e f in i t io n  o f  ’man’ and show th e r e fo r e  an alm ost 
ta u to lo g ic a l  ch a ra c ter . The ’ d ig n ity  o f  man’ i s  j u s t i f i e d  
by i t s  d e f in i t io n  as an in h e ren t, in n a te  p art o f  human nature  
in d is s o lu b ly  bound up w ith  th e  r a t io n a l  q u a l i t i e s  o f  th a t
1 )  Kant: ' Das G efuehl des Schoenen und des Erhabenen; (1764)
Ch. I I  & 2 .
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n a tu re . Indeed th o se  r a t io n a l q u a l i t i e s  in  t h e ir  variou s  
a c t i v i t i e s  and m o d ific a tio n s  ( in  th e  A rts , S c ie n c e s , P h ilosop h y  
e tc )  p rovid e th e  main r a iso n  d ’ e tr e  o f human d ig n ity .  The 
u n iv e r sa l v a l id i t y  ( in  i t s  d is t r ib u t iv e  s e n s e )o f  human 
d ig n ity ,  on th e  o th er  hand i s  v in d ic a te d  on th e  b a s is  o f  an 
u n iv e r sa l p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  human b ein gs in  th e  r a t io n a l ,  t h i s  
b e in g , by d e f . an e s s e n t ia l  q u a lity  o f  human n a tu re .
L ater , in  h is  c r i t i c a l  v /r it in g s , Kant had to  change 
h is  ground fo r  m eth od olog ica l reason^* In  view  o f  th e  re q u ire ­
ments o f th e  tra n scen d en ta l method o f  deduction^^, Kant had 
to  abandon h is  former view  o f  moral v ir t u e ,  i . e .  v ir tu e  
grounded in  an in n a te  n a tu ra l sen tim en t. In accordance w ith  
h is  new method Kant now grounded moral v ir tu e ,  i . e .  th e  good
w i l l ,  in  i t s  d eterm in ation  by th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e ,
2 )i . e .  in  th é  d eterm in ation  o f  w i l l  by reason;  ^ and th e
1 ) T ran sferr in g  th e  problem o f  objectiv it;)'' from th e c r it iq u e  
o f  Pure Reason to  E th ic s  Kant form u lates h is  q u estio n
th u s: "Whether in  E th icc  too  th e r e  might not be a pervading
la w fu ln e s s , which i s  n ot dependent on th e fm a te r ia l con ten t  
•or th e  m a ter ia l d if fe r e n c e s  and v a r ia t io n s  o f  what i s  
w il le d ,  but determ ined s o le ly  by th e  manner in  which i t  
i s  w i l le d ,  i . e .  th é  p a r t ic u la r  m od ality  o f  th e  w i l l  i t s e l f  
which th ereb y  p rov id es t h i s  la w fu ln e ss  w ith  o b j e c t iv i t y  
in  th e  tran scen d en ta l sen se  o f  th e  word, i . e .  p rov id es  
a ground fo r  th e  n ecessa ry  and u n iv e r sa l v a l id i t y  o f  
e t h ic a l  v a lu e s ."  v i z .  C a ssirer : Kants Leben unâLehre.
p . 266 .
2) Thus reced in g  fu r th e r  away from Rousseau by grounding  
both V irtu e  and i t s  r e c o g n it io n  in  reason .
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p o s s i b i l i t y  of^such a d eterm in ation  o f  w i l l  by reason , he 
deduced from th e  presupposed p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  freedom . On 
th e  o th er  hand, he view ed Human n ature as s p l i t  in  two p a r ts ,  
one ir r a t io n a l  se n su a l, and one r a t io n a l p a r t . Inner worth  
and d ig n ity  i s  made c o n d itio n a l on th e  dom ination and determ in- 
a tio n  o f  th e  ir r a t io n a l  p art by th e  r a t io n a l;  i . e .  u lt im a te ly  
in  th e  freedom o f  th e  human w i l l  which en ab les man to  determ ine  
h im se lf  in  accordance w ith  th e  d ic ta te s  o f h is  reason and 
r e g a r d le ss  o f  h is  sen su al d e s ir e s  and im p u lses. That i s  th e  
D ig n ity  o f  Man, i s  made to  depend on th e  a b i l i t y  o f  Man to  
perform moral actions^^  and bear moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  i . e .  
in  th e  l a s t  in s ta n c e , on th e  freedom o f  th e  w i l l .
In t h i s  new framework, th e  dem onstration  o f  th e  o b je c t iv e  
r e a l i t y  o f  th e  D ig n ity  o f  Man, and th e  v in d ic a t io n  o f  i t s  
o b je c t iv e  u n iv e r s a l i t y  are rendered extrem ely d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  
not a lto g e th e r  im p o ss ib le .
For on c lo s e r  in sp e c t io n  Kant*s deduction  seems to  move 
in  a c i r c le :  He presupposes th e  freedom o f  th e  human w i l l
as a n ecessa ry  c o n d itio n  fo r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  i . e .  e x is te n c e  
and r e a l i t y  o f  moral o b lig a t io n  and r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  and then
1 ) Thus oddly enough r  e-appro aching Rousseau, by r e la t in g
Human D ig n ity  s o le ly  to  th e  moral sp here.
^20
a t tr ib u te s  D ig n ity  to  men because th ey  have fr e e  w i l l ,  i . e .  
are m orally  r e sp o n s ib le . Now I cannot suppose x  to  be y , 
and y to  be im p lied  by z and then  s t a t e  th a t  z  i s  w, because  
z im p lie s  A c a te g o r ic a l judgement cannot be deduced
from two h y p o th e tic a l judgem ents. The o b je c t iv e  r e a l i t y  
o f  th e  Dignit;)^ o f  Man cannot be deduced from th e  h y p o th e tic a l  
r e a l i t y  o f  freedom , much l e s s  can th e  u n iv e r s a i l i t y  o f  i t s  
a p p lic a t io n  be so deduced.
But n oth ing  l e s s  than such o b je c t iv e  r e a l i t y  i s  demanded 
by Kant fo r  t h i s  con cep t. Nor, to  judge from th e  way in  which  
he f i r s t  in trod u ced  t h i s  concept. "Nun aber sage ic h  -  Now 
1 say man and every reason ab le  agent e x i s t s  as an end in  
h im se lf  or to  judge from th e  v i t a l  fu n c tio n  and c r u c ia l
im portance t h i s  conept p o s s e s s e s  in  h is  system  o f  e t h ic s ,  
cou ld  Kant admit o f  l e s s .
Now th e  on ly  p o in t , in  K ant's system  where we can break
through th e  c i r c l e  and touch r e a l i t y ,  i s  in  th e  e x is te n c e  o f
1) X = man, y  = freedom , z = moral a c t io n , w = d ig n ity .
1 cou ld  however from th e  g iv en  c e r ta in ty  o f  x  i s  w argue.
The d e r ta in ty  o f  x  i s  y . 1 cou ld  a lso  frm th e  c e r ta in ty
o f  z deduce th e  e x is te n c e  o f  y , and so th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
X i s  w,  th a t  i s  from th e  o b je c t iv e  r e a l i t y  o f  moral 
exp er ien ce  argue th e  d ig n ity  o f  man. See n ext page.
2) Kant: Grundlegung . . .  Absch. 111.
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moral exp er ien ce  as a datum o f  so v iv id  a c e r ta in ty  th a t i t  
exc lu d es a l l  doubt. "A h ig h er  c e r ta in ty  than th a t  which  
a ssu res  us o f  our moral s e l f ,  our autonomous p e r s o n a li ty ,  i s  
n ot con ceivab le" ^ ^ . T his exp er ien ce  however i s  o f  n e c e s s i t y  
l ip l i t e d  to  my own p erson . I t  can th e r e fo r e  a ssu re  me o f  my, 
own freedom ,.m y own moral r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  and th e r e fo r e  o f  my 
own d ig n ity  and w orth, but n ot o f  th e  d ig n ity  o f  o th e r s . I t
i s  however th e  < JMiignity o f  o th er s  th a t stan d s to  q u e s t io n ' i f
*
I am to  l im i t  my "own freedom out o f  a r e sp e c t  fo r  t h e i r s .
Nor can th e  S ig n ity  o f  O thers be dem onstrated s o le ly  
from my sen se  o f  moral r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  and o b lig a t io n  and from 
my vo lu n ta ry  s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n ,  fo r  then i t  would be dependent 
e n t ir e ly  on my p le a su r e  whom 1 ^rwished to  honour in  t h i s  way, 
and who are to  be th e  r e c ip ie n t s  o f  D ign ity  con ferred  by me.
But t h i s  i s  e x a c t ly  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  Kant w ish es to  exclu d e  
as most d etr im en ta l to  th e  moral r ig h tn e s s  o f  an a c t io n .  
T herefore from a K antian p o in t o f  view  i t  i s  most u n s a t is fa c to r y  
and u n accep tab le  th a t  man sh ould  a cq u ire  moral d ig n ity  by 
bein g  tr e a te d  as though he p o sse sse d  i t .  From a Kantian  
p o in t o f  view  man must be tr e a te d  as b ein g  p o sse sse d  o f  moral 
d ig n ity  becau se he so p o sse s se d . A corrab oratin g  reason
1 ) Kant; K r it ik  der p ra k t. V er n .; T e i l  1 . ch . 5*
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fo r  t h i s  p o s it io n  i s  d er iv ed  from K ant's view  that^ one cannot 
acq u ire  moral w orth, and hence dignity" by an o u ts id e  gran t  
but on ly  by an in n er  e f f o r t ,  by an in n er unshakeable d e c is io n  
to  be determ ined in  a l l  o n e 's  a c t io n s  by r a t io n a l co n sid er ­
a t io n s  o n ly .
But in  th e  f i r s t  p la c e  .the p o s s e s s io n  o f  d ig n ity  i s  
accord ing to  Kant dependent on moral w orth , i . e .  th e  d e c is io n  
to  a llo w  on e’ s w i l l  to  be determ ined o n ly  by r a t io n a l  ^ d  
th e r e fo r e  (accord in g  to  Kant) moral c o n s id e r a t io n s . In th e  
second p la c e , we have p roof .p o s i t iv e  th a t  th e  w i l l  o f  some 
men i s  h ard ly  ever so determ ined and th a t  th e  w i l l  o f  most 
men i s  r a r e ly  so determ ined . In th e  th ir d  p la c e , d ig n ity  
m ust, in  s p i t e  o f  a l l ,  be regarded as th e  u n iv e r sa l a t t r ib u te  
o f  a l l  men. In  consequence o f  th e s e  c o n s id e r a tio n s  and in  
order to  p reserv e  th e  u n iv e r sa l v a l i d i t y  o f  d ig n ity  ( in  th e  
d is t r ib u t iv e  se n se ) Kant i s  com pelled  to  d e f in e  d ig n ity  as  
th e  r ig h t f u l  a t t r ib u te  o f  a l l  men in s o fa r  as a l l  men a re  
p o t e n t ia l ly  cap ab le o f  moral a c t io n . Kant defends t h i s
\
co n te n tio n  as fo l lo w s :  No m atter how low a man has sunk he
may, a t any moment, awaken to  h is  moral r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  and 
rou sin g  h im se lf  e x e r c is e  h is  p r e r o g a tiv e  o f  f r e e  a c t io n ,f r e e ly  
determ ined . In so fa r  as man never lo s e s  t h i s  c a p a b i l i ty  a l ­
to g e th e r  he always p o s s e s s e s  d ig n ity  and i s  o f  i n f i n i t e  v a lu e .
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J u st as every bad a c tio n  must be view ed as i f  man had f a l l e n  
in to  i t  d ir e c t ly  from th e  s ta g e  o f  innocence"^^ so a t any -
moment man i s ,  as i t  w ere, in  t h i s  s t a t e  o f in n ocen ce, and '
■ ■(
- s t a r t in g  from i t ,  f r e e  to  r i s e  above h is  s e l f i s h  degradation  
and work out h is  s a lv a t io n  in  h is  own way. H is purpose must 
be re sp e c te d  and h is  e f f o r t s  toward i t  must not be r e s t r ic t e d .
' Even proof p o s i t iv e  o f  th e  continuous moral tu rp itu d e  and 
u t t e r  w o r th le ssn ess  o f  a man does not r e la x  my o b lig a t io n  
to  resp ed t h is^ erso n  or perm it me to  d ep rive him o f  th e  u n i­
v e r sa l human a t tr ib u te  o f  d ig n ity .  Hence th e  u lt im a te  ground
fo r  th e  d ig n ity  o f  Man, i s  not th e  a c tu a l e x e r c is e  o f  h is  moral
o)
p rer o g a tiv e  but h is  p o te n t ia l  c a p a b il i ty  o f  so e x e r c is in g  
i t ,  should  he ch oose . In o th er  words th e  -ÿLtimate ground 
fo r  th e  d ig n ity  o f  man i s  man's p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  th e  r a t io n a l , 
h is  d e f in i t io n  as a r a t io n a l  b e in g .
But i f  t h i s  i s  so , then  th e  p o s se s s io n  o f  d ig n ity  i s  
p r a c t ic a l ly  independent o f  moral worth; s in c e  to  a s s e r t  th a t  
man i s  p o ten tia lly  capable o f  acq u ir in g  such Worth, i s  to  
a s s e r t  noth ing more than th a t he i s  r a t io n a l by n a tu re . But
■A.
i f  th e  D ig n ity  o f  Man i s  an immediate outcome o f h is  r a t io n a l i ty
_  ■ . , i „  .         I I I ,     . . . .  . . .     —  .  ,  I I . . .  ,
1) Kant: R e lig io n  in nerh alb  den Grenzen der b lo sse n  Vernunft: 
P art iT  É4T
2) Which by th e  way we can never w itn e ss  or p rove, s in c e  on ly  
God se e s  in to  th e  h eart o f  men. I t  i s  however oddly enough 
p o s s ib le  to  have p roof fo r  th e  d e lib e r a te  in frin gem en t
o f th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e .
, ,  »
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i t  seems g r a tu ito u s  and in d e fe n s ib le  to  r e s t r i c t  (a s  Kant - ^
".'XT'
r  '  ^ f  %
does) th e  v a l id i t y  o f  t h i s  concept to  th e  Moral Domain. >
A retu rn  to  th e p r e - c r i t i c a l  p o s it io n  seems th e r e fo r e  
in d ic a te d , indeed  h ard ly  a v o id a b le , u n le ss  Kant can show th a t  
th e  concept o f  th e  D ig n ity  o f  Man as a U n iversa l a t tr ib u te  
o f  Man, i s  s e l f - e v id e n t  on ly  w ith in  th e  Moral Domain.
That i s ,  Kant to  uphold h is  p o s it io n  must show th a t u n le ss  
man i s  con sid ered  as a member o f  th e  Moral Domain h is  Digni;by 
i s  not im m ediately p erce iv ed  by Reason, nor on b ein g  p erc e iv ed , 
acknowledged w ith ou t h e s i t a t io n .  In o th er  words, Kant must 
show th a t  on ly-'in  th e  moral domain i s  th e  o b je c t iv e  v a l id i t y
o f  th e  D ig n ity  o f  Man as a u n iv e r sa l a t tr ib u te  o f  Man n e c e s sa f -
\ 1
i l y  im p lied  in  th e  concept o f  man.
L et us examine K ant's account o f  th e  manner in  which
Reason i s  made to  acknowledge th e  u n iv e r sa l a p p lic a t io n  ;of
/
th e  D ig n ity  o f  Man; "This p o s it io n  th a t  humanity and every  
i n t e l l i g e n t  being i s  an end in  i t s e l f  i s  n ot e s ta b lish e d  by 
my o b serv a tio n  or ex p er ien ce , as i s  seen , f i r s t ,  from th e  
g e n e r a lity  by which we have extended i t  to  every r a t io n a l  b ein g
I • '
w hatsoever; and second because humanity was e x h ib ite d  not 
as a s u b je c t iv e  end o f  mankind, ( i . e .  n ot a s .a n  o b je c t  which • 
i t  s t to d  in  t h e ir  o p tio n  to  pursue or d e c lin e )  but as th e ir  
o b je c t iv e  end, which w hatever oth er ends mankind may have,
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does as a law c o n s t i tu te  th e  supreme l im it in g  co n d itio n  o f
such s u b je c t iv e  ends and which must con seq u en tly  tak e  i t s
1)r i s e  from reason a p r io r i  . . .  " ^
Now "A ll mankind; must o f  n e c e s s i t y  thus co n ce iv e  to
th em selves t h e ir  own e x is te n c e  and to  t h i s  ex ten t i t  i s  a
s u b je c t iv e  p r in c ip le  o f conduct."  But "in  th e  very same way
a l l  r a t io n a l b ein gs thus co n ce iv e  t h e ir  own e x is te n c e  by fo r c e
o f th e  same grounds o f  reason  which determ ine man to  th in k
so" and th e r e fo r e  "the above ( i . e .  "Every i n t e l l i g e n t  nature
e x i s t s  as an End in  i t s e l f )  i s  like%vise an o b je c t iv e
p r in c ip le " . . .  from i t  as th e  supreme p r a c t ic a l  p o s it io n  a l l
2 )law s o f th e  w i l l  must be capab le o f b ein g  deduced . . . "   ^ •
Now t h i s  argument seems to  me to  be based on a q u estion  
begging f a l la c y :  ,
From th e  p ro p o s it io n : I n e c e s s a r i ly  regard  m yself as
an "end in  m yself" i . e .  I n e c e s s a r i ly  a t t r ib u te  D ig n ity  to  
m yself Kant f i r s t ‘s argues th e  l im it a t io n  o f  th e  concept o f  
D ig n ity  to  th e  Moral Domain, and then  i t s  ex ten sio n  to  a l l  
r a t io n a l a g e n ts . He argues as fo llo w s :  I rega.rd m yself as'
p o s s e s s in g  d ig n ity , as being o f  i n f i n i t e  v a lu e , s o le ly  on th e
1 ) Kant: Grundlegung . . .  Bk. 1 . Ch. 111.
2) Kant: Grundlegung . . .  Bk. 1 . Ch. 111.
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ground and to  th e  ex ten t to  which I a lso  regard m yself as 
capable o f moral a c t io n , i . e .  as a r a t io n a l being whose v / i l l  
i s  capable o f determ ining i t s e l f  in  accordance w ith  an fo r  
th e sake o f  th e moral law. The c e r ta in ty  which ch aracter­
i s e s  my d ir e c t  and immediate experience o i  my moral resp on sib -  
i l i t i e s  a ssu res me th a t th e  view I have, o f m yself as p o sse ss in g  
d ig n ity  i s  f u l l y  j u s t i f i e d .
In connection  w ith  t h i s ,  and a g a in st K ant's view , i t  must 
be mentioned th a t men apart from th e ir  s p e c i f i c a l ly  moral 
ex p er ien ces , p o ssess  oth er ways and means o f  e^cperfencing ,
I' .
, th e ir  own d ig n ity , th e ir  own va lu e as persona n otab ly  in  :
th e  p ro cesses  o f  a r t i s t i c  cr ea tio n  in  th e  p u rsu it o f  s c i e n t i f i c
tr u th , or in  th e  e x e r c ise  o f  power ( i . e .  a fundam entally
"immoral" a c t iv i t y . )  I t  seems th er e fo re  unreasonable to  \.v|
co n fin e  th e  concepteof D ign ity  when acquired by way o f an ‘
' . ■ ' 
immediate experience to  th e  moral domain. VS
This i s  b es id e s  th e  p o in t however, and we may concede 
th e  moral im p lic a tio n s  o f D ig n ity , w ithout p reju d ice  to  our 
argument. We may a lso  grant a second, more im portant p o in t
to  Kant: Namely we may concede th e  p la u s ib i l i t y  o f  an argument,
based on analogy and in d u ctiv e  rea so n in g , which from th e  fa c t  
th a t I regard m yself as p o ssessed  o f  D ign ity  on c e r ta in  grounds 
draws th e  con clu sion  th a t other r a t io n a l b ein gs when regarding
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th em selves so ( i . e .  as p o sse ssed  o f  d ig n ity )  w i l l  probably  
do so oh th e  same grounds. In o th er  words, th e  same complex 
o f  circum stances and co n d itio n s  which a ssu res me o f  th e c e r ta in ­
ty  o f  my own freedom and moral r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  a ssu res o th er  
r a t io n a l b ein gs o f  t h e ir  freedom and t h e ir  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .
. But no p o in t in  th e  argument n e c e s s a r i ly  im p lie s  an
;
assurance o f  each o th e r 's  freedom and moral c a p a b i l i t i e s .  In  
oth er words, th e  in d u c tiv e  assum ption, or even th e  f a c t  th a t  
each r a t io n a l being regards h im se lf  as p o sse ssed  o f d ig n ity ,  
on th e  same ground and fo r  th e same reasons th a t  a l l  o th er  
r a t io n a l b ein gs regard  each h im se lf  as p o ssessed  o f  D ig n ity , 
does not in v o lv e  a lo g ic a l  n e c e s s i ty  fo r  r a t io n a l b ein gs to  
regard each o th er as p o sse ssed  o f D ig n ity .
T h is , however, i s  th e  d e c is iv e  t e s t  fo r  a gen era l 
r e c o g n it io n  by r a t io n a l b ein gs o f the u n iv e r sa l a p p lic a t io n  
o f  th e  D ig n ity  o f Man. That a l l  men are p o sse ssed  o f d ig n ity  
can not be deduced from th e  concept o f Human d ig n ity  i t s e l f ,  
s in c e  u n iv e r sa l v a l i d i t y i i n  th e  d is t r ib u t iv e  sen se  i s  not an 
e s s e n t ia l  q u a l i f ic a t io n  o f  th e  concept and th e r e fo r e  not 
im p lied  in  i t .  The complex and s y n th e t ic  concept o f  th e  
o b je c t iv e  u n iv e r s a l ity  o f th e D ig n ity  o f  Man i s  not s e l f -  
ev id en t i . e .  im m ediately p erce iv ed  by reason; th e  v a l id i t y  v 
o f th e  sy n th e s is  i t  performs i s  in  need o f p ro o f. This 
p ro o f, up to  now, reason has been in cap ab le  o f  supplying and
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we seem again driven  back to th e  p r e - c r i t i c a l  s ta g e  o f K ant's 
p hilosop hy in  which he adm itted t h i s  sy n th e s is  to  be performed 
by an in n a te  sen tim en t. This i s  tantamount to  g iv in g  up 
th e  autonomy o f  E th ics  and th e  r a t io n a l i t y ,  i . e .  th e  o b j e c t iv e ' 
n e c e s s i ty ,  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l im p erative .
Some so r t  o f o b je c t iv e  j u s t i f i c a t io n  and v in d ic a t io n  i s  
th e r e fo r e  d esp era te ly  needed, i f  we are to  save th e  autonomy  ^
o f  E th ic s , and not beg th e moral q u estion  a t th e most c r u c ia l -, 
p o in t .
S im ilar  problems have been fa ced  by, to  name but a few , 
Rousseau (3ra v o lo n té  g e n e r a le ) , J . S . M ill (General happiness) 
and S artre  ( I 'a c t e  in d iv id u e l engage to u te  l ' hum anité).
Let us b r ie f ly  examine th e ir  r e s p e c t iv e  arguments and study  
th e  r e s p e c t iv e  so lu t io n s  o ffered :
Rousseau has th e  e a s ie s t  stand: "Les engagement s
qui nous l i e n t  au corps s o c ia l  ne sont o b lig a to ir e  que 
p a r c e q u 'ils  sont m utuels; e t le u r  nature e s t  t e l l e  qu'en  
l e s  rem p lissan t on ne peut t r a v a i l l e r  pour au tru i sans travofR*" 
pour aut^ u^ i sans- t r a v a i l l e r  pour s o i .  Pourquoi la  v o lo n té
I ‘
g e n e r a le e s t - e l l e  tou jou rs d r o ite , e t  pourquoi tou s v e u le n t-
\I
i l s  constamment l e  bonheur de chaqu'un d 'eux s i  ce  n 'e s t  • 
parce q u ' i l  n 'y  a personne que ne s'a p p ro p rie  c e t  nom chaqu'un 
e t qui ne songe a l u i  meme en vo tan t pour tous? Ce qui 
prouve que 1 ' é g a l i t é  de d r o it  e t l a  n otion  de j u s t ic e  q u 'e l le
■ *
- . f - 1
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prod uit d ér iven t de la  p referen ce que chaqu'un se  donne e t \
1 ) ' ‘par consequence de l a  nature de l'homme" . Men, according . 
to  t h is  argument, r e sp e c t each o th e r 's  persons and a t tr ib u te
d ig n ity  to  each o th er , because t h is  i s  th e  on ly  p r a c t ic a l  ' ' -
/
way to  pursue th e ir  own ends in  com parative s a fe ty  and se c u r ity .  
By a volu ntary  s e l f - l im i t a t io n ,  th ey  secu re a s im ila r  s e l f ­
l im ita t io n  in  o th e r s , indeed  th e  one i s  th e  co n d itio n  o f  th e
o th e r . " ilsV n e son t o b lig a to ir e s 'q u e  parce q u ' i l s  sont y
m utuels"; and t h i s  s e l f - l im i t a t io n  in  r e tr o sp e c t  co n fers *'
r ig h ts  and p r iv i le g e s  and d ig n ity  on th e  members o f the  
co n tra t s o c ia l .  In other words t h i s  d ig n ity  depends on th e - 
w il l in g n e s s ,  or th e  enforced (en forced  by .the very c i rcum- ' . 
sta n ces  o f  human e x is te n c e  and i t s  n atu ra l dangers) w i l l in g ­
n ess  to  s e l f - l im i t a t io n .  But i f  th ere  should be a man, or 
a group o f  men whose p referen ce  fo r  them selves need n o t, 
thanks to  a cc id en ta l circum stan ces, be l im ite d  in  order to  
assu re i t s  ovm su ccess  ( fo r  in sta n c e  th e  near exterm ination  
o f  th e  red races in  North America) then th ere  i s  no power in  
th e  world which can fo r c e  th o se  men to  a t tr ib u te  d ig n ity  to"" ■ 
th e  o th e r s , and th e r e fo r e  th e se  o th ers w i l l  not p o sse ss  d ig n ity , 
R ousseau's argument does not safeguard  th e  o b je c t iv e  Uni^versal- 
i t y  o f  th e  D ign ity  o f  Man. I t  p rovid es fo r  a com parative '
1 ) J . J . Rouseeau: Le Contrat S o c ia l 11 . 6.
m
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g e n e r a lity  in s id e  c lo se d  s o c ie t ie s  on ly , more or l e s s  in  th e  . 
sen se  o f  L in d say 's "other p e o p le 's  behaviour i s  n e c e s sa r ily  
an assumed background to  ours . . .  d if fe r e n t  s o c ia l  atmospheres 
compel us to  act d i f f e r e n t ly  . . .  i f  one knows th a t p eop le  
are w i l l in g  to  cooperate one a c ts  d i f f e r e n t ly  even i f  on e's  
purpose i s  not allow ed to  a l t e r  . .  moreal r u le s  . . .  are no 
u se u n le ss  th ey  are g e n e r a lly  kept and form an e f f e c t iv e  
moral code, i . e .  most men are ready to  keep them and in fo r c e  
th e ir  keeping . . .
R ousseau's ex p o s itio n  we must admit does not help  us 
much except fo r  being u se fu l as a reminder th a t we must not 
allow  th e  D ign ity  o f  Man to  be reduced to  a c o n d it io n a l  
s ta tu s   ^ by d in t o f  f in d in g  our system  o f  E th ics  d is in t ig r a t e  
in to  r e la t iv e  and ephemeral moral cod es. The o b j e c t iv it y  
and autonomy whatever e l s e  i t  would be i t  would no lon ger  be 
E th ics  -  i s  in d is e l lu b ly  bound up w ith  th e  a b so lu te  v a l id i t y  
o f  th e  D ign ity  o f  Man and u nexcep tion ab le u n iv e r s a l ity  o f  
i t s  a t tr ib u t io n .
J . S . M i l l ' s  famous argument on general happiness runs: 
"the s o le  evidence i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  produce th a t anything
1) A. D. Lindsay: "The Two M o ra lities"  p . 21 -  22.
2) Whether i t  i s  dependent on c a lc u la t io n s  o f  temporary
expediency, or n atu ra l immutable in n a te  in t e r e s t s  which
however them selves fu n ctio n  d i f f e r e n t ly  in  d if fe r e n t  ’
c ircu m stan ces.
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i s  d e s ir a b le  i s  th a t p eop le  do a c tu a lly  d e s ir e  i t  . . .
No reason can be g iven  why th e  gen era l happiness i s  d e s ir a b le  
except th a t  each person so fa r  as he b e l ie v e s  i t  to  be a t ta in -  
ab le  desires h is  own h ap p in ess . T his however being a fa c t  
we have not on ly  a l l  th e  p roof which th e  ca se  admits o f ,  but 
a l l  which i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  req u ire  th a t happiness i s  good; 
th a t each p erso n 's  hap^iness i s  a good to  th a t person and
th e  gen era l h ap p in ess, th e r e fo r e  a good to  th e  aggregate o f
1 ‘ ■ a l l  p erson s" . I f  analysed  t h is  argument proves a mine o f
problems each o f  which has had i t s  day as a cause c e le lb r e
o f p h ilo so p h ic a l d isp u ta tio n ^ ^ . The on ly  p o in ts  which need
concern us here i s  (a ) th e  argument (g iv en  th e  r e la t io n sh ip
what i s  d e s ired  i s  d e s ir a b le , what i s  d e s ir a b le  i s  good and
th e r e fo r e  what i s  d es ired  i s  good) from th e  goodness o f  each
p erso n 's  happiness fo r  h im se lf to  th e  goodness o f  gen era l happi-
I
n ess fo r  th e  aggregate o f  persons and (b) th e  argument from 
th e  fa c t  th a t each person a c tu a lly  d e s ir e s  h is  own h ap p in ess, 
to  the fa c e  (? ! )  th a t gen era l happiness i s  d es ired  by a l l .
\
( i . e .  d e s ir a b le  I or ought we to say "ought to  be d es ired  by 
a l l " ) .  I t  has o fte n  been p o in ted  out th a t the v a l id i t y  o f
1) J . S . M ill:  U t i l i ta r ia n is m , Ch. IV.
2) v i z .  th e  d isc u ss io n  on th e  lo g ic a l  and r e a l r e la t io n s h ip s  
between th e d es ired  and th e d e s ir a b le , th e d e s ir a b le  and 
th e  good, and th e  d es ired  and th e  good re sp .
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M il l ' s  argument h inges on th e  d e f in i t io n  o f  gen era l h ap p in ess.
I f  th e  general happiness i s  a sum o f p a r t ic u la r  h ap p in esses
than each in d iv id u a l d e s ir e s  i t  to  e x a c tly  th a t  degree to
which h is  own happiness i s  in v o lv e d . Thus, i f  fo r  in s ta n c e ,
I d e s ir e  to reg a in  my coat from a cloakroom in  which hang many
oth er co a ts  d es ired  by many o th er  p eo p le , i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to
d e fin e  th e  concepts o f  a l l  th e  c o a ts , a l l  th e  p eo p le , and a l l
th e d e s ir e s  o f  a l l  th e  p eop le  fo r  a l l  th e ir  c o a ts . Nwmy
d e s ir e  fo r  my c o a t , though d e fin a b le  as p art o f  th e  general
d e s ir e  fo r  a l l  th e  co a ts  in  th e  cloakroom i s  n e ith e r  in crea sed
nor d im inished  nor $ â ffected  in  any o th er way by being part
o f  a gen era l d e s ir e . Nor i s  my coat a f fe c te d  in  any way by
hanging to g e th e r  w ith  o th er  c o a ts . But i f  to  reg a in  my coat
I have to  queue up so as to  avoid  a scram ble in  which a l l
co a ts  in c lu d in g  mine are l i a b l e  to  be damaged, then  my d e s ir e
i s  no lon ger  a m echanical p art o f  th e  sum t o t a l  o f  a l l  d e s ir e s
but en ters in to  some co -ord in a ted  system  w ith  them l im it in g
i t s  own in t e n s i t y  and accommodating i t s e l f  to  a l l  th e  o th ers
somewhat in  th e  same manner as th a t  d escr ib ed  by Rousseau
in  th e  co n tra t s o c ia l .  My d e s ir e  i s  now m od ified  in  i t s
a c t iv i t y  by th e  c o l l e c t iv e  d e s ir e  o f which i t  i s  now a
"chemical" p a r t , but i t  s t i l l  i s  a d e s ir e  fo r  my own coat
I ' )and fo r  noth ing e l s e .   ^ I can however en visage th e
1 ) and a l l  my coa t ga in s i s  a r e la t iv e  s a fe ty  from damage,
3 3 3
p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t my d e s ir e  fo r  my coat en ters in to  some combin­
a tio n  w ith  th e  oth er p e o p le 's  d e s ir e s  fo r  t h e ir  c o a ts . Thus, 
by jo in in g  in  w ith  o th er p eop le  I am a b le  to  pay an attendant' 
to  guard i t  w h ils t  I'm away, brush i t ,  and mend i t ,  a th in g  
beyond my means i f  I were on my own. Here my d e s ir e  en ters  
in to  an organic r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  a l l  th e  o th er  d e s ir e s ,  
forming a c o l l e c t iv e  system  by which my coat i s  a c tu a lly  
b e n e f it t e d  and p o s s i b i l i t i e s  opened up fo r  i t s  improvement
which would not have e x is te d  had I remained on my own. But
\
s t i l l  my d e s ir e  i s  cen tred  on my own c o a t , and i f  through  
t h i s  organ ic r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  o th er p e o p le 's  co a ts  b e n e f it  
as w e ll as my ovm, t h is  i s  as fa r  as I am concerned o f  second­
ary im portance, a mere a c c id e n ta l by-product o f th e  s i tu a t io n .  
In o th er words, thought my happiness be an organ ic part o f  th e  
general h ap p in ess, i . e .  in c r e a se d , m od ified , even changed in  
i t s  con ten t by th e  whole o f  which i t  i s  a p a r t, and though  
I be a t i r e l e s s  worker fo r  th e  improvement and enrichment o f  
gen eral h ap p in ess, I am b a s ic a l ly  concerned on ly  w ith  my own 
h ap p in ess, and w ith  gen era l happiness on ly  in so fa r  as i t  i s  
th e  p reco n d itio n  o f  mjr own. At no p o in t in  th e  r a t io n a l  
argument lea d in g  from my own happiness to  gen era l happiness  
had I any reason to  put th e  regard fo r  o th er p e o p le 's  happiness  
above my own (w ithout p erson al s a t i s f a c t io n  which would on ly  
be another way o f  c u lt iv a t in g  my own h a p p in ess). At no p o ih t
.  t -
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was I con fronted  by a r a t io n a l ly  n e c e s s ita te d  demand (a r is in g  
from th e argument i t s e l f )  to  d e s ir e  gen era l happiness fo r  
i t s e l f  and re g a rd le ss  o f  my ovm. In o th er  words a t no p o in t  
was I g iven  th e  opportunity  to  cro ss  th e  boundaries o f s e l f -
I-
centred  i s o la t io n  and en ter  th e  s e l f l e s s  g e n e r o s ity  which i s  
M il l ' s  u ltim a te  in te n t io n .
We must th e r e fo r e  conclude th a t th e  fa c t  th a t  general 
happiness i s  d es ired  by a l l  p eop le  or even th e  p ro p o s it io n  
th a t i t  ought to  be d e s ir e ô  by a l l  p eo p le , are not s u f f i c ie n t  
to  cover M il l ' s  e th ic a l  meaning. To i t  must be added th e  
demand th a t g en era l happiness ought to  be d esired  fo r  i t s  
own sake or fo r  th e  sake o f  th e  regard I have fo r  o th er p eop le  
and re g a r d le ss  o f any s a t i s f a c t io n  th a t might occur to  me 
in  th e  p r o c e ss . This must be so i f  I am to  put th e  co n sid er­
a tio n  o f  gen era l happiness above the co n sid era tio n  fo r  my
own in  ca se  o f  c o n f l i c t !  -  as M ill tau gh t. This demand
• - !■
however i s  im p lied  in  none o f  th e concepts which appear in  - ■
th e  o r ig in a l argument (my h ap p in ess, gen era l h ap p in ess, my _ 
person , th e  aggregate o f  p erson s, good fo r  me, good fo r  a l l  
e t c . )  nor in  th e  r e la t io n s  d efin ed  to  hold  between them.
I
From th e g iven  f a c t  o f  my d e s ir e  fo r  my happiness fo r  i t s  
own sake,' th e  d ia le c t ic s !  p rocess o f reason can" a t th e  utmost 
le a d  to  a conept o f  gen era l happiness as th e  u lt im a te  warrant 
and supreme co n d itio n  o f  my own h ap p in ess. I t  can never
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fu rn ish  me w ith  th e id ea  o f general happiness as being desirabl»  
fo r  i t s  own sake, nor confront me w ith  a demand to d e s ir e  i t  • 
fo r  i t s  own sak e. This demand i s  not j u s t i f i e d  by th e  preceed* 
in g  argument nor indeed d e fin a b le  w ithout a c e r ta in  fo rc in g  ' 
o f th e  concepts w ith  which M ill o p era tes . I t  must th er e fo re  
be regarded as an in tru d er from some oth er domain, th e  eruption  
o f  some heterogeneous source which gratu itou sly^ ^  d isru p ts  
th e  cohesion  o f th e  argument^^. B es id es , in  th e  g iven  
co n te x t, t h i s  demand d e fe a ts  i t  s own ends fo r  i f  a l l  p eop le  
acted  on th e  maxim th a t one ought to  d e s ir e  and pursue gen eral 
happiness at th e  expense o f on e 's  own happiness i f  n ecessary , 
nobody would be happy a t any tim e, and gen era l gloom and • !  
m isery th e  s o le  e f f e c t .  This i s  a p o in t to  which we s h a ll
- \
have to  te tu rn  when d isc u ss in g  p e r fe c t  and im perfect ( i . e .  
p o s it iv e  and n eg a tiv e ) d u t ie s .  A p u rsu it o f M il l 's  argument 
in  v in d ic a t io n  o f  th e  id ea  o f general happiness as a moral 
duty has shown th a t the moral o b lig a t io n  so d efin ed  ( i . e ;  a 
regard fo r  o th er p e o p le 's  happiness and, a f o r t i o r i ,  a regard  
fo r  th e ir  persons) cannot be deduced from the e x p l ic i t  te n e ts  
o f  M il l ' s  u t i l i t a r ia n  system  o f  E th ic s . This id ea  has been, 
as i t  w ere, in je c te d  in to  the system  by th e fo r c e  o f  some
1) g ra tu ito u s  from th e p o in t o f  view  o f  the argument.
2) v iz  M il l 's  dictum "an unhappy S ocrates i s  b e tte r  than a 
con tented  p ig " , which a lso  rep resen ts  a d isru p tio n  o f  
th e  u t i l i t a r ia n  argument.
p .  ■t ■ '
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spontaneous in t u i t io n .  B eing in com p atib le  with, th e  gen era l 
ten or  o f  h is  p h ilo so p h ic a l th eory  i t  d isr u p ts  i t s  id e a t ic  
co h es io n .
The p r o f i t  o f  t h i s  le s s o n  fo r  our study o f  th e  Kantian  
th eory  i s  t h is :  Though th e  id e a  o f  th e u n co n d itio n a l regard  
we owe to  o th er  p e o p le ’ s person s as th e  core o f  all^-our moral 
o b lig a t io n s ,  i s  not an id ea  d isr u p tiv e  or in im ic a l to  th e  
gen era l ten o r  o f  th e  Kantian th eory  o f  e th ic s ;  analogy from 
M il l ’s argument b rin gs home th e  su sp ic io n  th a t  in  Kant’ s ca se  
to o , th e  id ea  in  q u estio n  may be th e  product o f  some in t u i t io n  
in je c t e d  in to  th e system  by th e  eru p tiv e  and ir r a t io n a l  
fo r c e  o f  th a t  in t u i t io n ,  ra th er  than th e  r e s u l t  o f  a r a t io n a l ly  
dem onstrable deduction  from r a t io n a l ly  v a l id  con cep ts which  
Kant took  i t  to  b e . In sh o r t , what ]|ant had taken to  be a 
sim p le  ca se  o f  i n t e l l e c t u s  querens in te lle c tu m , i s  r e a l ly  
another ca se  o f  an in t e l l e c t u s  quereus f id e n ,a n d .a s  such  
l i k e l y  to  be d isap p o in ted  in  i t s  q u est.
L et us s e e  what we can lea rn  from S a r tr e ’ s argument in  3 ' 
v in d ic a t io n  o f  h is  p r o p o s it io n , ”1 ’ a ct in d iv id u e l engage to u te  
I ’humanité" which runs th u s: "C E oisir c ’ e s t  a ffirm er  l a  v a leu r
de c e  que nous c h o is s is s o n s ,  parceque c ’ e s t  tou jou rs l e  b ien  
que nous c h o is s is s o n s  . . .  Rien ne peut e tr e  bon pour nous 
sans 1 ’ e tr e  pour tou s . . .  A lo rs , c h o is ir  pour s o i  c ’ e s t  c h o is ir  
pour tou s . . . "
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S artre in te r p r e ts  both th e p ro p o sitio n  and i t s  proof 
in  two d if fe r e n t  se n se s , a m etaphysical sen se  and a moral » 
sen se . I in ten d  to  show th a t th e two do not accord and th a t  
th e  moral in te r p r e ta tio n  r e s ts  on a supplementary in tu it io n  
o f  th e  in t r in s ic  worth o f human b e in g s , which i s  a l ie n  to  the  
b a sic  m etaphysical tenor o f S a r tr e ’s e x i s t e n t ia l i s t  thought 
and superimposed on i t .  Moreover th e  argument (quoted  
above) which could ju s t  pass in  i t s  m etaphysical s e t t in g  becomes 
p la in ly  fa l la c io u s  i f  a moral in te r p r e ta t io n  i s  attem pted. ' 
To expound th e  f i r s t  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f S a r tr e ’ s argument 
we must b r ie f ly  sketch  in  i t s  m etaphysical background.
S a r tr e ’ s fundamental te n e t  i s  th a t God does not e x i s t .  From 
th is  a l l  oth er th in g s  fo llo w . S in ce  God does not e x i s t ,  man 
i s  a b so lu te ly  fr e e  to  do as he p le a s e s . Man’ s freedom i s  
ab so lu te  and he can never escape i t .  He i s  condemend to be 
f r e e .  This l ib e r ty  i s  not l im ite d  in  any way s in c e  no 
o b je c t iv e  tr u th , no moral p r in c ip le , no r e l i g i o u s . co n v ic tio n , 
no in t r in s ic  va lu e e x is t  apart from man’s choosing to  b e lie v e  
in  them. Thus mah i s  r e sp o n sib le  fo r  th e  tru th  he b e lie v e s  
in  as w e ll as fo r  provid ing  the p roofs in  i t s  favour. Man 
i s  r e sp o n s ib le  fo r  h is  very exp er ien ces, s in c e  th e  r e sp e c t iv e  « 
s ig n if ic a n c e  and in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  exp erien ces i s  determ ined  
by th e s e le c t io n  he makes. Man i s  thus re sp o n s ib le  fo r  h is
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s l i g h t e s t  th ou ght, h is  most tr a n s ito r y  em otion, even th e  
in t e n s i t y  o f  h is  n a tu ra l w ants. Man i s  s o le ly  determ ined  
by h is  c h o ic e , and he chooses as he w i l l s  . For man’ s 
-w ill  i s  determ ined by n oth in g a t a l l ,  i t  i s  a b so lu te ly  f r e e .
Man becomes what he w i l l s  h im se lf  to  become. However s in c e  
freedom i s  not m erely a q u a lity  o f  man but h is  very  essen ce  
( l a  l ib e r t é  e s t  1 ’ é t o f f é  de son e tr e )  any a c t io n , th ou gh t, , 
im p u lse , which d en ies  t h i s  freedom i s  an a c t o f  bad f a i t h .
Any attem pt to  appeal to  a moral p r in c ip le ,  an in t r in s ic  , '
v a lu e !  a r e l ig io u s  c o n v ic t io n  when fa ced  w ith  a c h o ic e , i s  %
an a c t io n  smacking o f in s in c e r i t y ,  cow ardice, and "mauvais- y!:
f o i" .  I t  i s  a d ep lorab le  and moreover f u t i l e  attem pt to  
evade and s h i f t  on e’ s r e p s o n s i b i l i t i e s .  Whatever man chooses
to  do or to  be he must choose in  th e  co n sc io u sn ess  o f  h is
\
a b so lu te  l ib e r t y  and f u l l  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .  T his i s  th e  
on ly  p o s s ib le  r ig h t  ch o ice  ( l a  ch o ix  au nomme de l a  l ib e r t é )  
and in  choosing to  choose so man s e t s  i t  up as an o b je c t iv e ly  
r ig h t  p r in c ip le  o f  a c t io n . Thus in  choosing  th e  r ig h t  way 
fo r  h im se lf , he ip so  fa c to  chooses th e  r ig h t  way fo r  o th e r s .
1 ) I have a lread y  drawn a t te n t io n  to  th e  s im ila r  v iew s o f  
a c e r ta in  number o f  th eo lo g ia n s  and t h e ir  r e l ig io u s  
.d o c tr in e s . A lso to  th e  v iew s o f  P ico  de lira n d o lla ,
F ic in u s , e t c .
339
Man i s  com pelled (by th e  lo g ic a l  n e c e s s ity  o f h is  m etaphysical 
s i tu a t io n )  to  choose th e  freedom o f ethers when he chooses h i s  
ow n ^ \ I t  i s  f a c tu a l ly  im p o ssib le  fo r  man to  pursue h is  
own l ib e r t y  w ith ou t pursuing a tü ie  same tim e th e  l ib e r ty ,  o f  
oth ers^ ^ .
Two im portant co n c lu sio n s  must be drawn from t h i s  meta­
p h y s ic a l th eo ry . The f i r s t  which need not concern us fu rth er  
fo r  th e  moment, i s  th a t seen  afeainst t h i s  s ta rk  m etaphysical 
background th e  im p lic a tio n s  o f  "1’a c t in d iv id u a l engage 
to u te  1*humanité" become tr u ly  t e r r i f y in g .  ^or i t  means th a t  
man, in  w hatever h e chooses to  f e e l ,  th in k , or do, moulds 
th e  whole o f  humanity in  h is  own image.. The second which  
i s  o f th e  g r e a te s t  im portance fo r  u s , i s  th a t th e  regard fo r  
l ib e r t y  ( i . e . t h e  p erso n s, as l ib e r t y  i s  th e  essen ce  o f th e  
human p erson) o f  o th ers  i s  a n ecessa ry  r e s u l t  o f  a regard  
fo r  my own person  and th e r e fo r e  a compulsory not a vo lu n tary  
a c t .  As such i t  i s  m orally  ir r e le v a n t .  The on ly  moral 
duty which can be d efin ed  w ith in  th e  bounds of  ^ S a r tr e ’ s m eta-
1 ) Je s u is  o b lig e  de v o u lo ir  en meme temps que ma l ib e r t é  
des a u tr e s .
Je  ne peux prendre ma l ib e r t é  pour but que s i  je  prends 
egaj^lement c e l l e s  des a u tres  pour b u t.
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1 ) ip h y s ic a l assum ptions, i s  a duty to  o n e s e lf  . !
T his however i s  not a t a l l  what S artre  w ants. He in ten d s j
to  e s ta b l is h  a moral code where such a code ought to  be I
e s ta b lis h e d  namely in  th e  r e la t io n  between one man and an- |
o th er  in  th e  in trasu b  j ec t i  ve sp h ere. S a rtre  proceeds toddo 
t h i s  in  th e  fo llo w in g  manner: He a s s e r t s  th a t th e  s o le  datum
which can be im m ediately and d ir e c t ly  exp erienced  i s  th e  
r e f l e c t i v e  co n sc io u sn ess  expressed  in  th e  d e c la r a t io n  ’c o g ito  
ergo sum". At th e  same tim e, through t h i s  same primary 
exp erien ce I ga in  an in t u i t iv e  knowledge o f  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  
l ’ a u tre , th e  o th er  p erson . In t h i s  in t u i t io n  . . .  "Je 
découvre l ’ au tre comme un l ib e r t é  posee en fa c e  de moi qui 
ne veu t que pour ou con tre  m oi. A in si découvrons nous to u t  
de s u i t e  un monde qui nous appelons 1 ’ in t e r su b je c t iv e  . . .  " 
However we may regard t h i s  a ffir m a tio n  o f a primary and 
i n t u i t iv e  p ercep tio n  o f  th e  "other" , and th e  a s s e r t io n  th a t  
t h i s  in u it io n  i s  p art o f th e  very f i r s t  ’c o g i t o ’ , we cannot
d isc u ss  i t  any fu r th e r  s in c e  S a r tre  e x p l i c i t l y  d ec la re s  i t  ^
2 ) !an in t u i t io n ,  and c la im s th e  san ctu ary  o f  in t u i t io n  ^. j
1 ) In  t h i s  con n ection  i t  i s  h ig h ly  unim portant whether choosing  
fo r  o n e s e lf  im p lie s  a lso  choosing fo r  o th e r s , s in c e  i t  i s  
on e’ s own s a lv a t io n  one works o u t, and: in  which one i s  
p rim a rily  in te r e s te d . The s a lv a t io n  o f  o th ers  i s  an in ­
e v ita b le ,  though not u n d esira b le  c o r r o lla r y  to  on e’ s own.
2) D escartes a ffirm ed  th a t in  t h i s  exp erien ce and through i t
I ga in  knowledge o f  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  God. Both affirm atio ij 
however seem th e  exp ression  o f  some sep a ra te  in t u i t io n ,  \
sep a ra te  from th e  p ercep tio n  o f  th e  I th a t  i s ,  ra th er  \
than in fe r e n c e s  from th e  primary datum o f  th e  c o g ito .  j
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For our purpose i t  i s  enough to  n o te  th a t th e  ’ other* \"p  
i s  not id e n t ic a l  or in d is t in g u is h a b le  from th e  I ,  nor i s  he  ^
com pelled to  l i v e  in  harmony w ith  th e I .  He i s  f r e e  to  
choose fo r  or or a g a in st th e  l i  T herefore th e  I must be 
f r e e  (from th e  p o in t o f view  o f  th e  o th er) to  choose fo r  or
"r
a g a in st  th e  o th er . That i s ,  what th e  I chooses fo r  i t s e l f  / ;
( fo r  i t s e l f  i t  chooses on ly  th e  good) i t  does not n e c e s s a r i ly  •
/
choose fo r  th e  o th er . In o th er  words, "To choose fo r  one­
s e l f  i s  to  choose fo r  others"  i s  a moral in ju c t io n , not a
law o f human nature ( i . e .  m etaphysical human n a tu r e ) . i
■ ■ 1
T herefore th e  p ro p o s it io n  ’I ’a c t  in d iv id u e l engage to u te  i
1
l ’hum anité’ m ust'be c l a s s i f i e d  as a moral in ju n c tio n
to  regard a l l  on e’ s a c t io n s  ’ as though’ th ey  were to  be '-
I • ■
o b lig a to r y  fo r  a l l  mankind, and not as a law o f  n a tu re .
Hence th e  m etaph ysica l and th e  moral in te r p r e ta t io n s  o f  S a r tr e ’ is 
th eory  o f  ch o ice  a c tio n  and r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  are m utually  
e x c lu s iv e .
1 ) eq u iv a len t to  Kant’s c a te g o r ic a l  im p erative: Act on ly  
on th a t  maxim which i s  a lso  f i t  to become a u n iv e r sa l  
law o f  n a tu re .
2) I t  i s  even q u estio n a b le  whether th e  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  th eory  -, 
a llow s o f  moral in ju c t io n s  a t a l l ,  s in c e  i t  tend s to  .  ^
o b je c t iv a te  (v e r d in g lic h e n ) a l l  r e g u la t iv e  id e a s , and a l l  * 
c a te g o r ie s , v iz  n ext paragraph.
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The d isr u p tio n  c^ours a t th e very p o in t where th e  in tu iti'v e  
p ercep tio n  o f  th e  o th er as a f r e e  and th e r e fo r e  dangerous 
bein g  breaks th e  tr a in  o f  th e  argument. The ’o th e r ’ i s  no 
lo n g er  something which I mould in  my own image every tim e
I
I make a c h o ic e , he i s  a person fo r  h im se lf , who makes h is  
own ch o ice  ir r e s p e c t iv e  and u n in flu en ced  by th e  ch o ice  I 
make fo r  him.
veu t pour ou cen tre  m oi." He th e r e fo r e  p o sse s se s  
th e  d ig n ity  o f  a f r e e  p erson , and as such I  ought to  r e sp e c t  
him even as he ought to  r e sp e c t  me. That i s ,  we both ought 
to  choose to  r e sp e c t each o th e r ’s persons though we are not 
by v ir tu e  o f  our very nature com pelled  to  do so . Thus and 
thus on ly  moral, d e c is io n s  and a c ts  can be d e fin ed .
^Let us i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  p o in t by re-exam in ing S a r tr e ’ s
p ro p o s it io n : ’I ’a c t in d iv id u e l engage to u te  1 ’hum anité’
and th e  argument which i s  supposed to  v in d ic a te  i t :  ’C h o isir
pour s o i  c ’ e s t  a ffirm er  l a  va leu r  de ce que nous c h o is s is s o n s
parce que c ’ e s t  tou jo u rs l e  b ien  que nous c h o is s is s o n s .
Mais r ie n  ne peut e tr e  bon pour nous sans 1 ’ e tr e  pour tou s
■
. . . .  a lo r s  c h o is ir  pour s o i  c ’ e s t  c h o is ir  pour to u s ’ from ' 
th e  p o in t o f  view  o f a moral in te r p r e ta t io n .
S in ce  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  p h ilosop h y  t r a n s la te s  a l l  m o d a lit ie s  
o f  exp ression  in to  p r o p o s it io n s  about su b sta n ces, and o b je c t­
iv â t e s  (v e r d in g lic h t )  a l l  r e g u la t iv e  id ea s  ( l i k e  freedom)
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in to  e x is t in g  e n t i t i e s ,  and a l l  in ju c t io n s  ( l i k e  th e  c a te g o r ic a l
'
im p era tive) in to  ca u sa l law s we must d isc u ss  even th e  moral 
in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  S a r tr e ’ s argument in  terms o f  f a c t s ,  and 
fa c tu a l  ex p er ien ce . That i s  we s h a ll  n ot d isc u ss  whether 
one ought to choose o n ly  th e  good fo r  o th ers  hut whether one 
does, s in c e  S a rtre  a s s e r t s  e x a c tly  t h i s  by denying th e  e x i s t ­
ence o f  in te n t io n s  and o b lig a t io n s  apart from th e a c ts  which  
r e a l i s e  th o se  in te n t io n s  and o b l ig a t io n s .
Given t h i s  i n i t i a l  framework fo r  our d isc u ss io n  we can  
now a ffirm  th a t  ’c h o is ir  pour s o i  . . .  c ’ e s t  a ffirm er  l a  
v a leu r  de ce  que nous c h o is s is è o n s ’ i s  f a c t u a l ly  c o r r e c t  and 
moreover a s e l f - e v id e n t  p r o p o s it io n  i f  on ly  v a lu e  be d efin ed  
lo o s e ly  enough i . e .  not r e s t r ic t e d  to  moral v a lu e . In  t h i s  
se n se  we can a lso  say ’ que c ’ e s t  to u jo u rs l e  b ien  que nous 
c h o i s s i s s o n s ’ i .  e . i f  th e  concept o f  th e  good be a lso  
d efin ed  lo o s e ly  enough to  cover a l l  p o s s ib le  c h o ic e s :  One
always choose th e  good or what appears good and were i t  on ly  
th e  l e s s e r  o f  two e v i l s .  The p r o p o s it io n  . . .  "Eien ne 
peut e tr e  bon pour nous sans 1 ’ e tr e  pour tous" . . .  on th e  
oth er  hand seems very  q u e stio n a b le . There i s  no reason  on ,
1) Nijrfhil appettim us n i s i  sub r a t io n s  b o n i, n i h i l  aversamur' 
n i s i  sub r a t io n s  m a li.
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earth  why som ething should  not be good fo r  me, or why I 
should  forego  som ething th a t seems good to  me (and which does 
n ot harm o th er s) sim ply because i t  i s  not good fo r  e v e iy -  
body. As a m atter o f  f a c t  I can th in k ,o f  many good th in g s  
which come under t h i s  ca teg o ry . In consequence, th e propos­
i t io n :  * c h o is ir  pour s o i  c ' e s t  c h o is ir  pour touj^s* seems q u ite  
in c o r r e c t  i f  we are to  tak e i t  as th e  statem ent o f f a c t  as 
which i t  i s  d e fin ed  in  S a r tr e ’ s system . The tr u th  o f  th e  
m atter i s  ra th er th e very o p p o s ite . A ll our con sciou s  
and w il le d  a c t s ,  a l l  our d e s ir e s ,  a l l  our purposes in so fa r  
as th ey  have not as y e t  b een su b jected  to  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  
im p erative  and ad ju sted  to  th e requirem ents o f  th e  moral 
law^^ are p r im a rily  c h o ice s  fo r  us a g a in st  o th e r s . I f  our 
w i l l s  are d ir e c te d  towards co n re te  ends, toward m ateria l 
p o s s e s s io n s , i t  i s  th e  e x c lu s iv e  r ig h ts  in  t h i s  p o sse ss io n s  
which we covet m ost. The more d e s ir e s  o f  m a ter ia l th in g s  
accord and agree w ith  each o th er , th e  f i e r c e r  th e ir  b a t t le  
a g a in st each o th er  v iz  th e  pun a ttr ib u te d  to  F ran cis th e  I  
and c i t e d  by Kant: was mein Bruder Karl w i l l  das w i l l  auch
ic h  (naehm lich M ailand) ( i . e .  what my b roth er Karl w i l l s  
I w i l l  to o , namely M ilan o). The b ig g er  th e  d if fe r e n c e  in  
what we d e s ir e ,  th e  g re a ter  our chance o f  not g e t t in g  in
1) i . e .  Subsequently cut to  th e  moral m easure.
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each o th ers  way. ^ut d if fe r e n c e s  in  what i s  d e s ir e d  e n ta i l  
a mutual n eg a tio n  o f  th e  v a lu e  o f  what i s  chosen in  each c a se . 
Thus i f  A ch ooses one frock  and B chooses another A c e r ta in ly  
th in k s  her ch o ice  th e  w ise r , and even though i t  i s  not d ir e c te d  
a g a in st  B in  th e  sare  crude way i t  would be i f  B had chosen  
th e  same fr o c k , i t  i s  d ir e c te d  a g a in st B in so fa r  as i t  d en ies  
th e  q u a lity  o f  B’ s t a s t e .  At no p o in t  th e r e fo r e  can what 
A chooses fo r  h e r s e l f  in  m a ter ia l th in g s , in c lu d e  A’ s choosing  
th e  same fo r  B, l e t  a lon e  fo r  a l l*  E x c lu s iv e n e ss  o f  p o s s e s s ­
io n  dom inates a n d 'd ir e c ts  a l l  p u r su it  o f  m a ter ia l ends.
But even in  th e  p u r su it  o f  s p ir i t u a l  ends and r a t io n a l a ch iev e ­
ments where e x c lu s iv i t y  o f  p o sse s s io n  has no r e a l  meaning as  
th e  same s p ir i t u a l  co n ten t can be pursued, a t ta in e d , and i t s  
p o sse s s io n  enjoyed by many men a t th e  same tim e w ith ou t l o s s  
to  i t s  in n er  r ic h n e s s , e x c lu s iv i t y  o f  p o sse s s io n  i s  never­
t h e le s s  h ig h / ly  v a lu ed . In  th e  l a t t e r  c a se , th e  v a lu e  6 f  
e x c lu s iv i t y  r e fe r s  to  th e  p e r s o n a lity  o f  him who p o s se s s e s  
ra th er  than to  what i s  p o sse sse d . The ch er ish ed  b e l i e f  in
1) I f  th er e  are ten  good p o e ts  l i v in g  in  th e  came Century, 
p oetry  does not s u f fe r  by i t ,  nor i s  th e  achievem ent o f  
th e  s in g le  p oet ip so  fa c to  d e tr im e n ta lly  e f f e c t e d .  The 
v a lu e  o f  a book i s  not le s s e n e d  by having been read by 
many, nor th e  v a lu e  o f  a .p a in tin g  by b ein g  vior/ed by many 
nor th e  v ir tu e  o f  am usical sco re  by having been l i s t e n e d  
to  by many.
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th e  e x c e p t io n a lity  o f  our persons and our p u r su its  i s  th e  
th in g  d ea rest to  our h.eart, and t h i s  a lon e i s  reason  enough 
to  make any c h o ic e , which i s  a ch o ice  fo r  o u r se lv e s  a t th e  
same tim e a ch o ice  a g a in s t  o th e r s . I th in k  t h i s  i s  why, 
i f  by chance we come upon p eo p le  whose id ea s  and p u r su its  
com p lete ly  resem ble our own we are both  p le a se d  and d is ­
p leased ^ ^ . However g rea t our joy  in  f in d in g  kindred so u ls  
a joy  which i s  nourish ed  c h ie f ly  by th e  p r a is e  im p lied  in  
such agreem ent, th e  annoyance a t f in d in g  our most ch er ish ed  
’ e x c e p t io n a l i t i e s ’ d u p lica te d  i s  fa r  g r e a te r  fo r  such  
d u p lic a t io n  d eva lu es our e x c e p tio n a lity ^ ^ : ”Lebt man denn
1) That I th in k  i s  one o f  th e  reason s why p eop le  h asten  to  
marry anyone th ey  f in d  resem b les them l i k e  th a t:  i . e .
to  e lim in a te  th e  th r e a t  to  th e ir  e x c e p t io n a lity  by 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .
U n less  o f  cou rse one m arries th e  d u p lic a to r  v iz  fo o tn o te  
1 , and co n tin u es to  be ex cep tio n a l a deux. Compare a lso  
Thomas Mann’s in t e r e s t in g  d e sc r ip t io n  o f  h is  em otions 
when he h im se lf  was s t i l l  w r it in g  h is  book Dr. Faustus  
and ’’From S w itzer lan d  came th e  two volumes o f  Herman 
H e sse ’ s G la s p e r le n s p ie l . In  fa r  M ontagnola my fr ie n d  had 
ach ieved  l i i s  d i f f i c u l t  and b e a u t ifu l  n o v e l, o f  v/hich untml 
t h i s  moment I had knov/n but th e  in tr o d u c tio n  . . . .  I 
o fte n  sa id  o f  t h i s  in tro d u c tio n  th a t  i t s  s t y l e  was so 
near to  me, as though ’’p art o f  m y se lf” . Enabled to  take  
in  th e  whole in  one com prehensive .view , I  f e l t  alm ost 
t e r r i f i e d  to  s e e  how s im ila r  i t  was. to  what had occup ied  
me so in te n s e ly  th e s e  l a s t  y e a r s . The same id e a  o f  a 
f i c t i o n a l  b iograp her, and th e  same overton es o f  parody, 
which t h i s  form p erm its . The same emphasis on m usic.
The same c r it ic is m  o f our age and our c u ltu r e  though  
more dreamy and u top ian  than my own . . .  s t i l l ,  th ere  were 
s i m i la r i t i e s  enough -  more than enough, and th e  entry  
I made in  my d iary: ’’To be reminded th a t  one i s  not
(Continued n ext page)
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wenn Andre leb en ?”^^
The on ly  o cca s io n  o f which I can th in k , on which to  
choose fo r  o n e s e lf  i s  a lso  to  choose fo r  o th ers  i s  when one 
e x e r c is e s  on e’ s r ig h t  to  v o te  on p o l l in g  day. But qua v o te r  
one i s  a p r io r i  and to  a ce r ta in d e g ree  d iv e s te d  o f  on e’ s 
in d iv id u a l i t y ,  one i s  p art o f  a c o l l e c t iv e  body. Further­
more on e’ s l ib e r t y  i s  r e s t r ic t e d  by th e  l im ite d  number o f  
a lt e r n a t iv e  c h o ic e s , and by th e  p r e - fa b r ic a te d  n atu re o f  th e  
c h o ic e s  in  q u e stio n . I f  I  r e ta in  my in d iv id u a l i t y ,  fo r  i n s t .  
i f  I  stand  fo r  e le c t io n  my ’choosing^ to  stand  im p lie s  th a t  
I. do not want any o th er  p arty  to  ga in  my s e a t ,  and more­
over d e s ir e  my own p arty  to  support me in  p re feren ce  to  a l l  
o th er  a ccep ta b le  ca n d id a te s .
In consequence, i t  seems f a i r l y  s a fe  to  conclude th a t  
an a c t o f  ’ choosing fo r  o n e s e l f ’ ( c h o is ir  pour s o i )  does not 
de fa c to  in v o lv e  an a c t o f  ’ ch oosing  fo r  a l l ’ ( c h o is ir  pour 
t o u s ) .  T ran sla ted  from th e  s ta tu s  o f  ca u sa l law s so b eloved  
o f  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  to  i t s  proper m od a lity , th e  e x h o r ta tiv e  
and im p erative  m od ality  proper to  moral in ju n c t io n s  our
(C on tin u ation  o f  fo o tn o te  from p rev iou s p a g e ):
a lo n e  in  th e  w orld i s  always annoying” b lu n tly  exp resses  
t h i s  f a c e t  o f  my f e e l in g s .  I t  i s  but another v e r s io n  
o f  G oethe’ s: Lebt man denn wenn Andre leb en ?” Th.
Mann: ^Die Entstehung des Dr. F au stu s, p . 68 . The Goethe 
q u ota tion  i s  from W e st-o c s t lic h e r  Diwan, Buch des Unmutes, 
11 .
1) v iz  Goethe: W e s t-o e s t lic h e r  Divan c i t e d  p . $ 5 8 . f .2 .
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p r o p o s it io n  would be: ’Choose fo r  a l l  what you would choose
fo r  y o u r s e lv e s ’ or ra th er  ’Never choose fo r  o th ers  but what 
you would choose fo r  y o u r s e lv e s ’ ( i . e .  ’what i s  o f  v a lu e , . 
what i s  good’ ) .  T h is , however, would in  r e a l i t y  mean an 
in to le r a b le  in te r fe r e n c e  w ith  o th er  p e o p le ’ s p e r s o n a l i t ie s  
s in c e  n ot I but th ey  must choose fo r  th em selves what th ey  
co n sid er  o f  v a lu e  and o f  good ness. As fo r  m y se lf , I  am 
supposed to  r e sp e c t  th o se  c h o ic e s , I  even am under an o b l ig a t ­
io n  not to  in t e r f e r e  w ith  them. At th e  utm ost I can be 
s a id  to  be under an (im p er fec t)  o b lig a t io n  to  fp r th er  th e  
’ c h o ic e s ’ o f  o th ers  ”as fa r  as in  my power” , i . e .  I  ought to  
adopt t h e ir  ends and th e ir  atta inm ent o f  t h e ir  ends as my 
own. At no tim e however can I be s a id  to  be under a moral 
o b lig a t io n  to  make my ends, th e ir s^ ^ . A f o r t i o r i ,  when we 
t r a n s la t e  i t  as w e ll  as th e  com prehensive p r o p o s it io n  ’1 ’ a c t  
in d iv id u e l engage to u te  l ’hum anité’ back in to  i t s  e icL ste n tia l-  
i s t  m od ality  as a ca u sa l law which i s  v a l id  de fa c to  , th e se  
p r o p o s it io n s  are endowed w ith  a determ in ing and e f f e c t iv e  
power fa r  beyond th e  requirem ents o f  E th ics^ ^ . There i s  
however noth ing ga in ed  in  e th ic s  by a d im in u ition  o f  th a t  
sphere o f  in t e r e s t  which a man can choose fo r  h im se lf  as he
1) Rather .rem in iscen t o f  ’S o is  mon fr e r e  ou j e  t e  meure* 
Ohamfort’ s famous pun on th e  Jacobine: ’l a  f r a t e r n i t é
ou l a  m ort’ .
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p le a s e s  w ith ou t th ereb y  f e e l in g  th a t he i s  ’ engaging’ th e
whole w orld and much to  be ga in ed  by extending i t .  T herefore
+ -
even th e  duty to  make th e  ’freedom o f  o th ers  my end a t th e  
same tim e th a t  I make my own freedom my end’ must n ot be 
p ressed  beyond an o b lig a t io n  not to  pursue my own freedom  
a t  th e  expense o f  o th e r s . In no v/ay can I be o b lig e d  active-:  
l y  to  seek  th e  freedom o f  o th ers  sim ply because such a p u r su it  
would be s e l f  c o n tr a d ic to ry  and m ea n in g less . In  K antian  
term ^: I cannot make th e  moral p e r fe c t io n  o f  another man my 
end because moral p e r fe c t io n  must be ach ieved  from w ith in  
as i t  w ere, i t  cannot be imposed from w ith o u t. In term s o f  
S a r tr e ’ s p h ilo sop h y  th e  same th in g  h o ld s , fo r  i f  th e  r ig h t
c h o ic e  fo r  man i s  th e  ch o ice  made in  th e  f u l l  co n sc io u sn ess
\
o f h is  a b so lu te  l ib e r t y  and a ccep tin g  f u l l  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  
fo r  i t ,  th e  l ib e r t y  o f  another man which I make my ovm end 
i s  not h is  c h o ic e , and th e r e fo r e  cannot rep resen t a r ig h t  
u se  o f  h is  e s s e n t ia l  l ib e r t y .  In' o th er  words o th er  p e o p le ’ s  
l ib e r t y  ( in  th e  m etaph ysica l se n se )  cannot be an end fo r  my 
w i l l  fo r  I cannot bestow  l ib e r t y  on o th er  p eo p le . Moreover 
even i f  I cou ld  bestow  i t ,  t h i s  i t s e l f  would be a d e n ia l o f  
t h e ir  l ib e r t y ,  fo r  i t  would make them u t t e r ly  dependentt 
on me. Other p eo p le , however, are endowed w ith  t h e ir  own 
l ib e r t y ,  which i s  th e  in t r in s ic  co re  o f  t h e ir  human nature,*  
and S a r tre  d ec la re s  th a t he knows them to  be so endowed by
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an i n t u i t iv e  p ercep tio n  o f  ’ th e  other* as th e  compliment to  
th e  I .  In t h i s  in t u i t io n  th e  ’other* appears as an in(%)endent 
e n t i t y ,  com plete w ith  h is  own l ib e r t y  and h is  power ’to  choose
fo r  or a g a in st  me’ . T his independent s ta t u s ,  t h i s  equal
/
l ib e r t y  o f  th e  ’o th e r ’ compels each one o f  u s , on a p lan e o f  
mutual engagements to  tak e each o th e r ’ s l i b e r t i e s  as an end, 
i . e .  not to  v io la t e  them. T his i s  however, tantamount to  
a demand, th a t  men should r e sp e c t  th e  persons o f  a l l  o th er  
men.
Once aga in , we are brought to  conclude th a t  th e  moral 
con ten t o f  a seem ingly  r a t io n a l dem onstration  o f  th e  d ig n ity  
o f  man qua man, i s  provided  by th e  eru p tiv e  and somewhat^^ 
ir r a t io n a l  agency o f  in t u i t io n .
Summing up we can sa y , th a t  what have seemed a t  f i r s t
i
s ig h t  r a t io n a l arguments dem onstrating th e  D ig n ity  o f  Man in
O thers by in d u c tiv e  reason in g  from th e  data  o f  my own p erson -
2 )a l i t y  , are fundam entally  on ly  a barrage o f  words to  h id e  
th e  mental jump performed under t h e ir  co v er . T his m ental 
jump i s  occasion ed  by th e  in tr u s io n  o f  à l o g i c a l l y  always 
g ra tu itu o u s^ ^ , a t tim es in t r in s i c a l l y  in com p atib le  idea^^
1) I s h a l l  tr y  to  j u s t i f y  th e  q u a l i f ic a t io n  ’ somev/hat’ 
( i r r a t io n a l )  a t a la t e r  p o in t .
2) th a t  i s  in  Kant and M ill ,  not in  S a r tr e .
3) in  Kant and S a r tr e .
4 ) in  M ill .
» '
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in to  th e  argument. w ith  i t s  appearance p r e v io u s ly  used  
coirepts acq u ire a new meaning, and a new v a l i d i t y .  But as 
th e  vjord^^ denoting th e  concept i s  u s u a lly  not rep la ced  
by another or q u a l i f ie d  by an e p ith e t  to  ev id en ce th e  inner  
change in  co n te n t, th e  f a l la c y  o f  seeming to  prove what has 
r e a l ly  accepted^^ w ith ou t p roof (namely th e  in tr u s iv e  id ea )  
i s  made p o s s ib le .
In th e  framework o f  th e  Kantian th eory  o f  E th ic s  th e  
p o s it io n  can now be d escr ib ed  as fo llo w s :  The c a te g o r ic a l
im p erative  in  i t s  empty fo r m a lity , i n s t i l l s  th e  q u a l i t ie s  o f  
c o n s is te n c y , freedom autonomy and ra t io n a lity ^ ^  in to  th e  
w i l l  i t  d eterm in es, s in c e  th e se  are th e  q u a l i t ie s  which are  
th e  p rec o n d itio n s  o f i t s  e f f i c a c i t y . On th e  o th er  hand th e  
c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tive  has no s p e c i f i c a l l y  moral s ig n if ic a n c e
1) i . e .  ’gen era l h a p p in ess’ in  M i l l ’ s ,  ’l i b e r t é ’ in  S a r tr e ’s 
argument.
2) I u se  ’a ccep ted ’ ra th er  than ’ assumed’ , because in t u i t io n s  
and p o s tu la te s ,  i f  based on in t u i t io n ,  p o sse ss  a g r e a te r  
com pellin g  power than assum ptions.
3) n o t i t s  moral good ness, fo r  as we have se e n , r a t io n a l i t y  
i s  not id e n t ic a l  w ith  moral goodness.
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on ly  when they acquire a concrete co n te n t, when they are referred  
to  the concept o f th e D ign ity  ofi man; and more p a r t ic u la r ly   ^
when re ferred  to  th e u n iv ersa l v a l id i t y  o f t h is  concept i . e .  ' 
to  th e p ro p o sitio n  th a t a l l  men qua men are endowed w ith  
d ig n ity . The o b je c t iv e  n e c e s s ity  o f e th ic s  i s  th ere fo re  d irect  
- l y  dependent on th e  u n iv ersa l v a l i d i t t ^ h i s  p ro p o sit io n , 
s in c e  th e  d e f in it io n  o f th e  c a te g o r ic a l im perative does not 
e n ta i l  th e  lo g ic a l  n e c e s s ity  o f  i t s  u n iv ersa l v a l id i t y ,  
and s in c e  th e o b jed tiv e  n e c e s s ity  o f th e  ca t.egorica l im perative  
i t s e l f  depends on th e u n iv ersa l v a l id i t y  o f  th e  concept o f  
th e  D ign ity  o f Man.
What proof or assurance have we o f i t s  u n iv ersa l v a lid ity ?  
In th e  f i r s t  p la ce  the p ro p o sitio n ; " a ll  men-qua-men are ' 
endowed w ith  D ign ity” i s  not an a n a ly t ic a l p ro p o sit io n  (as  
Kant tr ie d  to  p ro v e). From th e bare concept o f man, only  
h is  r a t io n a l i ty  can be<.deduced w ith  any c e r ta in ty  as to  i t s  
u n iv ersa l v a l id i t y .  B i^t th e  q u a lity  o f  r a t io n a l i t y  does 
not e n ta il  (by lo g ic a l  n e c e s s ity )  th e  q u a lity  o f  montai good­
n ess nor does i t  e n ta il  th e p o sse ss io n  o f  d ig n ity . The 
p ro p o sit io n  ”a l l  men qua men are endowed w ith  d ign ity"  is , ..'Æ 
th ere fo re  a sy n th e tic  p r o p o s it io n . - -
I t  i s  however not a sy n th e tic  p ro p o sitio n  a p o s te r io r i  
fo r  the fo llo w in g  reasons: (1 ) I can experience on ly  my
own d ig n ity  as a moral b ein g , s in c e  I can be c e r ta in  èn ly  . .A
. : - ,
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o f  my own freedom and ray own c a p a b i l i ty  o f  moral a c t io n .
(2 )  S in ce  m o ra lity  l i e s  in  th e  manner o f  w i l l in g ,  and s in c e  
i t  i s  beyond'my power to  s e e  in to  th e  hidden m otives o f  an­
o th er  man, I can never a c t u a l ly  be c e r ta in  th a t  th ey  perform  
moral a c t io n s  and are cap ab le o f  perform ing moral a c t io n s ’.
(5 )  I am on th e  o th er  hand c o n t in u a lly  fa c e d  w ith  th e  s ig h t  
o f  p eo p le  who d isreg a rd  th e  moral law s and who th e r e fo r e  
d e f i n i t e ly  do n ot perform moral a c t io n s .  (4 )  Any judgement 
from m y se lf to  dbhers i s -  th e r e fo r e  not w arranted by ex p er ien ce . 
But even i f  i t  were so j u s t i f i e d  in d u c tiv e  reason in g  cou ld  
n ever supp ly  s u f f i c i e n t  c e r ta in ty  fo r  th e  o b je c t iv e  and
a b so lu te  n e c e s s i t y  o f  t h i s  s y n th e s is .  • We must however have
)
s u f f i c i e n t  c e r ta in ty  nay a b so lu te  c e r ta in ty  in  t h i s  m atter .
The p r o p o s it io n  ’ a l l  men qua men are  endowed w ith  
d ig n ity *  i f  i t  be a l l  o b j e c t iv e ly  n ece ssa r y , must th e r e fo r e  
be an a p r io r i  s y n th e t ic  p r o p o s it io n .
Now i t  seems to  me th a t  i f  any r a t io n a l  n e c e s s i t y  can 
be s a id  to  e x i s t  fo r  th e  s y n th e s is  in  q u e stio n , i t  i s  not o f  
th e  s ^ e  k ind  o f  r a t io n a l  n e c e s s i t y  as th e  r a t io n a l  n e c e s s i t y  
in  which th e  s y n th e s is  between w i l l  and freedom f in d s  i t s  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  There i s  no n e c e s s i t y  to  co n ce iv e  a l l  men 
as eo ip so  endowed w ith  d ig n ity ,  s im ila r  to  th e  n e c e s s i t y  to  
th in k  o f  th e  w i l l  as b ein g  f r e e .  In  o th er  w ords, th e  
ex ten sio n  o f  th e  a t t r ib u te  o f  d ig n ity  to  a l l  men qua men
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( i . e .  to  co n ce iv e  o f  d ig n ity  as a p r e r o g a tiv e  n a tu ra l to  a l l  
men) i s  n ot a ca teg o ry  o f  rea so n . But perhaps a r a t io n a l  
j u s t i f i c a t io n  fo r  th e a p r io r i  s y n th e s is  between man as such  
and d ig n ity  can be found in  some m iddle term , in  whom as a 
p r e -c o n d it io n  common to  b oth , both  cou ld  be grounded?^^
Now i f  such a term cou ld  be found, th e  com posite concept o f  
th e  d ig n ity  o f  a l l  men, would d er iv e  from t h i s  term , and 
th e r e fo r e  be dependent on t h i s  term . I t  would be a c o n d it io n ­
ed, a h y p o th e t ic a l s y n th e s is .  T his would le a d  to  E th ic s  
i t s e l f  (a s  a d i s c ip l in e )  b ein g  dependent on th e  same m iddle  
term . E th ic s  would th u s be reduced to  a heteronomy d ic ta te d  
by th a t  term . Both r e s u l t s  are u n a ccep ta b le , and sh ou ld  
be rep u d ia ted  most d e c i s iv e ly .  A ll a ttem p ts to  v in d ic a te  . 
th e  p r o p o s it io n  " a l l  men qua men are endowed w ith  d ig n ity "  
by th e  a u th o r ity  o f  th e  s c r ip tu r e s ,  a m etap h ysica l d o c tr in e  
in c lu s iv e  o f  a t e l e o lo g i c a l  v iew  o f  th e  u n iv e r se , or man’ s 
b io lo g ic a l  q u a l i f ic a t io n  must be rep u d ia ted  as damaging to  
th e  u n c o n d itio n a l v a l id i t y  o f  human d ig n ity  as su ch , and by 
im p lic a t io n , to  th e  autonomy o f  e t h i c s .  A ll attem pts to
I
v in d ic a t e  th e  p r o p o s it io n  " a l l  men qua men . . .  " b y  in d iv id u a l
1 ) A ll  th e se  c o n s id e r a t io n s  are couched in  K antian term s.
T his does not eo ip so  in v a l id a te  th e  g en era l v a l i d i t y  
o f  th e  c o n c lu s io n s . N a tu r a lly  th ey  would have to  be 
form ulated  d i f f e r e n t ly  w ith in  a d i f f e r e n t  s e t t in g .
I  /
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and outstanding^^ q u a l i t i e s  must be rep u d ia ted  as p e r n ic io u s
to  th e  u n iv e r sa l a t t r ib u t io n  o f  human d ig n ity .  A ll attem pts
to v in d ic a te  th e  p r o p o s it io n  " a l l  men qua men . . . "  by a mutual
agreement to  accord  each o th er  t h i s  d ig n ity  (a  ’c o n tr a t s o c i a l ’ )
must be rep u d ia ted  as damaging to  th e  r e a l i t y  o f  d ig n ity .
F in a lly  th e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  perform ing th e  s y n th e s is  between
"human being" and ’ d ig n ity *  i s  n ot grounded in  an em otional
2 )n e c e s s i t y   ^ in h eren t in  a l l  human h e a r ts . As a m atter o f
1 ) as Kant d id  by making d ig n ity  dependent on moral c a p a b i l i t y .
2) v iz  R ousseau’ s v iew , and a lso  K ant’s v iew  in  h is  p re -  
c r i t i c a l  w r it in g s  e s p e c ia l ly  in  "Das G efuehl des Schoenen* 
und des Erhabenen" quoted on page . K ant’s l a t t e r  
o c c a s io n a l lo o s e  r e fe r e n c e s  to  th e  h ea rt as th e  s e a t  o f  
m o r a lity , must n ot be in te r p r e te d  to  mean th a t  he had g iv en  
up th e  view  th a t  m o ra lity  i s  e x c lu s iv e ly  grounded in  reason . 
He u se s  th e  term "heart" to  cover th o se  d e c is io n s  prompted 
by reason  and commonsense but n ot f u l l y  understood  in  t h e ir  
t h e o r e t ic a l  d em on stration . At no tim e does he appose 
h ea rt (th e  ir r a t io n a l )  to  reason  ( th e  r a t io n a l ) .  He 
opposes h ea rt ( r a t io n a l  rea so n , Eingebung des n a tu e r lic h e n  
V erstandee) to  mind ( o f  which a t tim es in  s p e c u la t iv e  
d e lib e r a t io n  one can make unsound and in c o r r e c t  u s e ) .  I -  
b e l ie v e  p a ssa g es l i k e  th e  one on Herr Garve ought to  be 
in te r p r e te d  in  t h i s  sen se : "Hr Garve remarks (about th e
d if fe r e n c e  which I d e f in e  between th e  d i s c ip l in e  th a t  
te a ch es  us how to  become happv and th a t  which te a ch es  us  
how to  be worthy o f  h ap p in ess) are: ’For my p a rt I  must
c o n fe ss  th a t  though I  can understand t h i s  d iv is io n  o f  
id e a s  w ith  my head I  cannot f in d  t h i s  d iv is io n  in  my h e a r t .
I cannot even comprehend how anyone can be su re th a t  he
had i s o la t e d  h is  d e s ir e  fo r  h ap p in ess to  such a d egree , 
th a t h is  a c t io n s  were in àôed  done fo r  d u ty ’s  sake only"
. . . .  In  s p i t e  o f  Hr G arve’ s c o n fe s s io n  th a t  he does not 
f in d  th e  d iv is io n  (o r  ra th e r  sep a ra tio n ) aforem entioned  
in  h is  h ea rt I do n ot h e s i t a t e  to  c o n tr a d ic t  him and defend  
h is  h ea rt a g a in s t  h is  head. He, th e  upstanding man has 
in d eed  found ( t h i s  d iv is io n )  in  h is  h ea rt ( i . e .  in  th e
(C ontinued n ext page)
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f a c t  very  few p eop le  a c tu a l 1 f e e l  th a t  a l l  p eo p le  are  
endowed w ith  d ig n ity .  M ostly th e  in n a te  em otional 
regard fo r  o th er  p e o p le ’ s p erson s embraces a r e s t r ic t e d  
and d e f in i t e  group (who are thought o f  as endowed w ith  
d ig n ity  in  v ir tu e  o f  t h e ir  c l a s s ,  p r o fe s s io n , n a t io n a l i t y ,  
e t c ) .  Almost alw ays th e  p u re ly  em otional r e sp e c t  fo r  
o th er  p e o p le ’ s persons exc lu d es c e r ta in  groups on more or 
l e s s  d e fe n s ib le  r a t io n a l  reason s (madmen, c r im in a ls , th e  
v ic io u s  and th e  depraved) or on ir r a t io n a l  sometimes even  
u ncon sciou s grounds (p r o fe s s io n , r e l ig io n ,  n a t io n a l i t y ,  
r a c e ) .
The s y n th e t ic  p r o p o s it io n  "A ll men-qua-men are  
p o sse sse d  o f  d ig n ity "  i s  th e r e fo r e  in ca p a b le  o f  any p roof  
w h atsoever, in c lu d in g  th e  tra n scen d en ta l p roof fo r  th e  
o b je c t iv e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  c a t e g o r ie s .  S in ce  i t  i s  a lso  not
(C ontinp .ation  o f  fo o tn o te  from p rev io u s p age):
d eterm in a tio n s o f  h is  w i l l ) ,  but he cou ld  not a d ju st i t  
in  h is  head to  th e  u su al ex p la n a tio n s  accord ing to  psycho­
lo g ic a l  p r in c ip le s  (w hich are a l l  o f  a p h y s ic a l ca u sa l 
n atu re) so as to  understand what cannot be understood  
or ex p la in ed , naniely th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a c a te g o r ic a l  
im p era tive  and in  order to  sp e c u la te  on t h i s  im p era tive  
. . . "  Kant: "Ueber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in  der
T h eorie  r ic h t ig  s e in  ta u g t aber n ic h t  fu er  d ie  P ra x is  
( 1793) ,  p a rt 11 .
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s e l f - e v id e n t  i t  cannot be th e  o b jec t o f  an in t u i t io n ,  in  th e  
usual sen se  o f  in t u i t io n .  I t  can th e r e fo r e  be on ly  c l a s s i f i e d  
as a p o s tu la te  which because o f  th e  uniqueness o f  i t s  nature  
and p o s it io n  can on ly  be d escr ib ed  by com parison. L ike th e  
p o s tu la te  o f freedom i t  i s  w h o lly  im p lied  in  th e  g iven  datum 
o f moral exp erien ce and re p r esen ts  th e  u lt im a t^ r e a so n  fo r  ‘ 
t h i s  ex p er ien ce . In another sen se  i t  resem bles th e  p o s tu la te  
o f  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  God in  i t s  ( i . e .  th e  l e t t e r ’ s )  s tr u c tu r a l  
r e la t io n s h ip  to  r e l ig io u s  ex p er ien ce , fo r  i t  can be taken fo r  
th e  e f f e c t iv e  r e a l  cause o f  moral exp erien ce as w e ll  as fo r  
i t s  u lt im a te  reason  (form al c a u se ) . That means th a t  moral 
exp erien ce  though i t  i s  our on ly  means o f  d isc o v er in g  t h i s  
p o s tu la te , i s  not to  be tr e a te d  as though i t  were th e  cause  
or th e  ground o f  th e  p o s tu la te . On th e  con trary , th e  p o s tu la te  
i s  tob e tr e a te d  as though i t  were th e  cau se and th e  ground o f  
moral ex p er ien ce , on th e  j u s t i f i c a t io n  th a t moral exp erien ce  
can be exp la in ed  com p letely  on ly  by t h i s  postu late. (N ote  
th e  c lo s e  analogy to  th e  p o s tu la te  o f  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  God 
in  r e l ig io u s  e x p e r ie n c e ). In sh ort th e  p o s tu la te  i s  to  be  
tr e a te d  not l i k e  a p o s tu la te .  I t  i s  to  be tr e a te d  in  a l l  
r e sp e c ts  and to  a l l  p urposes, l i k e  a statem ent o f  f a c t ,  th e  
statem en t o f  an u lt im a te , ir r e d u c ib le , u n q u estion ab le  f a c t .
Now i t  so happens th a t  th e ir r e d u c ib le  and u n q u estion ab le  
f a c t  th e  p o s tu la te  i s  supposed to  s t a t e  i s  not a very probable
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f a c t .  I t  i s  indeed  *a f a c t ’ den ied  and in v a lid a te d  by th e  .
g r e a te r  p art o f our exp erien ce and knowledge. I t  th e r e fo r e
resem bles th o se  te n e ts  o f  our c o n v ic t io n s  o f  which i t  can be
tr u th fu l ly  sa id : credo quia absurdum. An a ct o f  f a i t h ,
and a g r a tu ito u s  a ct o f f a i t h  a t th a t i s  needed fo r  i t s
accep tan ce. F ourth ly  i t  has a p e c u lia r  q u a lity  o f  i t s  own,
1 )th e  power o f  ch a llen g in g  th e  w i l l  . I t s  ch a llen g e  i s  th a t  
th e  w i l l  by e le c t in g  to  t r e a t  th e  p o s tu la te  as though i t  were 
a statem en t o f  f a c t ,  v / i l l  in  th e  end, p r e v a il  by cr ea tin g  
th e  f a c t ,  whose statem ent i t  was supposed to  b e .
To sum up: th e  p o s tu la te  th a t  a l l  men qua men are endowed
w ith  d ig n ity  f u l f i l s  th e  fo llo w in g  fou r sim ultaneous fu n c tio n s:
(a ) I t  fu n c tio n s  as a n ecessa ry  h y p o th esis  w ithout 
which moral exp l i e n e e  would be n e ith e r  p o s s ib le  
nor e x p lic a b le .
(b ) I t  i s  a statem ent o f f a c t  ( i . e .  a statem ent o f  
e x is te n c e )  and as such i s  th e  r e a l and e f f ic a c io u s  
cau se o f  moral exp er ien ce .
(c )  I t  i s  an a ffir m a tio n  o f  f a i t h  in  th e  fa c e  o f  c le a r  
ev id en ce to  th e  con trary .
(d ) I t  i s  a ch a llen g e  to  our w i l l s ,  i . e .  r e g u la t iv e  . ‘ •
id e a .
S in ce  i t  f u l f i l s  a l l  th o s^ fu n ctio n s sim u lfetoeously , each o f
]) Thus what L indsay had c a l le d  ’The C hallenge to  p e r fe c t io n ’ 
( The Two M o r a lit ie s p . 5 0  i s  now reco g n ised  more 
p r e c is e ly  as th e  ch a llen g e  to  accep t th e  p o s tu la te  th a t  
a l l  human b ein gs are endowed w ith  d ig n ity .
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th e  fou r p r o p o s it io n s  c o r r e c t ly  d e f in e s  one fa c e t  o f  i t s
nature^^. A ll f a c e t s  p lay  d e f in i t e  and d e c is iv e  r o le s  in
moral th eory  and p r a c t ic e ,  so th a t  t h e ir  sep a ra te  d e sc r ip t io n
might n ot prove a lto g e th e r  u s e le s s .
Now th e  p r e c is e  and con crete  con ten t which Kant a sc r ib e s
to  th e  concept o f  man i s  su b jed t tb  co n sid era b le  v a r ia t io n s ,
as a l l  h is  in te r p r e te r s  had o cca sio n  to  n o te  w ith  j u s t i f i e d
annoyance. At tim es i t  n ea r ly  c o in c id e s  w ith  Rousseau’s
concept o f  man, i . e .  man in  th e  framework o f  th e  ’co n tra t  
2 )s o c i a l ’ \  In t h i s  s e t t in g  men (prompted according to  
Rousseau by th e  id e a  o f  th e ir  own advantage, but according  
to  Kant prompted by a 'rev eren ce  fo r  law and la w fu ln e ss^ ^ ), 
are en jo in ed  by th e  c a te g o r ic a l im p erative  to  impose r e s t r i c t ­
io n s  on t h e ir  w i lfu ln e s s  in  obed ience to  a law which a c tu a lly  
does n oth ing  but ensure th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  l i f e  in  la r g e r  
groups. Such v a lu e  and d ig n ity  as men p o sse ss  under th e se
1 ) I t  i s  in t e r e s t in g  to  n o te  th a t Kant e x p l i c i t l y  u ses  b fir st  
p art c ;d ; but never a . A p o in t we have d isc u sse d  a lread y , 
and probably would r e j e c t  b: p art tv/o fo r  m ethodical
rea so n s, an error which I s h a l l  d isc u ss  l a t e r .
2 ) Not in  nature where he has much more v a lu e  in  h im se lf .
3) Which we have seen  i s  not enough to  exclude th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  
o f  immoral conduct o f  th e  g r o s s e s t  k ind .
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circum stances accrues to  them from th e ir  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  th e  
system  o f mutual o b lig a t io n , and counter o b lig a t io n s .
At o th er tim es Kant u ses a concept o f  man so r ich  in  
th e  a t tr ib u te s  o f  i n f i n i t e  va lu e and in v io la b le  d ig n ity , that^ 
to  be m otivated  by th e c a te g o r ic a l im perative i s  no longer  
eq u iva len t to  being m otivated  by a reveren t obedience to  th e  
.law, but i s  ra th er eq u iva len t to  being m otivated  by a spontaneous 
re sp e c t fo r  th e  human person , a r e sp e c t p e r fe c t ly  expressed  
in  th e id ea  o f  human d ig n ity . Understood in  t h is  sen se , 
th e  c a te g o r ic a l im p erative , e s p e c ia l ly  in  i t s  second form ulation  
i s  th e  d ir e c t  outcome o f  th e  response evoked and th e  re sp e c t  
commanded by the human person . The d ig n ity  o f  th e  human
person i s ,  h ere , an o b je c t iv e  datum^^ e x is t in g  fo r  i t s e l f
!
whether i t  be re sp ected  or n o t, y e t  a t a l l  tim es commanding
t h is  r e sp e c t . Both a t t itu d e s  can r e s u lt  in  th e  same r ig h t
• 1
a c tio n s  but i t  i s  one moral maxim we fo l lw  when we pay 
a tte n t io n  to  another p erson ’ s in t e r e s t s  because we have set'
' o u rse lv es  th e  p r in c ip le s  o f  m u tu ality  and e q u a lity  o f  claim ;
I ■ '■
and a d if fe r e n t  one we fo llo w  when we pay a tte n t io n  to  another 
p erson ’s in t e r e s t s  because we re sp e c t and'honour him as a ,
- 1, I , 1 , I I y -1 -  ' -  - -
1) According to  Kant t h i s  d ig n ity  i s  e n ta ile d  by th e  r a t io n ­
a l i t y ,  and th e r e fo r e  by the a b i l i t y  o f  th e  human being  
to  be determined by th e  moral law .
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p erson . M ora lity  proper b eg in s a t  t h i s  l a t t e r  p o in t fo r  
m o r a lity  i s  n o th in g  but th e  r e sp e c t  and regard  o f  man fo r  man.
The s p l i t  between th e  two a t t i t u d e s  i s  unm istakeably  
announced in  th e  o fte n  c i t e d  sen ten ce : "Now I  say  th a t  man
. . .  e x i s t s  as an end in  h im se lf" 'a n d  i t s  s ig n i f ic a n c e  gauged  
a r ig h t by Otto in  a somewhat sen tim en ta l an n ota tion : " I t
i s  w ith  g r e a t in n er  em otion th a t  we look  upon t h i s  eru p tion  
o f  a deep and independent in t u i t io n ,  fo r  v/e are p r iv i le g e d  
to  v /itn ess  th e  b ir th  o f  th e  m ig h t ie s t  and most s ig n i f ic a n t  
o f  a l l  id e a s  th a t  were ever pronounced in  th e  domain o f  e th ic a l  
enquiry: The id e a  o f  a c o n c r e te , e x is t e n t  v a lu e - in -a n d -fo r -
i t s e l f , an id e a  moreover which reason  can both  accep t and 
respectV^^.
The d is t in c t io n  so e s ta b lis h e d  r e fe r s  howbver on ly  to  a 
d if fe r e n c e  in  in n er  m o tiv a tio n . I t  i s  s ig n i f ic a n t  because  
by i t  a new p o ih t o f  v iew , has been ga in ed , a change in  
a t t i t u d e .  The new a t t i t u d e  does not correspond to  new d u t ie s ,  
nor does i t  c r e a te  or in s p ir e  new d u t ie s .  \T h is needs to  be  
s tr e s s e d  most em p h atica lly  s in c e  th e  d if fe r e n c e  in  in n er  
m o tiv a tio n  i s  u s u a lly  con fu sed  w ith  th e  d if f e r e n c e  between  
p o s i t iv e  and n e g a tiv e  d u t ie s .  I t  i s  assumed, -  on th e
'— "--- ------------------------------- - ---- - -- T-----------------— — — —
1) R. O tto: N otes to  Kant’ s Grundlegung . . . .  p.  I 99 .
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s tr e n g th  o fth e  e v o lu tio n  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tive  from 
i t s  second form u la tion  (th e  e n d - i n - i t s e l f ) to  i t s  th ir d  
( th e  Kingdom o f  ends) and on th e  s tre n g th  o f K ant’s d i s t in c t ­
io n  o f  two s ta g e s  in  th e  Kingdom o f  Ends th e l a t t e r  b e in g  
d efin ed  as th e  s ta g e  a t which we not on ly  r e sp e c t  th e  ends 
o f  o th ers  but a c tu a l ly  fu r th e r  them "adopting them as fa r  
as p o s s ib le  as our ovm" -  th a t  th e  p o s i t iv e  d u t ie s  are o f  
a h ig  ier , more sublim e order than th e  n e g a t iv e . Whenever 
Kant t r ie d  to  avoid  th e  im p lic a t io n s  o f  " im p erfect duties"^^  
he i s  accused  o f  a m erely n e g a t iv e  a t t i t u d e  tournerais -  
a s e n s e le s s  a cc u sa tio n  s in c e  a l l  moral approach as such must 
be ’n e g a t iv e ’ as I  s h a l l  tr y  to  show. The p rem isses on which  
I  base t h i s  co n te n tio n  are th e  fo llo w in g :  (a ) The concept
o f  a moral p o s i t iv e  duty i s  a s e l f  co n tr a d ic to r y  concept and 
th e r e fo r e  in v a l id ,  (b ) We can de fa c to  g iv e  no c o n s is te n t  
d e f in i t io n  or d e s c r ip t io n  o f  a moral duty which i s  a lso  a 
p o s i t iv e  duty , ( c )  The id e a  o f  p o s i t iv e  d u t ie s  i s  one o f  
th o se  hum anitarian id e a s ,  whi^h in  th e  cou rse o f  even ts have
1) A dm ittedly Kant’ s reason s in  a v o id in g  to  develop  th e  id e a  
o f  im p erfed t d u t ie s  i s  e n t ir e ly  d i f f e r e n t ,  v iz  pp _ A/s" 
from th o se  I  am ad vocatin g  h ere . I t  i s  th e r e fo r e  doubly  
im portant fo r  me to  prove th a t  th e  u n co n d itio n a l a t tr ib u t io n  
o f  d ig n ity  to  man in  th e  co n cre te  w holeness o f  h is  e x i s t ­
ence and h is  p u r su its  does n ot as Kant thought n e c e s s a r i ly  
e n ta i l  th e  a ff ir m a tio n  o f  im p erfect d u t ie s .
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proved more d etr im en ta l to  m ora lity  than any o u tr ig h t d i s -  
regard o f  th e moral law .
To tak e th e  f i r s t  p o in t f i r s t :  There seems good reason
V'
to  th in k  th a t moral laws are by th e ir  very nature cmpLled ‘ 
to  op erate  in  a r e g u la t iv e  l im it in g ,  i . e .  ’negative*  manner. 
T his i s  so , because th e  ground o f  a l l  moral o b lig a t io n  i s  th e  
re sp e c t fo r  o th er  p e o p le ’ s d ig n ity , p lu s th e  p o s tu la te  th a t  
a l l  p eop le are p o sse ssed  o f  d ig n ity . Now th e  d ig n ity  o f  
th e  human person , as fa r  as i t  i s  a source o f  moral o b lig a t io n s ,  
in s p ir e s  on ly  one o b lig a t io n :  th e  o b lig a t io n  to  tr e a t  i t  ^
w ith  proper re sp e c t i . e .  not to  v io la t e  in  any way. In  
oth er words, i t  i s  my moral duty to  r e fr a in  from ÿ r eatin g  > 
oth er  p eop le as mere means to  my ends (n e g a tiv e  d u ty ). By 
th e  nature o f  th e  s i tu a t io n  however, th e  d ig n ity  o f  another  
human person cannot put me under an o b lig a t io n  to  c u l t iv a t e  
or f o s t e r  i t  in  any way, s in c e  s t r i c t l y  sp eak in g , I have no ' ,
power to  do so . In o th er words a p o s i t iv e  moral d u tie s  in  
regard to  the d ig n ity  o f  obher p e o p le ’ s p erson s, are s e l f ­
co n tr a d ic to ry .
The fo llo w in g  r e f le c t io n s  might help  to  j u s t i f y  t h i s  
con ten tio n : Let us assume th a t  th ere  i s  a p o s i t iv e  moral
duty. A p o s i t iv e  duty i s  a duty not m erely to  r e fr a in  from 
doing som ething, but a duty to do som ething. ^hat i s  
a c t iv e ly  to  s e t  out to  b rin g  something about. In order to
3 6 4
do t h i s ,  I must w i l l  to  bring th a t c e r ta in  something about, 
i . e .  I must choose a c e r ta in  end. A p o s i t iv e  duty i s  th e r e ­
fo r e  a duty to  choose a c e r ta in  end. Can th ere  be a moal 
duty to  adopt one end ra th er  than another? I t  seems most 
im probable. For ends as we know are th e  correspondents o f  
d e s ir e s  or t h e ir  m o tiv es . They are on ly  fr e e  to  r e fr a in
f
from a c tin g  on th e  promptings o f  th e ir  d e s ir e s ,  out o f  a regard  
fo r  o th er  p e o p le ’s p erso n s. Thus to  love , m usic, or to  pursue 
a p o l i t ic a l  career  cannot be moral d u t ie s , nor does moral m erit 
accrue from such p u r su its . Now i f  m ora lity  i s  d efin ed  as 
th e  regard I owe to  o th er  p e o p le ’s d ig n ity , th e  duty to  adopÿ 
an end, v/ould mean a duty to  make oth er p e o p le ’ s ends my end.
On l im it in g  p e o p le ’s d ig n ity  to  t h e ir  moral p u r s u its , we f in d  
( in  accordance w ith  Kant’s v iew s) th a t we cannot h elp  o th ers  
in  th e ir  moral d e c is io n s  s in c e  th e  change o f  h eart which i s  
expressed  in  th e  moral d e c is io n  must be ach ieved  by th e  person  
d ec id in g . Moreover i t  would be a r e f le c t io n  in  th e  s in c e r i t y  
o f our regard fo r  them, and a d en ia l o f  th e  eq u a lity  o f s ta tu s  
which th e  p o sse ss io n  o f d ig n ity  co n fe r s , were we to  assume
1 )th a t th ey  req u ire  our help  or th a t  we are ab le  tg^ rov id e i t
1 ) The case  o f  th e  p r ie s t  (or  any o th er  a u th orised  person) i s  
d if fe r e n t  s in c e  he i s  endowed w ith  th e  power to  help  by 
sp e c ia l  d isp e n sa tio n . In  h is  p r ie s t ly  s ta tu s  he p o sse sse s  
c e r ta in  p rer o g a tiv es  and c e r ta in  d u tie s  which d er iv e  d ir e c t ­
ly  from h is  s ta tu s  and do not ap perta in  to  him qua human 
b e in g . These d u tie s  are th e r e fo r e  not moral duties^ b u t  
co n tra ctu a l d u t ie s ,  i . e .  d u tie s  not d efin ed  fo r  men as such, 
but fo r  c e r ta in  men in  c e r ta in  circu m stan ces.
• V
i  ■
• ' . 4  *r.
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Let us ho Vf ever assume th a t d ig n ity  i s  not on ly  an a t tr ib u te
o f  th e  moral person ( i . e .  man in  as fa r  as he obeys th e  moral
law s) but a lso  th e  a t tr ib u te  o f  man in  th e  con crete  v a r ie ty
o f  h is  p u r su its  and d e s ir e s .  Then man in  th e  con crete  w hole­
n ess o f  h is  e x is te n c e  ought to  command my regard . In t h i s  
.case (accord ing to  Kant) my moral p o s i t iv e  duty might be to  
help  another man in  th e  p u rsu it  o f  h is  co n crete  ends, i . e .  
to  adopt h is  happiness as my end. This maxim g e n e r a lly  
adopted would e f f e c t  th e  u t te r  unhappiness o f  everyone. For 
i f  m ora lity  i s  more d e s ir a b le  than ea r th ly  goods, by making
another man’ s happiness my end I la y  up tr ea su r es  fo r  m yself .
-
in  heaven w h ils t  tem pting him to  forego  higfewn p e r fe c t io n  
fo r  th e  b aser r ic h e s  o f  t h i s  earth  which I help  him to  am ass.''
'iI coiimit in  f a c t ,  th e  p e r fe c t  moral crim e. ( I t  was Satan who
showed C h rist th e  kingdoms o f  th e  world I ) . ^If hovfever I  k
inform  him o f  my r e a l'  in te n t io n s  in  h e lp in g  him to  w orld ly  "
h ap p in ess, and encourage him to  do th e  same fo r  me ( i . e .  to  
seek  h is  m ora lity  by h elp in g  me to  acquire m a ter ia l goods) 
n e ith e r  o f  u s , I b e l ie v e ,  would have th e  l e i s u r e  or be in  th e  
proper s t a t e  o f  mind to  enjoy th e  f r u i t s  o f  each o th ers  
lab our, and t h i s  labour would be so much v/asted e f f o r t .  We • ^
might as w e ll  s i t  q u ie t ly  a t home and c u l t iv a t e  our moral /• .
p e r s o n a l i t ie s  in  l e s s  e la b o ra te  ways. , . /
'-i ...
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T his argument i s  v a l id  on ly  i f  I  in d u lge  in  th e  a c t i v i t i e s
o u tlin e d  above ( i . e .  in  a c t io n  meant to  bring about th e
m ateria l w p ll-b e in g  o f  another person) p u rely  as a m atter o f  '
duty. The same a c t i v i t i e s  in du lged  because o f  a person al
lo v e , or a n a tu ra l in c l in a t io n  to  s o c ia l  c h a r ity , are j u s t i f i e d
by th e  joy and s a t i s f a c t io n  th ey  bring th e  agen t. However, ' ^
as th ey  are not performed fo r  th e  sake o f duty th ey  have no 'V-;
moral m erit and are in  fa c t  o f  no fu r th er  in t e r e s t  to  our ,
enquiry. I t  should  however be noted  th a t a concern w ith  o th er
p e o p le ’ s in t e r e s t s  undertaken p u rely  as a m atter o f  duty '
re p resen ts  an in te r fe r e n c e  w ith  th e  p r iv a te  and p ro tec ted
sphere o f  in t e r e s t  o f  another person , and in so fa r  as i t  i s  .V
not j u s t i f i e d  by th e  natu ra l im pulses o f p erson a l lo v e ,  has
1 )
som ething d ec id ed ly  in s u lt in g  about i t / .  In so fa r  as t h i s  : r:
in te r fe r e n c e  can be regarded as in s u lt in g  i t  re p r esen ts  a
'  ■ '  i
h u m ilia tio n  o f  another man’s d ig n ity  and to  th a t ex ten t must 
be counted a m orally  wrong a c t io n . I t  fo llo w s  th a t  o th er
1) Lamont in  P r in c ip le s  o f  moral judgement pp 127 -  151, 
draws a t te n t io n  to  th e  extrem ely in s t r u c t iv e  f a c t , th a t  
on ly  se lf -r e g a r d in g  a c tio n s  as fa r  as they in f lu e n c e  oth er  
p e o p le ’ s l i v e s ,  enjoy le g a l  p r o te c t io n . The t e s t  o f  s e l f -  
in t e r e s t  i s  ap p lied  to  determ ine what a person may or may 
not do as regards other p erson s. I enjoy le g a l  p r o te c tio n  
fo r  in sta n c e  i f  I demand th a t the pub mext door be c lo sed  
because i t  rep resen ts  u n fa ir  com p etition  to  my own b u s in e ss ,  
but not i f  I demand th a t i t  be c lo se d  because i t  rep resen ts  
a danger to  th e  moral w e ll being o f  other p eo p le . In te r ­
fe r e n c e s  w ith  oth er p e o p le ’s l i v e s  on p h ila n th ro p ic  grounds 
are not san ction ed  by th e  law . The law thus seems to  
p r o te c t  th e  l ib e r t y  o f  each to  choose h is  own good.
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p e o p le ’s happiness can never be our moral duty.
Can my own moral p e r fe c t io n  be a moral and p o s i t iv e  
duty fo r  me? Ought I to  make my own moral p e r fe c t io n  my end?
I th in k  n o t . For were I  to  do so I would obey th e c a te g o r ic a l  
im p era tive , and re sp e c t o th er  p e o p le ’s persons as a means to  
my own moral p e r fe d tio n , and not fo r  th e ir  own sak e. I  
would thus d efea t my own end. no l e s s  su r e ly  than i f  I  had 
m isused o th er  peop le in  some cruder way.
An a lte r n a t iv e  kind o f  p o s i t iv e  duty, th e one most eager ly  
and most o fte n  advocated i s  th e  duty to  b e n e f it  humanity.
Now humanity can be b e n e f it t e d  in  variou s ways. One can bene­
f i t  i t  by c r e a tin g  b e a u t ifu l th in g s , by d isco v er in g  and pro­
m ulgating tr u th , by improving s o c ia l  c o n d it io n s , by teach in g  
and preaching th e  good. I s h a ll  assume th a t a l l  th e se  th in g s  
are my duty even i f  I do not n a tu r a lly  d e s ir e  to  do them.
Then to  u se  Kant’s form u lation  I would t r e a t  m yself as mere
means fo r  th e  b e n e f it  o f  humanity.
Now i t  i s  Kant’ s co n ten tio n  th a t i t  i s  m orally  wrong to
u se  o n e s e lf  as a mere means, i . e .  th a t i t  i s  a moral duty not
to  t r e a t  o n e s e lf  as a mere means. And though I cannot agree  
w ith  Kant th a t i t  i s  a moral o ffe n c e  to  u se  o n e s e lf  as a 
means I cannot agree w ith  the view  advocated above th a t i t
i s  a moral dutÿ to  t r e a t  o n e s e lf  as a mere means.' I t  seems
{
to  me th a t th e  way I choose to t r e a t  m yself i s  one o f  th o se  
th in g s  which must be l e f t  to  me to  d ec id e  as I p le a s e  w ith
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w ith  no moral s tr in g s  a ttach ed .
E xp lan tation : I f  Kant were r ig h t  then th o se  we count
g r e a te s t  and most n ob le  among men would stand co n v ic ted . 
G a lile o  C opernicus, c o u n tle ss  o th e r s , d ied  fo r  Truth, th e  
m artyrs d ied  to  t e s t i f y  to  th e  g lo ry  o f  God, C h rist d ied  to  
e x p ia te  th e  s in s  o f  men. S u rely  th ey  cannot be regarded as 
 ^ moral o ffe n d e r s . The c a te g o r ic a l im p erative  we conclude, 
can be d efin ed  on ly  as between man and man in  th e  in tr a ­
sub j e c t iv e  sphere but not as between man and h im se lf . I  am 
m orally  speaking ju s t  as e n t i t le d  to  k i l l  m yself w ith  drink, 
as to  k i l l  m yself in  work, or fo r  my cou n try . S e l f - s a c r i f i c e  
i s  not a moral crim e. On th e  o th er hand martyrdom i s  n o t 'a  
moral duty. No m atter jow good th e  r e s u l t ,  I am n ot o b lig ed
to  s a c r i f i c e  m yself fo r  i t ,  to  u se  m yself as a means^^. I t
i s  a d e lib e r a te  p re feren ce . I f  I do not d e s ir e  i t  m y se lf ,
I am not o b lig e d  to  c r e a te  workd o f  a r t ,  to  l i v e  fo r  o th e r s , 
to  tea ch , preach or reform . I t  i s  not my duty to  inform  
humanity o f  th e good as I  see  i t ,  or o f  th e  Truth when th ey  
are in  error . G a lile o  fo r  in sta n c e s  had no moral duty to
inform  p eop le  about th e  movements o f th e  sun.
1 ) T herefore a tta c k s  l ik e  t h is  are m orally  m y s t i f i e d :  "The
c r it e r io n  o f  r ig h t  conduct ( fo r  such p eop le) becomes not 
i t s  u lt im a te  e f f e c t  on human happiness but i t s  e f f e c t  on 
th em se lves , on th e ir  own s a n c t i t iy .  There i s  a f r a n t ic  
d e s ir e  to  escape person al d e filem en t even i f  th e  cause i s  
to  be b etrayed ."  J . Lewis: The P hilosophy o f  B etra y a l."
p .  5 .
369
To produce good fo r  th e  world by u sin g  o n e s e lf  as a 
means i s  thus a p r iv i le g e  not a duty. As such i t  i s  perm itted  
though not required^^. To produce good fo r  th e world a t th e  
expense o f u sin g  somebody e ls e  as a means i s  a moral crim e.
I t  may be req u ired  but i t  i s  not p erm itted . No .m atter how 
d e s ir a b le  th e  r e s u l t ,  I have no moral r ig h t  to  u se o th er  p eop le  
as means fo r  th e  b e n e f it  o f  y e t  o th er p eo p le , or even fo r  - 
t h e ir  own, fo r  example by s a c r i f ic in g  th e ir  happmness to th e ir  
moral p e r fe c t io n , e tc .
In other words I have no r ig h t  to  fo r c e  o th er  p eop le  to  
accep t my id ea  o f th e  good, nor have I a r ig h t  to  d ec id e  fo r  
them, what i s  and what i s  not good, even i f  th e  good in  q u estion  
be V irtu e  and th e moral p e r fe c t io n  o f  man, or th e  sa lv a t io n  o f
1) The duty to  d ie  fo r  o n e 's  country i s  n ot a p r iv i le g e ,  nor 
a moral duty. I t  i s  a co n tra ctu a l duty. The c i t i z e n  who 
enjoys th e  am en ities  and p r o te c tio n  o f  a country has an 
o b lig a t io n  tod efen d  th a t country in  ca se  i t  i s  th rea ten ed .
He a lso  has a duty to  abide by th e  laws o f th a t  country, 
v iz  "Consider then S ocrates^  th e  law s perhaps might say"
. . .  we having g iven  you b ir th , nurtured and in s tr u c te d  you 
and having im parted to  you and a l l  o th er  c i t i z e n s  a l l  th e  
good in  our power, s t i l l  proclaim  . . . .  th a t anyone who i s  
not s a t i s f i e d  w ith  us may tak e h is  property  and go wherever 
he p le a se s  . . . .  But whoever adntinues w ith  us a f t e r  he has 
seen  th e  manner in  which we ad m in ister  j u s t ic e  and govern  
th e  c i t y ,  we now say th a t he has in  fa c t  en tered  in to  a 
compact w ith  u s , to  do what we order, and we a ffirm  tlia t  
he who does not obey us who gave him b ir th , and because  
he does not obey us who nurtured him, and because having  
made a compact th a t he would obey us he n e ith e r  does so 
nor does he persuade us i f  we do anything w rongly, though 
• we propose fo r  'his c o n s id e r a tio n , and do not r ig id ly  command
(Continued on next page)
370
h is  s o u l. The re sp ec t fo r  o th er  p e o p le 's  persons and th e ir  
f r e e  ch o ice  th e r e fo r e  must stop  a l l  my s in c e r e s t  e f fo r t s  , 
fo r  th e ir  good: The re sp e c t fo r  th e ir  persons o b lig e s  me t o -
se e  them err , and s in ,  w ithout in te r fe r in g  as lon g  as they  
in  t h e ir  turn do not in te r f e r e  w ith  o th e r s . "Man" as Kant 
sa id  "must be a llow ed  to  work out h is  own sa lv a tio n "  in  h is   ^
own way, in  h is  own tim e . However, i f  i t  g iv e s  me joy  to  
serv e  th e  common ends o f  h im anity I am p e r f e c t ly  f r e e  to  do 
so as long as i t  i s  c le a r ly  understood th a t  such s e r v ic e  
e n t i t l e s  not to  tr e sp a ss  a g a in st th e  l i b e r t i e s ,  which in c lu d es  
th e  l ib e r t y  to  err , o f  th o se  whom I claim  to  serv e: "Ideal
m ora lity  tran scen d s j u s t ic e  but does n ot a b o lish  it^ ^ " .
To sum up: As th e  very essen ce  o f  moral o b lig a t io n  i s
a vo lu n tary  s e l f - l i p i t a t i o n  in  th e  p u rsu it  o f  ends ( i . e .  
good)moral o b lig a t io n  can not be turned to  th e  a c t iv e  p u rsu it vv 
o f  c e r ta in  ends ( i . e .  p o s i t iv e  d u t ie s ) .  Moral o b lig a t io n
(C on tin u ation  o f  fo o tn o te  from p rev iou s page):
him to  do what we order, but le a v e  him th e  ch o ice  o f  one 
o f  two th in g s  e ith e r  to  persuade us or to  do what'we 
r e q u ir e . . ."  C r ito . 15. Should however h is  co n tra ctu a l 
duty s la sh  wit^i h is  moral duty, he i s  fr e e  to  fo llo w  th e  
c a l l  o f  m o r a lity . Even s o ld ie r s  have a r ig h t  to  r e fu se  • 
commands which are " i l le g a l"  because o f  th e ir  inhum anity. 
T his i s  th e  p rer o g a tiv e  o f  th e  human person as such p reserv ­
ed in  a l l  subsequent engagements.
1) W. D. Lament: P r in c ip le s  o f  moral judgement; p .179#
For id e a l  m o ra lity  read im perfedt or p o s i t iv e  d u t ie s ,  fo r  
j u s t i c e ,  p e r fe c t  or n e g a tiv e  d u t ie s .
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must not be p ressed  in to  a s e r v ic e  fo r  which by th e  nature  
o f  th in g s  i t  i s  not s u ite d . I f  n e v e r th e le s s  v/e fo r c e  i t  
to  accom plish th o se  th in g s  which i t  must not a sp ir e  to  accompUsb 
we may in a d v e r te n tly  be le d  to  th e  most t e r r ib le  o f a b erra tio n s,
* I
Moral fa n a tic ism  because o f  i t s  accompanying s e l f - r ig h t e o u s ­
n ess (c o n sc ie n c e  bgging on th e  deed in s te a d  o f  serv in g  as a 
brake i s  a most dangerous phenomenon: "Der Trieb zur k a lten
b lu tig e n  Grausamlceit t r i t t  unüer den Hero en der W eltgesch ich te  
8 e l  ten  k ra sser  hervor a ls  b e i Gruendern von Tug ends t  aat en . 
R ein ste  und a b s tr a k te s te  P flich feiora l, h o ech ster  s i t t l i c h e r  
Id e a lism u s's in d  d ie  L e i t z i e l e  C alvins und R ob esp ierres.
Weshalb b lic k e n  s i e  so m uerrisch und f in s te r ?  Weshalb stleht 
der Henker izmner neb en ihnen? S ie  s in d  d ie  gross  en Maenner 
d ie  das Koepfen in  e in  System gebracht haben, S ie  haben
Hekatomben bluehender Menschen auf dem A ltar  der Tug end g e -
*
s c h la c h te t ,  d ie  uebrigen  verb /annt oder w ie im Zuchthaus 
gezwaengt und geq u aelt -  a l l é s  in  Namen des Gut en . 1 s t  
denn das Gute n ic h t Guete? Sobald das Gute mehr zu s e in
/
s tr e b t  a ls  G uete, und das M oralische mehr às was feich immer
. /
von s e lb s t  v e r s t e h t ' ,  sobald  aendert es s e in e  Triebgrund- 
lagen  . . .  Sobald d ie  Moral e in en gew issen  Punkt u e b e r s te ig t  
w ird s i e  zur P e r v e r s io n " ^ \
1 ) N. Kretschmer: G en ia le  Menschen, p . 38.
■ ) ^ 
■(
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The treatm ent o f  Man remains th e  u lt im a te  t e s t  fo r  any
a c t io n  which cla im s moral m e r it . E th ics  knows no g rea ter
purpose, no h igher v a lu e  than man. "La personne humaine
e s t  p lu s  qu'un va leu r  meme un v a le u r ,de prem iere rang, e l l e
a r b itr e  to u te s  l e  v a leu rs e t  c ' e s t  son a r b itr a g e , son
incom m ensurabilité avec une v a leu r  quelconque, son re fu s  de
1 )se  m ettre sur l e  marche . . .  qu’on appelé sa  d ig n ité"
M o r a lity 's  ta sk  i s  to  safeguard  man and h is  d ig n ity , ' 
from a l l  in te r fe r e n c e , a l l  attem pt to  v io la t e  them in  any way. 
The concepts o f  'man' and h is  d ig n ity '  show m ainly th e ir  
forb id d in g  a sp ect in  E th ic s . They op erate on ly  as warning 
boards on which th e  words 'T resp assers w i l l  be p ro sec u te d ', 
are w r it te n  c le a r ly  fo r  a l l  to  s e e .  T his i s  th e  s e c r e t  o f
th e ir  moral pwwer. . .  And both th e  s e c r e t  and th e  power are
\’
l o s t  when breaking through th e  se lf- im p o se d  a u s te r ity ,  th ey  
seek  to  in s p ir e  p o s i t iv e  a c t io n , a ff ir m â tory deeds. The on ly  
p o s it iv e  a c t io n  th e  concept o f  th e  d ig n ity  o f man cou ld  in s p ir e  
( th e  on ly  way in  which i t  m a n ifests  i t s e l f  p o s i t iv e ly )  i s  " 
th e  form ulation  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l im p erative in  th e  second  
form ulation : "Never adt so th a t by th y  a c t  thour sh o u ld st
u se  a human fe l lo w , being as a means a lon e" . But on th e
1) R. Bertrand: V aleurs et v é r i t é s  tr a n s u b je c t iv e s , p .171*
•2-)— above-p'# 228 -
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memorable o cca sio n  when t h is  happened Kant f a i l e d  to  id e n t i fy  
i t  (a  supreme ir o n y !)  as th e  source o f  h is  in sp ir a t io n  nor 
did  he r e a l i s e  th e  tremendous consequences fo r  h is  system  o f  
. e th ic s^ ^ . What Kant acquired in  th a t " eru p tive  in tu it io n "  
o f  which Otto speaks i s  noth ing l e s s  than th e  causa iu r i s  and 
th e  causa r e a l i s  o f th e  c a te g o r ic a l im p erative; th e  exp lan at­
io n  o f th e  in e x p lic a b le :  th e  exp lan ation  o f how a c a te g o r ic a l
im p erative i s  p o s s ib le  and why i t  i s  v a l id .  Moreover g iv e n ' 
th e  concept o f human d ig n ity  ( i . e .  man as an end in  i t s e l f ,  
a person commanding r e sp e c t)  in  th e  con crete  w holeness o f h is  
e x is te n c e  th e  c a te g o r ic a l im p erative i s  no lon ger an empty 
formula and th e  dangers concom itant to  i t s  empty fo r m a lity  
which we have d iscu ssed  a t such len g th  above, are com p letely  
e lim in a ted . The c a te g o r ic a l im p erative  has acquired  a 
co n crete  m ater ia l co n ten t, but i t s  'c a te g o r ic a l '  ch aracter  
i s  not im paired th ereb y . For t h i s  con tent i s  u n iv e r s a lly ,  
c a te g o r ic a l ly  v a l id  i t s e l f ,  and i t  can be regarded as th e  
' end' o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l im p erative on ly  in  th e  very  sp e c ia l  
sen se  o f  a l im it in g  end, an end which must never be v io la te d .  
The good w i l l  r e ta in s  i t s  autonomous, f r e e ,  and d is in te r e s te d  
ch a ra c ter . I t  remains i t s  own nomothe tos determ ining i t s e l f  
by th e  bare id ea  o f  moral r ig h tn e s s , w ith  th e  s o le  d is t in c t io n  
th a t th e  id ea  o f moral r ig h tn e ss  i s  no lon ger  th e  rep resen t­
a tio n  o f  law as such, but th e id ea  o f  man as a being endowed
9 oiy ÙJ1
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w ith  d ig n ity  and commanding r e s p e c t . The good w i l l  thus - ■
i
acq u ires a co n crete  d e f in i t e  end, but n e v e r th e le ss  p reserves  ^
th e  s p e c i f ic  manner o f  m otivation  which provided th e  i n i t i a l  , 4 
d e f in i t io n  o f  i t s  goodness, s in c e  t h i s  end i s  on ly  a l im it in g  , 
a r e g u la t iv e  end. The v a l id i t y  o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l im p erative  
r e s t s  on th e  u n con d ition a l v a l id i t y  o f  i t s  u lt im a te  ground. -^ -
(th e  d ig n ity  o f  th e  human p e r so n ). The u n con d ition a l v a l id i t y  
o f t h is  ground, however, i s  as we have seen  assured  by p o s tu la te .  
Now, i f  th e  p ro p o s it io n  " a l l  men qua men are endowed vfith  
d ign ity"  i s  u n c o n d itio n a lly  a n d o b je c tiv e ly  v a lid ^ ^ , then th e  
command to  r e sp e c t  t h i s  dignitr}^ and never m isuse fo llo w s  from 
i t  and i s  j u s t i f i e d  by i t .  The a p p lic a t io n  o f  t h is  ca t ego r -  -
i c a l  im p erative no lon ger  fo llo w s  th e  scheme o f  s e le c t in g  Vf
" '1
f e r  a c t io n  th o se  among our maxims which p resen tin g  th em selves j  
to  our a tte n t io n  in  th e  f i r s t  p la c e  on th e  prompting o f  our 
n atu ra l d e s ir e s  prove th em selves f i t  to  serv e  as th e  maxims 
o f  a u n iv e r sa l l e g i s l a t i o n ,  but s e l e c t  fo r  a c t io n  th o se  among 
our maxims which b e s t  comply w ith  th e c a te g o r ic a l  demand to  
r e sp e c t th e d ig n ity  o f  man and never to  m isuse i t .
Thus th e  concept o f  th e  "D ign ity  o f Man" in  i t s  u n iv e rsa l  
v a l id i t y ,  con crete  o f  co n ten t, and th e  upper end amongst a l l  
ends, th e  Supreme V alue, i s  th e  c o n s t i tu t iv e  elem ent o f  E th ic s ,
1 ) t h i s  co n d itio n  i s  f u l f i l l e d  thanks to  the p o s tu la te .
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i t s  s o le  n ecessa ry  b a s is .  But i t  always rem ains a l im it  
imposed on our n atu ra l p u r su its  and p u rp oses, never a purpose 
in  i t s e l f .  Though i t  i s . t h e  c o n s t i t u t iv e  elem ent o f  e t h ic s ,  
i t  i s  ^0 not i n ' i t s  p u rp osive c a p a c ity , i . e .  in  i t s  fu n c tio n  
o f  'good ' but in  i t s  l im it in g  r e g u la t iv e  c a p a c ity , i . e .  in  
i t s  fu n c tio n  o f  ' r i g h t ' .
The c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tive  d e fin ed  by th e " c o n s t itu t iv e  
n o tio n  o f  E th ic s  now runs: " V io la te  not th e  d ig n ity  o f  man
in  any human b ein g  a t any tim e and/or any accoun t."  Tlis
c a te g o r ic a l  im p erative  i s  however tantamount to  a demand
*
fo r  th e  Supremacy o f  the.-Maral Values oyer a l l !  o th er  v a lu e s .  
The moral v a lu e  fo r  which t h i s  Supremacy i s  demanded, i s  th e  
' D ig n ity  o f  Man as an upper l im i t  to  th e  p u r su it  o f  a l l  ends, 
i . e .  in  i t s  fu n c tio n  o f  r i g h t . The n o tio n  o f  r ig h t  i s  th u s  
v in d ic a te d  as th e  on ly  n ecessa ry  b a s is  fo r  E th ic s  and t h i s  
has been dem onstrated by an a n a ly s is  o f  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  and 
im p lic a t io n s  o f  our d a ily  moral exp er ien ce  w ith ou t recou rse  
to  any h eterogen eou s h y p o th eses .
The whole e d i f i c e  è f  E th ic s  i s  thus shown to  r e s t  on a 
p r in c ip le  which we a lso  d isc o v er  as th e  u lt im a te  cause o f  our 
moral ex p er ien ce , th e  ground which makes t h i s  exp erien ce  both  
i n t e l l i g i b l e  and v a l id .  Ttns ground i s  th e  p r o p o s it io n  " a l l
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men qua men are endowed w ith  d ig n ity " . And t h i s  p r o p o s it io n
\  '
i s  a f r e e  and g r a tu ito u s  p o s tu la te ,  v in d ic a te d  by i t s  f r e e  ' 
and gredaituous a c c e p ta tio n .
The q u estion  as to  th e  v a l id i t y  o f  t h i s  postrJLate i t s e l f  
i s  th e r e fo r e  in d ic a te d , n ot in deed  in  th e  sen se  th a t i t s  
v a l id i t y  as th e  u lt im a te  ground o f  moral exp erien ce  a lread y  
im p lied  in  th e  data o f  moral exp erien ce  can be questioned^^ y 
but in  th e  sen se  th a t  th e  v a l id i t y  o f moral exp erien ce  i t s e l f  
can be q u estio n ed . In o th er  words th e  in t r in s i c  s ig n if ic a n c e  
o f  moral exp er ien ce  i t s e l f  can be q u estion ed  in  comparison y  ■ 
v/ith  th e  im p lic a tio n s  o f  r e l ig io u s  exp er ien ce  or o f  m axim alist 
exp er ien ce  fo r  example. That i s ,  though th e  v a l id i t y  o f  
moral exp er ien ce  i s  always and e n t ir e ly  based on th e  accep tan ce  
o f  th e  p o s tu la te  o f  th e  in t r in s ic  d ig n ity  o f th e  human p erson , 
th e r e  i s  no r a t io n a l  or p r a c t ic a l  n e c e s s i t y  to  accep t th a t  
p o s tu la te ,  i . e .  to  make th e  requirem ents o f m o ra lity  th e  
lo a d s ta r  o f  o n e 's  l i f e .
As a m atter o f  f a c t  both i t  ancjthey can be r e je c te d  
w ith ou t s e l f - c o n tr a d ic t io n  and l i f e  i s  p o s s ib le  w ith ou t ,
them.
1 ) Which o b v io u sly  i t  cannot.
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The unanswerable q u estio n  o f  E th ics  i s  th e r e fo r e  not 
'how reason  can be p r a c t ic a l  or freedom p o s s ib le ? '  but v/hy 
t h i s  p r a c t ic a l  reason , and p o s s ib le  freedom should  be used  
to  p o s tu la te  th e  d ig n ity  o f  th e  human person , and impose i t  
as a l im it in g  r e p r e s s iv e  in f lu e n c e  on i t s e l f .  The q u estio n ­
ab le  sy n th e s is  o f EtTmcs i s  th e  one between th e  p o s tu la te  and 
th e  reason ab le  w i l l  and reason  which i s  im p lied  in  a l l  human 
a c t io n s . In o th er  words n ot th e  v a l id i t y  ( i . e .  th e  i l l u s o r i -  
ness^^) o f  moral exp erien ce  stan d s to  q u estio n  but the v a l id ­
i t y  o f  i t s  c o n te n t, th e  le g it im a c y  o f  th e  im p lied  demands and 
r e s t r ic t io n s  on h-uman?freedom, stan d  to  q u e stio n .
Also to  q u estio n  stan d s whether th e  n o tio n  o f  r ig h t  
by i t s e l f ,  though v in d ic a te d  as th e s o le  n ecessa ry  b a s is  o f  
e t h ic s ,  can a ls o  be regarded as com p lete ly  s u f f i c i e n t  fo r  th e  
form u la tion  o f  a com plete e th ic a l  system . That i s ,  whether 
in  order to  a ch iev e  such a com plete and s e l f  con ta in ed  moral 
system , i t  w i l l  not be n ecessa ry  to  add to  th e  supremum bonum 
( i . e .  moral p e r fe c t io n  founded on th e  n o tio n  o f  ' r ig h t ' )  
th o se  th in g s  which make up th e  consummatum bonum i . e .  'v a lu e s '
1) The i l lu s o r in e s s  o f  moral exp er ien ce  i s  d isproved  by th e  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  and d i s t in c t l y  moral ch aracter  o f  i t s  con­
s t i t u t i v e  n o tio n  and ground th e  concept o f  th e  d ig n ity  
o f  man. T his concept i s  a d i s t i n c t l y  and s p e c i f i c a l ly  
moral concept which cannot be reduced to any elem ents  
o r ig in a t in g  from o th er  domains.
3 7 8
and 'g o o d 's  l i k e  h a p p in ess , su c c e s s , m a ter ia l p o s s e s s io n s ,  
e t c .
Both q u estio n s  must be postponed t i l l  our n ext ch ap ter . 
For th e  moment, we must f i r s t  sum up what we have le a r n t  
c o n s t i tu te s  th e  nature o f  'r ig h t* .
Some R e f le c t io n s  on th e  Nature o f  E ight
From th e se  var iou s en q u ir ie s  in to  and r e f le c t io n s  on 
th e  fu n c tio n  o f  R ight in  E th ic s , emerges in  r e tr o sp e c t  a 
f a i r l y  c le a r  id ea  o f  what i t  i s  th a t  i s  meant by 'R ig h t ' .
By r e f le c t in g  on v;hat e x a c t ly  i t  was th a t  was demanded when 
th e  concept o f  'r ig h t '  in  c o n tr a d is t in c t io n  from th e  concept 
o f  'good' was used  in  moral judgements the s p e c i f i c  fe a tu r e s  
and q u a l i t ie s  o f  th e  'r ig h t*  were g ra d u a lly  assem bled. By 
co n sid er in g  th e  way in  which i t  a f fe c te d  th e  'g o o d ', and th e  
r e la t io n s  th ereb y  e s ta b lis h e d , both between i t s e l f  and th e  
'g o o d ', and between i t s e l f ,  th e  good and moral judgem ents,
-  th e  manner, e x te n t , and l im i t s  in  which i t  o p era tes .have 
been d e lin e a te d . The manner in  which th e  'R igh t' o p e r a te s , 
i s  i t s e l f  an in t r in s ic  qualit^^ (though secondary) and s p e c i f i c  
q u a lity  o f  th e  concept o f  R ig h t. As Renee Bertrand says :
"une essen ce  ou b ien  n 'e s t  qu'un nom ou b ien  se  reco n n a it a 
l a  m aniéré dont e l l e  s tr u c tu r e  l e s  ch oses e t  l e s  a c t io n  dont 
e l l e  " f a i t  l o i " t he  b e s t  perhaps th e  on ly  way in  which
1) Renee Bertrand: V aleurs e t V elites transub j e c t iv e s  ;
Revue de M etaphysique e t de l a  M orale; Ju ly  194-1, p . 166.
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to  d isc o v er  th e  nature o f so in ta n g ib le  an unneasurable  ^
a q u a lity  as 'r ig h t*  was to  con sid er  i t s  ta n g ib le  and measurable 
e f f e c t s .  That i s ,  i f  and in so fa r  as th e  e f f e c t s  in  q u estion  
' can th em selves be sa id  to  be ta n g ib le  and m easurable^^. Now 
th e se  e f f e c t s  are met w ith  p r im a r ily , and reco g n ised  in  th e  
v e r d ic t s  o f  moral judgem ents. An enquiry in to  th e  fu n c tio n  
o f  'r ig h t '  in  moral judgements seems th e r e fo r e  v in d ic a te d  as 
a validdand  le g it im a te ' way o f  d e te c t in g  th e  n atu re o f  th e  
' r ig h t  *. ,
Ndw, th e  moral v e r d ic t  o f  'r ig h t '  r e s t s s in  th e  l a s t  /  , i
■ instance on a t e s t  o f accordance or non accordance w ith  a 
law . T his law we have found to  be more or l e s s  id en tica l^ ^  /
: ■ . V *
w ith  K ant's second form ula o f  th e  c a te g o r ic a l  im p era tiv e , and p 
to  ruh ( in  a p r o v is io n a l form) : "Never by any a c t in fr in g e  ' 1
th e  d ig n ity  o f  o th er  men, by u sin g  them not as ends in  them­
s e lv e s  but as mere means". The u lt im a te  ground fo r  t h i s  law  y
1 ) The 'good' fo r  in s ta n c e  i s  more ta n g ib le ,  more m easurable.
I t  a llo w s d eg rees, en ters  in to  com bin ation s, in c r e a s e s ,  
e v o lv e s , p r o g r e s se s . The R ight i s  e ith e r  com plete and 
p e r f e c t ,  or non e x is t e n t .  There are no d eg rees . Combin­
a t io n s  are im p o ssib le : th e  s i tu a t io n  i s  e ith e r  dominated
by the' R igh t, or devoid  o f R igh t. I t  adm its o f  no in c r e a s e ,  
no p ro g re ss , no betterm ent or indeed  anyfehange w h atsoever.
I t  i s  th e r e fo r e  very hard to  dem onstrate i t s  a c tu a l p resen ce .
2) As Samuel C larke p o in ted  out in  a p assage I  have a lread y  
quoted in  another connedtion  i f  th e  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  th e  
n o tio n  o f  R ight are not always ta n g ib le  in  men's d e e d s , . 
and even c o n sc ie n c e s , a t l e a s t  th ey  are always p resen t  
in  men's judgements o f  o th er  men's d eed s.
5) I have om itted  th e  r e fe r e n c e  to  th e  I :  i . e .  one must not 
u se o n e s e lf  as a means, because I have argued t h i s  to  be 
an erroneous ex ten sio n  o f  th e  moral law to  th e  in ner  
sphere o f  a person and moral law to  have no s ig n if ic a n c e  
and no v a l id i t y  in  t h i s  in n er  sp here. /
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i s  th e  p o s tu la te d  p r o p o s t it io n :  "A ll men-qua-men are
p o sse sse d  o f d ig n ity " . "Right" w i l l  be th e  v e r d ic t  on every  
a c t io n  th a t  accords w ith  th e  law; "Wrong" on every a c t io n  ' ■  ^
th a t  d isreg a rd s i t .  As th e  law can be e ith e r  r e sp e c ted  or 
d isd a in ed  but not p a r t ly  accep ted  in  an a c t io n , th e r e  can"be 
no in term ed ia te  grades between 'right#* and 'w rong'. R ight 
i s  th e r e fo r e  e ith e r  consummate and p e r f e c t ,  or n o n -e x is te n t:  
'r ig h t '  i s  a b s o lu te . Again, s in c e  an a c t io n  cannot in  p art 
accord  w ith  th e  law and in  p art r e j e c t  i t ,  but must be e n t ir e ­
l y  in  accord w ith  th e  law , or e n t ir e ly  a g a in st  i t ,  r ig h t  i s  " 
i n d i v i s i b l e . S im ila r ly  a n 'a c t io n  cannot accord w ith  th e  law  
in  some r e sp e c t and not in  o th e r s , but must a lto g e th e r  and ' 
w h olly  accord w ith  th e  law . 'R ig h t ' is  th e r e fo r e  t o t a l . , 
The 'r ig h t '  in  sh o r t , e ith e r  dom inates a s i tu a t io n  or does 
not dominate i t ;  tertiu m  non datu r. I t  i s  th e r e fo r e  f ix e d ^^  
and f ix e d  u n e q u iv o ca lly , immutably. S in ce  th ere  i s  on ly  
one law and th e  law must be com p lete ly  accep ted  so as to  
dominate th e  a c t io n  w hatever i t s  co n ten t (m a ter ia l maxim).
1 ) I t  i s  indeed  a l i t t l e  l i k e  th a t  northern  s t a r .
"of whose tr u e  f ix e d  and r e s t in g  q u a lity  
th e r e  i s  no f e l lo w  in  th e  firmament 
The s k ie s  are p a in ted  w ith  un-numbered sp ark s, ,
They a l l  are f in e  and everyone doth sh in e;
But th e r e 's  but one in  a l l  doth h o ld  h is  p la c e .
Juljlfe Caesar -  1 1 1 ,1 .* • I '
'I
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th e  i n f i n i t e  v a r ie ty  o f  th e se  co n ten ts  i s  not r e f le c t e d  in  
th e  v e r d ic t ,  which pays a t te n t io n  on ly  to  th e  dom ination or 
non dom ination o f  a l l  co n ten ts  by th e  law . 'Right* i s  th e r e ­
fo r e  c h a n g e le ss , on e. F in a lly  s in c e  th e  a c t io n  i s  adjudged  
on account o f  i t s  accordance w ith  th e  law , and on ly  on account 
o f t h i s  accordance th e  r ig h t  i s  a lso  e x c lu s iv e . The 'm orally  
r i g h t ' we can conclude i s  e x c lu s iv e , one, t o t a l ,  in d iv i s ib l e ,  
and a b so lu te . A ll th e se  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  are e s s e n t ia l  to  
th e  ' r i g h t ' s in c e  th e absence o f  any orLe o f  them would d iv e s t  
i t  o f  i t s  q u a lity  o f  ' r i g h t ' .  A ll th e se  q u a l i t i e s  can be 
p red ica ted  o f  th e  moral law i t s e l f ,  on th e  form al ground th a t  
i t  accords w ith  i t s e l f ,  but more s ig n i f i c a n t ly  because th e  
moral law i s  th e  p e r fe c t  r e a l i s a t io n  o f  a l l  th a t  i s  im p lied  
by th e  a s s e r t io n  o f  th e  p o s tu la t e .  The s p e c i f i c  q u a lity  
o f  th e  moral law i s  th a t  i t  i s  "right"^ The m a ter ia l and 
e f f e c t iv e  cause o f  th e  e x is te n c e  o f th e  moral law and th e  
ground o f  i t s  r ig h tn e s s  i s  as we have seen  th e  b a s ic  moral 
p o s tu la te :  "A ll men-qua-men are p o sse ssed  o f  d ig n ity " .
A ll th e  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  ennumerated: e x c lu s iv e n e s s , on en ess,
t o t a l i t y ,  i n d i v i s i b i l i t y ,  and a b so lu te n e ss  can be p red ica ted
I
o f th e  p o s tu la t e .  But th e  p o s tu la te  i s  not ' r i g h t ' because  
o f th e s e  q u a l i f ic a t io n s ,  but p r io r  to  and apart from them. - 
The ground o f  i t s  moral r ig h tn e ss  l i e s  in  i t s e l f  and cannot 
be fu r th e r  j u s t i f i e d  or v in d ic a te d . The moral p o s tu la te  i s
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th e  l a s t  and ir r e d u c ib le  ground o f  a l l  moral r ig h tn e ss  and •:
i t  must be accep ted  as such, or r e je c te d  as su ch .
The Autonomy o f  E th ic s  cannot be m aintained u n le ss  t h i s  •
p o s tu la te  be regarded as th e  non p lu s  u lt r a  ground o f - a l l  /
moral judgem ents. The r e je c t io n  o f t h i s  p o s tu la te  as th e  y
1 ) :u lt im a te  ir r e d u c ib le  ground o f a l l  moral r ig h tn e ss  o f  
n e c e s s i t y  le a d s  to  Heteronomy. To sum up: O neness, t o t a l i t y ,
e x c lu s iv e n e s s , i n d i v i s i b i l i t y  and a b so lu ten ess  are th e r e fo r e  ' ' 
e s s e n t ia l  i . e .  in d isp e n sa b le  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  o f  th e  concept , 
o f  'R igh t* . But th ey  are on ly  form al, i . e .  s tr u c tu r a l  
q u a l i f i d a tio n s , which can be p red ica ted  ju s t  as v a l id ly  o f  ‘ 
l o g ic a l  or a r ith m e tic a l ' r ig h t n e s s ' .  They ga in  th e ir  f u l l  
moral s ig n if ic a n c e  on ly  when c lu s te r e d  around th e  co n crete  
core o f  th e  moral p o s tu la te ,  on ly  when r e fe r r e d  to  th e  m a ter ia l 
con ten t o f  th a t  p o s tu la te .  The c o n s t i t u t iv e  and d e c is iv e  
q u a lity  o f  th e  m orally  r ig h t ,  i s  th e r e fo r e  i t s  r e fe r e n c e  to  , ' 
th e  moral p o s tu la te . A ll o th er  q u a l i t i e s  might p o s s ib ly  
have been in fe r r e d  from th e  concept o f  'Right* i t s e l f .  The ' " 
l a s t  had to  be fu rn ish ed  by moral ex p er ien ce , s y n t h e t ic a l ly .
I
I t  i s  th e r e fo r e  p o s s ib le  to  r e j e c t  t h is  p art w ith ou t v i t i a t in g
1th e  a b str a c t s tr u c tu r e  o f th e  'r ig h t '   ^ but not w ith ou t  
d estro y in g  th e  'm ora lly  r ig h t '  s in c e  th e  r e je c t io n  o f  t h i s  
p art i s  th e  r e je c t io n  o f  m o ra lity  i t s e l f .
1 ) Every law , every v a lu e ,w ith o u t ex cep tio n , e s ta b l is h e s  a 
sphere o f  "right" as i t s  em anation. But not every .law  or va lu e  
e s ta b l is h e s  a moral sphere v iz  th e  a lread y  c ite d :  "That which  
promotes th e  N ation a l S o c ia l i s t  movement and Germany i s .r ig h t I "
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In our co n s id e ra tio n  o f  moral judgements we have found
f. ; .
th a t t h e ir  fu n c tio n s  in  moral exp erien ce in c lu d e , b e s id e s  
th e  pronouncem ent'of moral v e r d ic t s ,  in ju n c t io n s  and demands 
addressed  to  th e human w i l l .  Moral judgements th en , express  
moral ob ligations as w e ll as moral v e r d ic t s .  Moral o b lig a t io n  - 
i s  th e  demand th a t th e  human w i l l  submit a l l  i t s  purposive y
:":y
a c tio n s  to  th e  tou ch ston e o f  th e  moral law . The human w i l l  xs
•ti
which com plies w ith  i t s  moral o b lig a t io n s  a c ts  r ig h t ly .  I t /  
i s  t ig h t '  to  f u l f i l l  o n e 's  moral o b l ig a t io n s ,  to  comply w ith
A'
th e ir  demands.
The demand expressed  in  moral o b lig a t io n s  i s  a c a te g o r ic a l  
th a t i s  an u n co n d itio n a l and a b so lu te  demand addressed  to  
a l l  human w i l l s  w ithout ex cep tio n , a t a l l  t im e s . I t  en jo in s  
every s in g le  human w i l l  ( i . e .  every  s in g le  human person) 
to  l im i t ,  or g iv e  up a l l  i t s  ends and purposes, to  suppress 
or d isregard  a l l  i t s  d e s ir e s , in c l in a t io n s 'a n d  m otives when' 
and in so fa r  a s  th ey  do not accord w ith  th e  moral law . T his 
demand i s  c a te g o r ic a l fo r  i t  ta k es account on ly  o f  th e  o b lig a t io n  
expressed  in  th e  moral law 'never to  m isuse th e  d ig n ity  o f  
a human b e in g ’ . I t  d isregard s a l l  th e  co n crete  d eterm in ations  
o f th e  w i l le d  a c t io n :  ( I t s  m otiv es , p urposes, ends and probable
con seq u en ces), 'a ll c irc u m sta n tia l v a r ia t io n s :  (How i t  i s
performed i . e .  whether i t  i s  performed f r e e ly  or under d u ress,
by whom i t  i s  perform ed, when and w here); a l l  th e  cau sa l
\
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conaaqqiiencé o f th e  a c tio n  ( i . e .  how th e  changes wrought in  
th e  s itu a t io n  by a com pliance w ith  the c a te g o r ic a l demand work 
out in  th e  end). The c a te g o r ic a l im p erative i s  th e  demand ' 
th a t th e  human w i l l  be e f f e c t iv e ly ,  f i n a l ly ,  d e c is iv e ly ,  ' ' <
u n c o n d itio n a lly  and w ithout ex cep tio n , i . e .  u n iv e r s a lly ,  
determ ined by i t s e l f ,  in  a l l  p e r t in e n t a c t io n s , i . e .  in  a l l  
a c tio n  a f fe c t in g  oth er p eo p le . The c a te g o r ic a l im p erative  
cla im s an u n co n d itio n a l, u n iv e r sa l, o b je c t iv e  v a l id i t y  fo r  
i t s e l f ,  s in c e  what i t  commands i s  th e  u n co n d itio n a l, u n iv e r sa l, 
o b je c t iv e  v a l id i t y  o f  th e  moral law . NoW i t  i s  'r igh t*  
th a t the moral lav/ should  be v a l id  fo r  a l l  persons a t a l l  
t im e s . The e s s e n t ia l  fe a tu r e  o f th e  m orally  'r ig h t '  in  i t s  
second sen se  we can now sum up i s  th  e e l  aim i t  puts forward
, .'w
fo r  u n c o n d itio n a l, o b je c t iv e ,  u n iv e rsa l v a l id i t y ,  i . e . '  a f i a t1
j u s t i t i a  . . .  The w i l l  ought to  be determ ined by th e  moral law
I
1) Whenever and whereever i t  may be: u n iv e r s a lly
( '
2 ) r e g a r d le ss  o f  consequences and circum stances ) uncon-
) d it io n -
3 ) re g a rd le ss  o f  m otives and purposes • ) a l l y .
4) r e g a r d le ss  o f  th e  q u a lity  o f th e  p e r s o n a li t ie s
in vo lved : im p a r t ia lly , o b je c t iv e ly .
The r ig h t  i s  by i t s  very nature v a l id  alw ays, fo r  every­
body e f f e c t iv e ly ,  u n c o n d itio n a lly , i . e .  i t s  v a l id i t y  i s
■ )
u n iv ersa l ,  o b j e c t iv e , a b so lu te . T his i s  but another form al, 
s tr u c tu r a l q u a l i f ic a t io n  o f  th e r ig h t  as such which a lso  holds
fo r  what i s  'r ig h t '  in  lo g ic s  or in  a r ith m e tic s . The s p e c i f i c
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and d i s t in c t iv e  fe a tu r e  o f  th e  m orally  r ig h t  i s  th a t i t  con fers  
t h i s  v a l id i t y  on th e  con crete  con tent o f th e  moral p o s tu la te  
( i . e .  on th e  d ig n ity  o f  th e  human p erso n .)  This i t  can do 
in  two ways: F ir s t  in so fa r  as a w i l l  by a f r e e  and u ncond ition -,
a l d e c is io n  has accepted  th e  b a s ic  p o s tu la te  and a l l  i t s  
im p lic a t io n s , i . e .  what i s  m orally  r ig h t  i s  u n c o n d itio n a lly , 
u n iv e r s a l ly ,  o b je c t iv e ly  v a lie d  fo r  t h i s  w i l l .  Secondly  
i t  proclaim s th e  u n co n d itio n a l, u n iv e r s a l, o b je c t iv e  V a lid ity  
o f  th e p o s tu la te  fo r  a l l  w i l l s :  i . e .  i t  d ec la re s  th e  demand
th a t every human person w ithout excep tion  should choose to  
accep t the b a s ic  p o s tu la te  as a moral o b lig a t io n : even i f
th e  p o s tu la te  i t s e l f  has not accom plished t h i s  fo r  i t s e l f .
T his demand i s  s t r i c t l y  speaking not d e fin a b le  in  th e  e th ic a l  
domain s in c e  i t  i s  not grounded in  th e  p o s tu la te , and cannot 
th e r e fo r e  be j u s t i f i e d  or v in d ica ted  on moral grounds, except 
in d ir e c t ly  as i t  commands in  th e ir  name, and d er iv es  i t s  
a u th o r ity  from them. In oth er words: M orality  i s  to  choose
th e moral p o s tu la te  in  i t s e l f ,  by i t s e l f ,  fo r  i t s e l f .  To 
accept i t  on some extrneous ground can no lon ger  be d efin ed  
as M ora lity  in  th e  tru e  se n se . To accep t i t  on extraneous 
grounds, though the ground them selves be based on th e  moral ' 
p o stu la te  i s  Education towards M orality , not M ora lity . The 
r ig h t  o f  th e  moral to  demand can pass unquestioned  as lon g  
as i t  i s  unopposed. I f  and when i t  i s  opposed (by some oth er  
b a sic  ch o ice ) i t  must show i t s  c r e d e n t ia ls .  The v a l id i t y
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o f  th e se  c r e d e n t ia ls ,  th e  r ig h t o f  th e  moral demand to over­
r id e  oth er b a s ic  ch o ices  must be con sidered  sep a ra te ly  s in c e  
th ey  are n e ith e r  r a ise d  nor d efin ed  in s id e  th e  Moral Domain,, 
but in  regard to  è th er  Domains. I t  i s  in  sh ort th e problem  
o f th e  Primacy o f  E th ic s .
Two remarks on th e  nature o f t h i s  Primacy: F ir s t ly  th e
Primacy o f th e  E th ic a l Domain i s  a t a l l  tim es con ceived  as 
a P r a c t ic a l  Primacy. I t  i s  not fo r  E th ics  to  t e l l  a p a in te r  
what to  p a in t , or a s c i e n t i s t  what to  d isc o v er , but i t  would 
i f  i t  were e f f e c t iv e  stop  th e  one from m a ltr e a tin g ,h is  models 
and th e  o th er  from m isusing h is  in v e n tio n s . The p r a c t ic a l  
Primacy o f  E th ic s  i s  d ir e c t ly  dependent on th e  a ffirm a tio n  
o f  th e  v a l id i t y  o f th e  b a sic  p o s tu la te . I f  and when th e
/
p o s tu la t e 's  u n c o n d itio n a l, o b je c t iv e  and u n iv e r sa l v a l id i t y  | 
i s  r e je c te d  th e 'P r a c t ic a l  Primacy o f E th ics  i s  d estroyed .
The P r a c t ic a l Primacy o f  M orality  over a l l  o th er v a lu es  i s  
th e  c o n s t i tu t iv e  fa c to r  o f  th e  moral u n iv e rse . T herefore  
to  r e j e c t  th e  p r a c t ic a l  primacy o f  E th ic s  i s  to  exclude one­
s e l f  from th e moral sp here, to  put o n e s e lf  beyond th e  E th ica l  
p a l e . ' Our q u estion  i s  now, whether and how an o b lig a t io n   ^
i s  p o s s ib le  which en jo in s a l l  men to  proclaim  th e primacy o f  
E th ic s , and i f  so how i t  i s  to  be d efin ed : i . e .  in  what i t s
v a l id i t y  can be grounded see in g  th a t i t  i s  .improbable indeed  
im p o ssib le  th a t e th ic a l  demands and co n sid e ra tio n s  p r e v a il  
in  other Domains ( fo r  in sta n c e  th e  A e s th e t ic a l)  s in c e  t h i s
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would d estroy  th e  Autonomy o f  th o se  Domains and th er e fo re  
th e ir  s p e c i f ic  n atu re. I t  i s  a lso  im p ossib le  th a t E th ica l  
demands and co n sid era tio n s should n e c e s s a r ily  dominate o th er . 
Domains from o u ts id e  (d e s p ite  th e ir  inner autonomy) s in c e  
t h i s  would e ith e r  make im p ossib le  a f r e e  and ir r e d u c ib le  
• i n i t i a l  ch o ice  o f th e  b a sic  moral p o s tu la te , or the p o s s ib i l i t y  
o f o th er  such fr e e  and ir r e d u c ib le  c h o ic e s , both o f v/hich 
co n tr a d ic t th e fa c t s  o f  our variou s ex p er ien ces.
S econ d ly , th e  P r a c t ic a l Primacy o f  E th ics  can be maintained  
independently  o f i t s  Autonomy, (a s  th e  U t i l i t ia r ia n s  and I  
th in k  P sy ch o a n a lis ts  do)^^ and i t s  Automomy can be m aintained \
in dependently  o f i t s  P r a c t ic a l Primacy (a s  M aximalistsrmay 
d o).B oth  can be denied (a s  in  E v o lu t io n is t  and S o c io lo g ic a l  , , i
T heory). Our problem i s  whether i t  i s  a t a l l  p o s s ib le  to  
a ffirm  them both to th e r . We s h a ll  tr y  to  examine t h i s  ' '
problem in  our l a s t  ch ap ter. ,
The e s s e n t ia l  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f th e  R ight we have 
found to  be i t s  a b so lu te n e ss , on en ess, t o t a l i t y ,  i n d i v i s i b i l i t y ,  
a b so lu te n e ss , and i t s  u n co n d itio n a l, o b je c t iv e  u n iv e rsa l v a l id ­
i t y .  The s p e c i f ic  and d i s t in c t iv e  fe a tu r e  o f th e  M orally  
Right we have found to  be i t s  con cerete  con ten t: namely th e
p ro p o sitio n : "A ll men-qua-men are p o ssessed  o f  D ign ity" .
' " I
1) v iz .H , B. Acton: Man w ithout con sc ien ce; I I . ;  th e
H ibbert Journal, O ct. 194-9*
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We must now b r ie f ly  d escr ib e  th e  co n d itio n s  under which th e  
* r ig h t  * op erat e s .
Moral judgements as we have seen pronounce v e r d ic ts  on 
a ct and address in ju n c tio n s  and demands to  w i l l s  to  accord  
w ith  th e  moral law fo r  th e  sake o f  th e  moral postu late. They 
do not fu rn ish  th e  con tent: m otives, d e s ir e s ,  ends, purposes
o f th e  a c t s .  They take a c ts  in  th e ir  con crete  w holeness 
o f  t h e ir  m ateria l determ ination  and demand th a t they ad ju st 
and re g u la te  them selves so as not to  in fr in g e  th e  moral law . 
The m ateria l con tent i s  subsummed under th e  name o f 'g o o d ', 
th e  in ju n c tio n  to  r e g u la te , a d ju st , l im it  th e  'good' and th e  
'p u r su it  o f  good' so as not to  in fr in g e  th e  law i s  subsummed 
under th e  name o f  ' r ig h t ' .  The 'r ig h t '  th e r e fo r e  i s  not 
a c o n s t i t u t iv e ,  m ateria l elem ent o f a c t io n , i t  i s  a s tr u c tu r a l,  
r e g u la t iv e  p r in c ip le .
I t s  fu n c tio q d a d ir e c tin g , l im it in g ,  r e g u la t iv e  and in  
so fa r  can be sa id  to  be n e g a tiv e . (N egative d u tie s  are 
p e r fe c t  d u t ie s ! )  I t  cannot emerge from t h is  n eg a tiv e  
manner, s in c e  by e s ta b lish in g  i t s e l f  as a c o n s t i tu t iv e  elem ent- 
o f a c t io n , ( e .g .  by exp la in in g  to  peop le th a t th ey  ought to  
accept th e  b a s ic  moral p o s tu la te )  i t  lo s e s  i t s  nature o f 
'r ig h t '  and w th  a l l  o th er purposes, d e s ir e s ,' ends, no m atter 
how and by what in sp ir e d  i t  comes under th e  ju r is d ic t io n  o f  
'good* and in v a lid a te s  i t s  claim  to  prim acy. The n eg a tiv e  
form o f  most e th ic a l  laws i s  not an acc id en t but a re co g n itio n
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o f  th e  in t r in s ic  nature o f the 'r ig h t* . Even where laws 
are d efin ed  p o s i t iv e ly  l ik e  in  'Love they neighbour* th e ir  
moral a p p lic a t io n  i s  p urely  r e g u la t iv e .
What goes beyond th e  s t r i c t l y  moral application , becomes 
e ith e r  th e  p u rsu it o f  'human w e lfa r e * , or th e  p u rsu it o f  
'mankind's moral p e r fe c t io n ' or in  a r e l ig io u s  v a r ia t io n  th e  j . 5 
p u rsu it o f t h e 's o u l 's  s a lv a t io n ' .  A ll th e se  p u r su its  are 
n o to r io u s ly  prone to ex cesses  such as T o ta lita r ia n ism , C alvin* - 
ism , Jansenism , e tc . L im its must be s e t  to  th e  p u rsu it o f 
th e se  high purposes by th e  moral law re sto red  to  i t s  p r is t in e  
p u r ity  and a u s te r ity .  'Love th y  neighbour as th y se lf*  .?!
m orally speaking means *Eespect thy  neighbour more ±han / / /
t h y s e l f '  (S in ce  one may use o n e s e lf  as a mere means: s e l f -  ;yj
s a c r i f i c e  i s  not a moral o ffe n c e ! but one must never use  
oth ers as mere means: th e  s a c r i f ic in g  o f  o th ers  i s  always
a moral o f fe n c e ) .  This i s  eq u iva len t to  th e  r e s u lt s  o f  our 
prev iou s r e f le c t io n s  on p e r fe c t  and im p erfect d u tie s  and 
th e  im p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  d e fin in g  im p erfect d u tie s  w ithout in ­
v a lid a t in g  themoral ch aracter o f  th e  system  in  which they  
are d e fin e d . Now moral judgements are judgements about my 
a c tio n s  or o b lig a t io n s  to  r e g u la te  my a c t io n s  as fa r  as th ey  
a f f e c t  o th e r s . K ant's co n ten tio n  th a t th ey  a p p lied  to  o n e - ' 
s e l f  was shown to  be mistaJcen as a r e s u lt  o f  th e  same previous  
co n sid era tio n  o f  p e r fe c t  and im p erfect d u t ie s . The law
'u se  no human being as a means a lone' , i s  not d e fin a b le  in s id e
yd
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th e  in d iv id u a l domain s in c e  (a ) I may w ithout doing wrong u se  
m yself as a means (S e lf  s a c r i f ic e  i s  not a moral crime) 
although I have nor moral duty to  do so ( S e l f - s a c r i f i c e  i s  a 
p r iv i le g e ) ;  and (b) I  have on ly  o p tim ific  d u tie s  towards 
m y self, which however are not d u tie s  under th e  id ea  o f r ig h t  ,
and moral law , but d u tie s  under th e  id ea  o f 'good' and ends.
In ether words th ey  do not come under th e  heading o f duty but
under th a t o f th e  p u rsu it  o f ends. They are th e r e fo r e  su b jec t
to l im ita t io n  and r e g u la tio n  by th e moral law andacts done fo r  
th e ir  sake are r ig h t  not by v ir tu e  o f th e  goods pursued but 
by th e  v ir tu e  o f th e  moral law obeyed. We can th er e fo re  , / /  
fu r th er  determ ine th e  co n d itio n s  under which th e  'Right* 
becomes o p e r a t iv e , and say th a t i t s  f i e l d  o f  operation i s  th e  
in te r s u b je c t iv e  domain. In t h is  domain a lon e has "m orally 
right** any s ig n if ic a n c e .  I t  i s  d efin ed  fo r  t h i s  domain a lon e. 
For th e  moral law ordains th e  r e la t io n s  between man and man.
And moral judgements are passed  and o b lig a t io n s  d efin ed  on ly  
betv/een man and man. Moral judgements or moral o b lig a t io n s  
expressed  or th e  a c tio n s  o f  man which regard on ly  h im se lf - .
are e ith e r  an im pertinence or an in te r fe r e n c e . They are on ly
\
excusab le on th e  ground o f  a c e r ta in  W eltanschauung, l i ÿ e  
P la to 's  in ju n c tio n s  or R e lig io u s  observances and in ju c t io n s ,  
and would as such re v e r t to  th e  'p u rsu it o f  good 'type w ith  
which we have a lready d e a lt .  Again th e  'm orally ' r ig h t  does 
not cibrate between God and man. For th e moral law does not
‘ ■ v  ^
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h old  between God and man. Man can never use or m isuse God, 
and i t  would be more than s e n s e le s s  to p resc r ib e  to God 
hov/ He should use man so as to  be moral (An im p o s s ib i l i ty  
y e t  attem pted tim e and aga in . Even Kant t r ie d  to  do t h is
in  a way, but then he did not claim  to  t e l l  th e  nature o f
\
God, he to ld  us th e  nature o f  a p o s tu la te  o f p r a c t ic a l  rea so n ).
.  I
L a stly  th ere  i s  one in d isp en sa b le  co n d itio n , or rath er  
p reco n d itio n  v/hich must be f u l f i l l e d  i f  th e  'm orally  r ig h t ' 
i s  to  op era te . This i s  Freedom. The r e s t r ic t io n s  imposed 
by moral o b lig a t io n  must be f r e e ly  and d e lib e r a te ly  chosen  
and accep ted , through th e  fr e e  and d e lib e r a te  ch o ice  and 
d e c is io n  to  accept th e  b a sic  p o s tu la te  o f  m o ra lity .
The co n d itio n s  under which th e  m orally  'r ig h t '  becomes _ 
o p era tiv e  are th ere fo re : th e  in te r s u b je c t iv e  domain as th e
f i e l d  o f i t s  op era tion , th e  r e g u la t iv e , l im it in g ,  d ir e c t in g  
e f f e c t  as th e manner o f i t s  op era tio n . Freedom o f  c h o ic e , as 
th e  co n d itio n  fo r  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f i t s  op era tio n .
Now, s in c e  th e  'R igh t' i s  th e  c o n s t i tu t iv e  concept o f  
î;he E th ica l domain, th e nature o f th a t domàin, i t s  ex ten t and 
l im it s  are d ir e c t ly  determ ined-by th e  nature o f th e r ig h t .
The E th ica l .Domain w i l l  be a uniform , homogenous, non expand- 
i b l e ,  unchanging and e x c lu s iv e  Domain. I t  w i l l  be a s t r i c t l y  
l im ite d , a narrow and a u stere  Domain. I t s  a u s te r ity  i s  
narrow but l ib e r a t in g .  By t h i s  Domain a lower l im it  i s  
d efin ed  below which human conduct must not s in k . Human
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p u rsu it and endeavour are however fr e e  to  r i s e  above i t ,  
w ithout being d ic ta te d  to  in  any way. The concept o f  th e  
Right as a l im it in g  r e g u la t iv e  p r in c ip le , does not provide  
a con tent to  human l i v e s ,  does not p resc r ib e  an Id e a l, does 
not ad v ise  a c e r ta in  way o f  l i f e .  I t  le a v e s  a l l  p u r su its ,
to  be sought or avoided, a t our good p lea su re . We can "
y
choose as our g i f t s .a n d  temperaments persuade u s , fr e e  p f  
fe a r , f r e e  o f th e  an x iety  th a t th ere  may e x i s t ,  moral o b lig a t io n  
to  choose one way o f  l i f e  ra th er  than another.. Pushkin in  
fa c t  i s  as good as p o etry . A happy l i f e  as a mother o f e ig h t  
i s  ju s t  as good as a happy l i f e  in  c lo is t e r e d  contem plation  
and in tr o s p e c t io n . In th e  eyes o f .E th ic s  a l l  p u r su its  are
)
equal in  th a t they are a l l  su b jec t to  th e moral law .
Again we may pursue our p u r su its  s in g ly  or combine d if fe r e n t  
p u r sû its  in  any p a ttern  we p le a s e . We may pursue them' 
m oderately, or im m oderately. We are even fr e e  to  pursue them 
to  e x c e ss , to  th e  very l im it s  o f what i s  humanly p o s s ib le  
(fo r  i n s t .  the s c i e n t i f i c  p u rsu it o f tr u th  e tc )  provided we 
c o n f l i c t  not w ith  and tr a n sg re ss  not th e  moral law . Thus 
th e  e th ic a l  domain d e fin e s  a lso  an upper l im it  to  purpose beyond 
which one may not go . I t s  a u s te r ity  here i s  r e p r e ss iv e  but * 
sublim e.
The l ib e r a t in g  fu n ctio n  o f  e th ic s  as a lower l im it  o f  
'conduct and th e r e p r e ss iv e  fu n ctio n  o f  e th ic s  as th e  upper 
l i ^ i t  o f  a sp ir a tio n  have p a ra d o x ica lly  enough the contrary
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e f f e c t  on our l i v e s .  By s e t t in g  us f r e e  to  fo llo w  our own 
in c l in a t io n s  as we p le a se  provided we do' not s in k  belov/ a 
c e r ta in  l e v e l  o f  conduct E th ics  d e liv er s* u s  bound hand
I ' <
and fo o t  to  th e  tyranny o f  our ch a ra c ters , temperaments, in  
modern p a r lia n c e  to  th e  tyranny o f  our g lan d s. By imposing 
l im it s  on our most ch erish ed  and p e r s is t e n t ly ,  c o s t i l y  pursued
•higher* a sp ir a tio n s  E th ic s  provides us w ith  a freedom no
/
oth er  d is c ip l in e  can o f fe r  u s , i t  enables us to  be fr e e  o f  
o u r se lv e s . l ln  a l l  o th er d is c ip l in e s  and domains l i k e  th e  ! 
a e s th e t ic  domain, th e  r e l ig io u s  domain e t c . ,  we acqu ire th e  
freedom to  be o u r s e lv e s ) . The power to  d isregard  the ch aracter , 
th e  temperament, th e  glands which we d id  not choose and cannot ■ 
help  and th e  b a s ic  d e c is io n s  which we d id  choose but s t i l l  
cannot h e lp , i s  th e  power conferred  on us by E th ic s . M orality  
i s  th e e f f e c t iv e  e x e r c ise  o f t h is  power. For in  M orality  / 
we can help  . . .  and th ere  i s  nothing we cannot h e lp , s in c e  
though we may not always be fr e e  to  choose our 'y e s* es we are
always fr e e  to  say *no • to  v/hatever v io la t e s  th e d ig n ity  and
\






PART I I I  ^
An attem pt to  c la r i f y  th e  nature and source o f th e  
c o n s t itu e n t  n otion  o f  th e  'm orally  r ig h t  * 2 The concept 
o f  human d ig n ity  or th e  d ig n ity  o f man qua man. "
The moral law , as i t  emerges from a l l  preceed ing r e f l e c t ­
io n s and d isc u s s io n s , can now be form ulated as fo llo w s:
"You s h a ll  not v io la t e  a t any tim e or on any account 
th e  d ign ity -o f-m an  in  any human being"^^.
The u ltim a te  ground o f t h i s  law 1É th e  p rop osition !.
"A ll men qua men are endowed w ith d ig n ity " w ith  i t s  r id er :
"The u n iv e r s a l ity  o f " a ll"  in  th e  above p ro p o sit io n  a llow s o f  
'no ex cep tio n s"^^. This p ro p o sit io n  i s  th e  b a sic  p o s tu la te  
o f e th ic a l  th eory , and th e  b a sic  maxim o f  a l l  e th ic a l  p r a c t ic e .  
The concept which i t  d e fin es  and on which i t  r e s t s  i s  an
I
1) i . e .  in 'v iew  o f  no end, im p elled  by no m otive, under no 
circu m stan ces. ' The moral law in  sh ort reco g n ise s  no 
extenuating  circum stance to  i t s  non-perform ance. ,
m 2 ) We s h a ll  d isc u ss  escapes provided by r e s t r ic t in g  d e f in it io n s  
o f  ’man*, ( i . e .  d e f in i t io n s  which exclude as ’ subhuman* 
c e r ta in  members o f  th e  human race) la t e r .
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ir r e d u c ib le , primary, though complex concept whose v a l id i t y  V 
can be n e ith e r  demonstrated nor v in d ic a te d . I t  must be
accepted  or r e je c te d  in  to to  any by i t s e l f .  I t  i s  th e  concept
o f human d ig n ity  or th e  d ig n ity  o f  man qua man.
This law i s  th e  n ecessary  co n d itio n  o f a l l  moral rigrht- ÿ
'i
n e s s , or ra th e r , t h is  law tali en in  con ju n ction  w ith  i t s  p o s tu l-  ^
I
a te  and th e  r id er  to  t h is  p o s tu la te  i s  th e  on ly  n ecessary  
co n d itio n  o f  a l l  moral r ig h tn e s s . A ctions which do not conform 
to  t h is  law are eo ip so  m orally  wrong a c t io n s , v iz :  th e
already c ite d  examples o f ’double m o r ^ ity ’ , o f  s la v ery  of" ,
tyranny and d ic ta to r s h ip s , even th o se  committed subratiojtf |
■boni by p r iv a te  persons in  p r iv a te  c i r c l e s .  This law i s  , ..r;
\  ■' '
a lso  a s u f f i c ie n t  co n d itio n  o f  moral r ig h tn e s s . A ctions  
which conform to  t h is  law are ’righ t*  whatever t h e ir  a d d itio n a l  
con ten t may be: Push p in  i s  as good as p oetry  from a moral :
p o in t o f v iew .
This form ulation  may be commended by ennumerating th e  
fo llo v /in g  s o c ia l  consequences o f  accep tin g  i t :
I
a) The form ulation  a llow s com plete freedom to  men to  
choose th e  ends and order th e  tenor o f th e ir  l i v e s  as th ey  
p le a se . I t  does not e s ta b lis h  i t s e l f  as an id e a l  way o f  l i f e
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or as a d e s ir a b le  purpee. For i t  i s  no p o s s ib le  to  perform- 
moral a c t io n s  which are nothing but m oral, one can on ly  perform  
on e’ s purposive and d e s ir e - im p e lle d  a c tio n s  in  a moral way.
Thus i t  resp ectd  th e n atural and id io sy n c r a t ic  spheresoof 
in t e r e s t  which each man seeks to  and has a r ig h t  to  e s ta b lis h  
fo r  h im se lf .
b) T his form u lation , th e r e fo r e , makes th e  p o sse ss io n
o f  d ig n ity  u n con d ition a l and independent o f  th e  q u a lity  o f  r
th e  sphere o f  in t e r e s t  which each man chooses fo r  h im se lf .
On th e  other hand i t  does not impose an a c t iv e  (and absurd!)
1 \
s;}Tnpathy  ^ w ith  a l l  men in  a l l  th e ir  spheres o f  in t e r e s t ,  
even where t h i s  i s  p r a c t ic a l ly  p o s s ib le .  I t  i s  a p r in c ip le  
o f r e s p e c t fu l  and benevolen t to le r a n c e  and n o n -in te r fe ren ce , 
not a p r in c ip le  o f  ch a r ity  and w ell-m eaning in te r v e n t io n .
c) T his law h olds a p r io r i  fo r  a l l  s i t u a t io n s . I t
embodies a sim ple id e a , easy to  grasp , e a s i ly  im planted in  '
\
you4s h e a r ts , easy to  le a r n . I s  t h i s  a lso  an id ea  which i s  
e a s i ly  accep ted , easy to  p r a c t ic e , easy to  keep? There i s  
very good reason to  th in k  t h is  id ea  i s ,  in  f a c t ,  accepted  
by everyone as long as i t  stands w ithout th e  r id e r  o f  i t s  
u n iv e r sa l or t o t a l  a p p lic a t io n  to  a l l  men w ithout ex cep tio n .
1 ) i . e .  an (im p erfect) duty o f  a c tu a lly  fu r th er in g  a l l  men,
and fo s te r in g  th e ir  spheres o f  in t e r e s t .
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There i s  indeed no man who does not apply i t  to  a t l e a s t  one ''1
o th er man. No man i f  th ere  be such a man -  and th ere  have
been examples o f  such l im it - c a s e s  -  can keep t h is  extreme 
1 )p o s it io n   ^ fo r  any len g th  o f tim e w ithout a breakdovm. and a 
submergence in  madness. The more u sual cou rse , however, i s  
to  apply t h i s  p r in c ip le  to  a l im ite d  number o f  men. In th e  
a rb itra ry  nature o f t h i s  l im ita t io n  l i e  th e  grounds o f a l l  
im m orality and such l im ita t io n  i s  th e  roo t o f  a l l  e v i l .
I
To' show th a t a l l  th e se  l im ita t io n s  are a rb itra r y , and 
must be avoided a t a l l  c o s t s ,  i s  th e  ta sk  o f  moral ed ucation . 
Indeed th e id e a l o f  moral ed u ca tio n is  th e  ta sk  o f  moral educat­
io n . Indeed th e  id e a l o f moral education  i s  to  mould men 
who w i l l  w ith  deep c o n v ic tio n  echo Montesquiai’s words : " If  ■ •
I knew o f  an a c tio n  which would be advantageous to  France -v; !
but harmful to  Europe or advantageous to  Europe but harmful , r'.,
to  th e  human race I should th in k  i t  a crim e", and who w i l l  3
act a cco rd in g ly .
1) I t  i s  an externe p o s it io n , fo r  he, who d ec la res  h im se lf
th e  on].y man p o ssessed  o f  d ig n ity , and den ies t h is  a t tr ib u te  
to  a l l  h is  fe llo w  men, d ec la res  h im se lf  a god who has'no  
o b lig a t io n s  and no r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  towards anyone, and 
i s  not accountable to  anyone.
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The moral law v/hich I have form ulated thus f u l f i l s  a l l  
th e  co n d itio n s  o f  th e  m orally  r ig h t .  I t  i s  a b so lu te , b in d in g , 
u n iv e r s a l . I t  does not c o n s t itu te  an end fo r  i t s e l f ,  but 
i s  l im it in g  and r e g u la t iv e  on ly . I t  has no bearing in  th e  
p urely  in d iv id u a l sphere but i s  d efin ed  fo r  th e  in te r s u b je c t iv e  
sphere a lo n e . I t  i s  a n ecessary  and a s u f f i c i e n t  co n d itio n  
fo r  th e  ’moral r ig h tn e s s ’ o f a c t io n s  conforming to  i t  whatever 
th e ir  a d d itio n a l con crete  co n ten t. I t  i s  a formal law and 
th e r e fo r e  u n iv ersa l and a b so lu te . But because i t  i s  grounded 
in  th e  con crete  concept o f  m an-endow ed-w ith-dignity, i t  i s  
not an empty law .
The v a l id i t y  o f  th e  moral law however depends e n t ir e ly  
on th e  co n d itio n  th a t t h is  concept be accep ted , and on th e  
fn n th er co n d itio n  th a t th e  p o s tu la te  demanding th a t i t  be 
p red ica ted  o f  a l l  men w ithout excep tion , be accep ted . Now 
t h i s  con cept, which i s  th e  fon s e t origo  o f a l l  ’moral r ig h t­
n ess  ’ and th e  ce n tra l a x is  on which h in ges th e  whole e d i f ic e  
o f e th ic a l  theory and p r a c t ic e , i s  as we have seen  by no 
means a s e l f - e v id e n t  co n cep t. I t  i s  th e  u lt im a te  paradox 
o f  E th ics  th a t w h ils t  exp erien ce , knowledge, s c ie n c e , even 
eq u ity  i t s e l f  urge i t s  wrongness, i t  i s  y e t  in t u i t iv e ly  
accepted  and s e c r e te ly acknowledged by most p eop le even 
th o se  who would deny i t  or l im it  i t  as they  see  f i t .  I t  
i s  ju s t  as s e c r e te ly  and in t u i t iv e ly  r e je c te d  by most p eo p le .
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e s p e c ia l ly  by th ose  who most lo u d ly  proclaim  and advocate  
i t s  in v io la b le  v a l id i t y .  B efore,how ever, we can d isc u ss  
th e se  d ifferB B ces amongst b a sic  in t u i t io n s ,  and a l l  th e ir  
e x is te n c e  im p lie s  fo r  a th eory  o f  E th ic s , we must p o in t out 
another fe a tu r e , another e f f e c t  of' our p resen t form ulation  \ 
o f  th e  moral law .
S in ce by d e f in it io n  th ere  can be no moral a c t io n s  i . e .  
a c tio n s  whose s o le  m ateria l i s  th e ir  own moral r ig h tn e s s , , 
moral r ig h tn e ss  can never be th e  s o le  fa c to r  in  p r a c t ic a l  
d e lib e r a t io n s  and d e c is io n s . W ills  b efo re  th ey  can l im it  
th e ir  purposes to  f i t  th e  moral law , must have purposes to  
l im i t .  T herefore in  p r a c t ic a l  d e lib e r a t io n s , d e c is io n s ,  
e t c . ,  v a lu es  a d d itio n a l to  and independent o f the moral va lu e  
have to  be w eighed, con sid ered , decided  on. I t  i s  th e se  
v a lu es which make up th e  con ten t o f  l i f e ,  th e good or th e  
bad l i f e .  There i s  no such th in g  as a moral l i f e ,  th ere  
i s  a good l i f e  l iv e d  m orally , or a bad l i f e  l iv e d  m orally . 
M orality , an<#oral p e r fe c t io n  as th e  id e a l o f l i f e ,  th e  f u l ­
f i l lm e n t  o f  l i f e  are s e lf - c o n tr a d ic to r y  con cep ts. This  
f i r s t l y  then  we w ish to  argue a g a in st Kant’ s con ju n ction  o f  
M orality  and H appiness.
In th e  second p la c e , I  w ish to  tr y  as b est I can to  
argue a g a in st a l l  th os E th ica l T heories which, once aware 
o f  th e  narrow range o f th e moral p r in c ip le  and i t  i n a b i l i t y  
to  fu rn ish  an id e a l o f th e  good l i f e ,  admit o th er
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values^^ to  be d efin ed  in  th e Domain o f E th ic s  and' to  claim
i
th e  v a l id i t y  o f  Ethical v a lu e s . This they do on th e  p r in c ip le ,
th a t E th ics  i s  th e  theory o f human conduct, behaviour,
a c t io n s , and th e r e fo r e  must talce account o f th e  p urposes,
d e s ir e s ,  ends i . e .  v a lu e s , which inform  th ose  a c t io n s .
E th ics  must c la s s i f y  them, and order them according to  m e r it ,
and accord to  th e  deservin g  amongst th o se  va lu es th e  s ta tu s
o f  moral v a lu e s . Any oth er treatm ent r e s t s  on an e x c e s s iv e ly
a b stra c t and a r t i f i c i a l  view o f  human conduct and w i l l  th ere­
offo r e  lea d  to  a tru n cated  and incom plete theory o f  E th ic s  \
I f in d  i t  n ecessary  to  postpone th e  d isc u ss io n  o f  t h i s  argument 
t i l l  I have f i r s t  con sid ered  th e problem o f  th e  in t r in s ic  
d iffe r e n c e  between primary in t u i t iv e  ch o ices  and whether th e  
primacy o f th e  moral ch o ice  can be deduced from a study of 
th e se  d if fe r e n c e s  or v in d ica ted  by i t .
The fo llo w in g  order seems th e r e fo r e  in d ica ted  fo r  th e  
problems y e t  to  be d isc u sse d .
1 ) i . e .  Such oth er va lu es as seem o f  high s ta tu s  and m er it.
2) T his argument which P ro f. H. B. Acton my su p erv isor
put to  me i s  th e  w e ig h t ie s t  and most im portant o b jec tio n  
to  th e  trends o f  my d isc u ss io n  o f th e  moral problem.
I t  p o in ts  out th e  most vu ln erab le  l in k  in  my e x p o s it io n .
I s h a ll  tr y  my b e s t  to  answer i t .
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a) Can M orality  be regarded as a ground, reason , or 
a b a s is  fo r  Happiness? ; ^ d ,  what do v;e mean by th e  , 
phrase "deserving o f  Happiness"?
b) What are th e  d iffe r e n c e s  between d if fe r e n t  b a sic  
in t u i t iv e  ch o ices? ; and. Whether th e  nature o f  th ese  
d iffe r e n c e s  v in d ic a te s  th e primacy o f th e  moral choice?
c) Can an e x c lu s iv e  d e f in it io n  o f E th ic s , i . e .  a d e fin ­
i t i o n  o f E th ics  based e x c lu s iv e ly  on th e  concept o f ,
th e  M orally R ight, be v in d ica ted  a g a in st th e  charges 
o f  a r t i f i c i a l  narrowness, and in su ff ic ie n c y ?  Or in  
oth er  words: I s  th e  concept o f  th e M orally Right a
s u f f i c i e n t  b a s is  / f o r  a com plete theory o f  E th ics?
, f
a) M orality  and h ap p in ess: Moral r e c t itu d e  according
to  Kant and as we accpet w h o le -h ea rted ly , l i e s  not in  an 
a c tio n  being o f a c e r ta in  so r t  such a s , e .g .  one th a t p reserves  
l i f e ,  p rov id es h ap p in ess, conforms to  a r u le , but in  an a c tio n  
which i s  performed fo r  a c e r ta in  reason , e .g .  i s  w i l le d  in
j
à c e r ta in  manner. Moral r e c t itu d e  , according to  Kant and 
as we accept no l e s s  w h o le-h ea rted ly , l i e s  in  th e  s p e c i f i c
manner o f  w il l in g  o n ly , ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f  actu a l e f f ic a c y .  I t
»
fo llo w s  th a t i t  i s  com pletely  up to  a man h im se lf to  a t ta in  
moral r e c t itu d e :  fo r :
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a) Man always knows h is  duty.
b) b) Man can always perform h is  duty.
c) Man’s moral o b lig a t io n , and h is  moral m erit 
are con fin ed  to  th e performance o f  h is  duty.
E xplanation: Man always knows h is  duty s in c e  h is
duty i s  always th e  same: namely to  ask h im se lf whether the
a c t io n  he proposes to  take prompted by h is  n a tu ra l d e s ir e s  
conforms to  th e  requirem ents o f  th e  moral law ( i . e .  not to  
u se another^human being as a mere means fo r  th e attainm ent 
o f h is  p u rp oses). An error o f con sc ien ce  i s  im p ossib le  in  
t h is  c a se . For "though I might err in  th e  judgement in  which
I th in li I was r igh t"  I can never err in  th e  con sciou sn ess
o f whether I indeed b e lie v e d  m yself to  be r ig h t ,  or on ly  made 
b e lie v e  th a t I b e lie v e d  m yself to  be in  th e  r ig h t " ^ \  More­
over th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f mailing a m istake (o f  f a c t ,  i . e .  in  
m istalcing a s p e c i f ic  con crete  in sta n c e  o f  duty) i s  fu r th er  
dim inished when we con sid er  th a t fa r  from approaching g iven  
s itu a t io n s '^  l ik e  so many dei-ex-m achina whose duty i s  to  
unravel th e  knots and le a v e  th e  s i tu a t io n  b e t te r  than th ey  
found i t ,  we -ourselves are part o f  th e  s i tu a t io n ,  having our 
own d e s ir e s , ends, and in t e r e s t s  in  th e  m atter in  sh o r t, 
an axe to  grind" . . .  So fa r  from attem pting to  deduce
1) Kant: Ueber das M issiin gen  a l l e r  p h ilo sop h isch en  Versuche
in  der T heodizee. (1791; ^
2) The view  taken by th e  o c c a s io n a l is t  s c h o o l. S ir  D.W. 
R oss, E. F. C a r r it t ,  E tc .
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p a r t ic u la r  d u tie s  from p r in c ip le s  we must begin  by v o l i t io n s  
su ggested  to  us by d e s ir e , w ith  a r b itr a r i ly  chosen ends and 
w ith  su b je c t iv e  maxims and we must use our p r in c ip le  as a 
method o f s e le c t io n  from among them. This method has 
th e  m erit o f reco g n is in g  th a t th e  f i r s t  stim u lus to  a c t io n s  
comes from d e s ir e ,  th a t we must pass from th e  proposed a c t io n  .
I
to  a general r u le , and th a t we must estim ate  th e  general r u le  
in  th e  l i g h t  o f our u ltim a te  p r in c ip le" ^ ^ . Now th a t th e  
u ltim a te  p r in c ip le  has been c le a r ly  form ulated , th e  chances 
th a t we w i l l  not err too much when estim atin g  th e  general 
r u le  in  th e  l ig h t  o f  th a t p r in c ip le  are reasonab ly  f a i r .
The margin o f  error, I should say , i s  su r p r is in g ly  sm all and ' 
becomes alm ost n e g l ig ib le  when th e  sen se  o f  duty (das m ora li-  
sche F ein g efu eh l) i s  brought in to  p la y . "The d if fe r e n c e s  
between what ought and what ought not to  be regarded as our 
moral duty fa r  frombeing as su b t le  as Mr. Garve supposes 
them to  be are graven in to  th e human h eart w ith  heavy and 
most l e g ib le  l e t t e r s .  And as fo r  h is  co n ten tion  th a t th e se  
d iffe r e n c e s  grow a lto g e th e r  in d is t in c t  once we proceed to  
a c t io n s , i t  c o n tr a d ic ts  even one’ s own moral experience"^^.
1) Pat on: Can %.son b e -P r a c tic a l?  ; p . 37*
2) Kant: Ueber den Gemeinspruch das mag in  der T heorie
r ic h t ig  s e in  tau gt aber n ic h t fu er  d ie  P rax is; I t e i l  
( 1795) quoted a t th e  head o f  th e  t h e s i s .
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Indeed " i f  we co n su lt our moral experience we have, i t  seems 
to  me, in  most ca ses  a reasonhhle c e r ta in ty  about our actu a l 
d u tie s  . . . .  Y/ithout t h is  c e r ta in ty  we should in  p r a c t ic e  be 
tempted to  s e t  a s id e  duty a lto g e th e r  . . . .  which o b v iou sly  
we do not do
In consequence, we can say th a t men always know th e ir
duty, and moreover are , in  most in s ta n c e s , f a i r l y  c e r ta in  o f
th e  actu a l conduct and deeds requ ired  o f them in  fu lf i lm e n t
o f th e ir  d u t ie s .
b) Man can always do h is  duty s in c e  he can always
r e fr a in  from performing a c tio n s  which do not conform to  th e
moral law . For, being a r a t io n a l and fr e e  agent man i s  not
e n t ir e ly  determ ined by h is  n atu ra l im pulses but has th e
power to combine, encourage, d iscou rage, f o s t e r  or suppress
2 ") 'each and any o f  them as he p le a se s   ^ . This f e a t ,  man, being  
a f i n i t e  b ein g , i s  fo rced  to  accom plish in  every s in g le  a c tio n  
he perform s, fo r  th e  sake o f variou s ends; and he accom plishes  
t h i s  f e a t  by th e  e x e r c ise  o f  h is  n atu ra l powers a lo n e . I t  
i s  by th e  e x e r c ise  of th e  same n atu ra l powers th a t man i s  ab le
1) Paton: Can Reason be p r a c t ic a l?  p . 35-
2) I th in k  t h is  d e sc r ip tio n  w i l l  s a t i s f y  even th e  exactin g  
demands and th e  c r it ic is m  o f th e  concept o f  freedom vo iced  
by P ro f. C. Ryle: The Concept o f  Mind: Cahpters: On
freedom and. The Bogey o f  Mechanism.
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i f  he so w ishes to  suppress fo r  th e  sake o f th e  re sp e c t he 
en te r ta in s  fo r  th e  d ign ity-of-m an  in  h is  him an fe llo w  b e in g s . 
Whether th e se  powers be in n a te  in  man as part o f h is  n atu ra l 
s t a t e  in  a g o d less  u n iv erse  or whether man be endowed w ith  
th e se  powers by a Personal C reator, or whether th ey  be but 
a s e l f - d e lu s io n  n ecessary  to  th e  su rv iv a l o f  th e  ra ce , -  i s   ^
im m aterial a t t h is  p o in t . What m atters i s  th a t each man 
qua man p o ssessed  t  ese  powers, ( i . e .  in so fa r  as he i s  a 
r a t io n a l and fr e e  agent) and th a t  th ey  are a t h is  command 
whenever h e cares to  e x e r c ise  them. Hence i t  i s  redundant 
to assume w ith  S t . P au l, S t .  A ugustine, Jansen, P a sc a l,
C alv in , e t c .  e t c . th a t a s p e c ia l d isp en sa tio n  o f god’s a rb itra ry  
and d iv in e  grace i s  c a l le d  fo r  in  each in sta n c e  b efo re  a moral 
d e c is io n  can be made. Moreover t h is  assumption stands in  
f la g r a n t  co n tr a d ic t io n  to  th e  b a s ic  moral postu late^ ^  and 
th e r e fo r e  to  everyth ing  which p a r t ic ip a te s  in  th e  nature o f  
th e  moral, th e r e fo r e  a lso  w ith  th e  moral tea ch in g s o f  th e  
Holy S c r i p t u r e s T h e  ten  commandments have been g iven  
to  man so' th a t he may keep them; and he may keept them because  
he can k eep them i f  he but w ish es: o
/ . - . N fJi 2 '" ''
1) I t  i s  indeed based on a d if fe r e n t  b a s ic  in t u i t io n ,  and
appeals t o ,  and i s  supported by a d if fe r e n t  asp ect o f  th e  
Holy S c r ip tu r e s .
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TFor t h is  commandment which I command thee th is  day 
i t  i s  hot too wonderful fo r  th ee to know nor i s  i t  fa r  o f f .  
I t  i s  not in  heaven th at thou sh ou ld st say: Who s h a ll  go 
up fo r  us to heaven and bring i t  unto us th a t we may hear i t  
and do i t?  N either i s  i t  beyond the sea  th a t thoyfehouldst 
say: Who sh a ll  go over the sea  fo r  us and bring i t  unto us
th a t we may hear i t  and do i t?  But i t  i s  very nigh unto 
th ee  in  thy mouth and in  thy heart th a t thou mayest do i t : 
See I have s e t  before th ee t h is  day l i f e  and good, and death 
and ev il" ^ ^ .
' This view i s  r e ite r a te d  again in  th e  con clu sions o f \
th e book o f  Job in  which th is  problem i s  most f u l ly  d iscussed.- 2
Man can be righ teou s i f  he wants to  be righ teou s in  th e
in te g r ity  o f h is  h eart. When man chooses r igh teou sn ess and
c lin g s  to i t  w ith a l l  h is  h eart, he i s  conscious o f having ,
! ' \ : 
done so , and conscious o f h is  own r e c t itu d e . God w ishes man v
to regard h im self a s ,a  fr e e  and conscious being capable o f
knowing h is  own heart and the righ teou sn ess o f h is  h eart, and
1) Deuternomy xxx. 11- 15* »
Ir
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he w ish es him to  c l in g  to  fchi^ knowledge and never deny i t :  {
^ Ir ll y t  _ )  3/ ,  / o / (  ' /  . J > f/S ' '> / A  |
/ / v / y v  n i l  / ,  f  .  )  4  -  / /  .  ‘j a A  '>'o/l e^J I
'31 .^  ^ .-v)bj //( pa-jU 4/  o  2 ^ ^ ^  4^ -t -.A/CV . I
^ ^A j row-y ^//Z’ 4(4  ^Oo I"-4 / j, Aav'/ 027 2'''^  .. aaV  , I
' .  '  i
(Job sp eak s:) My l i p s  s h a ll  not speak w ickedness nor my tongue: 
u t te r  d e c e it :  God fo rb id  th a t I should  j u s t i f y  you: t i l l  j
I d ie  I w i l l  not remove mine in t e g r i t y  from me. My r ig h t ­
eousness I h o ld  f a s t  and w i l l  not l e t  i t  go: my h eart hath
1 )
not reproached me as lon g  as I l i v e  \
(and God’s answer: )
The Lord sa id  to  El'phaz th e  Temanite: my wrath i s
k in d led  a g a in st th ee  and a g a in st thy two fr ie n d s :  fo r  you
have not spoken o f  me r ig h t  as my servan t Job hath . There­
fo r e   my servan t Job s h a ll  pray fo r  you fo r  him w i l l
2 )I accep t l e s t  I deal w ith  you a f te r  your f o l l y  . . .
T his i s  th e  answer g iven  in  th e  moral arguments o f  
th e  B ib le , th e  answer o f  th e  moral god. I t  i s  moreover th e  
on ly  answer p o s s ib le  fo r  a moral god, a god o f r ig h teo u sn ess  
and j u s t i c e ,  a god who has endowed men w ith  d ig n ity , and freedon
1) Job XXVII. 4 - 6 .
2) Job XLII. 7 -8 . The view  expressed  in  th e  book o f  Nob on
th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between M orality  and Happiness i s  never­
th e le s s  ' d ir e c t ly  opposed to  Kant. So i s  th e  view  taken
o f  th e  o r ig in /  dnd ground o f  r ig h t  as such, a q u estion
we s h a ll  d isc u ss  l a t e r .
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and th e  a b i l i t y  to  be r ig h teo u s in  th e ir  ov/n r ig h t:  :
" lam summus P ater a r c h ite c tu s  deus hanc quam videmus mundanam -g 
domum d i v in i t a t i s ,  templum augustissim um , arcanae le g ib u s
I ■
sa p ie n t ia e  fa b r e fe c e r a t . Super coe lestem  regionem mentibus ■ 
d ecorarat, aeth ereos g lob os a e te r n is  anim is v e g e ta r a t , vf
excrement a r ia s  ac fo c c u l entas in f  e r io r is  mundi p a rtes  ;
omnigena animal turba com plerat. Sed op ere consummata, 
d esid ereb a t a r t i f  ex e s se  aliquem  qui t a n t i  o p er is  rationem  , ;
perp enderet, pulchirtudinem  amaret, magnitudinem adm iraretur. \
Id c irco  iam rebus omnibus (u t Moses Timaeusque te s ta n tu r e )  
a b s o lu t is ,  de producendo him lne p o strem o co g ita v it . Verum nec 
erat in  a r c h ity p is  unde novam sobolem e f f in g e r e t ,  nec in  1 -
th e sa u r is  quod novo f i l i o  haereditarium  la r g ir e tu r , nec in  g 
s u b s e l l i i s  t o t iu s  orb i ubi u n iv e r s i  contem plator i s t e  se d e r e t . 
Iam p len a  omnia, omnia sum i s  m ed iis , in f in is q u e  ord in ibus  
fu eran t d is t r ib u ta . Sed non erat paternae p o t e s t a t is  in  
extrema fo e tu r a , quasi effoetam  -  d e f e c is s e .  Non erat  
s o p ie n t ia e  c o n s i l i i s  in o p ia  in  re  n e c e ssa r ia  fludbuasse. Non 
erat b e n e f ic i  amoris e t qui in  a l i i s  e s s e t  divinam l ib e r a lita te m  
laudaturus in  se  i l la m  damnare co g en tu r /.
S ta tu it  tandem optimus o p ife x  u t cu i dari n ih i l  proprium 
p otb rat commune a s se t  quidquid privatum s in g u l is  fu e r a t .
I g itu r  hominem. s i c  e s t  a llo q u tu s: Nec certem sedem , nec
propriam faciam , nec munus ullnm p e c u lia r e  t i b i  dedimus o Adam, 
u t quam sedem, quam fac iem , quam munera tu te  o p ta v er is  ea
592
pro v o to , pro tua s e n te n t !a lab ea s e t p o ss id ea s: D e f in ite
c a e te r is  natura in tr a  p r a e sc r ip ta s  a nob is le g e s  co erceretu r .
Tu n u llu s  a n g u s t iis  c o e r c itu s  pro tuo a r b i t r io , in  cujus manu 
t e  p o s u i, t i b i  i l la m  p r o e f in ie s .  Medium t e  in  mundi p o su i, 
u t c ircu m sp iceres in de commodius quidquid e s t  in  mundo: Nec
t e  coe lestem  neque terrenum, neque mortalem neque immortalem 
fec im u s, u t tu  ip s iu s  qua s i  a r b itr a t iu s  honorariusque  
p la s t e s  et f i c t o r  in  quam m alueris tu te  fgyrmam e f f in g a s .  
P o te n s / /  in  in fe r io r a  quae sunt bruta degenerare. P o te r is  
in  su p eriora  quae sunt d iv in a  ex t u i  animi s e n te n t !a re g en era r i. 
0 summam Dei P a tr is  l ib e r a l ita te m , summam et admirandam hom inis 
f e l i c i t a t e m .  Cui datum id  habere quod o p ta t id  e sse  quod 
v e l i t . Bruta sim ul acque nascentur id  secum a ffe ru n t (u t  
a i t  L u c iliu s )  e bulga m atris quod p o ssessu ra  su n t. Suprem i■ 
s p ir i tu s  aut àb i n i t i o  aut paulo mox id  fu e r u n t, quod sunt 
fu tu r !  in  perpétuas a et e m it  a t e s . N ascente homini om nifaria  
semina e t omnigenae v ita e  germina I n d id it  P a ter . Quae 
quisque e x c o lu e r it  i l i a  a d o lescen t e t  fr u c to s  suos fe r e n t  in
i l l o .  S i v e g e ta l ia  p lanto  f i e t .  S i se n su a l!a  a b b ru tescet.
\
S i r a t io n a l!a  c o e le s t e  evadet anim al. S i i n t e l l e c t u a l ia ,  
angelus e r i t  et Dei f i l i u s .  Et s i  n u lla  creaturatum  so r te  
co n ten tu s, in  u n i t a t i s  centrum suae se  r e c e p e r it ,  unus cum 
Deo s p ir i tu s  fa c tu s  in  s o l i t a r ia ,P a t r i s  c o l i t e  qui e s t  supra
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omnia c o n s t itu t i f s , omnibus a n te s ta b it .  Quis bunc nostrum  
charneleonta non admiretur ; aut omnino quis a l iu s  q u icquam 
admiretur magis? quern non immerito A sc lep iu s A th en ien sis  
v e r s ip e l l i s  huius e t seipsam tran sform an tis naturae argumenté 
per Prothhum. in  n y s t e r i i s  s i g n i f i c a r i  d i x i t .  Hinb* i l l a e  apud 
Hebraeos e t P ith a g o r ico s  metamorphoses ce leb ra tae" ^ ^ .
Man has th e  freedom o f  a l l  th e  v/orlds. He knows them 
a l l .  He knows where h is  duty l i e s .  And he has th e  power 
to  choose i t ,  and to  perform i t  whenever he so w ish es . This' 
i s  h is  p rer o g a tiv e , th e  p rero g a tiv e  o f  a human being " c ^  datur 
id  habere quod o p ta t, e s se  quod v e l i t " .  This i s  th e  moral 
view  o f man, indeed  th e  on ly  p o s s ib le  view i f  m o ra lity  i s  to  
have any meaning a t a l l .  Man, we must th e r e fo r e  conclude, 
can perform h is  duty i f  he so w ish es . ^
1 ) P ico de M irandolla: O ratio de hom inis d ig n ita t e .
T his C ontention  i s  in  fa c t  eq u iva len t to  th e  assumption  
o f  f r e e  w i l l  and i s  th e r e fo r e  a n ecessa ry  p reco n d itio n  o f  
th e  very p o s s ib i l i t y  o f moral o b lig a t io n  and r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  
in  sh o r t, o f  moral exp erience.. Ae such i t  cannot be denied  
u n le ss  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  our moral exp erience be denied  
a t th e  same tim e. T his indeed i s  th e  p o s it io n  taken by 
most Jew ish th e o lo g ia n s , in te r p r e te r s  and commentators:
"On which Moses Maimon comments th a t a l l  th e  Hebrev/s agree  
th a t God has endowed men w ith  fr e e  w i l l  and th a t th ey  
never doubt t h i s  but p r a is e  and g lo< /r ify  god because o f  
i t  and render him d a ily  thanks."  J . Bodin: De magorum
Daimonomania, p .9* quoted above. This does however not 
p reju d ice  th e  Jewish th e o lo g ia n s ’ view  on what i s  to  be 
con sid ered  th e  u lt im a te  ground o f  r ig h t ,  nor th e ir  concept 
o f God as th e  incom prehensible and om nipotent, which d is ­
agrees in  variou s p o in ts  w ith  Kant’ s concept o f th e  moral
(Continued next page)
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c ) Men’ s moral o b lig a t io n  and b is  moral m erit are
con fin ed  to  th e  performance o f h is  duty s in c e  consequences, •
r e s u l t s ,  even th e  e f f ic a c y  o f  h is  own a c tio n  or w i l l  are
beyond man’ s power to  con tro l or to  f o r e t e l l .  Man must do ,
h is  duty and le a v e  th e  r e s t  to  look  a f t e r  i t s e l f .  T his i s
b i t t e r  knowledge fo r  th e  man o f  a c t io n , "mihi gra tu lab ere
quod a u d isses  me prinstinam  meam d ign itatem  o b tin e r e . Ego,
autem. S i d ig n ita s  e s t  bene de re  p u b lica  s e n t ir e ,  ob tineo '
d ign itatem  meam. S i ,  autem in  eo d ig n ita s  e s t  s i  quod
s e n t ias re  e f f i c e r e  p o s s is  ne vestig iu m  ullum e s t  reliquum
nobs d ig n ita t is" ^ ^ ; but does not a f f e c t  th e  moral r e c t itu d e
o f th e  a c tio n  or o f th e  w i l l :  " F a ites  v o tr e  d evoir e t l a i s s e z
2 )fa ir e a u x  Dieux" \
We must th e r e fo r e  once a ga in cconclude w ith  Kant th a t  
th e  attainm ent o f  moral r ig h teo u sn ess  r e s t s  e n t ir e ly  in  our 
hands. We must however d isa g ree  w ith  Kant on th e  manner 
in  which moral r ig h teo u sn ess  i s  r e a l is e d  and moral p e r fe c t io n
^O ontinuation o f  fo o tn o te  from p rev iou s page)
God, and a lso  w ith  P ic  de M ra n d o lla s  concept o f  god as i t  
merges from th e  p receed ing  q u o ta tio n . This means th a t th e  
b a s ic  r e l ig io u s '  view i s  not in com p atib le  w ith  th e  assumpt­
io n  o f  human freedom: i t  changes not th e  con ten t o f  th e
moral exp er ien ce , but in v a lid a te s  i t s  autonomy and makes 
i t  dependent on an ex tern a l and not p r im a rily  moral power. 
I s h a ll  d isc u ss  t h i s  in  d e t a i l .
1 ) C icero: E p is tu ia e  ad fa m il ia r es; IV, 14; 1 .
2) C o r n e ille :  Horace; I I ;  s c . 8 .
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a tta in e d . P a r tly  because o f  th e  manner in  which we con sid er  th a t  
moral p e r fe c t io n  i s  ach ieved , and p a r t ly  because o f  o th er  con sid er­
a t io n s  which we s h a ll  d isc u ss  p r e se n t ly , vie can a lso  not concur 
w ith  Kant’s view th  t  a c e r ta in  w e ll  d efin ed  r e la t io n s h ip  ought 
to  e x i s t  between m o ra lity  and h a p o in ess . Namely th a t  on ly  
m ora lity  should  be con sid ered  as making one worthy o f  happiness; 
and^:that happiness ought to  be accorded to men in  exact p roportion  
to  h a p o in ess . I  s h a l l  try  to  show th a t  t h i s  R e la tio n sh ip  between  
M orality  and H appiness i s  not (co n tra ry  to  Kant’ s view ) x 'a tio n a lly  
required^^, n o t s t r i c t l y  sp eak ing , p a r t ic u la r ly  d e s ir a b le .
Let us approach the q u estion  from th e  an gle  o f  duty: Now
i f  I ta iie  upon m yself th e  duty o f  speaking or w r it in g  in  a ceR tain  
cause and i f  I  ch er ish  t h i s  cause fo r  i t s e l f ,  I  do so not on ly  
w ithout thought o f  payment, but a c t  a l ly  cannot be sa id  to  deserve  
payment, see in g  th a t I on ly  p le a s e  m yself by working fo r  th a t  
cau se . Again i f  I stand  under a c e r ta in  co n tra ctu a l o b lig a t io n  
to  somebody, I do not expect to  be lauded fo r  f u l f i l l i n g  my o b lig a t  
- io n s ,  nor do I d erserve to  be commended, se e in g  th a t th e  perform­
ance o f  such d u t ie s  i s  e lf-u n d ersto o d  and not fu r th er  remarkable 
in  any organ ised  so c ie ty .. Duty in  sh ort i s  an a c t io n  we ought 
to  perform and fo r  whose performance weecannot s t r i c t l y  speaking  
be p r a ise d , but fo r  whose om ission  we are h e ld  r e sp o n s ib le  and 
d eserve to  be blamed. T herefore when we now examine our moral
1) i . e .  ein Beduerfniss der Vernunft.
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duty, pur o b lig a t io n  not to  tr a n sg re ss  th e  moral law fo r  
th e  sa]{e o f th e  re sp e c t we ch er ish  fo r  other p eo p le ’ s persons - 
v/e can f in d  no reason why th e  f u lf i l lm e n t  o f t h is  duty should  
e n t i t l e  us to con sid er  o u rse lv es  as s p e c ia l ly  d eserv in g .
Having accepted  out o f our own fr e e  and u n con d ition a l ch o ice  
th e b a s ic  p o s tu la te  o f  M ora lity , anything we do in  accordance 
w ith th e  o b lig a t io n s  im p lied  in  i t ,  i s  on ly  done, as i t  were, 
to  p le a se  o u rse lv e s; having once accepted  th e  b a s ic  moral 
p o s tu la te , we engaged o u rse lv es  as by a co n tract to  a tten d  
to  th e  o b lig a t io n s  which fo llo w  from i t s  acceptance: th ere­
fo r e  th e  performance o f our moral duty seems se lf-v n d e r sto o d  
and not fu r th er  rem arkable, c e r ta in ly  not deservin g  o f  
s p c ia l  recompense. Rather when o ffe r e d  such recompense, 
in  p r a ise  or commendation, one should r e fu se  i t ^ \  Now 
i t  may be argued th at not th e  performance o f  moral d u tie s  
but th e  moral p e r fe c t io n  which i s  a tta in e d  through them 
d eserves recompense. Let us make i t  p e r fe c t ly  c le a r  th a t  
moral a c ts  performed in  view  o f the moral p e r fe c t io n  o f  th e  
agent are eo ip so  in va].id ated  as moral a c t io n s . In other
1 ) Even iü  Kant we f in d  one u ttera n ce  to  t h i s  e f f e c t  and 
in  some co n tra st to  th e tenor o f  h is  argument on th e  
C ritiq u e  o f p ra c t. Reason: " . . .  even th e  b est o f  men can­
not base h is  exp ecta tion  o f happiness on d iv in e  j u s t ic e  
but on ly  on d iv in e  lo v e  and mercy: For he who but performs
h is  duty has no claim  on th e  b le s s in g s  o f God." Kant: 
Ueber das M issiin gen  a l l e r ' p h i l .  Versuch in  der T heodizee; 
(1791) fo o tn o te  2. '
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words a man who puts h is  own moral p e r fe c t io n  b efo re  th e  
co n sid era tio n  o f other p eop le  a c ts  as wrongly as one who 
puts h is  monetary advantage b efore  h is  co n sid era tio n  o f  
o th e r s . He c e r ta in ly  does not deserve to  be recompensed
fo r  i t .  On th e  other hand, s in c e  i t  i s  th e  performance o f
moral a c t io n s  by which moral p e r fe c t io n  i s  brought about, 
i t  fo llo w s  th a t moral p e r fe c t io n  canndt be ach ieved  %hen 
d ir e c t ly  sought, as th e  aim o f  a c t io n . L^ k^e Truth or l i k e  
beauty i t  can on ly  be r e a l is e d  as th e by-product o f reg u la ted  
and d is c ip l in e d  conduct. Moral p e r fe c t io n  can th er e fo re  
be r e a l i s e d  on ly  as th e  unsought fo r  by-product o f moral 
a c tio n s  s in g le -m in d ed ly  and unassum ingly performed over a 
long  p er io d , fo r  th e ir  own sake, i . e .  fo r  th e sake o f our 
re sp e c t fo r  o th er p e o p le ’s p erson s. L ike Truth or Beaut^^
I i t  i s  th e r e fo r e  an e lu s iv e  in ta n g ib le  p recariou s s t a t e ,  an
e f f lo r e s c e n c e , a bouquet ra th er  than a su b stan ce, or a d is t in c t  
q u a lity . L ike Truth or Beauty i t  i s  in  a manner o f  speaking -, 
th e  recompense, because i t  i s  th e crown, o f  th e  a c tio n s  o f  
which i t  i s  th e  u n sou gh t-for by-product. Can i t  a lso  be 
sa id  to  be i t s  own reward? That depends on how we w ish to  
d e fin e  reward. There i s  reward in  th e  sen se  in  which ■
c e r ta in  v ir tu e s  are th e ir  ovm reward, a sen se  which con ta in s  
a strong re feren ce  to  h ap p in ess. ' C ertain  v ir tu e s ,  i f  th ey  
are but tru e  natu ral v ir tu e s  not m erely assumed ones, l ik e
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courage, com passion, m odesty, lo y a l t y ,  p u r ity , are th e ir  own 
reward in so fa r  as th e ir  very e x e r c ise  i s  accompanied by a 
f e e l in g  o f  joy  and h ap p in ess. Indeed t h is  joy  and happiness  
v/hich i s  found in  th e  e x e r c ise  o f  v ir tu e  i s  th e  su rest  t e s t  
o f  th e  tru e e x is te n c e  o f th a t v ir tu e . So much so th a t as 
von Hu eg e l sa y s . Pope B en ed ict XIV, in  h is  tr a c t  atus on th e  
B e a t i f ic a t io n  and C anonisation  o f Servants o f  God, p o in ts  
out four th in g s  g en er a lly  requ ired  by th e  Roman Church fo r  
formal C anonisation: a spontaneous popular c u ltu s  o f one
hundred years; th ree  w e ll a u th en tica ted  m ira c les; th ree  
w e ll a u th en tica ted  a c ts  o f h ero ic  v ir tu e ,  and th e  n o te  o f  / - 
expansive joy  in  th e  s a in t ’ s l i f e  and in f lu e n c e , however  ^ '
m elancholy h is  n atu ra l temperament. This jo y , t h is  happiness  
accompanies a lso  mental ex er tio n  or a r t i s t i c  ex ertio n  indeed  
any n atu ra l fa c u lty  f u l ly  and r ig h t ly  e x e r c ise d . Happiness 
i s  as' A r is to t le  so a p tly  put i t ,  l i k e  th e  purring o f  a 
sm oothly working machine. Now moral p e r fe c t io n  as we have 
seen  cannot be d ir e c t ly  ex e r c ise d , i t  i s  i t s e l f  a so r t  o f  
’purr*. But i t  has no a f f i n i t i e s  w ith  H appiness, ju s t  as 
Truth or Beauty have no a f f i n i t y  w ith  H appiness. This i s  
c le a r  when we con sid er  th a t th e  R espect fo r  th e  Human Person,n  
when i t  becomes a n atu ra l V irtue as in  th e  Love an^Care fo r  
th e  W elfare o f  Humanity^: when indeed i t s  e x e r c is e  i s  accompani^; 
by a f e e l in g  o f  Happiness and Joy, i s  no lon ger d efin ed  in
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th e  Moral Domain but i t s e l f  i s  su b jec t to  l im ita t io n  by th e  
moral law . When however moral a c t io n , keeps i t s  l im it s  as 
mqral a c t io n  then i t  lin lcs up nowhere w ith  Happiness except 
at tim es to  forego i t .  There i s  I am to ld  a c e r ta in  s a t i s ­
fa c t io n  to  be found in  such s e l f - d e n ia l ,  a c e r ta in  f e e l in g  
o f  su p e r io r ity  and s e lf - r ig h te o u s n e s s .  But su re ly  t h is  
f e e l in g  must be very s h o r t - l iv e d , or i f  kept a l iv e  lon ger  
i t  wnuld become ra th er  p r ig g ish . S ystem atic s e l f - d e n ia l  
i s  no i n f a l l i b l e  r e c ip e  fo r  m o ra lity , and th e d isap p oin ted
I
seek ers o f  m ora lity  p lu s Happiness on t h i s  path are th e  most 
d e so la te  o f  human b e in g s . ?/ould-be moral a c tio n  or even 
tru e  moral a c t io n  i s  no sh ort cu t to  H appiness, and th e  ' 
con sc iou sn ess o f  having done on e’ s duty cannot warm th e h eart 
h a lf  as long as th e  con sc iou sn ess o f  not having done i t  
torm ents i t .  Moral a c t io n  in  hhort i s  no f i e l d  fo r  s e l f -  
seek ers no m atter how sublim ated or p erverted  th e ir  purposes, 
fo r  happiness cannot even be d efin ed  in  connection  w ith  i t .
I
Moral a c t io n  i s  com p letely  s e l f - l e s s  in so fa r  as i t  seeks  
n e ith e r  to  b e n e f it  nor to  improve th e  s e l f  in  any way, and 
indeed  i s  a b so lu te ly  in d if f e r e n t  to  th e  s e l f  and ta k es  no 
account o f  i t .
Moral p e r fe c t io n  i s  th e  p e r fe c t  d is c ip l in e  o f  th e  s e l f .  
The p e r fe c t  balance o f  th e  s e l f  in  i t s  r e la t io n s  to  o th er s .
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As such i t  rep resen ts  a c e r ta in  peak o f human achievem ent, 
a s p e c i f ic  e x c e lle n c e  o f  th e  hu#an p e r s o n a lity . Does t h is  
e x c e lle n c e  deserve happiness as i t s  reward? Does th e  contem plat­
ion  o f t h is  e x c e lle n c e  arouse a heed to  s e e  happiness added 
to  i t ?  I s  th e s ig h t  o f th e  r ig h teo u s and th e  ju s t  in  th e  
unhappy circum stan ces, w h ils t  th e "wicked f lo u r is h  l ik e  th e  
green bay tree"  more o f fe n s iv e  than th e  s ig h t  o f th e  a r t i s t i c ­
a l ly  g i f t e d ,  th e  a t t r a c t iv e ly  handsome, or th e  form erly  grea t  
in  unhappy circum stances? I h o n e stly  th ink  n o t. I th in k  
th a t moral p e r fe c t io n  as an e x c e lle n c e  o f  human nature d eserves  
no more Happiness than any other e x c e lle n c e , and th a t i t  
c e r ta in ly  appears to  need i t  l e s s .  Indeed Happiness seems 
more ir r e le v a n t  to  Moral p e r fe c t io n , than to*any other  
q u a lif ic a t io n  o f  Human e x is te n c e , s in c e  M orality  i s  as i t  ?/ere 
th e  very n egation  of th e  im portance o f Happiness and moral 
a c tio n  i s  d efin ed  as th e  l im ita t io n  o f a l l  human purposes 
in c lu d in g  h ap p in ess. In fa c t  moral p e r fe c t io n  i s  an e x c e lle n c e ,  
or i f  we may borrow th e  termÿ. a v irtu e/u p rem ely  u n a ffec ted  
by and in d if f e r e n t  to  ou ter  circum stan ces. A v ir tu e  fo r  
p rin ces and fo r 'b eg g a rs at once, i t  sh in es  most c le a r ly  
when d esp o iled  o f  r ic h e s , fo r tu n e , beauty, t a le n t s ,  b ir th :  
a t th e  very core and k ern el o f  man:
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quo magis in  d u b iis  hominem sp ectare  p e r i c l i s  *
con ven it adversisque in  rebus noseere q u is i t  
nam verae voces turn demum p ecto re  abimo n\
'e lic iu n tu r  e t  e r ip itu r  persona, man e t res  .
and th e  ’r e s ’ whic remains i s  th e con sciou sn ess and the c e r ta in ­
ty  th a t man’s inner d ig n ity  i s  in v io la t e  and in v io la b le ,  even _. 
in  death: ’v iz  "ma v ie  e s t  dans vos mains mais non ma d ig n ité
or from another p o in t o f  view
/ - 
Summam crede n e fa s , animam p re fere  pudori 
• e t propter vitam  v iven d i perdere c a u s a s ^ .
Moral p e r fe c t io n  we dan now conclude, i s  th e  sp e c ia l
ex c e lle n c e  o f  man’ s innermost h ea r t. I t  has nothing to  do
w ith  th e more p erip h era l and a cc id en ta l e x c e l le n c ie s  o f  man’s
other q u a l i t ie s  l ik e  beauty, w it ,  charm e tc . I t  c e r ta in ly
has even l e s s  to  do w ith  ou ter circum stances, and w ith  happiness
The a u stere  and a lo o f nature o f  moral p e r fe c t io n  should on
th e  contrary re fu se  to/*egard i t s e l f  as in  any way needing
or d eserv in g  happiness".
Although i t  i s  in  th e  power o f everyone to  perform h is
a c tio n s  m orally , moral p e r fe c t io n  as th e  unwavering, un-
\
f la g g in g , con stan t a tte n t io n  paid  to th e  moral p o s tu la te  in  
a l l  circum stan ces, a t a l l  t im e s , th e  d is c ip l in e d  ex c e lle n c e  
o f w i l l ,  i s  a virtue^^ rare in deed . Like a l l  other ex c e lle n c es
1) L u cretiu s . De rerum natura. I I I .  in tro d u c tio n . .
2) C o r n e ille , Cinna I I  A ct. Sc. 1 .
3 ) Ju ven al, quoted by Kant in  K r itik  dér pralctischen Vernunft,
p art 1 .
4 ) I f  I may borrow t h is  term, fo r  th e moment, to  denote an
natural
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o f wMèl?. ïiBman nature i s  capab le, i t  moulds a c e r ta in  typ e , 
a c e r ta in  ch aracter , p ecu lia r  to  i t s  f a i t h f u l  v o ta r ie s :
This ch aracter we s h a ll  tr y  to  d escr ib e  very b r ie f ly  in  
p reparation  fo r  the problem o f d if fe r e n t  b a sic  and in t u i t iv e  
c h o ic e s . Now th e  ’fa i t h f u l  v o t a r ie s ’ o f m ora lity  are f i r s t  
id e n t i f ie d ,  indeed f i r s t  id e n t ify  them selves as such, by 
th e ir  in t u i t iv e ,  primary and g ra titu o u s ch o ice  to  accept th e  
b a s ic  m oral^postu late and i t s  c o n s t i tu t iv e  n o tio n , and a l l .  
th e  o b lig a t io n s  im p lied  in  i t s  accep tan ce. The b a s ic  moral 
p o s tu la te  and i t s  ambiance operate w ith  c e r ta in  w e ll .d e f in e d  
concepts l ik e :  D ig n ity , E q u a lity , L ib erty , Duty and Autonomy.
The c o n t(# la t io n  o f th ese  concepts evokes a c e r ta in  em otional 
respon se, a c e r ta in  quickening and f ir in g  o f  th e im agination  
and th e  h ea rt, in  human b e in g s. This quickening, t h is  f ir in g  
i s  o f  a s p e c i f ic  and d is t in c t  n atu re, c le a r ly  d is t in g u ish a b le  
from th e quickening o f th e  im agination  by th e  contem plation  
o f B eauty, or th e  f ir in g  o f th e  heart in  i t s  search  fo r  Truth. 
I t  i s  embodied in ,^nd  through, c e r ta ip  d is t in c t  and s p e c i f ic  
p sy ch o lo g ica l t r a i t s  and a t t itu d e s  which i t  fo rg es fo r  i t s e l f ,  
and which are c le a r ly  d is t in g u ish a b le  from th e se  in  which, 
and through which, th e  search fo r  T ru th ,for  example expresses  
i t s e l f .  The p sy ch o lo g ica l t r a i t s  which most n early  correspond  
to  th ese  moral concepts can be d escr ib ed  as an in ner a lo o fn ess
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and re serv e , a sober se lf-a ssu r a n c e  and p r id e , an u n re len tin g , , 
s e l f - d i s c i p l in e  and a maximal s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y ,  a l l  o f  which - 
combine to  determ ine a c e r ta in  orimary (moral I ) a t t i tu d e . fv
This a t t itu d e  c o n s is t s  in  equal p arts o f a jea lo u s guarding 
o f  th e ’not to  be abridged* ’d is ta n c e ’ between one man and 
another; a re so lv ed  n o n -in ter feren ce  w ith  th e  p u r su its , l i v e s ,  
id io sy n c r a s ie s  and ch aracters o f o th er men; a p u n ctilo u s  
and ceremonious treatm ent o f  o th er s , which i s  however no mere 
s u p e r f ic ia l  co u rtesy , but a cou rtesy  rooted  in  deep co n v ic tio n s:  
a p o l i t e s s e  de coeur.
The moral a t t itu d e  i s  based on the firm  co n v ic tio n  th a t  
th e  b a rr ier s  between one man and another are sacred , and must
j ■
not be tr e sp a sse d . I t  i s  an a t t i tu d e , p sy c h o lo g ic a lly  
p o s s ib le  on ly  to  men whose cen tre  o f  grav ity ,w h ose  awareness 
o f th e ir  in t r in s ic  importance i s  so sec u r e ly  e s ta b lish e d  
in  th e ir  own h earts th a t they f in d  no occasion  to  seek  out­
s id e  confirm ation: N eith er by tr e sp a ss in g  a g a in st o th ers
so th a t th e debasement o f o th ers may heigh ten  and affirm  
th e ir  own importance; nor by subordinating and abasing  
them selves so as t o ' prop up th e ir  to t t e r in g  importance by
I
th e  importance o f th e  o b je c t , th e  person , or th e  god to  whom 
th ey  subordinate them selves and b efore whom th ey  abase th e ir  
p erson s. M orality  i s  th e  cou rtesy  o f a f r e e  man towards
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h is  p eers: i t  i s  a republican  vi r tu e , par e x c e lle n c e .
t h is
was the v ir tu e  o f  th e  Greek c i t y  s t a t e s ,  on which th ey  prided  
them selves and to  which they a ttr ib u te d  th e ir  v ic to r y  over 
th e  P ersian  hordes l iv in g  in  barbaric serv itu d e:
\ y (I •> ) ^ ox-novT t&T, / This was a lso  th e
v ir tu s  Romanus, to  which th e  Romans a ttr ib u te d  th e ir  mastery 
o f th e  world: "A liae n a tio n es serv itu tem  p a t i  possunt
V 2 )
p opu li Romanum e st  propria l ib e r ta s"  . This was a lso
th e  v ir tu e  o f th e P o lish  n o b i l i t y  who w ould,not su f fe r  th e ir
King to  be more tha a primus in te r  p ares.
In i t s  beginnings an a r is to c r a t ic  v ir tu e  designed fo r  .
th e  e x c lu s iv e  use o f p a tr ic ia n s  amongst th em selves, i t  l o s t
none o f  i t s  p r is t in e  n o b i l i t y  when i t  became th e  v ir tu e  o f
a l l  f ig h te r s  and a l l  b a t t le s  th a t were fought a g a in st tyranny
and oppression: "Der G ott der Eichen wachsen l i e s s  der
w o llte  k ein e Knechte” ,^^ - ’’L iver daued a ls  s la v ”^^  "L*humanité
d o it  frem ir dans tou s l e s  am es quand l ’humanité ou que ce ' '
fu t  su b isse  1 ’ in j u s t ic e  e t 1 ’oppression-'^^ "L’homme e s t
ne l ib r e  ...**^^ e tc .  e t c .  e tc . U n iv ersa lly  ap p lied  to hold
1), A eschylus: P ers a i . 242; 349.
2) C icero: P h i l l ip ic a e  o ra tio n es in  M. Antonium. 6 .7 .  k
5) V o lta ir e .
6 ) Rousseau: Contrat S o c ia l , opening sen ten ce .
3) Martin Lu.t^er: Hymn.
4 ) B a tt le c r y  o f th e  Hansa c i t i e s .
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bétv/een every one human being and ei ery other human being  
moral p e r fe c t io n  becomes a dem ocratic v ir t u e , par e x c e lle n c e . 
I t  i s  th e  v ir tu e  o f th e  men who drev; th e American d ec la ra tio n  
o f independence: o f  th e  men who fought fo r  th e  R ights o f
Men in  th e  French R evo lu tion , o f th e  men v/ho in  England hold  
f a s t  to  th e p r in c ip le s  o f L iberalism  a t a tim e when th ese  '' 
p r in c ip le s  seem most obsolete. I t  i s  th e  v ir tu e  o f  a l l  men
who in  t h is  our age can 's in c e r e ly  say o f them selves "Je
V
s u is  r e s te  un v ieil amant suranné de l a  l ib e r t é  dans un temps 
ou presque t o u t . l e  monde aime a avo ir un m a itr e " ^ \
B efore en larging fu rth er  on th e p u b lic  and m a rtia l, th e  
’ in  tyran n os’ s id e  o f  moral v ir tu e  I permit m yself a short \  
d isg r e ss io n  to  i l lu s t r a t e  i t s  g e n tle r  a sp e c ts . The '
s to ry  o f Kant’s l i f e  and death seems th e  most appropriate  
ch o ic e . For i s  i t  not appropriate th a t Knat vmo had f i r s t  ’ 
preached th e  re sp ect on p r in c ip le  fo r  other p e o p le ’s persons 
should be c it e d  as an example, and i s  i t  not g r a t ify in g  
th a t he can be thus c ited ?
Kant in  h is  ch aracter and conduct was em inently f i t t e d  
to  serve  as an i l lu s t r a t io n  o f h is  own th eory . He p o ssessed  
by nature th a t ’ c o o ln e s s ’ , th e  reserv e  and unsentim ental 
a lo o fn ess  which i s  an in d isp en sa b le  fe a tu r e  o f  moral v ir tu e .  
In the age o f sen tm en ta lity  in  which he l iv e d ,  th is ' co o ln ess
1) T ocq u ev ille: . l e t t e r  to  A. S t o f f e l s ,  o f 7bh January 1836,
p. 470. Oeuvres e t correspondence in é d it e s ,  1861.
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brought him th e censure o f some o f h is  contemporaries^^ 
but a lso  earned him th e  r e sp e c t , a p p rec ia tio n , and p ra ise  
o f many others^ ^ . The ’sentim ental a t t i t u d e s ’ and ’m elting  
e m o t i o n s a f f e c t e d  by h is  age were a l ie n  to  Kant’s nature. 
’Em otions’ ■ produce te a r s ,  and nothing in  th e  world d r ie s  as 
q u ick ly  as te a r s :  th e maxims o f moral a c t io n  must r e s t  on
con cepts’’^^, he used to  say . N everth eless  Kant’s heart 
was warm and k ind , h is  em otions, though not ex a c tly  o f  th e.
1) "C harlotte von S c h i l le r  is -q u o te d  as having sa id  th a t  
Kant would have been one o f th e  g r e a te s t  examples o f  
humanity i f  he could  have f e l t  th e  emotions o f lo v e ;  
s in c e  he could  n o t, t h is  d e f ic ie n c y  marred th e  p e r fe c t io n  
o f h is  nature". quoted by E. C assirer: Kant’ s Leben - 
und Lehre, p . 441 from th e q uotations o f D. Schoendonrffen: 
Kants B r ie fv /ech se l.
2) Goethe con sidered  i t  Kant’ s g r e a te s t  m erit th a t he had 
freed  m ora lity  from i t s  sp in e le s s  and s e r v i le  bondage 
to  the " ca lcu lu s o f happiness" and had " c a lle d  us a l l  
back from th e effem inate' la s s itu d e  in to  which we had 
sunk" -  quoted by E. C assirer: Kants Leben und Lehre, 
p. 287j from G oethe’ s d isc o u r se s , Goethe to  Kanzler von 
M ueller on th e  2J A pril 1818. T ais opin ion  was shared  
by Humboldt, H o e ld er lin , F ic h te , S c h i l le r ,  to  name but 
a few . F ich te  used to  say , th a t he owes "not on ly h is  
th e o r e t ic a l  co n v ic tio n s  and te n e ts  to  th e Kantian p h ilo ­
sophy but a lso  h is  ch aracter , nay th e  very d e s ir e  to  have 
a character . . .  " quoted by E. C assirer; idem, p. 389,
J . B. Erhard v/rote in  h is  A utobiographie th a t he owed 
Kant "the regen era tion  o f  h is  inner l i f e "  and Jung- \ 
S t i l l i n g  th a t Kant’s teach in gs would bring about "a 
r e v o lu tio n  in  th e so u ls  o f man g rea ter  and more b le s se d  
than L uther’ s reform ation". The most e n th u s ia s t ic  and 
c lo s e  adherent hov/ever remained F r ied r ich  .v o n 'S c h ille r
in  s p it e  o f  th e  sharp d ist ie h o n  we have quoted on p . 
and L essin g , by nature and temperament h eld  views very  
s im ila r  to  Kant.
•3) i . e .  "d ie schmelzenden Gefuehle"
4 ) quoted by E. C assirer; idem, p . 287 from Schlapp’ s:
Kants Lehre vom G enie.
410
’m e ltin g ’ , v o c ifero u s k ind, were deep-rooted  and a sto n ish in g ly  
s e n s i t iv e .  The c a te g o r ic a l im perative and th e p ro p o sitio n  
th a t man i s 'an end in  h im se lf , were not mere th e o r e t ic a l  
id eas to  Kant. They were co n v ic tio n s  so deeply in gra ined  
th a t th ey  coloured  h is  s l ig h t e s t  thought and a c tio n , and 
formed th e  very core o f h is  b e in g . When Kant in  th e fe e b le n e ss  
• o f  h is  o ld  age had l o s t  alm ost a l l  power over h is  mind, h is  
character remained unchanged. To th e very l a s t  he preserved  
th e  t r a i t s  which had so im pressed a l l  th ose  who had had th e  
good fortu n e  to know him: an ’in c r e d ib le  m odesty’ , an
"Gefuehl fu er  Humanitaet", and "Die H o e ff lic h k e it  des Herzens".
His modesty must indeôd have seemed in c r e d ib le  ,and deeply  
touching to h is  sen tim en ta l contem poraries. -^ t s t i l l  seems 
so to  u s . But l e t  us quote: "Rousseau" Kant w r ite s  in
1765 ( i . e .  in  p r e c r i t ic a l  days) " is  th e  one who has put me 
a r ig h t . , He has fr eed  me o f  my b e se tt in g  s in :  th e  o v e r h
estim ation  o f  sp e c u la tiv e  th in k in g . He has shown my thought 
th e  way to  p r a c t ic a l a c t io n . The d azzlin g  su p e r io r ity  o f  
mere loiowledge I see  now fo r  th e  i l lu s io n  i t  i s .  I  learn  
to  re sp ec t a l l  human beings^^ and I should th ink  m yself o f  
l e s s  va lu e  than th e most common lab ourer, ^if I d id  not b e l ie v e  
th a t  my r e f le c t io n s  and w r it in g s  w i l l  help  to  secure and re ­
e s ta b lis h  th e  R ights o f  M en"^\ A more in tim a te  glim pse
1 ) " ich  lern e  d ie  henschen ehren", n ote: "Menschen" not
’M enschheit" ,' 'and: uuiirpa-re p .
2) See next page.
in to  th e  workings o f Kant’s in c r e d ib le  modesty i s  provided  
by th e  very la s t  fo o tn o te , to  h is  paper on "What i s  en lig h ten - - 
ment?" "Today th e  30th September I rece iv ed  B u s/liin g’ s 
Weekly News o f th e  13th  in s ta n t , in  which th e  B e r lin  Journal '
I
announces and a d v e r tise s  Mr. Moses M endelssohn’s re p ly  to  
th e  same q u estio n . I have not been ab le  to  g e t th a t number J
- . ' • ■ j
o f th e  Journal y e t ,  and I cannot r e ta in  t h is  paper u n t il  '
I ’ve read i t .  I th er e fo re  a llow  i t  to  stand meanwhile as yr
a p ro v is io n a l attempt and in so fa r  as i t  chances to^accord
v/ith th e  other reply"^^. The im pression  i s  fu rth er  
strengthened  by a l e t t e r  which Schuetz, one o f  th e  è d ito r s  ■
o f th e L itera ry  Reviev/ o f Jena, wrote to Kant (The Review 
had asked Kant to  co n tr ib u te  a paper on Herder’ s r e c e n tly  : 
p u b lish ed  "Ideen zur P h ilo so p h ie  der G esch ichte der Mensch- 
h e it" , and Kant had sen t in  h is  paper w ith  a covering note  
to  say th a t he was read;)'' to  forego h is  f e e  and th a t he begged  
h is  paper to  be tr e a te d  as a d ra ft-p rop osa l su b ject to  the' y ;
approval o f th e  e d it in g  b oard .): "I hope you have already
seen  our number w ith  your papers on Herder . . .  Everybody here
2 )  (Prom previous page):
Fragments aus Kant’s N ach lass, quoted by E. C assirer;  
Kant’ s Leben und L ehre, p . 251.




th in k s they are m asterp ieces o f p r e c is io n  . . .  My god, and 
you could have o ffe red  to forego your fe e  . . .  You could th ink  
th a t something you had w r itte n  might not be up to  our standard, 
or need our approval . . . .  I coiild  not r e ta in  my te a rs  to  read  
such words from you . . .  I cannot d escr ib e  what I f e l t  at 
th a t moment. I know I f e l t  happy, fr ig h te n e d , and indignant 
a l l  at once; e s p e c ia l ly  th e l a t t e r .  For I could  not but  ^ , 
r e c a l l  th e su p e r c ilio u sn e ss  o f our other sch o lars  none o f 
which i s  worthy to  loosen  th e  sh o estr in g  o f a Kant
Such was Kant at th e h e ig h t o f h is  fame. As Poerschke
w rote to  F ich te: "Of a l l  human beings Kant i s  th e le a s t
I
con sciou s o f h is  own g rea tn ess . . . "
As he grew o ld er  Kant grew very f e e b le .  He l o s t  h is
in t e l l e c t u a l  powers and could no lon ger express h im se lf '
c le a r ly .  He mumbled h is  words, he even fo rg o t words a lto g e th e r  
He could  no lon ger  w r ite , not even h is  own name. He l o s t
. y
h is  memory and h is  s ig h t  alm ost com pletely . One v i s i t o r ,  
who, a ttr a c te d  by th e ,)^  then , w idespread fame o f Kant’ s 
name had come to  pay h is  a tte n t io n s  to  th e  "Sage o f Koenigsberg"  
and had found a feeb le-m inded  o ld  man exclaim ed in  h is  d is -  
appointment: "I have seen  Kant’s husk, not Kant". But
W asianski, th e v ic a r  v/ho cared fo r  Kant in  h is  l a s t  years  
and who loiew him most in tim a te ly  wrote: "Kant’s grea tn ess  
as a Scholar and as a philosopg.er are known to  th e  w orld. ' a
I am too ignorant to  ap p recia te  them. Bpt th e  lo v a b le  and Mv:;
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rare q u a lity  o f hism odesty and h is  k indness I had occasion  
to  know b e tte r  than anyone e ls e  . .  . . On th e  th ir d  o f  
February (n in e  days b efore  h is  death) a l l  h is  v i t a l  im pulses 
seemed exhausted. He could and he v/ould eat no more . . .I
H is doctor came to  v i s i t  him th a t-d a y , by appointment w ith
me . . . .  S in ce Kant who could see  no lo n g er , d id  not n o t ic e
th e  d o cto r’ s p resen ce, I c a l le d  h is  a tte n t io n  o t i t .  Kant
im m ediately got up from h is  ch a ir , and gave th e  doctor h is'
%
hand, and sa id  something about "Posten" (ta sk s )  rep ea tin g  
and em phasising th e word as though he wanted to  be helped  
in  expressing h im se lf . , The doctor t r ie d  to  q u ieten  him 
by t e l l i n g  him th a t everyth ing was in  order a t th e  "Post" 
( p o s t - o f f i c e ) . But Kant in s i s t e d ,  and v/ent on rep eatin g  
"many ta sk s" , "hard ta sk s" , "great k indness", "gratitude"  
w ithout - any connection  but w ith  in crea sin g  warmth . . . .  I 
cou ld  by then guess p r e tty  a ccu ra te ly  a t what Kant meant 
to  say . He wanted to  say , th a t see in g  th e  doctor had 
so many other ta sk s , and e s p e c ia l ly  s in c e  he had  ^been • 
appointed to  th e  hard ta sk  o f R ector, i t  was very kind o f  
him (th e  doctor) th a t he had found tim e to  v i s i t  him.
"%uite righ t"  Kant sa id , s t i l l  standing up and trem bling
1) S ch u etz’ l e t t e r  o f th e  18th February 1784, quoted by 
C a ssirer  : Kants Leben und Lehre; p . 389.
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in  h is  w eakness. The doctor asked him to be sea ted . Kant
h e s ita te d , ashamed and r e s t l e s s .  I knev; h is  courteous
f e e l in g s  so w ell th a t I had no doubt as to  the reason wb!y
Kant, though t ir e d  to  th e utmost continued to  stand . ' I
advised  th e d octor, th a t Kant would w ith  th e  cou rtesy  and th e
1 )p o lit e n e s s  which were part o f h is  being \  r e fu se  to  s i t  
down as long as he, th e stran ger in  h is  house, remained
r. '
, stan d in g . The doctor would not b e lie v e  me a t f i r s t ,  but, 
was p rese n tly  convinced and indeed could not r e ta in  h is  te a r s ,  
when Kant, fo llo w in g  h is  example sa t  down, and making a 
supremeu e f fo r t  to  con cen trate  h is  remaining fo r c e s  sa id  q u ite  
c le a r ly  and firm ly: "Das Gefuehl fu er Humanitaet hat miçrh
noch n ich t v er la sse n ."  I t  was th e f i r s t  coherent sen ten ce
he had spoken in  weeks . . . 2 )
Nine days la t e r  Kant was dead and "His corpse was la id  
out in  h is  house in  Ko enigsb erg . . . .  From fa r  and near people  
came to  see  him. Rich and poor, high and low, they made 
th e  p ilgrim age . . .  Theycame fo r  many days, and many came 
two or th ree  tim es . . . .  They a l l  would be ab le to  say la te r :
I have seen Kant . . . .  A ll t h e 'b e l l s  o f Koenigsberg were
r in g in g  when they buried him. His c o f f in  was born by th e
\ ■
stu d en ts o f Koenigsberg and a great m u ltitude fo llo w ed  . . .
He was buried  . . .  in  th e  P r o fe sso r ’s Chapel, in  th e  U n iv ers ity
1) i . e .  Kant’s " fe in e  Denkuij^art und a r t ig e s  Benehmen".
2) E .A .W asianski: Immanuel Kant in  se in en  Lebensjahren.
pp. 204. 205.
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t .l)Church . . . "  ^. L ater th e  Stoa Kantiana was erected  on th e  
spot •
Let us return  to  th e harsher a sp ects  o f  moral p e r fe c t io n , ; 
i . e .  th e  p e r fe c t  d is c ip l in e  o f  th e s e l f .  We have seen th a t  
as such moral v ir tu e  assumes th e  character o f th e  democratic., or
b e tte r  the c iv ic  v ir t u e , par e x c e lle n c e . I wish to  add but- -
>
a few l in e s  to  the p o r tr a it  o f th e  "man o f c iv ic  v ir tu e " .
And by d escr ib in g  what q u a l i t ie s  t h is  man must have and what f  
q u a l i t ie s  he must nob h a v e ^ \ I hope to  d is t in g u ish  him q u ite  
c le a r ly  from th e r e l ig io u s  man and th e  M axim alist r e s p e c t iv e ly . '
I
F ir s t  then , c iv ic  v ir tu e  i s  th e v ir tu e  proper to fr e e  
men l iv in g  in  th e s o c ie ty  o f th e ir  p eers . The man o f  c iv ic  
v ir tu e  i s  a man deeply conscious o f h is  own in a lie n a b le  
d ig n ity , o f  th e  in v io la b le  d ig n ity  o f h is  fe llo w  men, and o f  
. t h e  o b lig a t io n  under which he i s  put by e ith e r . C iv ic  
v ir tu e , though a sob er, s te r n , and ra th er  p ed estr ian  virtue-, 
i s  a brave and g a lla n t  v ir tu e  none th e  l e s s .  None but th e
brave and th e  f e a r le s s  can be i t s  v o ta r ie s .  For, th e  " so le
p r a c t ic a l guarantee th a t th e  l ib e r t y  and d ig n ity  o f men w i l l  
be tr e a te d  w ith  th e  re sp ect and the regard which are i t s  due 
- i s  th e  read in ess o f  men to  f ig h t  fo r  it"-^" .^ To work fo r
1) E.A. W asianski: Immanuel. Kant in  se in en  Lebensjahren.
pp. 225-r 22^, quoted a lso  by Ernst C assirer .,'
I , 2) i . e .  what q u a l i t ie s  are compatible w ith  th e  q u a l i t ie s
in heren t in  c iv ic  v ir tu e , and which are n ot.
3 ) B. Croce: La S to r ia  comme p en siero  e comme a^zione.
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th e  attainm ent o f  l ib e r t y ,  to be v ig i la n t  in  i t s  maintenance,-' 
to  be prompt in  i t s  d efen se -  i s  th e duty o f  a l l  "men o f  
c iv ic  v ir tu e " , a duty from which no quarter can be given:
a l dovere d i com battere o f d i e sser  sempre p ron ti a com battere
1 ) . ’ non e dato s o t t r a r s i ' ' . yf-
\  A .
On th e other hand,' though g a lla n t  enough in  tim es o f , 
danger, c iv ic  v ir tu e , being by d e f in it io n  a r igorou s d is c ip l in e  
o f  the s e l f ,  and a stern  c l ip p e r 'o f  w ings, i s  not a very
A v ir tu e  o f  -s e lf-m od eration  o f  
, i t  i s  not made to  in sp ir e  men to  storm th e  heavens 
and d ep ossessth e  gods, nor to  seek  out th e  h e igh t and depths 
o f  human e x is te n c e . I t  p o sse sse s  not th e fa sc in a t io n  o f  
th e  extreme^^ th e  excessive^^ th e unique. The m ysteries
e x c it in g  v ir tu e .
a)l o i r
''a





B.Croce: ,La S to r ia  comme p en siero  e comme a z io n e .
"No excess i s  good". S . Burke.
Compare P. V a le r ie ’s: "Le monde n ’a de va leu r que par
l e s  extremmes, i l  ne dure que par le^  m ediocre."
Compare J . C octeau’s "Aucune excess n ’ e s t  r id ic u le "  
(Orpheus). Note a lso  th e  s ig n i f ic a n t  ch à ice  o f^th e  
terms in  which va lu e i s  expressed: "good" by Burke,
"Not r id icu lo u s"  by Cocteau. I t  seems reasonable to  
assume th a t th e a e s th e t ic  rather than th e  moral i s  th e  
gu id ing id ea  o f M axim alist ev a lu a tio n . Extremely illu m in ­
a tin g  in  t h is  con n ection  are th e fo llo w in g  remarks on 
"the r e la t io n sh ip  between the b e a u tifu l and th e m orally  
r igh t" : . Whether a c o n f l ic t  between th e good and
con ce ivab le  i t  w i l l  assume th e  character o f  a comic or 
lu d icro u s c o n f l ic t  are q u estion s o f  some consequence. - 
Now we know th a t every lu d icro u s c o n f l ic t  i s  judged to  
be so on a e s th e t ic  c r ite r ia ', i . e .  judged to  be lu d icr o u s .  
And s in c e  u n su ccessfu l a ttack  o f  th e  u g ly  on th e b ea u ti­
f u l .  Can such a c o n f l ic t  take p la ce  between th e  good ,
(Continued n ext page) \ ' , A
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o f  th e  in f i n i t e  and th e in d e f in i t e  are not i t s  p o rtio n .
I t  e n tic e s  not w ith  dangers, adventures, s p o ils  unim aginable.
I t  tran sp orts us not beyond our human s ta te .  I t  i s ,  in  
sh o rt, not a v ir tu e  fo r  M axim alists^’ previous page.
But i f  th e ’man o f  c iv ic  v ir t u e ’ d isd a in s the enticem ents
o f  h is  own to  which he opposes th e  resp ect he has fo r  th e
d ig n ity  o f man in  o th ers, he i s  a lso  deaf to  th e r e lig io u s
c a l l  to  repentance and exp iatory self-abasem en t b efore God, '
to which he opposes th e resp ect he has fo r  the d ig n ity  o f  
in
m an/him self. The l i f e  o f man, to  him, "n’ e s t  pas un p l a i s i r ,  i 
n i une douleur, mais une a f fa ir e  grave dont nous sommes 
charges e t quSl fa u t conduire e t term iner à n otre honneur"^^. 
The S ta te  o f  man, in  th e  eyes o f th e man o f  c iv ic  v ir tu e  i s  > .
an adm irable, a honourable, a d ig n if ie d  s t a t e .  I t s  value
(C ontinuation  o f  fo o tn o te  from previous page):
and th e b e a u tifu l . . .  I t  can, i t  does, and i t s  outcome 
i s  precluded at th e moment o f  in c e p tio n . Such a c o n f l ic t  
i s  however on ly  p o s s ib le  where th e  moral i s  not d efin ed  
w ith  regard and in  subordination  to  th e b e a u t ifu l , and 
where th e  moral arrogates primacy to  i t s e l f .  Wherever 
th e moral demands precedence o f  th e b e a u t ifu l , and thus  
provokes a show down i t  i s  beaten w ithout f a i l  . . .  and 
must be ca re fu l not to  become r id ic u lo u s . M orality can 
become lu d icrou s in  daring t ^ e n y  th e  in v in c ib le  might 
o f th e  b e a u tifu l . . .  The nature o f  th is  might i s  b est  
seen in  th e  nature o f th e  lu d icro u s, because th e  ludicruous 
throws l ig h t  on th e tra n sg ress io n  which a r is e  whenever 
something comes in to  c o n f l ic t  w ith  th e  b e a u t ifu l .  The 
Autonomy o f E th ic s , and o f th e  man o f moral v ir tu e  esp. 
in so fa r  as th e ir  independence from th e b e a u tifu l i s  
concerned, i s  a harmful i l lu s io n  which makes l i f e  gloomy 
and men s t u l t i f i e d  and u g ly . E th ics i s  hot an independeiil 
and autonomous d is c ip l in e  which can be expounded w ithout
(Continued next page)
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r e s t s  secu re ly  in  th e concept o f the u n con d ition a l, in a lie n a b le  
and autonomous d ig n ity  o f th e  human person as such.
Based on th e co n v ic tio n  th a t d ig n ity  i s  th e  very s t u f f  
o f which men are made, and in d iv is ib le  from th e  human person, 
th e  moral a t t itu d e  lo c a te s  th e  cen tre  o f g ra v ity , th e  source  
o f r ig h t and v/rong, d ir e c t ly  in  th e  human person. I t  i s  in  
consequence a s e l f  co n fid en t, and s e lf - s u f f ic ie n t^ ^  view  
o f l i f e ,  and hence a fundam entally ir r e l ig io u s  and impious 
a t t itu d e . By mailing man th e ground o f h is  own d ig n ity , th e  
moral a t t itu d e  needs not appeal to  God, indeed has'no in k lin g  
o f h is  e x is te n c e . Man i s  q u ite  s u f f ic ie n t  to  h im se lf . He 
does not depend on a God fo r  h is  d ig n ity , and th ere fo re  
fo r  h is  m ora lity . The moral a t t itu d e  i s  th ere fo re  deeply  
su sp ect in  r e lig io u s  eyes which always considered
(C ontinuation  o f fo o tn o te  from previous page):
co n sid era tio n  fo r  the b e a u t ifu l. Moralism, by which 
term I w ish to  in d ic a te , th e  jea lo u s attem pts o f th e moral, 
to  pose as an ab so lu te  and independent o b lig a t io n , i s  
made u g ly  by th ese  very attem pts and i s  apt to  become 
r id ic u lo u s . For i t  a sp ir e s  to  a primacy to  which i t  has  ^
no r ig h t , and in  th e  p rocess meets a fo e  in f i n i t e ly  strong­
er than i t s e l f  and who has th e power to make th e moral 
appear as a ludicruous and comic f ig u r e  . . . "  F.G. Juenger, 
"Ueber das Komische;" pp. 47, 4S. ' *
1) (o f  previous p a g e): T ocq u ev ille; fragment c ite d  by
Gustave de Beaumont in  h is  in trod u ction  to  T o cq u e v ille ’s 
works p. 124 (1861).
1) "Nous sommes quelque chose non p o in t par n otre d ig n ité  
m i s  en ta n t qu’i l  nous en estim e d ignes par sa grace,"  
C alvin , I n s t i t u t io n e s , 442.
419
- s e l f  s u f f ic ie n c y  a mortal s in .  The r e lig io u s  view o f man- 
as a being u t te r ly  v a lu e le s s  in  himself^^ previous page, 
whose natural habitus i s  a cr in g in g  and u tte r  self-abasem ent 
b efore God, i s  deeply su sp ect to  the moral v iew . Moral v ir tu e ,  
in  sh o r t, i s  not a va lu e  designed fo r  th e  u se o f cr in g in g  
worms, nor fo r  th e  use o f "creatures" dependent fo r  th e ir  very ; 
d ig n ity  and s ig n if ic a n c e  on the whim or th e  w i l l  o f God. I t  /y  
i s  a v ir tu e  fo r  f e a r le s s ,  fr e e  and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  men, l iv in g  yy 
amongst other fr e e  f e a r le s s  and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  men, deeply v;" 
convineèd o f th e in heren t dignit;)^ o f th e  human s ta te  and 
determined to  defend t h is  d ig n ity  a g a in st whoever might attempt:®  
to  v io la t e  i t :  even a g a in st heaven, even a g a in st th e ir  own
I t  i s  th ere fo re  hardly su rp ris in g  th a t th e moral  ^ )
a t t itu d e  i s  a t one and th e  same tim e jeered  fo r  i t s  t im id ity
by M axim alists and upbraided fo r  i t s  tem erity  in  th e  name o f
. •
Heaven. This brings us r ig h t to  our second problem:
B) What are th e  d iffe r e n c e s  between th e  p o s s ib le  b a sic  
(and in t u i t iv e )  ch o ices? , and: Can th e  primacy
o f th e  moral ch o ice  be deduced from th e nature o f  
th ese  d ifferen ces?
Explanation: The b asic  in t u i t iv e  c h o ic e s , other than
th e moral, most re lev a n t to th is  enquiry are a) th o se  which
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deny th e  v a l id i ty  o f the moral ch oice  a lto g e th er  by a sse r t in g  .
th e  i l lu s o r in e s s  o f a l l  moral experience, or b) th ose  v/hich ,
once accep ted ,are  found to be incom patib le w ith  a p r a c t ic a l
primacy o f th e moral c h o ise. In other words, th ose  in t u i t iv e
ch o ices which claim  a-m eta- or supra-moral r ig h t to  override
th e  in ju n ctio n  o f th e  moral law* i . e .  never to  v io la t e  the-
1)d ig n ity  o f  a human being "
' .  , 
Each o f  th ese  in t u i t iv e  ch o ices corresponds to  an
immediate and b a sic  experience; an in t u i t iv e  v is io n  o f man’s
e s ta te  which i s  h is  nature, an in s ig h t  in to  the arcanae o f
’ la  con d ition  humaine’ . The th ree  ways o f  experiencing man’s
e s ta t e ,  can be roughly described  as fo llo w s: •
a) th e  v is io n  o f man’s noth ingness which th e  th e  
n i h i l i s t i c  exp cr ien ce .
b) th e .v is io n  o f man’s humanity which i s  th e  experience  
o f r e la te d n e ss .
® c) th e  v is io n  o f man’ s uniqueness whicll i s  th e  v i t a l -
70 iù s t i c  exp erience.a
A ll th ree partake o f  th e  nature o f erup tive in tu it io n s ,  
|y'; i . e .  o f th e nature o f "Valeurs tr a n scr itiq u es"  in  Renee
i® '
f ' l  B ertrand's terms: "Valeurs tr a n sc r it iq u e s  . .  c ’ e s t  a d ire
un donne non pense, une ir r u p tio n , une iv a s io n  m en ta le" ^ .
— vi s  p-T— fer- fo o tn o te
î )  I s h a ll  not d ea l, except in  p a ss in g , w ith  th ose  a tt itu d e s  
which deny th e  u ltim a te  Autonomy o f  E th ics but a sse r t  th e  
P r a c tic a l Primacy o f i t s  law s.




A ll th ree  are normally experienced a t various tinies by almost
I
everyone. Their r e la t iv e  frequency, d is t in c tn e s s ,  c la r i t y  
and in te n s i ty ,  however, vary con siderab ly  w ith  d if fe r e n t  
p oep le . The eventual prevalence o f one in tu it io n ,  th e in te r ­
p re ta tio n  o f th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f each, and th e f in a l  a rb itra tio n  
between them i s  reso lv ed  in d iv id u a lly  by each person fo r  him- > 
s e l f .  The p o s s ib i l i t y  o f th e great v a r ie ty  o f so lu t io n  in  
s p it e  o f  th e sameness o f  th e  i n i t i a l  exp erien ces, i s  an o u t- ' 
come o f tha p a r tic u la r  nature o f  in tu it io n .  For, though
"toute in tu it io n  e s t  capable de s a i s i r  d ’une façon im m ediate-' 1
y'y
et adequate son jobje c t  i l  e s t  eronne de penser qu’ e l l e  se  
s u f f i r a i t  donc complètement a e l l e  meme . . .  l ’ in tu it io n  en V-X 
e f f e t ,  en meme temps qu’ e l l e  p e r ç o it  une donne ir r é d u c t ib le ,  
comporte une a c t iv i t é  m entale qui d iscrim in e c e t t e  donnee 
pour s ’ en emparer et entre ces deux composantes i t  e s t  im possib l 
d ’ é ta b lir  unse sep aration  com plete . . .  c ’ e s t  pourquoi une
I
in tu it io n  e s t  quelque chose d ’unique e t de complexe to u te  a 
l a  f o i s .  E lle ,  e s t  une en ta n t qu’ e l l e  r e v e l le  une maniéré
d ’ e tre  ou d ’a g ir  o r ig in a le  et sp e c if ic q u e  de r e e l;  mais e l l e
JL.e s t  complexe en'^an qu’ e l l e  e s t  l i e e  a un ensemble d’opérations
h A-
m en ta i e s . On s ’ exp lique de la  que l e s  in tu it io n s  du meme
o b je t , p u issen t v a r ie r  d’un in d iv id u  a l ’au tre . I t  en e s t  A,:'
a in s i  parce que la  s e r ie  des judgements co n sc ien ts  e t in -  :
co n sc ien ts  e t l a  s e r ie  des experiences qui sont in d is s o l lu b le -
\
ment l i e e s  a ces in tu it io n s  ont e te  d if fé r e n te s  chez l ’un
J ,
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et chez l ’a u tr e " ^ \
Thus, fo r  example, th e  n i h i l i s t i c  e^cperience o f man’s 
nothingness can be in terp re ted  as an u tte r  "creaturely"  
dependence on God, and lea d  to  R e lig io n , or i t .  can be in te r -  \
p reted  as the ab so lu te  s ta te  o f a god less u n iverse  and lea d
,
to  d if fe r e n t  system s o f E x is te n tia lism  and d if fe r e n t  forms 
o f  Id o la tr y . The r e la t io n a l  experience o f  man’s humanity, 
again , can be in terp re ted  as re fe r r in g  man as an organ isa i. Vii®
part to  a s o c ia l  organism, and lea d  to  d if fe r e n t  s o c io -  • X A 
b io lo g ic a l  and U t i l i t a r ia n  v iew s, or i t  can be in terp re ted  y® 
as c o n ta in e d 'e n tir e ly  in  th e  s in g le  man who en ters subsequentlyXX 
in to  a r e la t io n sh ip  o f mutual r e sp e c t , w ith  the equal and >;
in te g e r  humanity o f  o th ers , and lea d  to M ëra lity . F in a lly  
th e v i t a l i s t i c  experience o f man’s uniqueness can .be in te r -  ® ‘y
r ’ A
p reted  as providing proof fo r  th e ex is te n c e  o f th e  unique and
,  A T
excep tion a l p e r s o n a lit ie s  among men and fo r  th e  excep tion a l 
r ig h ts  and p r iv i le g e s  o f th ese  excep tion a l p e r s o n a l it ie s .
I s h a ll  choose one in te r p r e ta tio n  out o f each group 
to  represen t th e  r e sp e c t iv e  b asic  exp erien ce. Thus th e  
r e l ig io u s  experience and th e duty i t  g en era tes , the duty man 
has to  god, sh a ll  rep resen t th e  immediate experience o f man’s 
n oth in gn ess. The moràl experience and th e duty i t  gen era tes ,
1 ) A. Raymond: A c t iv it é  de juger: In tu it io n  et Valeur;
Revue de Métaphysique et de la  m orale, Oct. 1945* pp.
I  ^ 264, 265.
, 2®—vi-g . p ,-^
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th e mutual duty men have to each o th er , sh a ll  represen t th e
in t u i t iv e  experience o f man’s humanity. F in a lly  th e maximal-
\
i s t  e}ip e r i enc e , and th e  duty i t  gen era tes , th e  duty man has 
to  h im se lf , sh a jl represen t th e  v i t a l i s t i c  experience o f  
man’ s unique and ir r e p la c a b le  in d iv id u a lity .
Each o f th e th ree b a sic  exp erien ces, or rather each o f  
th e  chosen in te r p r e ta tio n s  o f th e b asic  experiences claim s  
ab so lu te  primacy fo r  i t s e l f  and seeks to  in v a lid a te  th e  
o th e r s . I t  i s  most important to  be c le a r  about t h is  rivalry^^  
C uriously enough th e  in v a lid a tio n  o f  r iv a l  in te r p r e ta tio n s  
assumes in  most express argumentation and d isp u te s , th e  
character o f a moral d isc r e d ita t io n  o f th e  r iv a l  a t t itu d e s .
Does t h is  fu rn ish  in d ir e c t  proof fo r  a de fa c to  primacy of 
m orality? I th ink  n o t. For w h a t'is  claim ed by each in te r ­
p r e ta tio n  i s  th a t i t  i s  .the only v a lid , th e on ly  tru e  in te r ­
p re ta tio n  o f r e a l i t y .  S ince i t  i s  th e on ly tru e  in te r p r e t­
a tio n  i t  i s  a lso  th e on ly  m orally m eritoriou s in te r p r e ta t io n .  
A ll other in te r p r e ta tio n s  are errors o f tru th ; m aliciou s  
m isrep resen ta tion s or subborn b lin d n ess; and as such m orally , 
rep reh en sib le  a t t i tu d e s .  This argument, which i s  commonlÿ 
used by a l l  in te r p r e ta t io n s , r e s t  on two fa l la c io u s  assumptions 
F ir s t ,  each in te r p r e ta t io n  assumes i t s e l f  to  be not on ly
1) v iz p.
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a Trutii, but tlie  only Truth and th e whole Truth, whereas '
we have seen th a t i t  i s  but one in te r p r e ta tio n  o f  one asp ect 
o f Truth. Secondly, each in te r p r e ta tio n  assumes th a t M orality *
I
and Truth are co in c id en ten t and inaq>arable q u a l i f ic a t io n s ,  
so th a t nothing can be true w ithout being moral at th e  same 
tim e, or moral w ithout being tru e; whereas, we have seen  
th a t th e  moral i s  but one in te r p r e ta tio n  o f one aspect o f  
Truth so th a t i t  i s  u n tru th fu l in so fa r  as i t  d en ies or d is -
■ i
counts th e  other asp ects  o f Truth and on the other hand tru th  
i s  more comprehensive than m orality  and in c lu d es domains 
which are merely " in d ifferen t"  and domains which are a c t iv e ly  j
opposed to  th e moral. M orality  i s  th ere fo re  only a p a r t ia l  j
iTruth. Truth moral on ly in  p a r ts . And th e  r e lig io u s  and ' »
I '
m axim alist a t t itu d e s  though au th en tic  and v a lid  in te r p r e ta tio n s  
/ ‘ - 
o f  r e a l i t y  ( i . e .  a sp ects  and p arts o f Truth) have no part
ii
in  m ora lity , and no claim  to  moral m erit whatever other
m erits they might r ig h t fu l ly  claim  to  p o sse s s . However, i' !
1 ' * 
s in c e  from th ese  r e f le c t io n s  i t  tr a n sp ire s  th a t in t e l le c t u a l
honesty^^ i s  not a moral q u a lity  in  th e  s t r i c t  sen se , i t  can .yW
1 ) By in t e l le c t u a l  honesty  I mean th e wish and th e  attempt to  
d efin e  on e’s concepts as c le a r ly  and d is t in c t ly  as p o s s ib le ,  
and to  r e s i s t  th e  tem ptation o f p lay in g  w ith  con cep ts, 
and ach iev in g  com binations which though p lea s in g  and 
g r a t ify in g  are q u estion ab le , in  w hort, what Thomas Mann 
c a l l s  "das unsauber© S p ie l m it B e g r if fen" and what th e  
Americans esp . L.C. Stevenson tak es to  be th e  essen ce o f  
m ora lity . I t  i s  however not m o r a lity ’s f a u l t  i f  other  
d is c ip l in e s  in  order to  " s e l l  th e goods" use i t s  term inology  
to  a d v er tise  th em selves.
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and must be regarded as a q u a lity  a c c e s s ib le  to , nay a duty 
incumbent on, a l l  who w ish to  d isc u ss , combat or advocate any 
o f the p o s s ib le  in te r p r e ta t io n s . I t  i s  th er e fo re  a t le a s t
in  th e o r e t ic a l  d iscu ss io n s  a duty equally  incumbent on advocates
11 ' 2*) o f the moral, th e  m axim alist ^, and th e re lig iou s^ ^  in te r p r e t-
1) M axim alist a t t itu d e s  u su a lly  claim  fo r  them selves t h e ,  
r ig h t to  make th e ir  own tru th  as w e ll as th e ir  own laws 
and own m ora lity . But th e  very fa c t  th a t i t s  ph ilosop hers  
(v iz  N ie tzsch e , Pareto e t c . )  openly claim  th is  r ig h t -  
proves' th a t they acknowledge th e ir  duty to be ’ i n t e l l e c t ­
u a lly  honest* in  th e ir  th in k in g , i . e .  to  make i t  as c le a r  
as p o s s ib le  to  them selves what th e  maxims and grounds o f  
th e ir  th e o r ie s  are and what im p lica tio n s and consequences 
are in v o lv ed . Muddled th ink ing and unclear concepts are 
not a usual d e fec t w ith  maximalist th in k ers .
2) R e lig io u s a tt itu d e s  are su b ject to  th e  r u le s  o f i n t e l l e c t ­
ual h on esty . Indeed s in c e  God see s  in to  the innermost 
heart o f man, any other p r in c ip le  would seem f o o l is h  as 
w ell as d esp ica b le . The book o f Job here g iv es  the  
c le a r e s t  answer: ab so lu te  s in c e r i ty  and th e  honest attempt 
to  th ink  as c le a r ly  as p o s s ib le , and uphold n oth ing'but 
th a t o f which we are most deeply convinced in  our deepest 
heart are th e  v ir tu e s  dearer to  God than th e  p recep ts o f  
m ora lity  and the keeping o f law s. Job was acq u itted
and r a ised  above h is  companions, not because he had been 
righ teou s b efore  h is  m isfortun e, but because in  h is  mis­
fortu n e he had never stooped to  d ish on esty , never u tter ed  ' 
a word th a t came not from h is  h ea rt, n efer  paid l ip - s e r v ic e  
to  th e  accepted  p ious a t t i tu d e s .  Therefore in  h is  s a c r i­
le g io u s  u ttera n ce , in  h is  d efia n ce  and accu sation s aga in st  
th e  in j u s t ic e s  o f h is  f a t e  he had served god more su re ly  
than h is  companions w ith  th e ir  puny e f fo r t s  to * j u s t i f y  
th e  ways o f God to  man*. The answer in  Job i s  not th a t  
God's ways are ju s t ,  or th a t man's demands for  ju s t ic e  
are u n ju st . I t  i s  th a t god 's ways are in sc r u ta b le , and 
th a t though Job was j u s t i f i e d  in  h is-m oral demands, accus­
a t io n s , a sse r t io n s  and s e lf -r ig h te o u s n e s s , a l l  th ese  have 
no meaning when brought forward in  arguments aga in st God. 
"Now my eye see th  th ee  . . .  I  abhor m yself and repent in
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dust and ashes". The idea of a Thedicee i t s e l f  i s  a 
sa cr ileg io u s  idea, a fundamentally impious and ir r e lig io u s  
id ea . I t  i s  in tere stin g  to note that Kant, for whom 
Reason = Good, and th erefore, what we have c a lled  in t e l l e c t ­
ual honesty i s  the supreme moral v ir tu e , remarked when 
d iscussing  the book of Job: "There i s  something touching 
and which moves the soul in  d isp laying a sin cere character " 
divested  o f a l l  falsehood and p o s it iv e  dissim ulation; 
as in te g r ity  however a mere s im p lic ity  and rectitu d e of 
ttie way of thinking (e sp e c ia lly  when i t s  ingenuity i s  
excused) i s  the le a s t  that i s  r e q u is ite  to a good character, 
and therefore i t  i s  not to be conceived upon what i s  
grounded that admiration with which we are impressed by 
such an object; i t  must then be, that s in c e r ity  i s  the 
property with which human nature i s  the le a s t  endowed.
A melancholy observationI As by that only a l l  the other 
p roperties so far  as they re s t  upon p r in c ip les  can have 
an in tr in s ic  true value. None but a contem plative misantirp 
(who wishes i l l  to nobody but i s  in c lin ed  to b e liev e  
everything bad o f men) can be doubtful whether to fin d  men 
worthy of hatred or of contempt. The properties on 
whose account be would judge them to be q u a lified  for  the  
former treatment are those by which they designedly do 
harm. That property, however, which seems rather to  
expose them to the la t t e r  degradation, can be no other 
than a propensity to what can be used as a mean to no end 
whatever, which i s  therefore o b jec tiv e ly  good for  nothing. 
The former bad i s  nothing but that of enmity (more m ildly  
expressed unkindness): The la t t e r  can be nothing e lse
than a ly in g  d isp o sitio n  (fa lsehood , even without any 
desigh to do h u rt). Tïïe one in c lin a tio n  has a view, 
which may in  certa in  other references be allowed and good 
for instance enmity against in co rr ig ib le  d isturbers of 
the peace. The other propensity however, i s  that to the 
use of a mean (the l i e s )  th a t, whatever be the view i s  
good for  nothing, because i t  i s  in  i t s e l f  bad and blame- 
ab le. In the q u a lity  of the man o f the former sp ecies  
there i s  w ickedness, y et w ith which there may be combined 
a f itn e s s  for  good ends in  certa in  external relations-, 
and i-tiéins but in  the means, which are not re j eatable in  
any vie\7. The bad of the la t t e r  sort i s  w orthlessness 
(N ichtsw uerdigkeit) by which a l l  character i s  refused  
to man -  here I c h ie f ly  in s i s t  on the impurfby ly in g  
concealed as man knows to fa d s ify  even the in te r a l declar­
ations in  the presence o f h is  own conscience. The le s s  
ought to surprise the external in c lin a tio n  to fraud; i t  
then be th is ,  that though everyone Imows the fa lsen ess  of 
the coin with which he trades, i t  can maintain i t s e l f  equal)
w ell in  c ircu la tip n .V ’Ueber das M isslin gen .a l le r  p h ilq - sophischen versuche in  der Theodieee;{%79l ) c lo s in g  passage.
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a t io n s . I t  i s , o n l y  on th e  grounds o f  what I have c a lle d  
’ in t e l le c t u a l  honesty* th a t any d isc u ss io n  i s  p o s s ib le  at a l l .  ;
Now th e  root o f a l l  moral th in k in g  or a ctin g  we have 
found to  be an a t t itu d e  o f re sp ec t towards th e d ig n ity  inherent 
in  human beings as such, and th e cen tra l concept o f  m ora lity  
we have d efin ed  as th e  diy(gnity-of-man-qua-man. This male es
E th ics  a p re-em in en tly  anthropocentric a t t itu d e  and as such  
d ir e c t ly  opposed to  th e  th eo cen tr ic ity ^ ^  which i s  th e  
e s s e n t ia l  and co n stitu e n t fe a tu r e  of. th e  r e l ig io u s  a tt itu d e ^ ’^ . 
This o p p o sitio n  e n ta i ls  a le g it im a te  r iv a lr y  between th e  
two a t t itu d e s  as to  w h ich -is  th e  more a u th en tic , th e  more 
accu rate , the more comprehensive in te r p r e ta t io n  o f r e a l i t y . .  
This r iv a lr y  may be lim ite d  to  an a sp ir a tio n  fo r  primacy, so 
th a t e th ic s ,  fo r  in sta n c e , w i l l  remain v a lid  in  i t s e l f ,  but 
su b jec t to  r e l ig io n  as i t s  u ltim a te  j u s t i f i c a t io n .  Or i t  may 
be pushed to  th e  a n ih ila t io n  o f th e  r iv a l  a t t itu d e  so th a t  
e th ic s ,  fo r  in sta n c e , w i l l  lo o se  i t s  proper meaning and no 
lon ger  be reco g n isa b le  as such. No wonder then th a t th e  
a t t itu d e s  regard each other as fundamental e r r o r s , and'decry
1) Karl B arth , fo r  in sta n c e , d e fin e s  T h e cce n tr ic ity  as th e  
s in e  qua non, and th e  content o f  th eo lo g y .
2) S im ila r ly  m ora lity  as an au th rop ecentric  a t t itu d e  i s  
opposed to  Maximalism as a T ita n o -cen tr ic  a t t itu d e :  I 
s h a ll  d isc u ss  t h i s , c o n f l i c t  la t e r .
#
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each, o th er as in a u th e n tic , sh o r t-s ig h te d , s u p e r f ic ia l ,  b igo ted ,
dangerous, e t . c  e t c . A ll th is  i s  le g it im a te , and to  a c e r ta in  -
1) _  p o in t \  f u l ly  j u s t i f i e d .  The i l l e g i t im a t e  a ccu sa tio n s , th e •
in t e l l e c t u a l  d ish on esty  creeps in , when th e r e lig io u s  a t t itu d e  , ;
accuses th e  moral o f being immoral, because i t  i s  im p io u s^ ,
or th e  moral a t t itu d e  accuses th e  r e l ig io u s  o f  being i r r e l ig io u s
b ecau se^ it i s  immoral^^. That i s  when the r e lig o u s  a t t itu d e
claim s moral m erit in  th e  p r e c is e  sen se , or when th e moral
a t t i tu d e  claim s to be th e on ly  tru e  and le g it im a te  r e lig io u s  -
a t t i tu d e .
\ ■ -
To take th e  la t t e r  case  f i r s t :  M ora lity , e . e .  some morale
p h ilosop h ers in c lu d in g  Kant, claim  th a t such o f  God's revealed;®  
Commandments and a c tio n s  as c o n f l ic t  or c la sh  w ith  th e  moral 
law must g iv e  way to th e  requirem ents o f  th e  moral law , and be 
d eclared  in v a lid . This claim  m ora lity  u su a lly  form ulates in  
th e innocuous and seem ingly in o f fe n s iv e  statem ent .that 'what i s  
ob v iou sly  and f la g r a n t ly  immoral,' or what lea d s  to  f la g r a n t ly  
immoral a c t io n s  cannot be God's tru e  w i l l ,  but an erroneous
1) In so fa r  as each a t t itu d e  i s  an au th en tic  d i s t in c t ,  and 
n ecessary  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  a b a s ic  and in escap ab le  
experience; but not in so fa r  as each a t t itu d e  in te r p r e ts
V but one b a sic  exp erien ce, whereas th er e  are always th ree  
such b a sic  eicp e r i enc e s .
2) i . e .  R e lig io n  d e fin es: Only what i s  conformant w ith  
r e l ig io u s  p r in c ip le s  i s  m oral.
3) i . e .  M orality  d e fin es  : Only what i s  conformant w ith  moral 




in te r p r e ta t io n  o f God’ s word“ \  In other v/ords i t  cla im s
I
to  know 6:od’s w i l l  b e tte r  than anyone e ls e ,  because in  God'iS 
own Nature J u s t ic e  and Goodness take precedence over h is
2 )w il l :  "Deura ip  sum non p osse  supplere locum causae form alis"  '
This in  a way amounts to  an u ltim a te  v in d ic a t io n  o f  th e  , _
Primacy o f  M orality  w ith  God h im se lf as our guarantor. '•
This i s  th e a t t itu d e  o f a l l  reason ab le , s e n s ib le  men o f  
g o o d -w ill who a lso  happen to  be r e l ig io u s , in  th e  sen se th a t  ^
th ey  b e lie v e  in  "Natural R elig io n " . They can claim  S t.
Thomas h im se lf in  support on many p o in ts . Yet i t  seems to  
me th a t th is  a ttitu d e ,w h ich  ^as mixed autecendents and 
r e ta in s  i t s  co n tra d ic tio n s  u nreso lved , can only be j u s t i f i e d  
by a p o s tu la te  demanding God’ s nature to  be such as to  be 
com prehensible and p e r fe c t  in  men’s ey es . Tlis would reduce
I i
i t  to  th e  dim ensions o f  Kant’s "R elig ion  in  den Grenzen der
z')
I b lo sse n  Vernunft"-^^. Of i f  r e c o i l in g  from th is  extreme i t
can m aintain i t s e l f  on ly  by most firm ly  c lo s in g  i t s  eyes 
to  th e  s p e c i f ic  nature o f th e  R eligious^  and th e  s p e c i f ic  - 
nature o f i t s  b a sic  and primary in t u i t io n ,  i . e .  th e  v is io n  
^of man’ s noth ingness and h is  u t te r  and a b so lu te  crea tu re ly  
dependence on God. I t  must a lso  c lo s e  i t s  eyes to  a grea t
part o f  th e rev ea led  Word. In abort i t  must deny th e
%  '
jî'k;■ d iffe r e n c e  between M orality  and R e lig io n , d iscard  a l l  s p e c f ic -
a l ly  r e l ig io u s  con ten t, and r e ta in  but th e  la b e l .  Apart
1) Kant: S t r e i t  der P ak u ltaeten , I ’ve d iscu ssed  the example
o f  I s a a c ’s s a c r i f ié e  on page
t-'.- '■ I ■
\  '  ,  -  ,
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2) Quoted aga in st D escartes’ in  Ralph Cudworth’ s R elig ion  o f  
Nature d e lin e a ted . ■ c
3) and h is  d en ia l o f th e ex is te n c e  o f a s p e c if ic  and v a lid  
r e l ig io u s  experience v iz  p.
from everyth ing e ls e  t h is  procedure has the demerit o f  method--
i c a l  and th e o r e t ic a l  inaccuracy. This seems too great a p r ice ;
\
to  pay fo r  th e primacy o f M orality , seen as com patible w ith  
th e  primacy o f  r e l ig io n ,  ( i . e  w ithout having to  admit th a t th e
V
two cannot be upheld a t the same tim e .)
Can one secure th e  primacy o f m ora lity , w h ils t  avoiding  
an obvious erroneous d en ia l o f th e d iffe r e n c e  between th e  
ex ig en c ie s  o f m ora lity  and r e l ig io n , on th e b a s is  o f th is  ,. •!
d ifferen ce?  In order to  answer t h is  q uestion  th e claim s of 
th e r e lig io u s  experience to  be a v a lid  experience, must be _ " .
review ed however b r ie f ly  before the p r in c ip le s  o f  conduct 
determiiuad by th e r e lig io u s  a t t itu d e  may be examined and comparée 
w ith  the s p e c i f i c a l ly  moral p r in c ip le s  o f conduct.
F ir s t  then , we contend th a t th ere  i s  a r e l ig io u s  experience: 
th a t i t  i s  a s p e c i f ic  and d is t in c t  experience and not merely 
a th e o lo g ic a l in te r p r e ta tio n  o f th e moral experience, and th a t ^  
i t  i s  th e  co n stitu e n t experience o f a d is t in c t  and sep arate  
domain, and th a t t h is  domain i s ' ju s t  as a u th en tic , v a l id  and 
le g it im a te  as th e  moral domain.
\I
The r e lig io u s  domain, then , i s  a u th en tic , v a l id , and
/
le g it im a te  as a d is c ip l in e  o f human thought because i t  i s
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grounded in  a b asic  primary experience: The v is io n  o f man’s
noth ingness i s  an experience common to a l l  men, but i t s  r e lig io u s  
in te r p r e ta t io n , i . e .  th e s p e c i f ic  r e l ig io u s  manner o f experiencin  
i t ,  i s  not so frequent, nor so h ab itu a l as th e  moral experience. 
I t  i s  however no l e s s  au th en tic  and v a lid , being o f  th e same 
stru ctu re  and form as the moral experience. Like th e  moral 
experience i t  i s  grounded in  an eru p tiv e , immediate, ir r a t io n a l  
in s ig h t ^ \  A lso i t  forms i t s  b a s ic  concepts: God i s  God,
man i s  n oth in g , i t s  b a sic  p o su tla te s :  God e x is t s ;  and i t s
laws and o b lig a t io n s  much in  th e  same way as the b a sic  concept 
o f m ora lity , i t s  p o s tu la te , laws and o b lig a t io n s  were formed.
Moreover Kant’ s famous d en ia l o f th e  v a l id i t y  o f r e lig io u s  
experience ” . . .  etwas U eb ern atu erlich es, Aber ein e Erfahrung 
von der es s ic h  sogar n ich t einm al, dass s i e  e in e Erfahrung 
s e i  ueberfuehren kann i s t  e in e  Ausdeutung gew isser  Empfindungen 
von dennen man n ich t w eiss  ob s i e  a ls  zur E rkenntniss gehoerig
I
einen w irk lich en  Gegenstand haben oder b lo sse  TraBumerei s e i en 
moegen. Den unm ittelbaren E in flu ss  der G o tth e it a ls  einen  
so lchen  fu eh len  w ollen  i s t ,  w e il d ie  Idee von d ie se r  b lo ss  
in  der Vernunft l i e g t  e in e s ic h  s e lb s t  widersprechende Anmassun^' 
i s  based on h is  m isconception o f th e  b asic  id ea  o f M orality
1) i . e .  ”un donne non pense, une eruption , une in vasion  m entale” 
H. Bertrand# p .
3) Kant: S t r e i t  der F acu ltaeten : Von R e lig io n ssek ten .
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which he thought grounded in  Reason and demonstrable by Reason 
but which as we have seen i s  r e a l ly  an in t u i t iv e ly  accreted  , 
concept, not v in d ica ted  or j u s t i f i e d  by r a tio n a l argum entation. . 
So th a t as a m atter o f  fa c t  a l l  th a t i s  sa id  in  th is  passage' 
about th e  r e lig io u s  experience can be sa id  word fo r  word about 
moral experience: th e concept o f  th e ’d ig n ity ’ o f man, fo r
in sta n c e , a lso  le a v e s  us doubting v/hether "es a ls  zur. Erkenntniss  
gehoerig  einen w irk lich en  Gegenstand habe oder b lo sse  Traeumerei 
s e i ."  Kant admits a few l in e s  fu rth er  th a t th ere  i s  something 
"was d ie  Menschheit in  der Idée zu ein er  ^uerde erhebt d ie  man 
an Menschen a ls  Gegenstaende der Erfahrung n ich t vermuten sollté*^; 
This amounts to  adm itting th a t th e  d ig n ity  o f man i s  an 
in t u i t iv e ly  accepted , or p o stu la ted  concept; in  short a non- 
r a t io n a lly  generated id ea . But so i s  th e  id ea  o f God.
T herefore i f  moral experience have any v a l id i t y ,  then r e lig io u s  
experience has th e same kind o f v a l id i t y ,  and degree o f r e a l i t y .  
The r e lig io u s  id ea  can be subsumed in  two p ro p o sitio n s: "God
e x i s t s .  God i s  God"^^.
1) Kant: S t’r e i t  der F acu ltaeten : Von R e lig io n ssek ten .
2) • !'< Wt'/ D ix it  Deus ad Moysed:
Ego sum -  qui sum: Exodus I I I .  14. I t  i s  p a r t ic u la r ly
in te r e s t in g  to  n ote  th a t S artre in  h is  a n a ly s is  f in d s  th a t  
on tak ing up th e  i n i t i a l  p o s it io n  o f  "Cogito ergo sun" he 
i s  brought imraediately fa c e  to fa c e  w ith  the concept o f  
I ’antrui* th e o th er , i . e .  th e moral experience w h ils t  Descarts 
who f i r s t  took t h is  i n i t i a l  p o s it io n  o f  se lf-aw aren ess was 
brought fa c e  to fa c e  w ith  th e concept o f God: The remarkable
s im ila r ity  in  stru ctu re  between th e tv/o d if fe r e n t , i . e .  d is ­
s im ila r  in  con ten t, experiences fu rth er  speaks fo r  our çon- 
te n tio n  th a t th ey  ought to  be considered  o f equal v a l id i t y .
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The God whose id ea  c o n s t itu te s  the au th en tic  r e l ig io u s  
experience th e  God who re v ea ls  h im self to  us at th e  very  
depths^^ o f our h o r r if ic  v is io n  o f man’s noth ingness i s  not 
th e  ’moral god’ (Der m oralische Gott)^^ o f  Kant but th e  
Deus absconditus simulacque rev e la tu s  o f  th e  B ib le .
1) Compare: j'. Tauber: Sermon on S t . Matthev/: ’Everything
depends . . .  on a fathom less sin k in g  in  a fathom less nothirg- 
n ess . . .  I f  a man could  answer then r e a l ly  and co n sc io u sly  
from th e bottom o f h is  heart: ’Then I am nothing and l e s s
than n o th in g ’ , a l l  would be accom plished. . . .  Thereupon 
speaks th e  Heavenly Father: "Thou sh a lt  c a l l  me Father
and sh a lt  never cease  to enter in , en tering  ever fu rth er  
in ,  ever nearer so as to  sink  th e deeper in  an unknown,
an unnamed abyss", quoted by E. U n d erh ill, M ysticism , 
p . 400.
2) "As now th e conception  o f God th a t sh a ll  be f i t  fo r  
r e l ig io n  (fo r  we use i t  not fo r  the behoof o f th e  explanat­
ion  o f nature in  a sp e c u la tiv e  view) must be a conception
o f him as a moral Being; as t h is  conception  as l i t t l e  -^ 3
as i t  can be grounded upon experience ju s t  as l i t t l e  Mi 
can i t  be exh ib ited  from m erely transcend en tal conceptions i-f 
o f an a b so lu te ly  necessary  being v/ho i s  to us t o t a l ly  r-
transcendent: so i t  i s  s u f f i c ie n t ly  evident th a t th e
proof o f th e e x is te n c e  o f such a being can be no other  
than a moral one." Kant, "Üeber das M isslingen  a l le r  
p h i l .  Versuch ein er T heodizee, 1 . N ote.
434-
Dens re v e la tu s  simul acque absconditus -  in  what way?
He i s  a revea led  go because man’s noth ingness would have remaine< 
empty and d eso la te  and desperate^^ had god not chosen to f i l l  
i t  w ith  h is  ovm image. Man’s need vfould have remained un- 
s a t i s f i e d ,  h is  cry unanswered \  h is  search fu tile^ ^  had god 
not chosen to  respond w ith  th e  revea led  word. Gods image 
and god’ s word, th ese  are th e two w ays of God’ s r e v e la tio n  o f  • 
h im se lf , and he i s  thus immanent and transcendent at th e same
4>
tim e, dw elling  in  man’ s h ea rt, and fa r  beyond him a t once .
But to  some theologians^^ th is  seemed too irrev eren t an 
in te r p r e ta t io n  o f th e Deus r e v e la tu s . I t  l e f t  man w ith  a
1) Compare ban’s n o th in g n ess’ as experienced by th e  E x is te n tia l-  
- i s t  th in k ers l ik e  Kirkegaard (b efore the ’leap  in to  f a i t h ) ,  
M. H eiddegger, f .P .  S a rtre , e t c .
2) v i z .  de profundis clamavi ad t e .  Domine, Domine exaudi ' 
vocem meam. Psalms 129, 1 . ,
3) v iz ;  In le c tu lo  meo per nocte s  q u aesiv i quern d i l i g i t  anima 
mea; Cant. I I I . l .
4 ) v i z .  th e " A risto te lia n "  school o f  R e lig io u s thought esp­
e c ia l ly  as developed by S t . Thomas and Dante, and evidenced  
by the m ystics v iz  S t . Augustine: v id e l ic e t  n esciu n t quod
ubique s i s  . . .  e t so lu s  es praesens etiam h is  qui longe  
f i e n t  a t e .  convertantur ergo et quaerant t e ,  quia non,
s ic u t  ip s i  desertuerunt creatorem suum, i t a  tu  d ese r u is t i  
creaturam tuam . . .  et ecôe in tu s  eras et ego f o r is  e t ib i  
t e  quaerebam . . .  mecum eras, et tecum non eram . . .  cognoscam ' 
t e  cogn itor  meus, cogn oscam  s ic u t  et cogn itu s sum^
C onfessiones V .2. X l ? . l .
3) v iz  ; th e d ia le c t ic a l  Theology o f  E. Brunner. Pr. Gogarten, 
K.' Barth represen t th e extreme p o s it io n  o f th e  P auline  
~ tr a d it io n  in  R e lig io u s  thought.
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ce r ta in  measure o f in i t i a t i v e  v i s - a - v i s  o f  G-od, and i t  l e f t  . 
man a p o s s ib i l i t y  tc^knov/ god d ir e c t ly  w ith  th e inner v is io n  ■* 
o f h is  h ea r t. I t  seemed not enough th a t God could have created  
man w ithout im planting in  him th e  need to  escape h is  own -i;
n o th in gn ess, so th a t God th e Creator i s  th e ground o f man’s 
need o f H im self. I t  seemed not enough th at once having - •
im planted th a t need in  a l l  men God could r e fr a in  from answer-I ' ^
in  i t  in  th o se  he did not choose to  answer. God i s  a lso  
thought to awaken t h is  need, make i t  conscious only to those. . • 
he p le a se s  to  malce so con sc io u s. God thus r e ta in s  th e f u l l  
i n i t i a t i v e .  By a double act o f grace, (a  double p red estin a t­
ion ) he awalcens one man’s need and s a t i s f i e s - i t : "Vea Vd
aq ui, amigo m io, la  h is t o r ia  in tim a y sé c r é ta  de mi conversion  
. . .  El m ister io  de m± conversion  (porque to do conversion  es r 
un m iste r io )  es un m ister io  de ternura . . .  No l e  amaba, y '
Dios ha querido que l e  ame, y . l e  amo: ,y porque l e  amo, estoy
convertido" W hilst th e o th ers walk in  darkness. He
2 >l e t s  h im self be sought by th ose  by whom he w ishes to  be found ^.
1) v iz  Donoso C ortes: L e tter  w r itten  2 1 st July 1849 to  
A lb eric  de B lanche, Marques de B a ffin , V. pp. 111-112.
2) "Die' L iebe G ottes i s t  n ie  e in e "verlorene Liebe" (th e  
term i s  M artin-Luther’ s ) . B ie i s  "unverlierbar" w e il iw i  
G ottes L iebe nur den Menschen g i l t  d ie  zum Gefuhdenwerden/, -h 
und Finden bestimmt sin d ."  Karl Barth: Die K irch lich e  ^
Dogmatic : Die Lehre vom Worte G ottes: v o l 2 . p . 459.
// >
But t h is  awakening must not be id e n t i f ie d  w ith  an immanent 
knowledge o f god. I f  man had an immanent knowledge o f  god 
i t  would g iv e  him a value and a d ig n ity  beyond h is  s ta t io n ,  
i t  would b u ild  a bridge from man to God. Man must not be 
allow ed to b u ild  such a b r id ge . The in a c c e s s ib i l i t y  o f God 
must not be dim inished. The immanent knowledge o f God i s  
th ere fo re  declared  in v a lid ) /  . The on ly au th en tic  revelation^^  
o f God i s  in  h is  au th orised  word: "The supreme ground o f a l l
Truth cannot be i t s e l f  an o b jec t o f re co g n itio n , only th e . /
’C h ristian  speech", th e words which were spoken to  th e  world  
can be made o b jec ts  o f our knowledge o f God" '^' .^ The various
1) Thus Barth argues th a t fo r  in sta n ce  Schleierm acher’s g rea tesi  
error ( ’d ie  gro sse  Verwechslung’ ) was th a t he m istook th e  
phenom enological-real occurence o f R evelation  fo r  i t s  
su b je c tiv e  p o s s ib i l i t y ,  i . e .  he thought th a t man in  h is  
r e lig io u s  cap acity  could hear the word o f God by h is  own 
e f fo r t :  "Die R e lig io n  a ls  Menschenmoeglichieeit kann n ich t
der Offenbarung a ls  der g r o ssen G ottesm oeglich keit g le ic h -  
g e s t e l l t  werden . . .  vielm ehr i s t  s i e  n ich t rnir Ohnmacht
der W irk lich k eit der Off enbarung gegenueber sondern E igen-^^  
macht, - . . .  (and as such s a c r i le g io u s ) .  K. Barth: C h r i s t - ^
l ic h e  Dogmatik im Entwurf, p. 315.
2) Wir muessen d ie  G eg en sa etz lich k e it dessen was S c h le ie r -  
macher w o llte  und der Glaubensv/elt der A postel und Reforma- /: 
to r  en aufdecken: d ie  in nere Unmo egl i  c hli e i t  e in es Buend- S
n is s e s  zwischen jerd er m ystischen Immanenzphilosophie .
und dem Christentum der Bib e l . . .  gerade an diesem ( i . e .  •
Schleierm achers) Iclassisch en  B e is p ie l  zu bewegen und d ie  "A 
ThodLogie vor d ie  Entscheidung zu s t e l le n :  entv/eder
C hristus oder d ie  moderne '(immanenz) R e lig io n ."  E. Brunner: 
Die Mystik und das Wort: Der Gegensatz awischen moderner
R elig ion sau ffassu n g  und C hristlichem  glauben d a r g e s te l lt  
an der T heologie S ch leierm achers. p . 10. - ' '
3) Emil Brunner: P h ilo sop h ie  der Offenbarung.
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in te r p r e ta tio n s  o f th e manner o f d iv in e  s e l f - r e v e la t io n  i s  
o f th e utmost importance fo r  the co rre la ted  in te r p r e ta tio n s  ; 
o f m orality^ \  \ ^
God i s  however -not on ly r e v e la tu s , he i s  a lso  absconditus./.M  
In the holy  sc r ip tu r e s , and in  th e inner r e c e sse s  o f our 
h e a r ts , he rev ea ls  h im se lf as th e hidden god whom we may never  
know. God i s  above a l l  an om nipotent, an i n f i n i t e ,  an in ­
com prehensible b ein g . His in com p reh en sib ility  i s  h is  very  
essen ce , as fa r  as we are concerned. I t  r e fe r s  to  th a t
fa sc in a n s , horrendum, terrendum e t c . which Rudolf Otto sub­
summed under th e  term ’das Numinoese’ th e numerous^^, and f
to  which i s  a ttached  th e a ttr ib u te  o f h o lin e s s . Holy i s  f
what i s  stran ge, u n fam iliar , uncanny in  a way which fo rev er  ' -f,
. ■ ■ A
excludes i t s  becoming fa m ilia r  and known. The h o ly  god i s  /  f ;
th e  in t r in s ic a l ly  stran ge , the e s s e n t ia l ly  and in a c c e s s ib ly  rS
and e te r n a lly  ’o th e r ’ : "Entre Dios y e l  hombre habia un ,S
S')abismo insondable*^'^. To measure t h is  God w ith  a human measure/ 
i s  sheer f o l l y .  To tr y  to  understand h is  ways i s  f u t i l e .  ;
1) For on ly  an however f a in t  immanence o f God, an however 
> fe e b le  i n i t i a t i v e  on th e  part o f man can assure man’s
e x is te n c e  as a moral person . . f
2) v i z .  R. Otto: Das H e il ig e .
3) Donoso C ortes: Carta a l em inentissim o Cardenal Forniar
sobre e l p r in c ip io . generador de lo s  mas graves errores
de n u estros d ia s . V. p . 191. /
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To judge them by the p r in c ip le s  o f m orality  and im m orality ,
i s  sa c r ile g e o u s . Thus, from a r e lig io u s  p o in t o f view a l l  /
attem pts 'to  j u s t i f y  th e ways o f God to  man* are notem erely  
. fo o l is h  but s in f u l .  They are in sp ire d  by th a t in fe r n a l p rid e  
which i s  th e  cause o f  human wickedness: " in itium  omnis
p e c c a ti superbia."  • /f j
This indeed i s  th e meaning o f  God’s answer to  Job:
W ilt thou disannul my judgement? W ilt thou condemn me th a t :
g
thou may e s t  be jus t f  led? Or has thou an arm l ik e  God? And %
can st thou thunder w ith  a v o ice  l i k e  him? . . . .  Behold now ,
Behemoth vrhich I made w ith  th ee  . . . .  Canst thou draw out
Leviathan w ith  a hook . . .  W ilt ^  make a covenant w ith  thee?"^^ 
Not th e j u s t i f i c a t io n  o f God m o r a lit ie s , but th e  h u m ilia tion
o f Job e x is t e n t ia l i t e r  i s  th e r e lig io u s  so lu t io n  o f man’s /
e v e r la s t in g  query . God isom n ip oten t, transcendent,
1 ) Job: XL, 8 , 3 , 15; XLI, 1 .4 .
2) The mixed f e e l in g s ,  mixed in  equal p arts o f acknowledgement,,
(of fa c t )  and exasperation  (m oral!) w ith  which th e  man o f
reason regards t h is  query and t h is  answer are admirably
because humoux^ly expressed by Heine:
Warum sch lep p t s ic h  blutend elend  
Unter K reuzlast der G erechte 
Waehrend g lu e c k lic h  a ls  e in  S ieg er  
Trabt zu hohem Ross der S ch lech te
Also fr a g en'w ir bestaen d ig  
Biis man uns m it einem Handvoll 
Erde en d lich  s to p f t  d ie  M aeuler.'
Aber i s t  das e in e  Antwort?
In other words t h e ,r e lig io u s  so lu t io n  though, f in a l  in  
terms o f r e a l i t y  i s  not f in a l  in  terms o f  r ig h t  and v/rong: 
in  terms o f m o ra lity . The r e l ig io u s  so lu t io n  i s  not a
(Continued next page) .
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incom prehensible. Man i s  fo o l is h ,  ephemeral and p ow erless. - 
The proper a tt itu d e  o f man when confronted  vd_th God’s m ajesty  
i s  h u m ility , penance, and adoration . "Then Job answered 
the Lord and sa id , I know th a t thou canst do a l l  th in gs and 
th a t no purpose o f th in e  can be r e s tr a in e d . Therefore. I
I +-
have u ttered  th a t which I understood n o t. Things too wonder- ' 
fu l  fo r  me which I knev/ n o t. I have heard o f  th ee  by th e  
hearing o f  my ear, but now mine' eye see th  th ee . Wherefore ;
I abhor m yself and repent in  dust and a sh e s .
From t h is  cen tra l te n e t on God’s i n f i n i t e ,  omnipotent 
and uncomprehensible nature a l l  r e l ig io u s  d octr in e  stem, '
(C ontinuation  o f fo o tn o te  from la s t  page): ,
moral so lu t io n . N everth eless  th e r e lig io u s  answer i s  , y 
f in a l  h ere, because th e moral q uestion  i s  put a p r io r i   ^ /J
in  th e  wrong, s in c e  i t  should never be ra ised  in  t h is  ' -
sen se . M orality i s  a m atter o f r e so lv e , a m atter between 
man and man. The moment i t  overstep s t h is  bound and i s -  ■ 
r a ise d  ( in  e x i s t e n t ia l i s t  terms as i t  were) between man' 
and God i t  becomes in v a lid , f o o l i s h  and n o n se n sica l. The .
moral d ev ice  as regards God i s :  "F aites v o tre  devoir et
la i s s e z  f a ir e  aux Dieux", or on a more a g g ressiv e  note: . fi |
"F iât j u s t i t i a  ruat coelum." Which i s  but another way o f  
rep eatin g  E .F. C a rr itts  most a p p osite  exclam ation: What i
i s  th e purpose o f  man from th e  p o in t o f view o f G od? I -‘,:j
do not know, and as a moral ph ilosop her I do not care!"
But i f  th e  m orality  makes i t s e l f  independent o f God i t  
cannot expect to  be recompensed by God. God in  h is  mercy 1 
may do so but he has -no moral o b lig a t io n  (even apart from 
h is  omnipotence) to  do i t .  i
1) Job: XLII. 1 -6 . j
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and a l l  r e l ig io u s  view s are determined by i t ,  in clu d in g  t h é ,  
r e lig io u s  views on m o ra lity . This i s  not the proper p la ce  
fo r  a d e ta ile d  examxation o f r e l ig io u s  d o ctr in e , and my 
purpose i s  mjich too humble to presume on any such ta sk . The 
fo llo w in g  arguments are n e c e s sa r ily  put forward very roughly  
and very much ad hoc. Hgughly then , we can d is t in g u ish
\
two a u th e n tic a lly  r e l ig io u s  approaches to  moral p r in c ip le s , -
law s, and problems. One keeps the moral content o f  ’m o r a lity ’
in ta c t  but v in d ic a te s  i t  on non moral grounds, i . e .  on the
r e lig io u s  ground o f being th e  command o f God which must be ^
obeyed fo r  th e  loved  o f  g o d ^ \ The o th er  changes not only
th e view p o in t on m o ra lity , but th e  con tent o f m orality  i t -  
2  )s e l f  , so th a t what may be san ction ed  on r e lig io u s  grounds , 
i s  condemned on moral grounds and v ic e  versa . The la t t e r  
contingency might b e f a l l  th e  f i r s t  approach but i t  i s  th e  . 
norm and th e  r u le  o f  th e second approach. . ’r
1) The f i r s t  approach i s  th e one seen  in  th e  book o f  Job, 
the Old Testament (g e n e r a lly  spealcing and confirmed by 
alm ost a l l  Hebrew T heologians -(v ia  p alsom ost th eo log ian s  
o f  th e  ’golden age o f C ath o lic ism ’ , and commands today
a great part o f th e  C ath olic Church.
2) The second a t t itu d e  i s  th e one propounded by the extreme 
fa c t io n  o f  th e  P ro testa n t Church, a fa c t io n  whose progress­
iv e  extremeness i s  o u tlin e d  by th e  names S t . P au l, C alvin , 




To exp la in  th is  somewhat cry p tic  remark l e t  us review *’
th e two a tt itu d e s  more c lo s e ly .  As always in  q u estion s o f
m orality  th e cru c ia l p o in t i s  the meaning attached  to  the
concept o f th e  d ig n ity  o f man. Now in  th e  f i r s t  approach
man though not endowed w ith  d ig n ity  by h is  own power, i s  ' , -
endowed w ith  d ig n ity  by God th e C reator, who lo v in g ly  created
1 )man in  h is  o\wi im age.’ A ll men are created  in  h is  image, -
and th er e fo re  a l l  men are p ossessed  o f  d ig n ity . The moral '' ' 
p o stu la te  i s  thus san ction ed  by the w i l l  and the grace o f god.
I
Moreover god in  h is  i n f i n i t e  lo v e  gave men th e power to  choose, r 
and th e  cap acity  to  w i l l  th e  good and ach ieve h is  own r ig h t­
eousness^^ .
The concept o f  m orality  r e ta in s  i t s  o r ig in a l meaning 
in  th is  co n tex t, and moral laws th e ir  id e n t ity :  moral r ig h t­
ness remains th e  c r ite r io n  o f  m ora lity . But the ground and ^
th e  reason o f m ora lity  are changed. . The ground o f m orality  
i s  th e w i l l  o f god, and th e reason o f  m ora lity  th e lo v e  o f  god. 
Laws are good laws because they  were commanded by God, and . 
because ’Omnis ra tio r  v e r i e t boni ab eus omnipot eut ia  - .
d ep en deat"^ \ The very b a s is  o f m orality: th e  concept o f
' -  -  I ■ «     I ■ ■ M l I I   l . l . . .  I I— . -  .1 l . n  « . . ■ ■ I „  p  ' -  "  .  -  . ■ ■ ■ I I
1) Et a i t :  Faciamus hominem and imaginem et similmtudinem
nostram . . .  Et c r e a v it  Deus hominem ad imaginem suam ad 
imaginem Dei c r e a v it  i l iu m  , Gen. 1 . 26, 27* note th e }
th r e e fo ld  r e p e t it io n  and emphasis.
I '
2) But not to  expect a recompense fo r  i t  I
3) D esca rtes.
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th e  in a lie n a b le  d ig n ity  o f man, has ceased to be th e  non- 
p lu s -n ltr a  ground o f r ig h t  a c t io n . I t  remains v a lid  in so fa r  
as i t  has p lea sed  God to cr ea te  man in  h is  own image and to  ,
endow him w ith  d ig n ity . The inner m otivation  o f m orality  -, ’
undergoes a sim ultaneous tr a n sp o s it io n  in to  th e  r e lig io u s  key:
M orality i s  th e doing o f r ig h t  a c tio n s not fo r  th e resp ect
,  i  %
o f man, but fo r  th e lo v e  o f God. E v il i s  not th e  abuse o f 4^  
human d ig n ity , but a s in  aga in st God. And s in c e  our f i r s t  f  /I  
duty to  God i s  to  lo v e  him w ith  a l l  our heart and a l l  oTxr % 
m ight, s in  i s  p rim arily  a d e fic ie n c y  in  the lo v e  o f God.
The breaking o f moral laws i s  wrong not because o f th e  in t r in s r  
badness o f th e  a c t io n , but because i t  i s  an a ct o f d isob ed ien ce
.. f .
towards God, who had commanded th o se  laws: "G atholicae fl6.es.}
e s t:  omne quod d ic itu r  malum aut peccatum e s s e , aut poenam
I )  ■
p e c c a ti The keeping o f moral laws i s  good because i t
/
i s  an act" of lo v in g  obedience towards God. The lo v e  o f God /  
i s  th e  u ltim a te  ground o f a l l  human o b lig a t io n , in clu d in g  o u r - 
’o b lig a t io n  to  lo v e  our neighbours’ . What god commanded i s  
th er e fo re  l e s s  important than th a t he commanded i t .  God . r
could  have g iven  us other laws to keep had he so chosen, 4/
. i  $
and fo r  the lo v e  o f him th ey  ought to  have been kept ju s t  -  ‘ ■ 
as s t r i c t l y .  Moreover had God chosen to  g iv e  us other laws 
th a t th e  ones we know, th ey  would have been ju s t  as r ig h t  and
1) S t . A ugustine.
.  4-43 .
I ' -  :
1 )ju s t  as good because b is  ch oice v/ould have made then so *
God’s w i l l  i s  th e essen ce o f h is  being and God’s a c ts  
are arb itrary  acts  o f sheer w i l l .  '-^ he arb itrary  and mysterious
w i l l  of'God m an ifests i t s e l f  in  th e  act o f r e v e la t io n , and
i s  answered in  the r e lig io u s  response by an act o f sheer ’ ’
w i l l  in  man which i s  th e  act o f f a i t h  . Thus indeed had 
I s r a e l  answereè ^od on Mount S in a i and had .said: :
we s h a ll  do thy w i l l ,  and we s h a ll  hear i t .  • I s r a e l  had ■ /, -
promised to  do God’s bidding because i t  was God’s b idd ing,
a
and because God had c a lle d  upon them to  do i t ,  and .prior to  
knowing what i t  was th a t God would b id  them do. Had they  
been ab le  to /d o  h is  bidding w ithout knowing what i t  was 
th ey  would not have asked to  hear i t  at a l l .  This complet'e 
tr u s t  and com plete self-abandonm ent in  th e hand and to th e  ■ ■-■d
w i l l  o f  God'was I s r a e l ’ s supreme a ct o f f a i t h ,  th e  r e lig io u â  
response par e x c e lle n c e . The- a c ts  o f sh ee t a rb itrary  w i l l  • f
are a c ts  o f lo v e . By an a ct o f  lo v e  I s r a e l  was"chosen, by
■ - t ;
an a ct o f  lo v e  i t  accepted  the ch o ice .
To sum up: To th e r e lig io u s  response every o b lig a t io n  : / /
has i t s  source in  God’s w i l l  and every o b lig a t io n  i s  an o b lig a t;  
- io n  to  lo v e  God. I f  God’s revea led  command c la sh es  in  any - :
1) v iz  Occam and D escartes.
2) This i s  the p o s it io n  common to  Occam, D escartes, Luther,
P a sca l, e tc . ' . _
3) Exodus: XIX, 8 . - :
/r ..
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way w ith  what i s  due to  the d ig n ity  o f man, i t  n a tu ra lly  ta^es  
precedence, s in c e  God i s  th e  source both o f th e command and 
o f  th a t d ig n ity  and i f  in  h is  in sc ru ta b le  way he has chosen  
to  su b ject the one to  th e other h is  w i l l  i s  always holy and 
must be obeyed, ad majorem dei gloriam .
He may wish to  t e s t  .us as he did Abraham, or he may have 
d is ta n t aims in  view o f which we knov; noth ing, but*whatever 
h is  demands -  th e  on ly  proper and f i t t i n g  response i s  f a i th  
and obedience and tr u s t ;  th e  u n flin ch in g  lo v e  o f God.
"This a t t itu d e  fin d s  i t s  cu lm ination  in  th e m iddle- 
a g e s . . .  in  th e  s p e c i f i c a l ly  C h ristian  E th ics  . . .  The formula 
. . .  fo r  th e s p e c i f i c a l ly  C h ristian  Moral Law i s  here th e  
A ugustin!an d e f in it io n  o f th e lo v e  o f God as th e h ig h est and 
ab so lu te  the e n t ir e ly  sim ple Moral end -  an end which con ta in s  
th e demand o f th e lo v e  o f God in  th e s t r i c t e r  sen se ( s e l f ­
s a n c t i f ic a t io n ,  s e l f4 d e n ia l ,  contem plation) and th e  demand 
fo r  th e lo v e  o f our neighbour ( th e  a c t iv e  r e la t in g  o f a l l  to  
God, t he a c t iv e  in te r r e la t in g  o f  a l l  in  God, and th e  most ' 
p en etrating  mutual s e l f - s a c r i f i c e  fo r  God) . This E th ic ,
a m ystica l in te r p r e ta tio n  o f th e  E van gelica l Preaching forms
1 ^
indeed a strong co n tra st  ^ to  th e This-W orldly E th ic o f Natuià
1) Just how strong a co n trast w i l l  become more apparent when 
we examine the more f la g ra n t ca ses  o f c o n f l ic t  between 
th e  moral and r e lig io u s  ^attitudes in  some p r a c t ic a l instances; 
l i ÿ e  th e w itch  t r i a l  o f Europe: The q uestion  o f  s o c ia l
aad p o l i t i c a l  reform; and th e r ig h t to  err, i . e .  freedom - 
o f  thought and th e  e x c lu s iv e  p o sse ss io n  o f  Truth.
" . f  '- .  - j  •
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Law . .  but then th is  cannot f a i l  to  be th e case  g iven  th e
e n tir e  fundamental character o f th e C h ristian  Ethic"^^.
2 )The second trend   ^ in  r e lig io u s  d octr in e  changes the
very content o f m ora lity , or rather i t  robs m orality  o f ' - ■
a l l  meaning and sim u ltaneously  renders th e " e th ic a l s itu a t io n  
im p o ss ib le " ^ \ I t  does so by m erely th ink in g  to  th e ir  
lo g ic a l  end th e thoughts e n ta ile d  by th e concepts o f  man’ s /  
noth ingness and god’s i n f i n i t e ,  om nipotent, incom prehensible / 
b ein g . By drawing the la s t  consequences from th e  c o n s is te n t  
r e l ig io u s  p o in t o f  view , i t  in v a lid a te s  the concept o f man’ s. 
d ig n ity  which i s  th e c r u c ia l concept o f  m ora lity , and 
p reclu d es th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  freedom which i s  th e s in e  qua 
non o f a llm oral r e s p o n s ib i l i ty ,  o b lig a t io n , and m erit. /
Man in  h is  ab ject nothing ess stands b efore  God. To . . : 
stand b efore God means th a t man i s  confronted  w ith  the • "-3/
" "  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  "   - . . I - . .  „  . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   '  _  .   I ,  ,  . .  —
1) E. T roeltsch : S o z ia lle h r en  der C h r istlich en  Kirch en ,
und Gruppen; p. 265* v
2) To i l lu s t r a t e  th is  trend I draw m ostly upon th e  w r itin g s  ;
o f  Karl Barth. / I
5) "Der P raedestinationsgedanke . . .  i s t  a ls  K orrektive zu 
e in er  sa e k u la r is ie r te n  " ch r istlich en "  H um anitaetsethik  
b e r e c h tig t  . . . ' a l s  P rin zip  e in er  E thik i s t  er un­
mo e g lic h  w e il er a ls  so lch es d ie  e th isch e  S itu a t io n   ^
se lb st^ a u fh eb t" . John C ullberg: Das Problem der ,/H
E thik in  der d ia le k t isc h e n  T h eolog ie , p . 45*; U^sala 
U n iv e r s ite ts  A r ssk r if t , 1938.
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1 )question : v/hat ought i  to  do? The q uestion  ch a llen ges  ^
man in  a l l  ser io u sn ess  and he i s  ob lig ed  to answer i t ,  but .
he cannot answer i t  because th e answer had been decided fo r
2 )him s in c e  th e beginning o f tim e in  God’s in sc ru ta b le  decree . 
This i s  man’s e x is t e n t ia l  p o s it io n , th e s ta t e  o f man.
Though th e  e x is t e n t ia l  s itu a t io n  i s  th e same fo r  a l l
men, r e a l i t e r  men are not conscious o f  th e ir  tr a g ic  p o s it io n
u n less  God opens th e ir  h earts  and th e ir  eyes, by a sp e c ia l
in d iv id u a l d isp en sa tio n  o f h is  grace to th is  or to  th a t man:
"Therefore hath he mercy on vfhom he w i l l  and whom he w i l l  he
hardeneth"^^. Man cannot on h is  own i n i t i a t i v e  c a l l  on God,
4")because th ere  i s  no p o in t at which man can con tact God g
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  —  -  -  -  ■ -  -  .  -  - t -  —
1) i . e .  "Die g rosse  Stoerung" K. B arth’s comprehensive t i t l e  
fo r  chapters d ea lin g  w ith  e th ic a l  problems in  Der Hoemer- 
b r ie f  v iz  p. 4-10. "Die gro sse  Stoerung" i s t  n ic h ts  
anderes a ls  d ie  Beunruhigung durch den den Menschen in  
ab so lu te  U ngew issheit versetzenden  Praedestinationsgedanken*.’ 
H. Eklund, quoted by J . C ullberg; idem. p . #3 .
2) "Das i s t  a lso  d ie  E x is t e n t ia l i t a e t  des Menschen dass er 
d ie  e th isch e  Prage hoert und ern st nimmt . . .  dass er ant­
wort en s o l i  aber n ich t antworten kann, w e il d ie  Antwort 
von Ew igkeit her in  G ottes R atsch luss geschriebeh  s te h t  -  
und dass er dabei Gott d ie  Ehre g ib t" , v iz  J . C ullberg,idem .
3) Romans IX, 18.
4 ) " Anlcnu epf ungspunkt " v iz  B arth’s answer "N ein  I " to  Emil 
Brunner’ s "lèfeur und Gnade". Barth argues a g a in st Brunner 
th a t man has l o s t  h is  image o f  God through o r ig in a l s in  
and th ere fo re  h is  humanity im p lies  no longer a cap acity
to  hear th e v/ord o f  God, th e p o in t o f  con tact e x is t s  no 
lo n g er . The on ly con tact now i s  through C hrist and through 
th e  C h ristian  f a i t h  and only through i t .  Not man as such, 





Man cannot go in  search o f what he knows not th a t he m isses  
he cannot lo v e  God u n le ss  God lo v es  him f i r s t .  Far from
being conscious o f God’s absence, or h is  need o f God u n less
God addresses h is  word to  man. "The knowledge o f God’s
word i s  not p o ss ib le  w ithout th e experience o f  God’s word. - 4
The word o f God i s  known when i t  malces i t s e l f  known" . - "^3;/
Man’s response to  God i s  thus dependent on a tv/ofold  act o f  3"
grace from God. God must address man b efore  man can repond,
and he must turn man’s heart to  the r ig h t response^^. How ’ 4.
does God address man? What i s  th e  r ig h t response to  God? ^
Gan man acquire any m erit, a lu e , d ig n ity  by making th e r ig h t
response!?  ^ Can he so lv e  h is  problem in  th is  way? F irst, then
God address man in  one way and in  one way only: by h is  ' 4
'
revea led  word: th e commandments and th e  evangel io n . S ince
■ '4:-^
man has no value in  h im se lf what i s  commanded by God i s  not 4  ;
determined by any co n sid era tio n  except God’s arb itrary  w i l l ,  v.g:
■ .  ^ ' -4
Hence "no T h eo log ica l E th ics  can decide what i s  commanded by
- y
God e ith e r  by having recourse t o ,t h e  etern a l order o f creation*^' 
or by analogy from this or th a t B ib le  v erse  . . .  what i s  commanded
g'. 1) K. Barth: D ie K irch lich e  Dogmatik; Die Lehre vom Worte
:>, ! ^ o t te s . 1 , p . 260.
I
Û' i . e .  "die verantw orth lich e Antwort", v iz  C h r is t lic h e
5’ Dogmatik, e t c .
4 M'
i . e .  "ad imaginem d ei c r e v it  ilium " v iz  n.
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by God only god h im se lf can t e l l  us -  in  h is  commandment." '^ ,^ i
  1
' ■ " ^  -i
1) K. Barth: Zwischen den Z eiten . p . 216.. compare a lso  i
G orer’s amazingly analogous psychographical d escr ip tio n  'j 
o f th e Russian character: " . . .  th e ordinary person 'j
cannot imagine h im self th ink in g  or f e e l in g  as th e deader ]
would do -  when he does not have th e n ecessary  inform - t
ation  (which by th e  nature o f th in g s  th e  ordinary .
person can never h ave). This p o in t can perhaps be ■
most c le a r ly se e n  by means o f a con trast w ith  the tu p le a l ^
a tt itu d e  o f th e Japanese . to th e ir  Emperor. Although / 
th e  Japanese regard th e ir  emperor w ith  tiie  g r e a te s t  . j
ven eration  i t  was always th e o r e t ic a l ly  p o s s ib le  fo r  ' \
a Japanese to know (as i t  were by in tr o sp e c tio n  ( immanence0 
what the Impæial w i l l  was and to act accord in g ly . The ;
ty p ic a l excuse fo r  p o l i t i c a l  a s sa ss in a t io n  was th a t /  4
th e persons a ssa ss in a te d  were ’f a i l in g  to carry out th e  !
v / i l l  o f th e emperor’ . This im p lies  th a t th e  a s sa s s in , !
h is  judges and th e p u b lic  opinion  to  which he appealed »
had means o f  knowing the w ild  o f th e  emperor which were 
not dependent on th e  emperor’ s announcement on the  
s itu a t io n  or the person in  q u estion . On a l e s s  markfed 
. l e v e l  an E nglish  or American s h ip ’s cap ta in  fo r  example 
can make d ec is io n s  as th e  King’s or th e  P r e s id e n t’s 
r e p r esen ta tiv e  w ithout f e e l in g  ( in  many cases’) th e  
n e c e s s ity  fo r  p r ior  co n su lta tio n  and con crete a u th orisa tion . 
With th e mass o f  Great Russians th is  i s  not th e  ca se .
They cannot^ their le a d e r ’s w i l l  in  sm all th in g so r  in  
great u n t i l  th e lead er  has declared  i t .  One th e  lead er  '' ! 
has made th e d ec la ra tio n  th e R ussians w i l l  d ed ica te  ■
a l l  th e ir  en erg ies and e a s i ly  th e ir  own l i v e s  to  the  
fu lf i lm e n t  o f th e  e :^ ress commands, w ish es, p la n s . No 
ordinary con sid era tio n s can stand in  th e way ,of carrying  
out th e  L eader’s w i l l ,  a course o f  a c tio n  so s ta r ted  
can on ly  be stopped or reversed  by th e  lead er  h im self  
making another d ec la ra tio n  o f h is  w i l l ."  G. Gorer: >
The Great R ussians, pp. 167 -  168. From t h is  d escr ip tio n  
i t  would seem th a t th e  Russians iiave a r e lig io u s  a t t itu d e  ^
to th e ir  country and i t s  r u le r , where the E nglish  and 
th e  Americans tak e th e  moral approach. ' This t a l l i e s  
w ith  some o f our o th en v ise  reached con clu sion s namely 
th e a f f in i t y  between th e  moral a t t itu d e  and c i v i l  demo- 
- cracy on th e  one hand, and th e  r e l ig io u s  a tt itu d e  and 
h ie r a r c h ic a l s ta te s  on the o th er .
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God’s revea led  commandments are b a s ic a l ly  two: "To
lo v e  God" and to " love on e’s neighbour". The two are not 
id e h t ic a l ,  nor i s  th e  second merely r e la t iv e  or l e s s  o b lig a to ry  
than th e f i r s t .  The f i r s t ,  again , draws i t s  v a l id i ty  not 
from th e c e r ta in  q u a lif ic a t io n s  o f  God’s nature (h is  in f i n i t e  
goodness, fo r  in sta n ce ) but l ik e  th e second, d ir e c t ly  from 
God’s w i l l .  Both commandments are v a lid , and a b so lu te ly  
v a l id ,  because they are h is  commandments. M orality i s  ttie  
keeping o f h ie  commandments. Whatever we d ec id e , when faced  
by h is  commandments i s  p rim arily  a d ec is io n  fo r  or aga in st  
him^^. Every d ec is io n  fo r  God i s  a d ec is io n  ad majorem d ei 
gloriam , a d e c is io n  fo r  th e g lory  o f God. But how can man 
in  h is  a b jec t noth ingness do anything fo r  th e g lory  o f God? . 
A ll he can do i s  to  t e s t i f y  to  t h is  g lo ry  "All moral a c tio n  
i s  but a n ecessary  and required  dem onstration to  th e  g lory  
o f  G od"^\ This dem onstration has ( in  th e  case o f th e  f i r s t  
commandment) th e  m ora lity  "der gebrochenen L in ie , der g e-  
beugten Anbetuÿg des erbarmenden Gottes"^^ which i s  th e  
exp ression  o f th e primary and appropriate response o f man to  -
1 ) K. Barth: Zwischen den Z eiten . p . 214.
2) "Notwendige und g eford erte  Demonstration aber auch nur 
d ie s  i s t  a l l é s  Ethos . . . "  K. B Girth. Der Roem erbrief, 
p. 417.
3) K. Barth, Der Roem erbrief, p . 417.
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God, namely the expression  o f h u m ility  and penance. In the  
case o f th e  second commandment we t e s t i f y  to  th e g lo ry  o f  God 
by lo v in g  our, as such w holly in d if f e r e n t , or even p i t i f u l  
and u n lovab le , neighbour. There i s  a lso  a th ir d  way in  
which we can t e s t i f y  by our a c tio n s  to  th e g lo ry  o f God, 
and thus act m orally . This i s  th e  v ia  n ega tiva  o f  "non
rev o lu tio n " . "We demonstrate our f a i t h  in  God’s grace and 
in  the world to  come -  by not d estroy in g  th e order we f in d  
in  th is " . We demonstrate our d is in te r e s te d n e ss  ih  th is  
world by "not acting" a g a in st i t s  ru lin g  ord ers. Non­
re v o lu tio n  comes thus a dem onstration fo r  th e  fa c t  "that a l l  
tru e  rev o lu tio n  comes from God not from human in su rg en ts .
S in ce from a moral p o in t o f view th is  p o s it io n  has th e character  
o f a p r a c t ic a l con clu sion  rath er than o f a b a s ic  te n e t ,  I 
s h a ll  d iscu ss  i t  a t a la t e r  p o in t, and fo r  th e  moment sh a ll  
return  to  the problem posed by God’s comuiand to  " love our 
neighbour". What ex a c tly  does t h is  command^  ^ mean in  t h is  
context?
To understand i t s  meaning arigh t we must remember, th a t  
according to Karl Barth God knows no " lo s t  lo v e" . In th e
1) K. Barth: Der Roem erbrief, p . 46$.
2) In th e  con tex t o f the f i r s t  r e l ig io u s  a tt itu d e  i t  remained 
in  content id e n t ic a l  v/ith the b a sic  moral law .
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q u estion  God puts b efore man the answer i s  contained , the  
grace o f responding r ig h t ly  i s  g r a n ited by the very act to  
th o se  whom God makes tr u ly  conscious o f h is  command.
In consequence th e revea led  word o f  God ia  a commandment
in  appearance on ly . In r e a l i t y  i t  i s  a prom ise. Not
"thou s h a lt  . . .  " th e  im p erative, but "Thou w ilt"  . . . .  th e
1 )fu tu re  in d ic a t iv e  i s  i t s  grammatical form * What God command­
ed in  th e Law he promised to  bring about in  th e  evan gelion , j 
so th a t th e commandments o f  the Old Testament are both  
contained  and superrogated by th e spontaneously lo v in g  se r v ic e  
of th e  N ew ^\ In th is  new l ig h t  the commandment to  lo v e
1) Compare K. Barth; Evangelium and G es e t z: , "Thou w il t  
means thou w i l t  lo v e  God through thy f a i t h  in  C hrist th e  
Redeemer. Theeconversion has been achieved  fo r  man by 
C h r is t’ s s e l f - s a c r i f i c e ."
2) TLhis mechanical d iv is io n  i s  fa r  from being c o r r e c t , compare: 
"Behold th e  days come, s a ith  th e  Lord th a t I w i l l  make a 
new covenant w ith  the house o f I s r a e l  and w ith  the house
o f Judah: Not according to  th e  covenant th a t  I made w ith
th e ir  fa th er s  in  th e  days th a t I took them by th e  hand to  
bring them out o f th e land o f Egypt, which my covenant th ey  
brake although I was an husband unto them, s a ith  th e  Lord;
But t h is  sh a ll  be th e  covenant th a t I w i l l  make v/ith th e  
House o f I s r a e l .  A fter  th ose  days s a ith  th e Lord I w i l l  
put my law in  th e ir  inward p arts and v /r ite  i t  in  th e ir  
h earts; and I w i l l  be th e ir  God and they s h a ll  be my p eop le . 
And they s h a ll  teach  no more every man h is  neighbour and 
every man h is  brother saying: Know th e  L o rd ,.fo r  they  
s h a ll  a l l  know th e  Lord. For I w i l l  fo r g iv e  th e ir  in iq p lty  
and I w i l l  remember th e ir  s in  no more." Jeremiah XXXI, 31-34
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one’ s neighbouj? -  and i t  makes no d iffe r e n c e  here whether we 
tr e a t  i t  as a commandment or a s a promise th a t we w i l l  lo v e  
OUT neighbour spontaneously -  acquires a new meaning which 
has not th e  s l ig h t e s t  resemblance w ith  i t s  moral meaning or 
i t s  meaning as in terp re ted  by th e f i r s t  r e lig io u s  a t t itu d e .
For in  t h is  con text i t  i s  our primary o b lig a t io n  to humble 
our own person by accepting  our neighbour’s lo v e , rather than 
to  re sp ect our neighbour’s person by g iv in g  him ou rs. This 
i s  th e  much harder ta s k . For help in g  our neighbour would 
enhance our s e lf -r e g a r d  and se lf-im p o rta n ce . Accepting h is  
h e lp , h is  c h a r ity , p i ty ,  and compassion I humble m yself. This 
s e l f - h u m il i ta t io n ‘i s  th e more m eritoriou s the more s in f u l ,  
a b je c t , poor and humble th e  neighbour i s  b efore  whom I humble 
m yself: fo r  only i f  he i s  humble and poor and tormented can
he come to  me in  th e name o f th e  s u f fe r in g ,C h r is t^ \  In  
return  I must t e s t i f y  to  th e Glory o f God in  my neighbour’s 
s ig h t .  But I must have no fu rth er  purpose by so t e s t i f y in g .
I must not care d ir e c t ly  fo r  my neighbour or do anything  
d ir e c t ly  fo r  h is  sake. "Ich w i l l  n ic h ts  and ic h  darf n ich ts  
w ollen  indem ich  Zeugniss ab lege . Ich  leb e  nur das Leben 
m eines Glaubens im Konkreten gegenueber mit dem Naechsten".
1) Das i s t  das v erh aen gn isvo ile  des le ib l ic h e n , des g e is t ig e n ,  
^und des g e is t l ic h e n  Reichtums: a ls  Reiche brauchen w ir
d ie  Menschen n ic h t."  K. Barth: Die Grosse B arm herzigkeit,
p .  1 5 3 .
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Indeed my neighbour as a person, i s  " in f in i t e ly  unimportant 
and in d if fe r e n t  to  n e " ^ \ Indeed he ought to remain in d if f e r ­
ent to  me fo r  I must have no u lt e r io r  purpose when I t e s t i f y  
to th e  Glory o f God, fo r  in sta n ce  the purpose o f converting  
him. Moreover I do not know whether I am supposed to  fu rth er  
h is  conversion  s in c e  I am not p rivy  to  God’s s e c r e t  co u n se ls , 
and do not know whether he i s  one o f th e chosen. The fa c t  
th a t he has helped me, in  th a t he i s  th e  instrum ent God has 
used to  make me humble m yself to  th e utmost proves th a t I 
have been chosen, not th a t ^  has been chosen. I f  in  
consequence o f my s e lf -h u m ilia t io n  I t e s t i f y  to  the g lory  o f  
god I do so spontaneously because I am urged to  do so by an 
inner n e c e s s ity ,  e .e .  because God has bestowed h is  grace on 
me. God can, i f  he so w ishes make my spontaneous demonstrat­
ion  a means whereby my neighbour as i t s  w itn ess  i s  a lso  awaken­
ed to the lo v e  o f God. Thus, in d ir e c t ly  my dem onstration  
fo r  god, brought w ithout any u lt e r io r  purpose, can become 
th e  instrum ent o f my neighbours s a lv a t io n . This indeed i s  
th e  only le g it im a te  and e f f e c t iv e  expression  o f  my lo v e  fo r  
my neighbour.
At no p o in t did I lo v e  my neighbour fo r  h im se lf. Indeed  
I was ex p ressly  forbidden to  do so . Too great a lo v e  fo r
1)K. Barth: K irch lich e  Dogmatik. Lehre vom ‘’o r te  G ottes 11,
p . 484.
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1 ) 'fo r  a man i s  not com patible w ith  C h ristian  lo v e  \  l e s t  th e  
image o f a man in terven e between us and th e  lo v e  o f God. At , 
no p o in t was th ere  a q u estion  o f  resp ectin g  him. This indeed  
would be a sa c r ile g io u s  a c t , an act which comes under the  
heading o f s in ,  o f e v i l  and o f wrong, s in c e  only God must be 
resp ected  and loved: S o l i  Deo G loria .
This a t t itu d e  lea d s  to a p o s it io n  which i s  d ir e c t ly  
opposed to th e  moral p o s it io n . In i t  the moral law and a l l  
i t  imports i s  f l a t l y  contradicted , derided and in v a lid a te d .
The tv/o p o s it io n s  are h o p e le ss ly  incom patib le, r e c o n c ilia t io n  
im p o ssib le , attem pt a t such r e c o n c il ia t io n  e ith e r  fo o l is h  or 
d ish o n est.
Now th a t t h e ' ’lo v e  o f one’ s neighbour’ has been reduced  
to  a m an ifesta tion  o f  th e  lo v e  o f God, we can form ulate our 
l a s t  q uestion  in  more p r e c is e  terms: Does th e lo v e  w ith  v/hich
a man c lin g s  to  God con fer m erit, d ig n ity , va lu e on th a t man’s 
person? B arth’s answer i s  a f l a t  no. Man cannot acquire
1) v iz :  Donoso Cortes:* L etter  to  Alb er ic  de Blanche quoted 
on page 557, : "Tuve un hermono a qui en v i  v iv ir  y m orir, 
y que vivo una v id a  de an gel, y , murio como lo s  angel es 
m oririan , s i  m uririan . . . .  y s in  embargo, mis lagrim as  
non tie n e n  f i u ,  n i l e  tendron s i  Dios no v ien e  en mi 
ayuda. Se que non es l i c i t e  querer tanto  a una creatura: 
Se que lo s  c h r is t ia n o s  no deben l lo r a r  à lo s  que acaban 
christianam ente . . .  y se  por ultim o que San Augustin  
tuvo escrupulos por haber 11orado a su madré . . . "
Compare a lso  S t . Augustine on th e  death o f h is  mother:
C on fession es, X III, 4 -6 .
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m erit by performing th e r ig h t a c t io n , th e  a ctio n  p lea sin g  
to  God; and i t  i s  im m aterial whether he perfa^rmed them in  
fu lf ilm e n t  o f duty or w ith  th e spontaneous joy o f th e e le c t ;
The reasons are: a) Man performs t a i s  a c t by th e Grace o f» \
God; b) Man chooses t h is  a ct because God has granted him 
by a sp e c ia l d isp en sa tion  o f h is  grace, the power to  choose 
th e  good, c) Man recogn ised  th e good act because god has 
opened h is  eyes by addressing him p erso n a lly  w ith  hi^vord.
"The moral q uestion  'what ought I to do?* or th e  q uestion  o f  
th e  chosen ones * what w i l l  I do? * i s  fundam entally a question  
to  which only God h im se lf and h is  a c tio n s  ( i . e .  p red estin a tio n )  
can provide an answer"^^. I t  i s  God who both addresses and’ 
answers h im self in  u s , who chooses to  lo v e  ^ im self through  
our lo v e  fo r  him. A ll comes from him and a l l  tends .towards 
him, and th ere  i s  none re sp o n sib le  or f r e e ,  or o f va lu e but 
He: S o l i  Deo G lor ia .
S ince no m erit, no va lu e , no dignit;}’’, and above a l l  no 
r e a l e f f ic a c io u s  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  can be p red icated  o f man, 
allhuman deeds as human deeds are in t r in s ic a l ly  in s ig n if ic a n t  
and ir r e le v a n t . S ince a l l  human e x is te n c e  on thehuman 
plan  i s  in t r in s ic a l ly  v /orth less th ere  i s  no great m atter 
between good and e v i l  in  the. temporal world. This perm its
1) K. Barth: Der Roem erbrief, p . 459*
V .
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p r a c t ic a l ly  an in f i n i t e  to lera n ce  towards m iscreants and 
offen d ers: "Wir koennen es uns l e i s ten  rom antischer zu se in
a ls  d ie  Romantiker und hum istischer a ls  d ie  Humanisten"^)' .
This to ler a n c e  s e t s  a t nought a l l  eva lu ation  o f human e x is te n c e  
qua human ( i . e .  in  th is  world) and d u lls  th e  moral p ercep tion  
by b lu rrin g  th e  d is t in c t io n  between r ig h t and wrong. But 
t h i s ,  we can now echo Barth, i s  o f no great m atter, s in c e  
in  th e  p resen t con text allm oral d is t in c t io n s  and d if fe r e n t ­
ia t io n  are devoid o f meaning see in g  th a t man cannot be considôr-
2 )ed as a moral agent a t a l l  y and th a t in  consequence *the 
e th i ca l s itu a tio n *  has ceased  to  e x i s t .
Moral laws can e x is t  on ly  in  a co n tex t, which a llow s  
d ig n ity  however acquired to  human b ein gs as such. That i s ,  
a l l  human beings as such are endov/ed ( fo r  whatever reason  
i t  may be) w ith  d ig n ity  and none may be a r b itr a r ily  excluded. 
M orality proper, i . e .  th e  keeping o f  moral laws fo r  m o r a lity 's  
sake can e x is t  on ly in  a con text where th e re sp ec t fo r  th e  
human persons i s  acknowledged as th e  reason , th e on ly reason, 
( i . e .  th e s u f f ic ie n t  reason) fo r  keeping th e law s. Hence th e  
ex ig en c ie s  o f  m orality  w i l l  n e c e s sa r ily  c la sh  both in  p r in c ip le  
and in  p r a c t ic e  w ith  th e second r e lig io u s  a t t itu d e  and w i l l  
n e c e s sa r ily  c la sh  in  p r in c ip le  w ith  the f i r s t  r e l ig io u s  a ttitu d e  
In p r a c t ic e  m orality  does not n e c e s sa r ily  c la sh  w ith  th e f i r s t  
r e lig io u s  a t t i tu d e , but then i t  does not n e c e s sa r ily  not
T1 ^ ari Barth; uas vVort G ottes und d ie  T h eolog ie , p . 55#
2) ^ ince p red estin a tio n  deprives man o f  h is  freedom, th e s in e  
qua non o f moral a c t io n s .
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c la sh  w ith  i t .  ouch c la sh es  are p o s s ib le , have occurred, 
and are d ir e c t ly  derived  from th e change of accent in  the  
inner m otivation  fo r  keeping the moral laws: from th e re sp ec t ,
o f  man to  th e  lo v e  o f  God. This change o f  accent can be o f  
in c is iv e  p r a c t ic a l im portance.
I
The r ig h ts  and wrongs o f th e w itch  t r ia l s  provide a 
fa sc in a t in g  i l lu s t r a t io n  hto t h i s  p o in t. Prom'a r e lig io u s  
p o in t o f view they were  p e r fe c t ly  j u s t i f i e d ,  one may even say  
praisew orthy: "Men and women who o f th e ir  own fr e e  w i l l  have
chosen to  succumb to th e d e v il must be h eld  re sp o n sib le  fo r  
th e ir  ch o ice  and hence punished. . . . .  This punishment has- 
moreover, th e v ir tu e s  o f  a p u r if ic a t io n . I t  b e n e f its  th e  
community which i s  being r id  o f th e e v i l  in flu e n c e , no l e s s  
than th e  m iscreant whom i t  redeems forever  . . .  To burn them 
at th e  stake was regarded as a p ious duty . . . .  The sou l o f ^
th e m iscreant h eld  in  such s in fu l  c a p t iv ity  by th e  corrupted
»
w i l l  w ith in  th e body must be s e t  fr e e  aga in . I t  must be  
d e liv ered  by co n fe ss io n . I t  must be d e liv ered  by the  
d estru c tio n  o f i t s  p r iso n . Torture t i l l  co n fe ss io n  . . .  and 
th e  a u to -d a -fe  assume th e  character o f  a c ts  o f mercy, they "
are th e solemn sa lvage o f something immortal from th e c lu tch es  
o f darkness and e v i l  . . .  an a ct o f  l o f t y  devotion  and pious  
gen u flex ion  b efore th e great wisdom and the g lo ry  o f  th e  Lord 
. . . .  The imposing o f a supreme p u r if ic a t io n  by f i r e  was an
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ec sta sy  and a devout communion w ith  the w i l l  o f God"^\
This d escr ib es the o f f i c i a l  and indeed in t r in s ic a l ly  r e lig io u s  
a tt itu d e  o f th a t tim e to  th a t problem: A ll i s  done fo r  th e
lo v e  o f Gbd, and man sa lvages another man's sou l fo r  th e  lo v e  
he bears h is  fe llo w  men as a c h ild  o f God whose sou l belongs  
to  god, and must be returned to god.
The s p e c i f i c a l ly  moral answer to  t h is  problem i s  g iven  
in  a booklet w r itten  at a tim e and pub lished  at a p la ce  where 
w itch  t r i a l s  were very much en vogue. "Und wer kann a lie n  
unrath so lch er  Gefaengnus erzieh len?  Es e n tse tz e t  s ic h  ein
C h r is t lic h  Gemnaht wann es davon h o ere t, ic h  geschw eige
s ie h e t ,  d ie  Saar stehen  einem gen Berg wann mans e r z e h le t .
Ja das Hertz im L eibe moech te  einem zersp r in g en wann man es 
bedencket dass ein  Mensch dem andern (d ie  w ir doch a l l e  un- 
gerech t) so grew lich  p la g e t . . . .  und in  so lchen  Jammer d rin get  
. . . .  0 ih r  R ichter . . .  so se y t ih r  je  vor Gotb und Menschen 
daran sch u l'tig : Wer den Mensch en erh a lten  kann und th u ts
n it  der i s t  e in  Todtschleger"^^. Ho mention here o f  s o u ls ,  
o f s a lv a t io n , o f p u r if ic a t io n , o f th e  Glory o f God and h is
t
■—  ' —  ' ' '............ ..........................................  -  — ----- ------------  ' -  ■ .................................... ...  '■ ■■ ■■■ ■ -   ■ ■ ■ ■ p M . i l
1) Thus G. Z ilboorg sums up th e approach o f th e M alleus
Maleficarum in  The H istory  o f Medical Psychology, p. 156.
2) M alleus Judicum: Das i s t :  G esetzhammer der imbarmherzigen 
H exenrichter auss dem b e s t en E r tz g o e t t l ic h e r , H atu erlich er  
und W eltlich er  Réchten von E tlich en  G h ristlich en  M eistern  
geschm iedet und je tzo  dur ch. .ein  en barmhertzigen C atholischer  
C hristen  a u ffs  newe b e s t i e l e t .  (Nuernberg? XVIthe Century, 
app. 1580?) pp. 71, 72.
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m ysterious w i l l .  Mention only again and again , o f Man,
Man's conduct to  Man, Man's c r u e lty  to  Man, Man's m isuse o f  
Man, Man's g u i l t  before Man, Man's o b lig a t io n  to  Man. And % 
th e s ig n if ic a n t  phrase: the heart breaks in  o n e 's  heart to  
look  upon such m isery. For here as always in  th e  moral appirad
su ffe r in g  has no supernatural v ir tu e  o f p u r if ic a t io n  and s a lv ­
a tio n , and when d e lib e r a te ly  and u n n ecessa r ily  (from a moral 
p o in t o f  view) i n f l i c t e d  by one man upon a other i t  i s  w holly  
and e n t ir e ly  e v i l . '  On th is  p r a c t ic a l is s u e  the r e lig io u s  . 
and the moral a t t itu d e  are d ir e c t ly  opposed to  each o th er ,  ^ - 
th e  primacy o f the one n ea tly  excluded th e  primacy o f th e  '' y .li 
o th er , and a ch o ice  has to be made between th e  two,.
That time has re so lv e d  th is  p a r tic u la r  co n te st in  favour 
o f m ora lity  i s  r e la t iv e ly  o f l i t t l e  s ig n if ic a n c e :  th e  c o n te st
i s  continued on other p o in ts  some o f which have ju s t  l a t e ly  
acquired p a r tic u la r  im portance, l ik e  th e  problem o f s o c ia l  
reform s, and th e  problem o f th e freedom o f thought or th e  
r ig h t  to  e r r .
The moral a t t itu d e  to s o c ia l  reform i s  s u f f i c ie n t ly  
obvious. N atu ra lly  anyone who b e lie v e s  th a t a l l  men are  
p o ssessed  o f  d ig n ity  and e n t it le d  to  be resp ected  in  th e ir
\
person, w i l l  be a m ilita n t  chamption o f l ib e r t y ,  democracy, 
and Perpetual Peace in  th e Kantian s e n s e . B u t  what i s
1) Vz Kant: Zum mrigen Frieden.
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th e  r e lig io u s  p o sitio n ?  There are two to  accord w ith  the  
two a t t itu d e s  we have described  above. The f i r s t  as 
exem p lified  by th e  famous prophesy o f  Isa iah^ ^ , accords p r a c t ic ­
a l ly  in  everyth ing w ith  th e  moral v is io n  o f th e p erfect, s ta t e  
to  which i t  adds th e p ie ty  o f an o v e r a ll orientation towards 
god. The second r e lig io u s  a t t itu d e  d e fin es  a very d if fe r e n t  
approach to  S o c ia l reform s. Not only i s  i t  unimportant to  
have them s in c e  nothing in  t h is  world i s  o f any great m atter;
' I
not on ly i s  i t  d es ira b le  not to  have them th e b e tte r  to  show 
th a t we are aware o f th e ir  e s s e n t ia l  in s ig n if ic a n c e  and g lad   ^
to  demonstrate t h is  awareness to  th e grea ter  g lory  o f God :
I t  i s  a ls o ,  according to Donoso C ortes, p o s it iv e ly  wicked ' 
to  bring them about s in c e  rev o lu tio n s  and reforms are on ly  
th e  l a s t  e f f e c t  o f th e  evo lu tio n  o f  p rid e; "el ultim o termino 
adonde ha llegad o  e l orgulo estad  e l revolucion^ ^ , and p ride  
i s  th e  root o f a l l  e v i l :  in itiu m  omnis p ecc a ti superb ia .
Cortes argues t h is  p o in t as fo llo w s: Every s o c ia l  and
p o l i t i c a l  question  r e s t s  on a T h eo log ica l q u estion . The 
course o f p o l i t i c a l  h is to r y  i s  judged and decided on Theo­
lo g ic a l  p r in c ip le s . A ll p o l i t i c a l  and s o c ia l  m istakes are
1) Isa ia h : Chap. I I ,  2 -4 .
2) The v ia  n egativa  o f e th ic a l a c tio n  as expounded by K 
Barth v iz  p.vsr'o
5) Donoso C ortes: Pensam ientos v a r io s , 11.
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rooted  in  r e lig io u s  s in s ,  and a l l  r e l ig io u s  s in s  are rooted  
in  T h eo log ica l errors.
Now, in itiu m  omnis p e c c a ti superbia -  p rid e  i s  th e  root
I
o f a l l  s in  -  and man’ s f i r s t  s in  was h is  apostasy  from god. 
P rid e was caused by man’s i n i t i a l  error: th e b e l i e f  in  h is
in n a te  g o o d n e ss^ \ This error takes th ree  forms each o f  
which g iv e s  r i s e  to  a p o lit ic a l or s o c ia l  ab erration . The 
f i r s t  error i s  th e b e l i e f  in  man’s immaculate conception; 
(immaculaâe coneepcion del hombre) th a t i s  man’ s natural 
im pulses are not regarded as in  them selves wicked. This 
g iv e s  r i s e  to a s o c ia l  Theory which holds th a t th e  primary 
ta sk  o f s ta te s  and governments i s  to  s a t i s f y  th e  natural needs 
o f man. The second error i s  th e  b e l i e f  th a t man’s w i l l  i s  
in t r in s ic a l ly  good and th a t he needs not god’ s grace to  turn  
towards th e  good. This g iv e s  r i s e  to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  theory ' 
th a t men o f good w i l l  can form s o c ie t ie s  w ithout having s t r i c t  
r u le s  and reg u la tio n s  imposed on them by a mighty r u le r . The - 
th ir d  error i s  the b e l i e f  in  th e  independence and autonomy 
o f reason and t h is  g iv e s  r i s e  to  the p o l i t i c a l  theory th a t  
a l l  s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  problems can be so lved  on r a tio n a l  
p r in c ip le s   ^* A ll th ese  errors are mad^ e by th e " p h ilo sop h ica l
1) C o rtes’ arguments are d irec ted  p rim arily  ag a in st Rousseau, 
and th e  id eas which in sp ir e d  the French r e v o lu tio n .
2) D. C ortes: sobre e l p r in c ip io  generador de lo s  mas graves
errores de n u estros d ia s .
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c iv i l i s a t io n "  as opposed to  tru e  C atholic f a i t h .  S ince t h is  
p h ilo so p h ica l c i v i l i s a t io n  assumes th a t man i s  capable o f  
tru e  knowledge by th e l ig h t  o f h is  natural reason , o f good ' ■ 
counsel and good p r a c tic e  through the in n ate  goodness o f  
h is  w i l l  and the p o sse ss io n  o f freedom, i t  encourages men to  
order, reform , or r e v o lu t io n is e  th e ir  s o c ie t ie s  in  accordance-' 
w ith  th e ir  chosen p r in c ip le s . Man c o n s t itu te s  h im self as  ^
th e au th orised  reformer o f th e world order, w ithout h im self 
f i r s t  undergoing a reform . Thus man transform s h im se lf in to  
a god, he cea ses  to be human and becomes d iv in e  in  h is  own 
eyes. He regards h im se lf as in h eren tly  good and worthy, 
and he th ere fo re  assumes th a t a l l  th e reforms and rev o lu tio n s  
he in s t ig a t e s  are changes to  th e  b e t t e r ^ \  But a l l  th ese  
assumptions p leasan t and f la t t e r in g  as th ey  might be are 
erroneous. The tru th  i s  th a t man i s  conceived  in  s in  
(concebido en pecado) th a t he i s  incapable o f good ( impôtencia  
pora e l b ien ) and th a t w ith  h is  apostasy  from God even h is  
reason becomes corrupted so th a t he no lon ger i s  capable o f  
d is t in g u ish in g  Truth and error. He i s  so r e ly  in  need o f  
God’ s grace: and god has granted him th is  grace by en tru stin g
t h is  ab so lu te  Truth to  th e  C ath olic Church. Only in  Truth 
i s  l i f e ,  on ly  in  th e C ath olic  Church S a lv a tio n . ’ e l error  
mata’ and ’y so lo  e l ca to lic ism o  es la  v id a ’ . But r e v o lu tio n -
1) D. C ortes: Ensayo sobre e l C ato lic ism o, e l L ibéralism e
et e l S o c ia lism e.
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o f r e b e ll io n  and the d ic ta to r sh ip  o f government. I p refer  
th e d ic ta to r sh ip  o f government -  i t  i s  th e l e s s  op p ressive .
The ch o ice  i s  between dicfcaÿorship from below or d ic ta to r sh ip
froiqAbove -  I p re fer  d ic ta to r sh ip  from above -  i t  i s  born in  ,
'
purer and gayer sp h eres. The ch o ice  i s  between th e  d ic ta to r ­
ship  o f th e  sword and th e d ic ta to r sh ip  o f th e  dagger. I 
p refer  the d ic ta to r sh ip  o f th e sword -  i t  i s  th e  nober weapon"^ 
The au th en tic  r e lig io u s  a tt itu d e  -  th e b e l i e f  in  th e  
in t in s ic  v /orth lessn ess o f th e human being -  in  th e  p r a c t ic a l  
q u estion s o f s o c ia l  reform n e c e s sa r ily  lea d s to  a p o s it io n
\
d ir e c t ly  opposed to  th e moral a t t itu d e . The q uestion  whether 
primacy is ,  accorded to  the one or to  th e  other i s  o f in c is iv e  
importance fo r  s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  p r a c t ic e .
Our th ir d  example i s  th e  problem o f ab so lu te  Truth and 
the freedom o f thought, or th e  r ig h t to  er r . The r e lig io u s  
p o s it io n  on th is  p o in t i s  summed up in  t h is  f a i r ly  recen t  
d ec la ra tio n  o f a C ath olic  d ig n ita ry : "What i s  . . . .  d is l ik e d
i s  th e  Church’s a ffirm ation  th a t she alone has th e charism
o f in d e fe c t ib ly  tru e  d octirn e: . . . .  I t  d s  accused o f  being
/
u n ch r ist ia n  in  i t s  in tra n sig ea n ce . But t h is  in tran sigean ce  
. . . .  fa r  from being "clean contrary to  th e  s p ir i t  o f th e  
Gospels" i s  ty p ic a l  o f  th e New Testament and o f  our Lord h im se lf  
S t . P eter in  th e  Acts a s s e r ts  th a t elsew here than in  "Jesus




C h rist th e Nazarene". S a lv a tio n  i s  not to  be found and th a t  
h is  a lone "of a l l  th e  names under heaven has been appointed  
to  men as th e one by which they must needs be saved". (IV 12) 
in  other words extra Christum n u lla  sa lu s  . . .  a most in tr a n s ig ­
eant a sse r t io n  . . .  For S t .  Paul th e d is t in c t io n  between th ose  
who are w ith in  and th ose  th a t are w ithout . . .  th e v i s ib l e  
Church i s  fundamental: "the Church i s  th e o b jec t o f C h r is t’s
lo v e . I t  i s  th e Church which w i l l  be redeemed": extra
ecclesiam  n u lla  sa lu s  . . .  Our Lord h im se lf in  S t . Matthew’s 
Gospel (XV 24) says: "My errand i s  on ly  to  th e l o s t  sheep
o f  th e House o f I s r a e l" . As to  h is  own p o s it io n  as th e  one 
m ediator -  an in tr n s ig e a n t p o s it io n  -  He sa id : "No man
knowe th th e Father save the Son, and th o se  to  whom i t  i s  th e  
son ’ s good p leasu re  to  rev ea l him." (X I. 2 7 ).
I would go fu rth er  and say th a t th e  op p o sitio n  aroused ' ; 
by t h is  in tra n sig ea n ce , in so fa r  as i t  i s  an op p o sitio n  to  
in tra n sig ea n ce  as such does not r e s t  upon a C h ristian  foundation  
at a l l  and i s  not an exp ression  o f c h a r ity . C h r is t ia n ity  
has always m aintained th a t Truth i s  one and th a t i t  i s  in ­
c o n s is te n t  v/ith th e m anifold forms o f  error. I t  has always 
too when f a i t h f u l  to  i t s  Gospel source m aintained th a t i t  • - ^
j
p o sse sse s  th is  Truth, th a t i t  can form ulate i t  th a t i t  tan  _ ST 
in  consequence condemn erro r . The h o s t i l i t y  to t h is  co n te n tio n /  
sp rin gs not from C h ristian  ch a ir ty  but deepdown, and unbeknown
CT'-' ■
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to  th ose  who share i t  form the human s p ir i t s  horror o f
encountering th e Absolute w ith in  th e temporal process
The moral a t t itu d e  w i l l  be ex a c tly  o p p o site . -^ t holds
as always th a t th e ’how* i s  more important than th e  *what’ ,
th e  manner in  which a th in g  i s  accom plished more important
than th e accom plished end. The s in c e r e  e f fo r t  o f human reason
the
to per to /T ruth  i s  o f g rea ter  va lu e , m orally speaking,
than th e acceptance o f Truth ^onder th e  d ica tio n  o f  a u th o r ity . 
The p u rsu it o f Truth more admirable than th e  unearned p o sse ss ­
ion  o f truth^^. Even th e errors and fa i lu r e s  o f th e  p u rsu it  
have more m erit than th e  e a s i ly  achieved  Truth by d ica tio n :
"La ra ison  qui v i t  dans 1 ’ in d iv id u , l a  ra iso n  qui peut errer , 
et qui a l e  d r o it  d ’ errer en chacun sans que jamais on p u isse  
l a  containdre a penser ce  qu’ e l l e  n ’a pas trouve elle-meme 
en to u te  f a ib le s s e  et en to u te  lo y a u té , la  ra iso n  qui n ’ e s t  
que la  s in c é r i t é  d’une ame pensant l e  v ra i e t  l e  b ien , e s t  
l e  tréfon d s de l ’ame humaine e t l a  se u le  chose sacree  qui 
s o i t  en monde" -  th e se  words o f B a y le ’ s have the au th en tic  
moral r in g . How ty p ic a l indeed i s  B a y le ’s in s is te n c e  on
th e r ig h t to  choose one’ s own way, o f  th e r ig h t to  e r r , o f
/
th e r ig h t not to be helped , or urged or forced  in  any way.
1) The Abbot o f  Downside: G aelic Tenantem, Dublin Review,
Spring 1950.
2) Compare Lessing&s dictum on Truth, quoted p.
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o f th e  r ig h t  to  be resp ected  in  one’ s independence. How 
s ig n if ic a n t  th e  in d iffe r e n c e  toward th e in tra n sig ea n ce  o f th e  
r e lig io u s  a t t itu d e  as long as th is  in tran sig ea n ce  i s  d irected  
towards i t s e l f :  i . e .  th e r e lig io u s  determ ination to keep i t s
Truth uncontaminated and untouched, and how even more s ig n if ic a n t  
the in s is te n c e  th a t such in tran sig ea n ce  must not be d irec ted  
a g a in st o th ers: N eith er by stopping th ose  oth ers to  look  fo r
th e ir  own tr u th , not by fo rc in g  th e  r e lig io u s  Truth on them, 
nor by preclud ing th e ir  f in d in g s  by th e  d ec la ra tio n  th a t -the 
p o sse ss io n  o f tru th  i s  a r b itr a r ily  l im ite d  to  a few e le c t s  
o f f a i t h .  How c h a r a c te r is t ic  th e in s is te n c e  on th e  u n iv e rsa l­
i t y  o f th e  r ig h t to  search fo r  Truth, and on th e  equal m erit 
o f  a l l  p u rsu it o f  Truth whether i t  ach ieve i t s  end or n o t.
The moral resp ect i s  g iven  to  human reason as such, and i t s  
e f fo r t s  both o f which r e l ig io n  regards w ith  th e  g r e a te s t  
contempt. Another s ig n if ic a n t  p o in t i s  th a t a consensus 
omnium, a general agreement on T h eoretica l Truth i s  not o f  
fundamental in te r e s t  to m orality  as long as the moral p o s tu la te  
i s  accepted  in  p r a c t ic e  and th e moral law ap p lied . A b e l i e f  
in  one Truth, i s  a fundamental te n e t  o f r e l ig io n .
The Consensus omnium i l luminatorum i s  th e  most important 
achievement o f th e Churéh, and i t s  h ig h e st p u rp o se^ \ But
1) Here too Gorer’ s d e sc r ip tio n  o f th e Great Russian a t t itu d e  
to  Truth p resen ts an amazing analogy to  th e r e lig io u s  
a t t i tu d e .
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as fa r  as m orality  i s  concerned i t  tak es second p la ce  to  * le  
d r o it  d* errer* . Hence, th^faoral a t t itu d e  can tr e a t  d isagree­
ments as natural and j u s t i f i e d  p r iv i le g e s  o f human persons, 
w h ils t  the r e lig io u s  a tt itu d e  must regard them as s ig n s  o f  
stitibbornness or fo o l is h n e s s , or sheer w ickedness and tr e a t
I
them as h a e r e s ie s , and th e  w iH full ab errations o f h a e r e t ic s .
On th e  q u estion  o f Truth and th e s ig n if ic a n c e  o f arguments 
and disagreem ents, and th e ir  p r a c t ic a l consequences the  
r e l ig io u s  and th e moral a t t itu d e  occupy d ir e c t ly  op p osite , 
p o s it io n s .  There i s  indeed a world o f d iffe r e n c e  between 
21a ra iso n  . . .  qui a l e  d r o it  d*errer* and s t i l l  remains 
*la se u le  chose sacree  au monde", and P a sc a l’s remark "Toute 
l a  d ig n ité  de l ’homme e s t  en la  pensee mais qu’ e s t  ce  que 
c e t t e  pensee? Qu’ e l la  e s t  so tte" ^ ^ . There i s  no way o f  
brid g in g  th ese  d iffe r e n c e s  and th ere  can be no doubt th a t  
th e  Primacy o f th e  one i s  not com patible w ith th e  Primacy o f  
e ith e r  be su pp lied  by anything but i t s  own domain. There­
fo r e  i f  th e  Prim acybfthe Moral Domain i s  to  be upheld, i t  
must be upheld by a gratu itu ou s d e c is io n , a fr e e  ungrounded, 
u n con d ition al ch o ice . And th is  d e c is io n , t h is  ch o ice  w i l l»  ^ I
have to be made w ith  th e  f u l l  knowledge o f i t s  im p lic a tio n s , 
and f u l l  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  i t s  consequences. What indeed  
does th e d e c is io n  to  accord Primacy to  th e  Moral Domain over
1) Pascal: Pensees; XXIV, 53-
4 6 9
th e  R elig io u s imply?
B efore attem pting to  answer th is  question  we must r e v ie w ' 
however b r ie f ly  the te n e ts  o f maximalism. Maximalism, has 
been d efin ed , as a c e r ta in  in te r p r e ta tio n  o f the in t u i t iv e   ^
and immediate p ercep tion  in d iv id u a l men have o f  th e ir  own 
b ein g . In t h i s ,  th e  v i t a l i s t i c  exp erience, th e in d iv id u a l  
p erce iv es  h im self as a unique being endowed w ith i n f i n i t e  
v a lu e . This i n f i n i t e  value i s  rooted  not in  th e in d iv id u a l’ s 
humanity, h is  shared c a p a c it ie s , but in  h is  in d iv id u a lity ,  
h is  e x c lu s iv e  con crete  q u a l i t ie s .  The b a sic  concept o f th is  
experience i s :  " M y s e l f - a s - i n f i n i t e l y - v a l u a b l e " I t s  
p o stu la te  runs: "I alone am o f  va lu e ."  And i t s  law commands
"Be a t th e maximum o f va lu e i . e .  A ctu a lise  your p o t e n t ia l i t i e s  
to  th e h ig h est degree,"  In so far  as t h is  experience i s  a cc ess ­
ib le  and presumably common to  a l l  men N ie tz sc h e ’s dictum  
th a t "M orality w ith  i t s  u n iv ersa l decrees wrongs every 
in d iv id u a l" , i s  v a l id .  However t h is  i s  not th e  most important 
nor th e  most au th en tic  a p p lica tio n  o f maximalism. S ince  
every human being i s  unique, th is  uniqueness as a common' 
property lo o se s  i t s  p r e c ise  m axim alist meaning. Maximalism 
a tta in s  i t s  f u l l  meaning only when th e o b je c t iv e  va lue o f a 
person approximates th e su b je c tiv e  s e lf - e v a lu a t io n  o f  th a t
1) $ h is  concept i s  a complex concept. . I t  i s  combined from 
the term: I e x i s t .  I am I .  I am cf i n f i n i t e  va lue
because I am I .
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person i . e .  when the m axim alist happens to  be a tr u ly  exception­
a l and outstanding human b ein g . I t  must however be noted  
th a t th e m axim alist must be outstanding and excep tion a l by * 
v ir tu e  o f  h is  own con crete  q u a l i t ie s ,  not as a member o f a
c liq u e  or e l i t e .  The maximalism o f th e  a r is to c r a t ic  e l i t e
1 Vin  P areto ’ s sen se y i s  only a pseudo-maximalism. True
enough such e l i t e s  arrogate th e p rero g a tiv es  o f  th e excep tion a l
in d iv id u a l. To be h is  own Truth, h is  own norm, h is  own law:.
th e o r ig in , ground and reason a t once o f what i s  good, r ig h t  -
2 )and tru e » But as th e  law s, norms, and ru le s  d efin ed  by 
such e l i t e s ,  are generated  dètermined and v in d ica ted  by the  
mutual and rec ip r o ca l re sp ec t which th e in d iv id u a l members 
show each o th er , (not by th e arb itrary  autonomy o f  one 
in d iv id u a l)  th e b a sic  a t t itu d e  o f an e l i t e  group co in c id es  
w ith  th e  a t t itu d e  o f double morality^^ when th e members o f  
th e  e l i t e  regard each other as equal, and w ith  an id o la tro u s
1) "La s to r ia  e un cim itero  d i a r is to c r a z ie "  -  P areto ,T ra tta to  
d i s o c io lo g ia  & 2053* "Toute e l i t e  qui n ’ e s t  pas p rete  a 
l iv r e r  b a t a i l le ,  pour defendre se s  p o s it io n s  e s t  en p la in e  
decadence." Pareto: Les Systèmes s o c ia l i s t e s  1 . p .40 . As
long as the e l i t e  i s  powerful enough to keep i t s  r ig h ts  or • 
assuired enough to" f ig h t  for ,  them, th ese  r ig h ts  are the  
tr u ly  ’moral* r ig h ts  ( i . e .  m axim alist r ig h t s ) .
2) Compare P areto , who fo llo w s  N ietzsch e  in  d efin in g  man as a > 
d eceiv in g  and deceived  b ein g . Man i s  d ecieved  in so fa r  as he 
b e lie v e s  th a t sc ie n c e  and philosophy are r a t io n a l, and th a t  
in  them reason seeks and can seek  o b je c t iv e  knowledge. Man 
i s  the deceiver, in so fa r  as he always masks h is  lu s t  fo r  ,
• power w ith  moral, le g a l  and r e lig io u s  im ages, and because  
he i s  com pelled to  do so i f  he does not w ish to  appear -  in  
h is  bare f a c tu a l i ty  -  l ik e  a b east o f  prey.
3) Compare page mi
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(fe u d a l, burocratic  or r a c ia l)  in te r p r e ta tio n  o f th e i n i t i a l
egiperience o f man’ s nothingness i f  members o f th e  e l i t e  regard
each other as occupying r e la t iv e  rungs on a r ig id  s c a le  o f '
v a lu es , i . e .  form a h ierarch y .
The e l i t e  or c liq u e  a tt itu d e  i s  fu rth er  d is q u a lif ie d  v
from ranging as an au th en tic  in sta n ce  o f maximalism by lack in g
th e genuine and com pelling b a sic  ex p e r ie n c e ^ \ which i s  the
sine-qua-non o f th gàax im a list c o n v ic tio n .
The b a sic  p o s tu la te  o f maximalism^^ i s  d ir e c t ly  opposed
to th e b a sic  p o s tu la te  o f m orality^^ , and th e m axim alist 
• 4)law  ^ c o n f l ic t s  and c la sh es  in  p r in c ip le  and in  p r a c t ic e  
w ith  th e  moral law^^. The m axim alist argument in  support
o f i t s  tra n sg ress io n  o f th e  moral law runs as fo llo w s: Men
(
are. unequal in  th e ir  very b e in g . The excep tion a l man alone  
i s  o f  v a lu e . The outstanding p er so n a lity  a lone i s  endowed 
w ith  d ig n ity . The excep tion a l in d iv id u a l i s  th e  on ly  va lu ab le  
b ein g , th e  on ly  being which i s  an e n d - t o - i t s e l f . This being  
must not be used as a means fo r  th e  b e n e f it  o f w orth less
1) As w e ll as th e  o b je c t iv e  w herew ithal.
2) I a lone among man o f v a lu e , i . e .  a l l  men (excep t me) 
are o f  no im portance.
5) A ll men have va lu e .
4 ) Be at th e maximum o f value: i . e .  u se everything as a 
means to th e  only end which i s  t h y s e l f .
5) Use no oth er man as a means.
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and in s ig n if ic a n t  b e in g s. On the contrary, th ese  w orth less  
and in s ig n if ic a n  t  beings ought t o , s e r v e  as a means fo r  th e /
: - A
purposes o f the va lu ab le  being, i . e .  tr ea ted  as means to  th e ^
\
end which i s  th e va lu ab le  b ein g . A resp ect fo r  others and)
a s e l f  “l im ita t io n  fo r  th e  sake o f o th ers i . e .  obedience to
th e moral law, would in  th e  cases o f th e excep tion al in d iv id u a l y
be a s in  ag a in st maximalism which i s  a s in  a g a in st ‘Nature*.
The excep tion a l in d iv id u a l has a r ig h t nay a duty to  disregard' 
th e m oral.law . I t  i s  a duty to  h im se lf a duty to  h is  excep tion ­
a l d e s tin y , h is  daimon. But i t  is a lso  more. I t  i s  a cosmic 
duty. For th e  E xceptional Man, th e Superman i s  th e purpose 
and th e aim o f  a l l  crea tion : in  him th e  ex c e lle n c e  o f a
gen eration  or many gen eration s i s  gathered , in  him q u a lit ie s  
i t  has taken ages to  breed are d i s t i l l e d  to  a p e r fe c t  blend;
.  .Vi
in  him th e  f in a l  d estin y  o f manlcing i s  consummated. By ; ,0
c u lt iv a t in g  and p e r fe c tin g  h is  own ex c e lle n c e  he endows th e
1 ) • Vworld w ith  what i t  most d e s ir e s :  Value . He i s  thus th e .
m a n ife sta tio n , th e redeemer,' th e  f u l f i l l e r  and th e purpose 
o f c r e a tio n . I t  i s  c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f  th e  excep tion a l man
th a t h is  d e stin y , h is  daimon p u lsa te s  in  exact harmony w ith  
th e cosmic ebb an d ctid e . Indeed th e tr u ly  excep tion a l as he
i s  born trium phantly on th e  c r e s t s ,  acquires h im self th e  
q u a lity  o f a cosmic power, a natural fo r c e . He i s  h is  own
•ÎI
1) O b jective en titlem en t i s  th ere fo re  e s s e n t ia l .
Li:-'
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daimon, h is  own d e s tin y , and th e daimon and th e d estin y  o f
many o th er s . To th e excep tion a l man h im se lf, t h i s  l a t t e r
r e s u lt  i s  o f no im portance. Driven by h is  daaim on,lured by
h is  d estin y , th e excep tion a l man obeys th e cosmic w i l l  which
i s  h is  ovm. He cared not whom he tram ples u nderfoot. And
whether th e  p r a c t ic a l outcome, be ruin  or sa lv a t io n , g lory
or p erd itio n  he cares not one # i t . For in  a l l  h is  dèeds he^
pursues on ly  h im se lf , and serves on ly h im self: His law i s :
1 )Be at th e  maximum o f v a lu e , be a t th e maximum o f a c tu a lity  ' y
be at the maximum o f y o u r se lf .
Maximalism o f person -  can be achieved in  d if fe r e n t
,  . ■ j
ways, r e a lis e d  in  d if fe r e n t  manners. ^t can be pursued in  !
th e  com prehensiveness and th e  u n iv e r s a lity  o f knowledge and  ^M 
v ir tu e s  and e x c e lle n c e s . The m axim alist law i s  made to  
determine th e  "Renaissance id e a l" . Thus i t  >was conceived  *
and d efin ed  by Goethe, by Humboldt, by th e  Humamist e d u c a t i o n a l  -  
system . In t h is  form a c e r ta in  harmony and inner balance  
so fte n s  th e harsher im p lica tio n s  o f th e  M axim alist view p o in t.
But th e  m axim alist id e a l can a lso  be conceived  as th e  maximal,
extreme single-m inded  con cen tration  on one p a r tic u la r  and
dominant t r a i t  in  th e  E xceptional Man's Nature: I t  i s  then
th a t fa n a tic ism  i s  born, and th e f u l l  im p lica tio n  o f th e  maxim- . 
a l i s t  a t t itu d e  becomes apparent. At th e same tim e th e fee lin g^  .
—   ,   -  -  -  . . .   ^ ' . ' / . j
' 1 ) I . e .
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o f  freedom, o f  r id in g  th e c r e s t ,  o f l iv in g  to  th e f u l l ,  o f  
f u l f i l l i n g  a d estin y  are in te n s i f ie d  to  th e h ig h e st p itc h .
The Men o f  Power, th e  Men o f D estiny (Napoleon fo r  in sta n ce ) as w 
w e ll as th e A r t is t s ,  th e  E xplorers, th e  V isionary P h ilosop h er, 
even some r e lig io u s  mystiigs are o f t h is  d e sc r ip tio n . As , '
long as they r id e  th e c r e s t ,  as long as th e  beat o f th e ir  ' .
l i v e s  i s  corythm ical v/ith th a t o f  n ature, th e ir  unimpsaded 
p rogress, th e ir  m iraculous su ccesse s  and achievem ents seem 
to  bespeak th e b le s s in g  and the grace o f God on a l l  th e ir
doing. But th e god whose b le sse d  th ey  are i s  not the Trans-
\ »
cendental and Personal God o f  th e  B ib le , not even th e impersonal 
unmoved mover o f  A r is to t le .
y
He i s  a s p ir i t  o f  N ature, a p u lsa tin g  fo r ce  b lin d ly
fo rg in g  ahead in to  th e  new: "This^ cosmic s p ir i t  must not
be m istaken fo r  th e  supernatural God o f C h r is t ia n ity . Nor
must th o se  whom he endows w ith  so p e r fe c t  an empathy in to  h is  -
own nature th a t they seem them selves m an ifesta tio n s o f 1 ’ elan
v i t a l ,  th ink  o f them selves as thereby partaking o f  th e  b le sse d
s o c ie ty  o f  th ose  to  whom God has g iven  th e  pwwer o f  C h ristian
l o v e ^ \  True, th e  V i t a l i s t i c  experience lead s to  V ita lism
( i . e .  Maximalism) and C h r is t ia n ity . But it's  dualism i s  
in
m o r a lly /d if fe r e n t . I t  r ep la ces  the C h ristian  o p p osite  o f
God .and th e  D ev il, good and e v i l  w ith  th e  v i t a l i s t i c  op p o sites
1) B ergson 's conception  in  Les deu x Sources de la  morale 
et de la  R e lig io n . '
' ;1 
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nl) ):Al i f e  -  death, elan v i t a l  -  apathy.
The m axim alist a t t itu d e  stands in  o p p osition  to the
r e lig io u s  a tt itu d e  as w e ll as to  the moral a t t i tu d e . I t  has
however more a f f in i t y  wi th  th e  r e l ig io u s  than w i th  th e moral
a t t itu d e  as i t s  b asic  exp erience, in  a sen se , i s  the inverde
o f th e r e lig io u s  experience: Man has become h is  own God, and
h is  d ig n ity  and value r e s t  no longer in  h is  shared humanity, ^
but in  h is  in d iv id u a l and unique p e r so n a lity , whose sacred
purposes a l l  oth er men must lo v in g ly  serve as means and humbly
adore, even as in  the r e l ig io u s  domain men are required  to
2)serve  ^ God lo v in g ly  and adore him humbly.
To mark the boundary ston es between th e r e l ig io u s ,  th e  ’ 
moral, and th e m axim alist p o s it io n s  l e t  us pass th e fo llo w in g  ' 
in sta n ces  in  quick review:
Man: Moral man wants and demands j u s t ic e .
r e lig io u s  man i s  in  d ir e  need o f mercy and hopes 
fo r  i t .  , ^55
maicimalist man w ishes fo r  n e ith er  j u s t ic e  nor 
mercy fo r  he has lu ck .
Truth: M orally: n eu tra l concept, r e lig io u s :  essen ce ,
m axim alist: convention .
a moral v ir tu e , a r e l ig io u s  s in , a weakening 
o f  the m axim alist p o s it io n .
1) Van Bruggen: Im Schatten  des N ih ilism u s: Die Expressionist-^;
is c h e  Lyrik Deutschlands: p . 175* 1
2) i . e .  regard them selves as means to  God’s g rea ter  g lo ry . V
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T olerance:
C h arity :
P rid e:
Democracy:
a moral v ir tu e , a r e l ig io u s  s in , a weakening 
o f  th e  m axim alist p o s it io n .
a moral faux p as, a E lig io u s  v ir tu e , a m axim alist 
crim e.
a m orally am bivalent term, a r e lig io u s  error, 
a m axim alist v ir tu e .
a m orally va lu ab le  s ta te ;  a r e l ig io u s ly  q u estion ­
ab le  s ta t e ,  a m axim alist abomination.
P re d e stin a tio n aad octr in e abhorrent to m orality; e s s e n t ia l
to  r e l ig io n ;  se lf-u n d ersto o d  fa c t  fo r  th e  
m axim alist.
D ign ity  o f  
Man:
Autonomy:
a m orally e s s e n t ia l  d octr in e; s in fu l  d octr in e  
fo r  r e l ig io n ,  a b iv a le n t  term fo r  th e m axim alist
moral va lu e , r e l ig io u s  s in ,  m axim alist value: 
and sou on.
The hurried  examples are enough to  show th a t th e  
various a tt itu d e s  are bound to c la sh  in  th e  m ajority  o f in sta n ces  
whenever p r a c t ic a l d e c is io n s  are requ ired , and th a t in  the  
m inority  o f  in sta n c es  when they do not a c tu a lly  c la sh , th e  
d iffe r e n c e  o f accent makes what seemed at f i r s t  b lu sh , id e n t ic a l  
m erely s im ila r  d ec is io n s^ ^ . S ince th ere  e x is t s  no p o in t o f  
con tact between d if fe r e n t  domains, none o f them can be demonstrat 
-ed  to be worthy o f unquestionable primacy over th e o th ers .
1) i . e .  s im ila r  in  appearance, d is s im ila r  in  substance.
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I f  such primacy i s  accorded to any one domain, i t  i s  accorded  
by an arb itrary  r e so lv e , by einem Machtsprueh d es .W illen s .
The domain to  whom we accord undisputed primacy over our 
con ative  l i v e s  acquires and keeps th a t primacy on th e
stren g th  o f  th e  i n i t i a l  and subsequent a ffirm atory  r e s o lu t io n s .
\
O bviously in  th e  p resen t con text we are f i r s t  and forem ost 
in te r e s te d  in  th e  actu a l consequences o f a r e so lu t io n  in  favour 
o f th e moral domain. Assuming then th a t we reso lv ed  to accord  
primacy to  the inoral domain, how would t h is  a f f e c t  our p o s it io n  
v i s - a - v i s  the r e lig io u s  domain? And v i s - a - v i s  th e  m axim alist . 
domain? "
A r e so lu tio n  in  favour o f th e  moral domain lea d s f i r s t  
o f a l l  to  th e  d en ia l o f th e a b so lu te  v a l id i t y  o f th e  R e lig io u s  - 
domain. This d e n ia l ' i s  th e d en ia l o f a body o f persuasions  
which may w e ll prove th e  more s ig n if ic a n t  v is io n  o f r e a l i t y ;  
th e  more p en etra tin g  comprehension o f man’ s e s ta te  and nature; 
th e  r ic h e r , more entrancing, more s a t is fa c to r y  way o f  th in k in g . 
For though one may continue to  fo llo w  th e o lo g ic a l d isp u ta tio n s , 
and even e x e r c ise  one’s own mind w ith  r e l ig io u s  .problems, one 
does so through an in su la t in g  w a ll, as i t  were. The l iv in g  
current o f  r e lig io u s  thought i s  cut o f f  when one approaches 
w ith mental p ro v is io n s  and re serv a tio n s  th e p r e ju d ic ia l ’b u t’ s 
and * a lthough’ s i n s t i l l e d  by a p rim arily  moral o r ie n ta t io n .
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Secondly one accepts an o b lig a tio n  to g iv e  moral d u ties  
precedence, at a l l  tim es and in  a l l  in sta n ces over any re lig io u s  
o b lig a tio n s  one may have even i f  doing th is  runs counter to '
th e very te n e ts  o f one’ s f a i t h .  /
i f  m orality  i s  to take precedence over R elig ion  then the  
Duty t é  Man must come before the duty to  God. I t  needs th e  
courage o f a l l  one’s co n v ic tio n s  to  put th is  consequence so 
b lu n tly  to  o n e se lf;  The duty to man i s  to  come b efore the' 
duty to God, and con sid eration  and resp ect fo r  the human person  
are to  come b efore con sid eration  and resp ect fo r  God: h is
revea led  word, h is  m anifest w i l l ,  h is  in s t i t u t io n s .  There 
i s  l i t t l e  co n so la tio n  in  the thought th a t God may w ell wish  
us to choose l ik e  th is  s in c e  we did not choose th e  primacy 
of th e moral domain fo r  th e lo v e  o f God but out o f resp ect  
fo r  man. S im ila r ly  we choose to tr e a t  a l l  men as equally  
p ossessed  o f human d ig n ity , although i t  i s  m anifest th a t men 
are by no means equal, in  d ig n ity  or in  anything e ls e .  And
again i t  may be argued th a t such might be God’ s se c r e t
in te n tio n , God’ s t e s t  fo r  the goodness o f our w i l l :  see in g
th a t i f  men were r e a lly  equal in  a l l  th in gs th ere would be 
no sp e c ia l m erit in  tr ea tin g  them w ith equal r e sp e c t . But 
then we would have to  answer h on estly  th a t "we do not know 
i f  th is  i s  r e a l ly  God’s wish and as moral agents we do,not 
c a r e / , our a c tio n s  are not informed by a d e s ir e  to  d iv in e
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God’s w i l l  but by a determ ination to conform to a moral law
we have s e t  before ou rse lves fo r  th e sake of th e  resp ect we
have fo r  hu#an persons. Therefore were we even convinced
th a t Goethe gauged God’s purpose more c o r r e c t ly  when he wrote
( th is  from a purely M aximalist a t t itu d e ):
Was? ih r  m is s b i l l ig t  den k ra eftig en  Sturm 
Des Uebermuths, verlogne P faffen? •
H aett’ A llah mich bestimmt zum Wurm ^\
So h a e t t ’ er mich a ls  Wurm gesch affen  *
We would s t i l l  i n s t i s t  on the equal d ig n ity  of a l l  men, 
and the p r o ^ b it io n  aga in st v io la t in g  th is  d ig n ity  in  anyone, 
s in c e  "as moral agents we care not one b it  fo r  God’s in te n t­
io n s , or the r ig h ts  o f  the E xceptional Man." For th is  i s  
another consequence o f th e  d ec is io n  to accord primacy to the  
Moral Domain: i t  means p u ttin g  th e duty to  another before
the duty to  o n e s e lf . Though th is  does not imply th a t I 
have a duty to  ose m yself as a means fo r  another man’ s end, I  
a lso  have no' r ig h t to  use men as a means to  my ends: The
duty to resp ect another person, comes before th e duty I 
have towards m yself in  the sense th at i f  my d estin y  and my 
nature, requ ire th e  s a c r i f ic e  o f other p eop le’ s l i v e s ,  happiness, 
freedom, or d ig n ity  I6u st ab sta in  from fo llow in g  th at p a r ticu la r  
s ta r  no m atter how com pelling the tem ptation.
This i s  a co.nsequence o f extreme ser io u sn ess . ' I t s
1) Goethe: West-^Oestlicher Diwan.
a/:'
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c lo se r  con sid eration  w i l l  f in d  a more appropriate and con­
ven ien t p la ce , in  th e d iscu ssio n  o f our th ird  problem.
To r e c a p itu la te :  According Primacy to  the Moral Domain
over th e  m axim alist, precedence to  our duty to  others over 
our duty to  o u rse lv es , may n early , and probably w i l l  mean.t'  ^
th at one has to  forego one’s chance o f s e l f -p e r fe c t io n , o f  
achievem ent, to forego the happiness and the joy th a t comes 
from natural in c lin a t io n s  given th e ir  f u l l  head, natural 
g i f t s  exerc ised  to th e  f u l l .  I f  we are very unlucky i t  may 
amount to a l i f e  m issed, a d estin y  denied, which i s  always 
a p iteo u s or even a lu d icrou s s ig h t . We might w e ll ask 
ou rselves whether M orality i s  worth having at th a t price?  
E sp e c ia lly  wheiyke consider th at i t  i s  by a gra tu itou s and 
arb itrary  d ec is io n  th a t we f i r s t  gave i t  t h is  Primacy, f i r s t  
form ulated the moral p o s tu la te , f i r s t  in terp re ted  our primary 
in tu it io n  o f man’ s humanity, in  th e mmral sen se f i r s t  ehose 
indeed to s tr e s s  th is  in tu it io n  as aga in st th e other two.
In sh ort, out ofaan ungrounded, u n ju s t if ie d , unvind icable  
resp ect fo r  th e  persons, th e d ig n ity , th e very humanity in  
other men, we gratumusly and d e lib e r a te ly  take upon ou rselves  
an o b lig a t io n  to  commit every con ceivab le o ffen ce  aga in st  
o u rse lv es , th e  world, th e va lu es and ends, even again st God, 
rather than break fa i t h  w ith  our fellowm en. This d ec is io n  
seems the more gratu itu ou s s in c e  th e primary in tu it io n  wbich
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i s  i t s  ground o r ig in  could a) have been in terp reted  d iffe r e n t ly ;  
and b) ms only one o f th ree equally  primary, immediate and 
d e c is iv e  exp eriences. I sh a ll lea v e  p o in t a) fo r  the moment 
s in c e  i t  forms part o f the th ird  problem which remains y e t  
to  be d iscu ssed . As fo r  b) i t  i s  in te r e s t in g  to  note th at 
a l l  men are capable o f a l l  the three primary experiences and 
th a t indeed no man can f u l ly  escape any o f them. Hence no 
man by choosing one can com pletely wipe out the memory o f ' 
th e other two. Ther p e r s is te n c e  o f th e b asic  moral in tu it io n  
(o f  man's humanity, or man's in v io la b le  d ig n ity ) can be c l  ear­
ly  observed in  the fa c t  th a t m axim alist and r e lig io u s  tran s­
g ressio n s  aga in st the law ( i . e .  when they tran sgress the.m oral 
law by applying i t  w ith  arb itrary  l im ita t io n s  and excep tions) 
are unconsciously  driven to  d eclare th a t th ose again st whom 
they tran sgressed  were not r e a lly  human. Thus A r is to t le  f e l t  
im pelled  to d efin e  s la v es  as instrum ents-w hich by an over­
s ig h t or in dolence o f nature are shaped l ik e  humans. Cicero 
f e l t  moved to d eclare th a t ' a l ie a e  n ation es s e r v itutem p a ti  
p ossu n t' .  The tor tu r in g  judges in  the w itch t r i a l s  were
wont to a llu d e  to the poor brutes whom they tormented as
1 ^ '"our l i t t l e  song-birds" . H eretics  and d isse n ter s  were
d escribed  as p ossessed  by D e v ils . To s tr e s s  th is  fo r  a long
r )  M alleus Judicum; p . 7/ ;^ ï^ un hoeret w ie ter  zu ih r  Hsrren la s s é  
Euch unter Augen s t e l l e n  . . .  wann ih r  e t l ic h e  Menschen habt 
d ie ih r  wohl s p o e t t l ic h  ewer schoenes-Gemuehts g egen den 
Armen zu erkennen gebende Vo egel zu nennen p f le g t  so nach 
eurem g e fa lle n  s in g en s o i l en . . .
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tim e not 'Mensch* but ’Christenmenscb.' was th e terminus 
tech nicu s fo r  hu#an being.
The upper c la s s e s  in  the n in eteen th  century were convincec 
th a t th e poor did not "feel"  th in gs as " in tensely"  as them selves 
were not human beings o f th e same order. Viscount Gurzon 
on see in g  some E nglish  so ld ie r s  bathing in  a stream i s  supposed 
to  have sa id : "I didn’ t  r e a l i s e  the working c la s s e s  had such
w hite sk in ."  The .Germans declared  every n ation  they wanted
\
to rob, e x p lo it , or murder, to  be merely subhuman e tc . e tc .
The offend ers most immune aga in st the p e r s is te n c e  o f th e moral , 
in tu it io n  are th e r e lig io u s  (s in c e  they are secure in  God 
tq  whom they pass on th e ir  inner u n easin ess) or th ose  bene­
fa c to r s  o f humanity who claim  to seek th e good of a l l  mankind 
even w h ils t  most h orrib lybffen d in g  aga in st th a t part which ’ 
they have in  th e ir  power (th ey  are secure in  a fa n a tic  b e l ie f  
in  th e goodness o f th e ir  own' d octr in e , and more important: 
in  a genuine d e s ir e  to  extend th e ir  supposedly righteous' ru le  
to  the whole w orld ). But no s in g le  human being choosing
th e m axim alist a tt itu d e  can a lto g eth er  r id  i t s e l f  o f the( '
memory o f th e moral in tu it io n  or a lto g e th er  quieten  i t s  m is -i^ ^
g iv in g s  on th is  p o in t w ithout lap sin g  in to  in sa n ity  (v iz
C àligu la , Nero, indeed what i s  termed the Caesarean complex).
As fo r  the primary r e lig io u s  in tu it io n  a M aximalist can always
p a in le s s ly  absorb i t  in to  the system o f h is  M e and conduct, 
under the heading o f "extrem es-of-exp erien ce" , new in stan ces
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o f  v/hicli are always welcome to him. S im ila r ly  th e b asic  
m axim alist and r e lig io u s  in tu it io n s  p e r s is t  in s p ite  of the  
moral ch o ice  and thus ex ige the moral ch oice to be reaffirm ed ; - 
and renewed from time to  tim e.
There e x is t s  no aspect or sense in  which th e primary 
moral in tu it io n  can be sa id  to be com pletely and a b so lu te ly  
superior to the other two. There can be no u ltim ate  ground 
fo r  decid ing in  favour o f th e Primacy o f the Moral Domain over - 
th e  R elig iou s and the M axim alist, other than th is  d e lib e r a te ,  
and gratu ituous ch o ice  i t s e l f .  "therefore i f  anyone chooses 
to  r e je c t  th e Primacy o f the Moral Domain he i s  e n t i t le d  to  
do so as and when he p leased  w ithout b e l i t t l in g  thereby or 
p reju d icin g  in  any way th e value o f h is  ch o ice . He must ' .
however stand by h is  ch o ice  and claim  such m erit as he may - ^
fo r  i t ,  but one th ing  he must never do: he must never tr y  ,
to claim  moral m erit. ' V
This we are p e r fe c t ly  e n t i t le d  to demand o f anyone, no 
m atter what h is  fundamental d e c is io n , s in c e  th is  demand i s  
sim ply a demand fo r  in t e l le c t u a l  honesty. I n te l le c tu a l  honesty  
whereby I mean an e f fo r t  to  d iscrim in ate  and d is t in g u ish  asj
sharply and as firm ly  as one can between the concepts w ith  
which one op era tes, i s  not (as we have shown on a previous 
occasion ) a moral v ir tu e . I t  i s  a q u a lity  required o f a l l  
such as wish to take part in  a th e o r e t ic a l d isc u ss io n , and
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th erefo re  a q u a lity  required a lso  o f th ose who re jec ted  th e  
b a sic  moral p o s tu la te , in so fa r  as they wish to d iscu ss t h e i r ' 
d e c is io n , i t s  im p lic a tio n s , grounds consequences e tc . That 
i s ,  i t  i s  incumbent on a l l  th ose who have made the m axim alist 
or th e  r e lig io u s  d ec is io n  not t o claim  moral m erit fo r  th e ir  
re sp e c tiv e  m axim alist and r e lig io u s  ch o ices .
This brings us r ig h t  to  our la s t  question:
c) Can an ex c lu siv e  d e f in it io n  o f E th ic s , i . e .  a ; ' i
I
d e f in it io n  o f E th ics based e x c lu s iv e ly  on the concept o f the \ j
m orally r ig h t , be c leared  o f th e charges o f a r t i f i c i a l i t y ,
narrowness and in su ff ic ie n c y ?  In other words: I s  the concept
o f the m orally r ig h t a s u f f ic ie n t  b a s is  fo r  a comprehensive
system o f E thics?
Obviously any ser io u s ob jec tio n  to an ex c e ss iv le y  narrow
d e f in it io n  o f m ora lity , cannot in tend  to  fo rce  m axim alist
or r e lig io u s  o b lig a tio n s  in to  th e p rec in cts  o f th e moral
domain, dr under the cover o f m o ra lity ’ s name. We are
1  )u e n t it le d  to take i t  th a t a l l  such o b lig a tio n s   ^ are elim inated
from th e f i r s t .  We a lso  take i t  th a t th e ir  claim s fo r
ÿ ' .primacy over m o ra l'ob liga tion s are r e je c te d  as immoral^ i . e .
‘Ur"
incom patible witl/bhe ex ig en c ies  o f m ora lity . What then are
rU we asked to  in clu d e in  the moral domain? C erta in ly  not some
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1)  i . e .  m axim alist o b lig a tio n s  and r e lig io u s  o b lig a t io n s .
I am not th ink ing here o f R e lig io u s systems which are 
moral Theories in  r e lig io u s  trap p in gs.
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o b lig a t io n  whose o r ig in s  cannot be traced  back to th e primary 
moral experience, fo r  such an o b lig a tio n  would come under th e  
ju r isd ic t io n  o f the m axim alist or under th e ju r isd ic t io n  o f  
th e r e lig io u s  domain. I t  must be some o b lig a tio n  grounded 
in  th e  primary moral experience, th e in t u i t iv e  v is io n  o f man’s 
humanity.
Now, t h e . i n i t i a l  experience o f man’s humanity can be 
conceived in  th ree d if fe r e n t  ways:^^ Man i s  humanity^^.
Man i s  part o f hum anity^M an i s  partaking in  humanity.
In the f i r s t  case the in d iv id u a l in carn ates, com pletely  
and a b so lu te ly , th e whole s ig n if ic a n c e  and value o f humanity.
The in d iv id u a l i s  the u n d on d ition al, inalienable n on -d eriva tive  
value: humanity. Human d ig n ity  i s  th e  e s s e n t ia l  a ttr ib u te
o f th e in d iv id u a l. T h is . is  th e s p e c i f ic a l ly  moral conception  
which I have used throughout. •
In th e second case the in d iv id u a l e x is t s  as part o f a 
whole, \as part o f human s o c ie ty , as a zoon p o l it ic o n . The 
in d iv id u a l incarn ates humanity, i s  the bearer o f i t s  uncondition­
a l in a lie n a b le , n on -d eriva tive  value and i s  p ossessed  of 
d ig n ity  in so fa r  as he i s  a zoon p o l it ic o n . His d ig n ity  remains 
h is  in a lie n a b le  a t tr ib u te , but i t  acquires s ig n if ic a n c e , and 
r e a l i t y  only in  the s o c ia l  s e t t in g ,  as a diamond acquires f i r e  
only in  the rays o f l ig h t .  Hence th e more advanced and p er fec t  
th e s o c ie ty  in  which th e in d iv id u a l e x is t s ,  th e grea ter  the
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spark le he can produce. The in d iv id u a l advances in  and 
through s o c ie ty , and morsJ-ity though keeping him in  mind as 
an in d iv id u a l, w i l l  f in d  i t  b est to  approach him by way o f  
h is  community. This i s  th e  U t i l i ta r ia h  approach. N aturally  
the U t i l i ta r ia n  takes the advancement, improvement, en ligh ten ­
ment and enrichment o f so c ie ty  to be h is  primary o b lig a t io n .
The resp ect fo r  the human person and i t s  in v io la b le  d ig n ity  
may, and probably i s ,  a part and even a purpose o f  u t i l i t a r ia n  
conduct. I t  i s  however always subordinate and su b ject to  
th e primary u t i l i t a r ia n  o b lig a tio n : th e duty to  so c ie ty  comes
before th e duty to  the in d iv id u a l.
In th e th ird  case the in d iv id u a l per se  i s  devoid o f
a l l  va lu e , a l l  value and a l l  d ig n ity  being centred in  th e id ea
o f humanity. The in d iv id u a l e x is t s  not as a part o f humanity,
1 )but as a means, a s tep , a rung on the ladder to  hnmanity 
The in d iv id u a l i s  valuable in so fa r  as he se r v e s , fu r th er s , 
help s th e ends o f humanity. The ends o f humanity are i t s  
s e l f - r e a l i s a t io n  and they are v a r io u sly  defined  as th e su rv iva l 
o f th e Race, the su rv iva l o f  the S ta te , th e p er fec tio n  o f  
th e Race, the p er fec tio n  o f th e S ta te . This conception of 
man’s humanity shades im perceptibly in to  ce r ta in  in terp re ta tio n  
of th e N ih i l i s t i c  in tu it io n  of man’ s nothingne^ss and, in  the
1) Compare Kant’ s "Ich lern e  d ie  Menschen ehren, i . e .  d ie  
Menschen = p eop le, not Menschheit = humanity:
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end, can be hardly d istin g u ish ed  from them. Humanity, the  
human race, the s ta te  become Id o ls  before whom man crin ges  
in 'u t t e r  dependence. By th is  a t t itu d e  h iera rch ia l s o c ie t ie s  
o f a l l  d escr ip tio n s  are created: v a st serfdoms, and sm all '
oppressive ty r a n ie s . When corrupt th ese  s o c ie t ie s  become , 
th e playground of a few opportune ’m axim alists* . I f  they  
p ossess in te g r ity  th ese  s o c ie t ie s  d efin e the m orality  o f an 
ant-heap when o r ien ta ted  tov/ards th e S ta te , or the m orality  ' ;
o f a breeding farm when or ien ta ted  towards the fu tu re  o f the  
RaÊe. Obviously we are not meant to allow  th ese  p r in c ip le s  , 
in to  the moral domain and expected to  g iv e  them the cover o f  
m o ra lity ’ s name.
The only ser io u s claim ant fo r  the r ig h t o f entry in to  
th e  moral domain and th e r ig h t to  bear m ora lity ’ s name i s  
th e  U t i l i ta r ia n  view o f  duty. The U t i l i ta r ia n  view (being  
based as we experience o f man’ s humanity) alone o f a l l  d ivergent 
conceptions o f th e nature of man, can be defin ed  in  the moral 
domain. For i t  alone accords a modicum o f autonomous D ign ity  
to  man. Now, the u t i l i t a r ia n  a tt itu d e  d efin es an o b lig a tio n  
o f i t s  own: th e duty to  s o c ie ty , and i t  claim s th a t th is
duty overrides th e  moral law in  the case o f c la sh . On th e  
other hand th e momL law i t s e l f  may be defined  as a duty to  
s o c ie ty , and i f  i t  be found to be o f s u f f ic ie n t  importance
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i . e .  u se fu ln e ss , i t  may even be made to override other more 
s p e c i f ic a l ly  U t i l i ta r ia n  d u t ie s . The s p e c if ic  U t i l i ta r ia n  
duty i s  th e duty to  b e n e f it  in  general the so c ie ty  in  which 
we l i v e .  We can so b e n e fit  in  general the so c ie ty  in  which ' 
we l i v e  e ith er  by enriching i t  m a te r ia lly , or by enriching  
i t  s p ir i t u a l ly ,  e ith e r  by improving i t  m a ter ia lly  or by 
improving i t  s p ir i t u a l ly .  M aterial enrichment ( f or  in stan ce  
b u ild in g s , fa c to r ie s ,  commerce, e t c . )  and m ateria l improve­
ment (h ea lth , sp o r ts , e t c . )  a r e is u a lly  subsumed under th e  
name o f w e lfa re , s p ir itu a l  enrichment ( th e a tr e s , p a in tin g s , 
scu lp tu r es , books) and s p ir itu a l  improvement (ed u cation , l e c t ­
u res , sermons, e t c . )  are subsumed under th e  name o f en lig h ten -  
ment.
Our duty, on th is  view , i s  to  work fo r  th e w elfare and 
the enlightenm ent o f th e s o c ie ty  o f which v/e are p a rt. Put 
l ik e  th is  i t  sounds p la u s ib le  enough, i t  even sounds prom ising. 
But when we wish to  take a c lo s e r  view of th ese  "duties"  
they sim ply d is so lv e . Imagine fo r  in stan ce  a man, l e t  us 
c a l l  him John, g e tt in g  up in  th e morning and saying to h im sselfj  
"What am i  going to  do fo r  my country’ s w elfare today?" I t  
so happens th a t h is  counti^^ i s  in  need o f engineers. Can 
John go fo r th  o f  a morning and b u ild  a bridge or construct 
a machine? Gan he is su e  fo r th  o f an evening and g iv e  a
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le c tu r e  on modern music or croone a song in to  a microphone, 
when and where h is  country may want such enlightenm ent and 
amusements? Years o f tra in in g  are needed fo r  p ro fic ien cy  
in  any p r o fe ss io n . B esid es anything turned out on demand 
l ik e  th at w i l l  probably not be o f la s t in g  va lu e , and su rely  
th e  U t i l i ta r ia n  w ishes to  ^  o f use rather than to  seem of 
u se . I t  appears th erefore  th a t th e  b est and most ad visab le  
th in g  fo r  John to do i s  to  stay  q u ie t ly  at home and tr a in  fo r  
a p ro fe ss io n  t i l l  he be r e a lly  p r o f ic ie n t .  But what p ro fe ss­
ion? E vidently  one th a t w i l l  prove most u se fu l to the country 
l ik e  engineering fo r  in sta n ce , or th e army. But suppose 
John i s  no good a t mathematics and hates army l i f e .  E ventually  
he w i l l  prove a burden rather than an a sse t  to h is  country 
and in  ad d ition  w i l l  have wasted years o f tr a in in g . Under 
th e circum stances i t  seems p referab le  th a t John should choose 
th e p ro fe ss io n  fo r  which he i s  g i f t e d  and hope th at i t  w i l l  
prove o f use to h is  country. But again John w i l l  be o f much 
grea ter  use at a job he lo v es doing fo r  i t s  own sake and 
regard less o f i t s  u ltim ate  u se fu ln e ss . I t  th erefo re  seems 
im perative th a t John should choose a p ro fessio n  he genuinely  
l ik e s .  ^t i s  indeed a poor excuse i f  a man can say no;' 
b ette r  o f h is  l i f e ’s employment than " it  i s  usefu l"  -  ( I  do 
not r e fe r  to th ose who lo v in g  th e ir  work beyond anything are 
shy o f having th e ir  passion  knovm and th ere fo re  say
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d ep rec ia tin g ly : "It i s  usefu l"  . . .  but to th ose who hating
and d e te stin g  what they do must con so le  them selves w ith the  
knowledge th a t i t  i s  u s e fu l) .  C erta in ly  nothing g rea t, 
nothing la s t in g  can be achieved in  th is  manner. A ll the great 
achievem ents, the important and d e c is iv e  changes of which 
humanity was the b e n e fic ia r y , were wroughtby and must bbe 
cred ited  to men whose sou l and heart were in  th e work they  
were doing, who found happiness and s a t is fa c t io n  in  th e ir  labour, 
and who had found th e ir  task  by fo llo w in g  th e ir  natural in c l in ­
a tio n s  and g i f t s .  The duty to  b e n e fit  humanity d efea ts  i t s e l f  
qua d u ty .,
B esid es, to  assume th a t men approach given  s itu a t io n s  
saying to  them selves "Now how can I iijiprove th is  s itu a t io n  
and by what?" in  the manner o f a teacher fac in g  h is  c la s s  
and saying to h im se lf, "Now what sh a ll  I ask whom?" seems 
to  me a strange and a r t i f i c i a l  d escr ip tio n  o f the way in  wüch 
men ac t .  I t  seems to  me th at men are rather in  th e p o s it io n  
of th e p u p il. They are part o f th e c la s s  which i s  asked 
q uestions and they n a tu ra lly  want to answer r ig h t ly ,  ^o g et  
good marks, or a lte r n a t iv e ly  to be n o isy  and naughty, to  g et  
turned out o f th e classroom , e tc . Men are part o f th e s itu a t io n ,  
and they have th e ir  own d e s ir e s  in  the m atter, and th e ir  own 
in c l in a t io n s , and they envisage ce r ta in  courses o f  action  
which they would l ik e  to  fo llo w , and I can see  no reason
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why they should not fo llo w  them. I t  seems indeed absurd to  
make the ch o ice  o f a l l  on e’s l ik e s  and d i s l ik e s , the ch oice  
o f a l l  one’ s a c t iv i t i e s  a matter o f duty; and th e whole 
approach, the very posing of th e question  seems at f a u l t .
I t  can in  most cases be traced  back to an i n i t i a l  m is in terp ret­
a tio n  o f the nature and th e fu n ction  o f  m orality^^.
U t i l i t a r ia n s ,  however, sometimes put forward another 
argument which on th e fa ce  o f i t ,  seems v a lid  enough^^. They 
claim  th at ju s t  as I have to ask m yself whether by my propos.ed 
a ction  I do not in fr in g e  the moral law, I a lso  ought to  ask 
m yself whether by th e  proposed action  I do not in fr in g e  the  
U ti l i ta r ia n  law. That i s  whether my a ctio n  may not have 
p ern iciou s or unpleasant consequehces fo r  th e so c ie ty  in  
which I l i v e .  S im ila r ly , when th e u t i l i t a r ia n  con sideration s.J  
c la sh  w ith the moral law I must ask m yself which I p refer  
to in fr in g e .^
1) The only case in  which th is  d escr ip tio n  o f conduct might
apply i s  when the fam ily  s o l i c i t o r  i s  c a lle d  in  to c lea r
up the mess in to  which th e fam ily  has got i t s e l f :  he
indeed seems to  say: "Now l e t  us see what the b est course i s
to  get yn out o f th is?"  But then he i s  an o u tsid e  consultant 
h is  in c lin a t io n s  and d e s ir e s  are not in volved , e t c . Except 
perhaps h is  d es ire  to  h e lp . But so i s  th e d es ire  o f people  
who d es ire  to b e n e fit  humanity. U tilita r ia n ism  however 
d ea ls not w ith  a d es ire  to  b e n e fit  humanity which i s  i t s
own j u s t i f ic a t io n ,  but w ith  a duty to b e n e fit  humanity 
which needs to be j u s t i f i e d .  Aspects o f the problems 
have been d iscu ssed  under th e  heading o f im perfect d u ties  
(p o s it iv e  d u t ie s ) .
2) Thus fa r  th e Rossian approach to E th ic s .
5) i . e .  The u t i l i t a r ia n  o b lig a t io n , l ik e  th e moral, i s  applied
i n t r i n s i c l l i y \ o r ^ \ a n § ^ f ^ î P i i ^ à e î i 8 è l ’ a i* a ’p l r f e e l  ( i . e .  ' n eg a tiv e) duty.
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Supposing then th at though my action  does not in fr in g e
th e moral law, i t s  outcome may be p ern iciou scr unpleasant:
♦ 1
By t e l l in g  a poet the tru th   ^ about-h is poems I may cause him
to  go home and hang h im self or a lte r n a t iv e ly  to break up a l l  
the p ottery  in  the house o f th e mutual fr ien d  where we meet.
I should, th ere fo re , knowing the s e n s it iv e  nature^ o f p o ets , 
re fr a in  from vo ic in g  my c r it ic ism  too p la in ly . On the other  
hand fo r  a l l  I know he might go home in  a rage and v;rite some­
th ing b e a u t ifu l , and then my action  would have the most sa lu tary  
e f f e c t .  Knowing the unaccountable reaction s o f p oets I 
should th erefo re  r isk  the tr u th ^ \
This sim ple example brings out the problem: There i s
my i n i t i a l  r ig h t ( ! )  action ; there i s  the unforeseeab le re­
a ction  i t  may arouse in  another agent; there are the consequence^ 
The U t i l i ta r ia n  con sideration  overlooks the s a l ie n t ,  the
important p o in t; the ex isten ce  o f th e other agent. I t  tr e a ts
1
t h is  fr e e  and presumably ra tio n a l agent as though he were but 
another th ing to be improved or en lightened  or b en efited  as 
I p le a se . But the moment th e  action  has passed from me 
to  th at other agent, i t  i s  no longer I ,  but he, whof; i s  the  
su b ject o f . th e a c tio n . He w i l l  r e a c t , not l ik e  a punching- 
b a ll  (coming back at the same a n g le ), but l ik e  a human being.
1) i . e .  a tru th fu l and s in cere  statem ent o f my opin ion .
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He w i l l  be angry or amused. He w i l l  f e e l  in su lte d  or stim ulated, 
He w i l l  say or do one t  ing or another, but whatever he does
V
i s  no longer my r e s p o n s ib ility  but h is .  To think otherw ise  
i s  to deprive him o f h is  s ta tu s  as a person.
I have, however, d ea lt w ith th is  question  from the aspect 
forced  upon me by the U t i l i ta r ia n  in te r je c t io n . A ctu a lly ,
I do not think th at in  a case l ik e  th is  the question  o f the  
consequences o f one’s frankness ( i . e .  the e f fe c t s  i t  might ' 
have on the l i f e  o f the poet) would troub le one e x c e ss iv e ly .
One would n a tu ra lly  assume th at the poet in  question (poets  
being n o toriou sly  tough creatu res) would know how to look  
a fte r  h im se lf. What would' trouble one in  th e matter i s  th a t  
one i s  much too p o l i t e  to  be tr u th fu l, much too conscious o f  
the ensueing conversational s tr a in , much too in dolen t to  bother 
at a l l .  Should one n everth eless fo rce  o n e se lf  to be frank  
and speak the tru th , one can never be sure th at one hadn’t  
done so as a matter o f s e l f - d i s c ip l in e .  None of th ese  doubts 
and d i f f i c u l t i e s  are in  any way actuated  by U t i l i ta r ia n  
con sid era tio n s.
There e x is t  another, and more ser io u s , ev en tu a lity  when 
U til i ta r ia n  con sid eration s openly c lash  with th e ex igen cies  
o f the moral law. This ev en tu a lity  can be b est ch aracterised  ' '
in  the fo llow in g  way: There are cases when I am supposed to  
w itn ess , by p rivy , or m yself in s t ig a te  an act o f in ju s t ic e  and
4 9 4
when I must not take up the case , d ivu lge i t ,  or d ec lin e  to  
commit i t ,  because such a conduct would harm and in ju re  so c ie ty , 
How can a r e je c t io n  o f in ju s t ic e  harm society?  Obviously 
only under very sin gu lar circum stances. In a s ta te  o f war 
or emergency, in  a s itu a t io n  when th ere i s  a "side which i s  
ours" and "a s id e  which i s  th e ir s" . When any weakness I 
cause "our side" may g iv e  an unproportional advantage to th e
"other side" e t c  S ince th is  i s  an age o f assorted  wars'
and continual em ergencies, we can sa fe ly  assume th at through­
out our l i f e - t im e s  there w i l l  always be a s id e  th at i s  ours 
and a s id e  th a t i s  th e ir s .  The ’ sin gu lar  circumstances* 
have, a la s , come to  s ta y . They are v/ith us almost without 
in terru p tio n , and we have grown so used to them th at they no 
longer seem extraordinary to u s. But th is  i s  no reason to  
assume th at they are not sin gu lar nor to assume th at the  
ex ig en c ies  o f th ese  s itu a t io n s  are th e c r it e r ia  o f moral 
judgement. As Benedetto Croce says: " It i s  stup id  to  make the
s ta te  or the n ation , which are necessary con d ition s for  th e  
higher a c t iv i t i e s ' o f  the S p ir it ,  the h igh est purpose o f those  
a c t iv i t i e s .  I t  i s  ju st  as stu p id  as to  contend th at th e end 
purpose o f thought. Art and M orality, i s  to  provide the human , 
organism with a good d ig e s tio n . The n e c e ss ity  which makes 
th e sa fe ty  o f a country the suprema le x  in  tim es o f war and 
emergency corresponds to th e s itu a tio n  o f a man whose s p ir itu a l
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a c t iv i t i e s  are suspended w h ils t  h is  stomach i s  out o f order
* 1 ^and he aw aits i t s  r e sto ra tio n  . Therefore th e moral judge­
ment cannot be grounded in  reasons o f exped iency,national or 
otherw ise. The moral judgement even in  case o f  v/ar and 
rev o lu tio n  w i l l  remain exem plified  by Montesquieu’s dictum: '
" If I knew o f an a ctio n  u se fu l to France but harmful to Europe, | 
or u se fu l to Europe but harmful to  th e  r e s t  o f humanity I 
should consider i t  a crime." This being the case I am caught 
in  th e m ajority of c o n f l ic t s  between a c lea r  moral duty to r e je c t  
in ju s t ic e  in  a l l  cases on the one hand, and an im perative 
n ation al in te r e s t  not to r e je c t  i t  on th e o ther. This in te r e s t  
may weigh so h eav ily  in  my con sideration s th at I might decide  
to  do as i t  b ids me. Though I might subsequently ju s t i fy  
my d ec is io n  by exp laih ing a l l  the circum stances which have 
brought me to i t ,  and th e overwhelming nature o f the in te r e s ts
in volved , though moreover I would be ready to  take f u l l\ -
r e s p o n s ib il ity  fo r  my d ec is io n , even to the extent o f claim ing  
th a t i f  a s im ila r  s itu a t io n  arose I would again choose to  act ■ ^  
in  th is  way. I should in  no way try  to  sa n c tify  my d ec is io n
I
by c a llin g  i t  a moral d ec is io n . I should a lso  not be prepared 
to  demand th at everybody e ls e  should act l ik e  m yself, though 
I c e r ta in ly  sh a ll expect people to act l ik e  me, and indeed
1) Viz: Benedetto Croce: The character of modern philosophy. .
/ a i
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have acted  as I have on the strength  of th is  exp ectation .
What khppened i s  th is :  I had compromised th e moral law, and
had done so on the assumption th at myreasons for doing so were 
strong enough to induce a l l  other persons concerned ( i . e .  
a l l  fe llo w  p a tr io ts )  to compromise at th e same tim e and to  th e  
same ex ten t. I cannot however demand (on moral grounds 
i . e .  as a moral demand) , that everybody compromise. I f  there  
be a man who when a l l  others are brought to  compromise, 
re fu ses  to  do so , no power on earth hs the moral r igh t to  make 
him do i t .   ^ Morevoer there are certa in  compromises ( i . e .  
tran sgression s o f the moral law demanded by n ation al in te r e s ts )  
which no n ation al in te r e s ts  are e n t it le d  to demand^^, and 
which in  case they are demanded the in d iv id u a l must re fu se  to  
make^^. Where p r e c ise ly  th is  l in e  i s  to be drawn^  ^ i s  a 
m atter o f some con jectu re. A ctually  i t  o s c i l la t e s  q u ite  a 
l o t ,  (from one age to another, and from one country to another) 
but in  any case i t  i s  a demarcation l in e  o f what I sh a ll c a l l
1) i . e .  on moral grounds, as a moral demand I might be able  
to demand as the b a sis  of a contract made, i . e .  a le g a l  
demand, v iz  p. ÿ
2) Even a so ld ie r  i s  e n t it le d  to  re fu se  to obey an "inhuman" 
order.
3) Even a so ld ie r  i s  held  p erson a lly  ( i . e .  le g a l ly  -  from a 
moral point o f view he i s  always "personally respon sib le") 
fo r  carrying out such an order.
4) By th is  l in e  we d if fe r e n t ia te  R ea l= p o litiIs  from more honest 
p o l i t ic a l  conduct. Barbarian from c iv i l i s e d  people.
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l e g a l i s t i c  nature. By l e g a l i s t i c  I wish to in d ic a te , what 
i s  and what i s  not perm itted by the w ritten  law s, as w ell as ' 
what i s  and what i s  not done according to the unw ritten, 
t a c i t  law o f custom^^, in  any given  s o c ie ty . Wherever the
l e g a l i s t i c  r e s p o n s ib ility  (punishment and public censure)
\
may be placed in  some c a se s , the moral r e s p o n s ib il ity  in  our 
sen se r e s ts  in  a l l  cases squarely w ith  the in d iv id u a l.
The moral character o f U tilita r ia n ism  i s  due to i t s  
in tr a s u b je c t iv ity  and to i t s  p r in c ip le  "everyone to count as 
one and no one to count fo r  more than one". The U t i l i ta r ia n  
contentions th at the in te r e s t  o f so c ie ty  overrides the in te r e s t  
o f the in d iv id u a l and that the in te r e s t  o f so c ie ty  i s  eo ipso  
m orally good, on th e  other hand are h igh ly  q uestionab le. At 
th is  p oint indeed the im p lica tion s o f the second conception  
become apparent. I f  man has d ig n ity  only as part o f a whole, 
then indeed the many are more important than the one. But i f ,  
as i s  the authentic moral p o s it io n , man has d ig n ity  as an 
in d iv id u a l per se , then the in te r e s t  o f the many i s  not (m orally  
speaking) more important than the in te r e s t  o f the in d iv id u a l, 
fo r  d ig n ity  i s  not a cum ulative commodity. Infringem ents o f  
the moral law committed by many again st one are ju st  as wrong
1) This " le g a l i s t ic  m orality" i s  what Westemark takes to be 
" r e la t iv e  E th ics" . The reason fo r  the r e la t iv i t y  i s  the  
temporal and lo c a l  f lu c tu a tio n s  o f  the demarcation l in e .
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as those committed by one again st one. From a moral point 
o f view, the in te r e s ts  o f s o c ie ty  (e sp e c ia lly  as long as 
s o c ie t ie s  are a r b itr a r ily  lim ite d  and do not comprise the whole 
o f Humanity) are no more sacred than th ose o f the in d iv id u a l. 
Moral laws are indeed prim arily  meant to  p ro tect th e in d iv id u al 
again st tra n sg ress io n s , even the tran sgression s of s o c ie ty .
Moral laws are th erefore  meant to curb and l im it  th e in te r e s t  
o f so c ie ty  not to san ction  them. Hence the demand th at the 
in d iv id u a l s a c r if ic e  h is  in te r e s ts  to those o f so c ie ty  i s  not 
a moral demand so long as the in te r e s ts  o f th e  in d iv id u a l do 
not in fr in g e  the moral law, or so long as t h is  i s  not th e  reason
why the in d iv id u a l i s  required to  forego h is  in te r e s t s .  From
\
a moral p o in t o f view , such a demand represen ts an unwarranted 
and u n ju s t if ia b le  in ter feren ce  w ith the l ib e r t i e s  o f the  
in d iv id u a l. From a moral po in t o f view th e abdication  o f the 
in d iv id u a l: "Die Abdikation des Individuums"^^ in  favour of
th e s ta te  which we w itn ess everywhere in  the world today i s  
a reg re tta b le  a f fa ir .  In consequence, and in  a l l  s in c e r ity  
I suggest th a t we r e je c t  th e U t i l i ta r ia h  claim  to M orality, 
and d ec lin e  to  accord moral s ta tu s  to the U t i l i ta r ia n  ob liga tion s  
Is  the Domain o f E th ics , when even U t il i ta r ia n  p r in c ip le s  
are elim inated , not too narrowky drawn, i t s  content in su ff ic ie n t?
1) Compare a lso  V. Monod: D éva lor isa tion  de l ’homme; p .60.
Etudes d’h is to ir e  et de P h ilosop h ie r e l ig ie u s e s ,  1955-58.
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Let us conàider for  a moment: What do we mean by Ethics?
Do we mean the whole o f our conative l iv e s?  The pursu it o f  
a l l  the ’good’s and the ’v a lu e s ’ we can think of-? C ertain ly  
n o t. The pursu it o f some values then and others n o t . And 
here the ways d iv id e . Some seek the ’good l i f e ’ and some 
seek to  ’b en e fit  s o c ie t y ’ and some pursue Truth and some are 
dedicated  to God. I f  one wishes one may c a l l  a l l  th is  E th ics . 
This i s  not a" quarrel about words. I only proposed th at  
E th ics and M orality be reserved as a p p ella tion  fo r  th at particuM
valu e, i t s  manner o f op eration , and i t s  f i e l d  o f action  (or
/
i t s  domain) which, not e s ta b lish in g  an end i t s e l f ,  or a purpose, 
a cts  as a l im it  to  a l l  p u rsu its  o f Ends and regulates- them in  
th e  name o f th e resp ect we owe to th e D ign ity  o f Man in  human 
b ein g s, a resp ect which ought to stop us transgressin g  or 
. tresp a ssin g  against human persons in  any way. N aturally  since- 
th is  va lu e, i t s  fu n ction , and i t s  Domain by v ir tu e  o f i t s  
s p e c if ic  nature and d e f in it io n  i s  l im it in g , non c r e a tiv e , non 
cum ulative, non p rogressive , and does not generate ends, i t  
cannot by i t s e l f  c o n s t itu te  the ’good l i f e ’ . I t  never by 
i t s e l f  c o n s titu te s  an action  or a p r a c t ic a l d e c is io n . But 
t h is  seems to me no reason to go in  fr a n tic  search fo r  some 
complementary^values which added w ith d scre tio n , might produce 
a resp ectab ly  la rg e  and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  domain. For purely  
m ethodical reasons i t  seems on th e contrary, p referab le  to
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sep arate , d if fe r e n t ia te  and d iscrim in ate our concepts as 
sharply as p o ss ib le , and to pursue our d iv is io n s  as fa r  as 
we can. '
S ynthesis and synoptic views are a l l  very w ell when one
I
knows what one i s  putting  togeth er , what one i s  see in g  together: 
i . e .  a f te r  a n a ly s is . Moreover i t  seems th a t certa in  th in gs  
are observed b e tte r  apart from th e ir  organic natural s e t t in g .
Their in tr in s ic  * d iffe r e n tn ess ’ and ’ sep araten ess’ from the  
complex whole in  which they are embedded, and which abscures 
th a t ’d if fe r e n tn e s s ’ , w i l l  be c le a r ly  recogn ised  and the manner 
o f th e ir  fu n ction s w i l l  grow more com prehensible. This does 
not mean th at once we have observed them apart we mean to l e t  
them languish  apart and fu n ction  in  vacuo -  But i t  means th at
we w i l l  not hasten to obscure or submerge th e ir  ’deparateness’
!
again and continue to require of one th ing what only another 
can supply. uThat we w i l l  never again require the ’good’ 
to  serve as a moral c r ite r io n  or to determine a moral duty, 
nor the % ght to y ie ld  m ateria l contents o f a c tio n . A c lea r  
and d is t in c t  id ea  o f M orality and a c lea r  and d is t in c t  idea  
o f i t s  manner o f operation  seem recompense enough fo r  th e  
narrowness o f the E th ica l Domain.
One f in a l  remark on th e sta tu s  o f m orality  in  a comprehensive 
view o f human conduct and human l i v e s .  Human l iv e s  and human
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conduct, to  re ca p itu la te  previous conclusions fo llow  certa in  
l in e s  and are governed by cer ta in  r u le s . The l in e s  have 
s ta r t in g  p o in ts  and end p o in ts  (m otives and ends); the ru les  
have p r in c ip le s . Human l i v e s ,  human p u rsu its , human conduct 
are th erefore  determined by ends, m otives and p r in c ip le s . And 
the p r in c ip le s  are o f three k in d s: th ose which p rescrib e  how
to a tta in  a pursued end, th ose which regu la te  the manner in  
which ends are to be pursued, th ose which decree what ends 
to pursue.
P r in c ip le s  which p rescrib e  how to a tta in  an end pursued 
are the h yp oth etica l im peratives o f purposive a c tio n . They 
are h yp oth etica l because whether we accept them or not 
depends on whether or not we are pursuing, i . e .  in te r e s te d ,  
in  the end which they help us to a t ta in . Ends are th in gs  
which we d e s ir e , and i f  I do not d es ire  a cer ta in  th ing the  
l in e  o f Conduct by which I am most l ik e ly  to  acquire i t  i s  o f  
no in te r e s t  to me. The h yp oth etica l im perative which p rescrib es  
the actio n s to be talien i s  th erefore  a su b jec tiv e  maxim o f  
lim ite d  in te r e s t .  The maxims regu la tin g  s c i e n t i f i c  research , 
or th ose regu la tin g  m artial careers can be s a fe ly  disregarded, 
indeed must be disregarded by the p a in ter , th e peasant and the
I
p r ie s t .
Rules o f conduct which are derived from the ob ject pursued 
are th erefore  not o b jec tiv e  ( i . e .  g e n e r a l l y  v a lid )  ru le s  o f
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conduct. They are n e ith er  o b jec tiv e  o b lig a tio n s  nor u n iversa l 
d u tie s . They would be u n iversa l d u ties or ca teg o r ica l 
im peratives only i f  there were an o b jec t, or o b jects  which a l l  
men ought to pursue. I f  there i s  such an ob ject then i t  ought 
to  be pursued by a l l  men qua men, i . e .  there would have to  
be a po in t of contact between th e nature o f man and the ob ject  
pursued. I t  would fo llo w  th a t o b jec tiv e  maxims o f conduct
Î ■
can be form ulate d w ith p rec is io n  only from th e point o f view  
o f the pursuing su b jec t. They are derived from and grounded
in  a d e f in ite  and circum scribed conception o f the nature o f
\
man. Now the nature o f man can be conceived in  d iffe r e n t  
ways each o f which w i l l  provide humanity w ith an "universally"  
v a lid  purpose, and o b jec tiv e  o b lig a tio n  or ca teg o r ica l im perative 
o f i t s  own. The purposes so construed are defined  as th e  
higher v a lu es . The usiaL higher values are Beauty, Truth and 
Goodness. The higher values them selves can be conceived in  
d iffe r e n t  ways, and so can the manner o f th e ir  m aterial r e a l­
is a t io n . According to  whether the r e a lis a t io n  o f higher values  
i s  lo ca ted  prim arily  w ithout or w ith in  th e human person we 
get th ree concom ittant p a irs o f concepts to the th ree higher  
valu es: A r t is t ic  dreation  and S e lf - r e a l is a t io n  to  correspond
to  b-Beauty; S c ie n t i f ic  achievements (th e  body o f knowledge) 
and r e lig io u s  fa ith  to correspond to Truth; Ideal s o c ie t ie s  
and moral p er fec tio n  to correspond to  Goodness. Concom ittantly
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th ree p a irs o f concepts are defined  to in d ica te  the ca p a c it ie s  
o f human nature which correspond to the r e a lis e d  id e a ls , and 
s in c e  th e tw ofold  lo c a lis a t io n  has re su lted  in  tw ofold  id e a ls ,  
th is  d u p lica tion  i s  r e f le c te d  back onto the higher values ' 
them selves. In consequence wne a rr ive  a t the fo llow in g  
correspondences; C reative capacity  and V ita l i t y ,  to correspond 
to "The Body o f human a e s th e t ic  achievements" and to Maximalism 
( fo r  Beauty); in t e l le c tu a l  cap acity  and s p ir itu a l humility^ 
( s e n s i t iv i t y )  to correspond to  "The Body o f human knowledge" 
and to R elig ion  (fo r  T ruth); and P ra c tica l capacity  and good 
w il l  to  correspond to the "Whole o f human Statesmanship and 
P o l i t i c a l  le g a l structures"  and to M orality (fo r  Goodness).
I t  must be noted th at th e  various id e a ls  and d is c ip lin e s  tend  
to  pretend to each others q u a lit ie s  so th at Maximalism arrogates 
th évalués of Truth and G oodness,/R elig ion  th e values o f Good­
ness and Beauty, and M orality the values o f Beauty and Truth 
without great su ccess.
The higher v a lu es, however conceived and in terp reted , 
are prim arily  s ig n if ic a n t  fo r  th e  order which they impose on 
the l iv e s  o f men. ‘ The more unavoidable, more day-to-day and 
commonplace p u rsu its  o f men, (fo r  example the p u rsu it o f the  
n e c e s s i t ie s ,  or th e  p ursu it o f m aterial p o ssess io n s) are sub­
ordinated in  each case to  th e p ursu it o f one o f th e higher  
valuks, andthus a cer ta in  shape, a cer ta in  stamp i s  s e t  on
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on human l i f e .  The most important fea tu re  o f th is  super­
imposed stamp i s  th at from a combination o f th e end chosen 
(Beauty fo r  in stan ce) and a cer ta in  conceptionoof the nature 
of man (th e  conception o f man’s unique in d iv id u a lity  for  
in stan ce) a cer ta in  law i s  formulated whose objeq i i t  i s  to  
reg u la te  the way in  which man’s usual action s are performed, 
a maxim o f conduct in  the "second degree". When.the r e a l i s a t f  
o f the h igher values i s  conceived to  be loca ted  v/ithout man, 
then th e maxims o f conduct o f the second degree merely command 
th a t a l l  other p u rsu its  be regarded as in s ig n if ic a n t  and sub­
ord inate to th e main p u rsu it which i s  the p u rsu it o f the higher  
va lu e. Thus the p ursu it o f knowledge decrees th a t not much 
tim e, energy or n o tic e  be given to th e pursu it of m aterial 
goods, and th e  a r t i s t  i s  not supposed to pay too much a tten tio n  
to  recent mathematical th eo r ie s  fo r  in sta n ce . But th ere  i s  
no attempt to change the f i r s t  degree purposes in  th em selvess. 
However when the r e a lis a t io n  o f th e higher Values i s  thought 
to  take p lace w ith in  the hu#an person, then th e maxims o f - 
conduct which we have termed o f "second degree" not only sub­
ord inate a l l  other p u rsu its , but seek to  in flu en ce  or change 
th ose  p u rsu its  in  them selves. Thus maximalism considers a l l  
p u rsu its  qua p u rsu its good, s in ce  they in te n s ify  the v i t a l i t y ,  
enrich the p erso n a lity , and heighten the value of th e pursue- 
ing  su b jec t. The Maximalist ca teg o r ica l im perative: Be
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at the maximum of y o u rse lf;  tends th erefore  to g lo r ify  and 
push a l l  human purpose to th e ir  u ltim a th u le . R elig ion  on 
the other hand vievis a l l  human p u rsu its as supremely in sig n ifica n t  
and even a c t iv e ly  e v il  in so fa r  as they d ivert part o f men’s 
a tte n tio n  from the contem plation o f God to th e ir  own a f fa ir s .
The R elig iou s im perative "Love God, and God alone" . . .  "Soli 
Deo Gloria" tensds to devaluate, in v a lid a te  and deny all'.human 
purpose except the consciousness o f God. M orality regai'ds '
8
a l l  purpose as being n e ith er  good nor e v i l  in  i t s e l f  so long  
as i t  does not encroach on the prerogatives o f the human person. 
The moral ca teg o r ica l im perative: "Never v io la te  th e d ig n ity
o f man in  thy fe llo w  men" tends th erefore  to  l im it  a l l  purposes f 
w ithout g lo r ify in g , devaluating or othervrise changing them 
in  them selves. I t  f u l f i l s  th erefore  a fu n ction  very sim ilar  
to  th at described above (v iz  the a r t i s t  and mathematical 
th e o r ie s )  w ith  th e exception th a t no purpose at a l l ,  not even 
th at o f m orality  i t s e l f ,  i s  exempt from th is  l im ita t io n . A ll 
three: the m axim alist, the r e lig io u s  and the moral views o f
human l i f e  can th erefore  be sa id  to form ulate reg u la tiv e  ru les  
for  human conduct.
In consequence M orality i s  seen to be merely one among 
sev era l p o ss ib le  s e t s  of re g u la tiv e  ru les  fo r  human conduct.
How then did i t  acquire the in o rd in a te ly  important p lace  i t  
occupies in  our judgement o f men? I t  seems to me th is  i s  so .
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not because an adherence to moral laws means much .^  ^ but because
a non-adherence to moral laws means more, and because g iven
our actu a l "human condition" a non-adherence to  the moral law
i s  as a ru le  unavoidable: Given th e  r ig id i t y  and th e  extreme
s e n s i t iv i t y  o f moral o b lig a t io n , any purpose or id ea l'w h o le  
%
h earted ly  pursued must lea d  in  one way or another to  a tra n s­
g ressio n  o f th e moral lav/.
I sh a ll  l im it  m yself to two examples o f th e a r t i s t ,  
and th a t o f the statesm an. The way o f th e  a r t i s t  lea d s  
through th e  domain o f maximalism to  the id o lis a t io n  o f h is  
work: th e  lump o f earth , the coloured tu b es, the'm inor or
th e major key. The m axim alist p o s tu la te  d efin es i t s  own. 
o b lig a tio n : i t s  i s :  expand, in crea se , deepen and enriéh . The 
expansion, in crea se , depth and enrichment o f * th e  s e l f  i s  paid  ' '
fo r  w ith  th e d isregard  and abuse o f o th ers. The id o lisa t io n .  
o f  one’s Work’ reduces one’ s fe llo w  men to  th e  le v e l  o f mere 
means. There can be, th ere must be no con sid era tion
V 1
o th er s , no resp ect fo r  th e ir  p ersons, th e ir  p u rsu its  o f th e ir  <
needs in  the l i f e  o f th e a r t i s t .  G u ilt and tran sgression , are 
' th e  p r ice  o f crea tion ,an d  nothing in  th e  a r t i s t ’ s l i f e  can 
escape th e m astica tin g  jaw o f the Moloch, who w i l l  \eventually  
spev/ out a poem, a canvass, fr v e  bars o f m usic. YJith luck  ( 
i t  w i l l  be a b e a u tifu l poem, a f in e  canvass, a most enchanting
I m usical phrase, and everything w i l l  seem j u s t i f i e d  in  r e tr o sp e c t .
I th ink  th a t i t  i s  q u ite  wrong to assume th a t i f  a man
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1) be but o f high moral s ta tu s  h is  other d e f ic ie n c ie s  
contd . seem unimportant. -It i s  when h is  moral s ta tu s  i s  low  
th a t h is  other ex c e lle n c es  and v ir tu e s  seem tin g ed  w ith  
b asen ess.
I f  not the s a c r i f ic e s ,  g u i l t , pain and e f fo r t  have a l l  been 
in  vain  and th e wheel must be s ta r te d  r o l l in g  again: " i l
fa u t recommencer, tou jours recommencer."
In th e  case  o f th e statesm an, th e  army commander, th e  
p o l i t ic ia n  o f whatever d e sc r ip tio n , th e s o c ia l  reformer -  
tra n sg ress io n  o f th e moral law i s  part o f h is  job. P eop le, 
th e ir  l i v e s ,  property , d ig n ity , are h is  raw m ater ia l, th ey  are  
by d e f in it io n , h is  means, cyphers in  h is  c a lc u la t io n s . This 
cannot be avoided even by :the most m orally s e n s i t iv e ,  the  
most cau tiou s o f men, i f  they occupy resp o n sib le  p o s it io n s .
Indeed th e  g rea ter  th e man the more imposing h is  achievem ent, 
th e  deeper h is  g u i l t ,  th e graver h is  tr a n sg re ss io n . Even from 
our own lim ite d  experience we have lea rn t to  know th a t tr y  
as we may we cannot avoid  g u i l t  and in j u s t ic e ,  and lack  o f  
con sid era tio n  and th e tram pling o f other p eo p le ’ s l i v e s  and 
happiness and d ig n ity  i f  anything, anything at a l l  i s  to  be 
ach ieved . No wonder then th a t the moral law i s  broken tim e  
and again . N everth eless the moral law stands unchanged. I t s  
demand as u n con d ition a l, i t s  p o s tu la te  as a b so lu te , i t s  ch a llen ge  
as g a lla n t  as b efore . We can come back to  i t  whenever we 
choose and i t s  d ir e c t io n s  v / i l l  be ju s t  as c le a r  and d e f in it e
508
as th e f i r s t  tim e we co n sc io u sly  and g la d ly  broke i t .  I t  
stand th ere an unchanged an unchangeable sign p ost to  Humanity
-  I t  i s  we who change: Has g u i l t  l e f t  i t s  mark on our brow?
-  has i t  coarsened our s e n s ib i l i t i e s ?  -  above a l l  has i t  
v i t ia t e d  th e  purpose,, the sh in in g  id e a l fo r  which we incurred  
i t  so bravely?
I t  seems to  me th at in  a l l  m atters d ea lin g  d ir e c t ly  w ith  
p eop le , th a t i s  in  a l l  p o l i t i c s ,  statesm anship , in  a l l  p u b lic  
fu n c tio n s , and p u b lic  o f f i c e s ,  evezytran sgression  aga in st th e  
moral law h o p le ss ly  v i t ia t e s  the purpose fo r  w h ic h iit  was 
committed. E^ery s in g le  person v io la te d  in  h is  l ib e r ty  and 
d ig n ity  in  the name o f a p o l i t i c a l  creed , v i t i a t e s  th a t creed  
and no m atter how f a ir  i t s  name at th e beginning turns ±t in to  
oppression  and tyranny. The tragedy o f  p u b lic  l i f e  i s  th a t  
one cannot choose one’ s enemies and th a t i t  i s  always th e  one 
who i s  low est on th e  s c a le  o f m ora lity  who has th e  ch o ice  o f
weapon. I t  i s  th e  tragedy o f  war th a t no on eis  v ic to r io u s
/
t i l l  each has become l ik e  th e other a t th e ir  low est common 
l e v e l  and th a t a l l  v ic to r y  i s  p y rrh ic , fo r  th e  v ic to r  i s  th e  
vanquished d isg u ised  as h im s e lf^ \
1) Thus i f  th e  (m orallyI ) in fe r io r  cause wins i t  has won an 
a l l  over v ic to r y . In so far  as i t  has not b o ld ly  k i l l e d  o f f  
i t s  ad versar ies i t  has won th e ir  so u ls . I f  the b e tte r  
cause winds in  most cases i t  f in d s  th a t propter vitam  v iven d i 
p erd er it causas: I t  d efea ts  i t s  ad versaries b o d ily , but i t s
heart has been contaminated as i t  must be i f  i t  i s  to  win at 
a l l  (v iz  th e  employment o f s p ie s , to r tu r e , e t c . )  by th e  moral
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1 ) s ta tu s  o f the adversary so th a t in  a way the
contd. adversary can be sa id  to  have carr ied  o f f  th e v ic to ry  
over i t s  so u l. I t  u su a lly  takes th e b e tte r  cause  
a longer tim e to recuperate from i t s  v ic to r ie s  than 
to recuperate from i t s  d e fe a t.
The moral law re ig n s then supreme over a l l  th a t appertains  
to  th e l i f e  o f n ation s and s o c i e t ie s .  Those who tran sgress  
i t  v i t i a t e  or f o r f e i t  everything: in te g r ity ,  v ic to r y , the
very purposes in  whose name and fo r  whose b e n e f it  they f i r s t ,  
tran sgressed  the. moral law. Do tra n sg ressio n s o f  th e  moral 
law a lso  a f f e c t  th e work o f th e a r t i s t e ,  th e fin d in g s  o f th e  
s c ie n t is t?  Does the moral law euLso re ign  supreme over th e  
r e la t io n sh ip  o f th e crea tor  to  h is  work, th e  inventor to  h is  
in v en tio n s , the d iscoverer  to h is  d iscovery , the th ink er to  
h is  thought? That im perceptib le coarsening o f  the h eart, th a t  
im p ercep tib le l e s s  in c s e n s i t iv i t y ,t h a t  comes w ith  the tran s­
g ress io n  o f th e  law, th e  d isr e sp ec t and d isregard  fo r  human 
d ig n ity . I t  i s  f e l t  in  a coarser rime, a more vulgar t in g e  
to  th e  sequence o f our thoughs, a poorer ju x ta p o sitio n  o f  
colou rs and o f m usical n o tes , an in fe r io r  chanting o f  s c i e n t i f i c  
v a r ia b le s , a sh ak ier form ulation  o f  mathematical equations?
At tim es i t  seems c le a r ly  so^^, at o th ers one hopes th a t moral
■ , — — 1 1 — .   — ■ I I -  .  , —  — I. , . . . . L  - ■ 1 . ^ 1  - ,  —  —  I. I .  .  m
1) I must exempt th e numerical charts o f th e s c i e n t i s t ,  the  
formulas o f  the math oiiat i c i  an s, th e lo g ic a l  an alyses o f  
th e  p h ilo sop h ers. The p u rsu it o f  Truth i t  seems i s  untinged  
by th e moral tra n sg ress io n s  o f  th ose who pursue i t .  Not-
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1 )  so th e  r e p o r ts  on th o s e  p u r s u its  and t h e i r  f in d in g s ,
co n td . w hich form s an in d is p e n s a b le  p a r t o f  th e  s c i e n t i s t s
e t c . work. The b ooks, p a p ers , l e c t u r e s  o f  th e  
s c i e n t i s t  and th e  p h ilo so p h e r  a re  j u s t  as v u ln e r ­
a b le  as th e  work o f  th e  s c u lp to r  o f  th e  p a in te r .
The form , th e  s j jÿ le , th e  e x p r e ss io n s  in  w hich  
ÿhe s c i e n t i s t ,  and th e  p h ilo so p h e r  re p o r t  t h e ir  
f in d in g s  to  th e  w o r ld , a re  in d i s c r e e t  g o s s ip s  who 
r e a d i ly  g iv e  away th e  moral s t a tu s  o f  t h e i r  a u th r s . 
The m oral immunity o f  th e  purs'^Jiit o f  tr u th  does 
n o t co v er  th e  e x p r e ss io n  o f  T ruth , th e  m oral immun­
i t y  o f  th e  f ig u r e ,  th e  form ula and th e  c h a r t , does  
n o t co v er  th e  e x p la n a tio n , and th e  d ed u c tio n , th e  
h y p o th eses  and th e  c o n c lu s io n s  w hich are e |ip r essed
in  v/ords. And hum anity, even s c i e n t i f i c  hum anity
cannot as y e t ,  a l t o g e t h e r  fo reg o  th e  u se  o f  words!
t r a n s g r e s s io n  marr th e  man but sp a re  h is  work, t i l l  one comes 
upon th a t  ja r r in g  n o te , th a t  f a u l t y  r im e, th e  v u lg a r  under­
to n e  o f  th o u g h t, th e  o s t e n ta t io u s - c o m p o s i t io n , and one i s  
r e lu c t a n t ly  fo r c e d  to  adm it th a t  th e  p r ic e  o f  m oral t r a n s ­
g r e s s io n  i s  a lw ays ex a c te d  to  th e  f u l l .  There i s  no escap e  
from  th e  e x ig e n c ie s  o f  th e  moral law .
I t  i s  our f a t e  and our tr a g e d y  t h a t  we can n e ith e r  
a c h ie v e  (a s  s ta te sm en , s o c i a l  r e fo r m e r s , p a t r i o t s ,  c i t i z e n s  
even) nor fa s h io n  (a s  a r t i s t s ,  cra ftsm a n , s c i e n t i s t )  an yth in g  
w ith o u t in  th e  p r o c e ss  in c u r r in g  th e  g u i l t  however s l i g h t  o f  
m oral t r a n s g r e s s io n ,  and th a t  every  tr a n s g r e s s io n  marrs th e  
n a tu re  o f  our p erso n s and our ach ievem en ts b o th . Betw een  
a law  we must break in  ord er to  grow and a growth v i t i a t e d
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by th e  g u i l t  o f  th e  broken law  we o s c i l l a t e  in  t r e p id a t io n ,
n ever q u it e  re a ch in g  th e  s t a r s ,  n ever q u it e  ready to  r e s ig n :
Denn m it den G o ettern  
S o l i  s ic h  n ic h t  m essen 
Irg en d  e in  Mensch 
Hebt er  s ic h  au fw a erts  
Und b eru eh re t
M it dem S c h e i t e l  d ie  S te rn e  
N irgen d s h a f t en dann 
D ie u n s ic h e r e n  S o h ien 
Und m it ihm s p i e l  en 
W o ik  en und W ihde.
S te h t  er m it f e s te n  
V M arkigen Knochen
Auf der v/ohlg eruendet en 
Dauernden Erde 
R eic h t er nichb auf 
Nur m it der B ich e  
Oder der Sebe  
S ic h  zu v e r g le ic h e n .
' (
THE DESIRED A N D  THE DESIRABLEI
By P é p it a  H a e z r a h i
J S. MILL’S dictum : “ The sole evidence it is possible to • produce that anything is desirable is that people actually 
- desire it has been so often refuted on so many plausible 
grounds that an attempt to vindicate it might not be wholly 
devoid o f interest.
One can recognise at least three distinctions of meaning 
between “ desired ” and “ desirable ” which either singly or in 
various combinations cover all ordinary senses o f the two 
notions. These, I shall, for want of a more precise apellation, 
term {a) “ the dispositional ” , {b) “ the emotive or propa­
gandist” and (c) “ the imperative or absolute.” I shall assume 
that “ X is desired ” means in all cases “ Y is now desiring 
X  ”, i.e. X  has overcome all rival claimants and all obstacles 
to Y ’s fullest attention. “ X  is desirable ” however seems cap-
.  ^Utilitarianism, Ch. IV.
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able of three different interpretations to match the three distinc­
tions. Thus X is desirable ” may be equivalent to : (a) X 
is capable of being desired ” or X would be desired if ;
(b) “ I approve of my (or your) desiring X ” ; and (r) “ X is 
good, therefore one ought to desire X
I wish to maintain that a consideration of the ways in which 
‘‘desired” and “ desirable” are actually used will show that far 
from being irreconcilable the difference between the two terms is 
one of degree rather than of kind and is adjustable to the point 
of interchangeability.2
(a) The dispositional sense of “ desirable ”
This is easily proved, indeed hardly a matter of dispute, in 
the context of the first interpretation. Here “ X is desirable ” 
i.e. X is capable of arousing desire ” strongly suggests the 
qualifying clause “ but does not at this moment ” . How, then 
can I know that X is capable of arousing^desire ? Either by 
recalling that X has done so on some past occasion or occasions ; 
or by its resemblance to an object which is actually desired now 
or which has been actually desired in the past. Thus, though I 
usually prefer brandy I might refuse it on an evening dedicated 
to whisky ; i.e., though I usually find brandy desirable I now 
desire whisky. “ The desirable ” is equated with the “ once, or 
usually desired ” . It might even be actually present in the 
form of a very faint desire, accompanying or called forth by the 
recollection of a past desire and immediately overridden by the 
much stronger desire for my present drink or by the desire to be 
reasonable and not mix them.
This use of “ desirable ” is sharply brought out by examples 
like “ It would be desirable for me to do some work but I’d 
rather go to the party ” , or in a more famous formulation 
“ Video meliora proboque détériora sequor ” . Here “ X is 
desirable ” means “ X fits into my general system of values, I 
approve of X, indeed I do actually desire it ; but alas, I entertain
 ^It should be pointed out that such gradual adjustments take place where the “ desired *’ 
and the “ desirable ’* are considered against the concrete background of their actual rela­
tionships. The abstract logical relations between these two concepts remain however 
unaffected by such adjustments and, indeed, follow laws o f their own. Thus in the context 
of the first interpretation—the most easily adjustable in its temporal concrete aspect, the 
logical relation is one of incompatibility and mutual exclusion : If X  is desired (i.e. actual­
isée!) it is no longer desirable (potentially desired). In the context o f the second interpre- 
ption a relation o f one-sided dependence holds. The desirable is always something that 
is already desired. But the desired can be either desirable or undesirable. In the context 
of the third interpretation the desirable is completely independent and indifferent to the 
desired. For the desirable is defined as the good, and remains so regardless o f whether it be 
actually desired or not. It is the object of this paper to show that this abstract relation, 
arrived at by a definition in vacuo, as it were, is not valid in the domain o f actual relation­
ships.
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some fiercer desires which, being incompatible with X, induce 
me to give it up (good as it may be, fitting as it may be, desired 
as it may be) in favour of their own realisation
It should be pointed out that the reference of “ desirable ” in 
the above examples to fittingness or approval is fortuitous and 
bj no means necessary, Cigarettes are desirable but I desire 
health more and therefore will not smoke them ” and Health is 
desirable but I desire a smoke more and will have my cigarette ” 
are two equally justifiable assertions. Asuming health to be 
indeed the greater good, this example neatly brings out my 
point : desirable ” , in this context, does not necessarily refer
to a greater good ; it connotes solely an over-ridden and sup­
planted desire. To misquote a saying of Gregory of Nazanz’ 
which the Master of Balfibl is very fond of citing “ The actually
desired is not necessarily the undesirable ” .
The difference, then, between “ desirable ” and desired ” lies 
in the time of realisation, or in intensity and degree. The ulti­
mate reference of the desirable (indeed its sole evidence for 
being desirable) is either to a past or future actual desire which 
X has or expects to be aroused or to a present actual, but very 
faint and overridden desire.
{I?) The emotive or propagandist sense of desirable
“ Desirable ” is often employed in a hortatory manner.^ At 
such times use is made of the double-entendre of this term with 
its simultaneous reference to desire and to approval, to stress 
the latter and thereby increase its emotive and propagandist 
power. An additional sleight of hand is performed by presenting 
this approval as applying directly to X, when in fact it applies 
only to the “ desiring of X ” . For "‘X is desirable” in this 
context means either I approve of my desiring X ” or I 
approve of your desiring X ” . It is of great interest to note that 
only the first case implies a necessary approval of X ; the second 
tacitly assuming it on insufficient grounds.
Thus, when, being an addict, I say Music is desirable ”, 
what I mean is : Music is a good thing ; I enjoy and desire it
very much ; I think well of myself for desiring it, I hope I will 
go on desiring it ” . On the other hand when disliking a certain 
task and wishing someone else to undertake it one says, e.g. : 
Domestic service is desirable ” , one appears to convey a
 ^ The kingdom  o f  heaven is not necessarily confined to fools.”
*I deal here w ith the hortatory use o f  “ desirable” only, i.e. cases where existing desires 
are checked or encouraged. I shall deal w ith the imperative sense o f  desirable which 
claims to order non-existent desires into being later. O bviously a strong hortatory flavour 
adheres to  the imperative use ; but not vice versa.
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favourable attitude to domestic service but what one has is a 
favourable attitude to the desiring of domestic service b\ some­
one else. One says, in effect, “ Domestic chores are a bore, how 
wonderful if someone else would do them ” .
This is a rather extreme example of the demagogic misuse to 
which “ X is desirable ” lends itself. Milder examples are met 
with daily as one says : “ Early bed-times are desirable ”, or 
“ Regular attendance at Church is desirable ” , when one has no 
intention of complying oneself but, on the other hand, has no 
actual distaste for these activities.
Altogether four uses of “ desirable ” in the hortatory sense 
can be distinguished : (^) “ I desire X and desire to go on 
desiring X ” ; ( )^ “ I desire X and desire somebody or every­
body else to desire X ” ; (f) “ Though I do not desire X I 
desire to desire it ” {d) “ Though I do not desire X myself I 
desire somebody else to desire it ” .
In aU four cases the actual object of desire and approval is 
the “ desiring of X ” not X. This is usually misunderstood and 
desire and approval are assumed to apply directly to X. Some­
times, X happens to be also approved and desired and then this 
hasty assumption is rendered innocuous. But sometimes X 
is not desired and approved, and if the spurious effects of its 
being desired and approved be consciously misused, the results 
might prove pernicious.
But the sole point which need concern us here is that “ X 
is desirable ” in the hortatory sense refers to, and is directly 
dependent on an existing actual desire for the “ desiring of X ”, 
which it tries to intensify and perpetuate (or check and lessen 
when “ undesirable ” is used).
(c) The imperative or absolute sense of desirable.
It is the third sense which is commonly supposed to 
exemplify the irreconciUablity of the “ desired ” and the “ desir­
able ” . “ X is desirable ” is equated to “ X is good, X ought to 
be desired regardless of whether it is actually desired or not ” . 
In the second sense, when X is not actually desired, the imperative 
or absolute interpretation retains its full stringency. Thus, 
“ X is desirable ” i.e. “ X ought to be desired ” seems to imply 
an obligation to desire a certain object though it had never been 
desired before, is not desired now, and is quite incapable of
® This is the hortatory equivalent o f “ video meliora ”, if a very faint desire for X  is 
existent which I desire to render sovereign ; or the hortatory equivalent of the imperative 
or absolute interpretation if It ry to call forth a non-existent desire, by my desire for this 
desire. But o f this later.
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arousing desire even under the most auspicious of circumstances. 
On asking why on earth we should be obliged to desire that 
object at all, we are told because it is “ good ” (or conducive to 
“ good ’)® and that one should always desire what is good (or 
conducive to good). In short, “ desirable ” is the predicate of 
an X which, though a fit object of a judgment of approval, 
i.e. “ good ” , does not affect our conative tendencies at all. By 
introducing an aUen principle of valuation, the norm of the 
“ good ” , an absolute difference in kind is assumed between the 
desired and the desirable.
To illustrate this point let us imagine something “ good ” 
which possesses no reference to desire ; e.g. a certain piece of 
modern music. We approve of the composition in so far as it 
satisfies the criteria, rules and principles of what good music 
ought to be. Now let us assume that listening to it affords none 
of the pleasures associated with classical music and leaves us no 
desire to repeat the experience, and also fails to satisfy any desire 
for self-improvement or for novel experience. In short, the 
composition is “ good ” because it comes up to standard, 
but we do not actually desire to listen to it for any reason what­
soever. This desirable—because good—piece of music would 
then not be desired at all and at first blush the case would seem 
proved for a use of desirable ” and “ desired ” in the third 
sense.
Now this argument has a very serious flaw : it fails to account 
for the difference of meaning between “ good ” and “ desirable ”. 
The hortatory power wliich judgments of approval {i.e. “ good ”) 
possess in themselves is, for instance, considerably intensified’ 
and to a certain degree actuafised and activated by the epithet 
“ desirable ”. When instead of calling X “ good ” I call X 
“ desirable ” I wish to imply in addition to : {a) that X is good ; 
{b) that the good ought to be desired (which are contained in 
“ good ”) ; (r) that the good can be desired : other good things 
in my experience have been desired ; at this very moment, I 
desire a good thing and desire it to be desired by others ; ® 
{d) that in a very small way it is in my power to bring a state 
about in which this thing will be actually desired by others, i.e.
* Both alternatives equally satisfy the argument.
’ It is interesting to note that in this case the hortatory intensification draws its power 
from a reference to the actually “ desired ” and not as in the case discussed above from a 
reference to approval. This sheds new light on the inherent ambivalence o f “ desirable * 
(i.e. its simultaneous reference to “ good ” and to “ the desired ”) and on the possibility 
o f a demagogic use o f this double-entendre, as at the dictate o f interest and not always in 
accordance with one’s real intentions, now  the one, now the other aspect is thrown into 
relief.
* But o f  this later.
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by calling it “ desirable ” I recommend it as if it were already 
and generally desired ; (e) that I actually, at this moment 
intensely desire to bring such a state about. The “ desirable ” 
in the imperative sense of “ what ought to be desired ” includes 
therefore a strong and essential reference to what is actually 
desired. That one ought to desire X, means that somebody 
exhorts one to desire X, in other words that somebody who 
actually desires X himself also desires others to desire X. Even 
the rejected piece of music must presumably have been desired, 
and desired passionately, by at least one person—its composer.
I cannot at this moment recall a single example of an object, 
which, having been considered desirable (and good), has not 
actually been desired by at least one person : the person who 
discovered it to be so. Thus, a social reformer who propagates 
the idea of absolute equality, desires people to desire absolute 
equality. He thinks that they ought to desire it. He himself 
approves of it and actually desires it. And though all men or the 
majority of men do not as yet desire it in actual fact, he does his 
best to bring about such a state.
The ultimate reference of the “ desirable ” in the sense of 
“ what ought to be desired ” is therefore to the actually desired, 
namely, the actually desired by the person who dictates the 
“ ought ” and brings into prominence the good hitherto neg­
lected, overlooked or rejected. The difference between “ desired” 
and “ desirable ” appears once again not so much a difference in 
kind, as in the generality of distribution ; in short, a quantitative 
difference adjustable by degrees.®
This seems to me to prove conclusively that “ the sole 
evidence for something being desirable is that people actually 
desire it.” ®^ We must be careful though to point out that evidence 
does not mean reason. We know that X is desirable because we 
find ourselves : {a) desiring X and encouraged, in this desire ; 
or, Q)) being admonished to desire X by somebody who having 
found it good, actually desires X ; or, (c) being admonished to 
desire it by somebody who does not think X good, does not 
desire X but misuses the hortatory power of the word to mis­
lead us as to the nature of X and of his feelings about X. But 
this is not the reason why X is good, nor why it is desirable. It 
is but the proof that X is desirable, i.e. of an existing relation 
between X and desire. The reasons are the actual qualities of X,
® Here, as in the dispositional use o f the term, what is desirable is what has not been 
fully realised. But whereas there the full realisation inside one single person had been impeded 
by circumstantial factors or lack o f intensity, here its chief lack is scope ; i.e. though fully 
realised (intensely desired by one person) it is not generally accepted and desired by others.
The italics are mine.
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which do not concern us here. This may possibly explain why the 
predicates desirable ” and desired ” are not fool-proof signs 
for the axiological standing of an X : the good is not neces­
sarily the undesired ” (!)
The weakness of the argument is in the indeterminate 
denotative scope of the term people'*\ If this be reducible to its 
lower limit of one, then Mill’s dictum holds. But if it be taken 
to mean “ a reasonable m a j o r i t y t h e n  it must be admitted a 
moot point.
In other words as long as we take Mill’s dictum to be a 
statement about the desirable being good by virtue of the third 
interpretation ; and the evidence for the good being desirable 
its being actually desired—it must be granted that this is the only 
way in which the desirable (and the good) can be recognised at 
all. But the claim that what the majority (by the way which 
desires is therefore desirable and good, is to say the least highly 
questionable. Therefore we ought to be very careful to keep 
these two assertions apart and be fully aware whether we argue 
against the first or the second. This seems to me a point of some 
importance, when considering such arguments as are brought 
forward by C. L. Stevenson in 'Ethics and Language. He 
writes :—
. . . J. S. Mill . . . treats the statement I f  something is 
desired it is desirable ” , as though it were axiomatic, the ante­
cedent being the sole evidence ” it is possible to produce for 
the consequent. If “ desirable ” meant capable of being desired, 
the statement would indeed be innocent enough. But Mill 
intends the word to carry all the import of good ” . Thus 
understood the statement so far from being axiomatic becomes 
highly controversial . . . “ That which is desired is desirable ” is a 
statement characteristic of an easy-going man who wishes to 
encourage people to leave their present desires unchanged and 
conversely the statement That which is desired is not desirable” 
is characteristic of the stern reformer who seeks to alter or 
inhibit existing desires. Statements about what is desirable unlike 
those about what is desired, serve not to describe attitudes m e r e l y  but 
to intensify or alter them.'^  ^ The alleged axiom then is controversial 
because it leads to disagreement in attitude. Although it seems 
innocuous to those content with a ready status quo it is intoler­
able to those who are striving to make fundamental changes in 
men’s aims ; and it is particularly invidious because its concealed
"  As no doubt Mill intended it to.
The majority o f  which country, which continent, which world ? 
All italics are mine.
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pun makes it seem to give the former people alone an axiomatic 
support. In defence of Mill it must be mentioned that he was 
assuredly not seeking this effect. . . .”
My conclusion that statements about the desirable no less 
than those about the desired describe actual attitudes (namely, 
those of reformers and innovators of all kinds) seems born out by 
Stevenson’s choice of the qualifying adverb merely \n the itaUcised 
proposition {vide supra). That is, Stevenson holds without reser­
vation that “ if something is desirable it is also desired ” . Now 
this is really all that Mill claims on the first point, though he also 
seems to imply by using the term “ people” that “ what is 
desirable is generally desired.” Nowhere does Mill assert what 
Stevenson by a very elementary error in logic^ ® takes him to 
assert ; namely, that “ if something is desired it is desirable This 
Stevenson characterises as the attitude of the easy-going man and 
proceeds to attack. • But surely no man is that easy-going. Surely 
some of the things actually desired must appear undesirable even 
to the easiest-going (for instance the desire of reformers for 
reforms I) What singles out the easy-going man is that he is apt 
to consider the usual and general desires of normal people to 
equate pretty nearly with what he holds desirable. He is also 
inclined to take the actual and general presence of a desire as a 
point in its favour. In this he concurs with the distributive 
implication of Mill’s dictum so that when Stevenson attacks his 
stand he argues against the second (distributive) not the (essen­
tial) first aspect of Mill’s dictum. The first essential aspect 
Stevenson does not touch upon except, unconsciously, and in a 
somewhat off-hand manner to agree with it.
To conclude : Mill’s dictim is immune to attacks directed 
against his definition of the “ desirable ” (as implying the notion 
of “ good ” and “ superior value ”) for in this context it seems im­
possible to find evidence that any desirable thing has been known 
to exist which has not also been actually desired by at least one 
person.
But the explicit inclusion of a reference to the distributive 
generality of being desired shifts the point of the argument. 
Mill goes on to argue that happiness is desirable not because it 
is good and because somebody desires it, but because each 
person and therefore all persons desire it. The proof for the 
desirable (whaf Mill desires us to desire) being desirable (good)
Ch. I, p. 17.
{a) (If something is desirable it is desired) entails ( )^ (All that is desirable is desired). 
But QS) does not necessarily entail (c) (All that is desired is desirable) but only (d) (Some 
things which are desired are desirable), (a) therefore does not entail (e) (If something is 
desired it is desirable).
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is not that it is good and that Mill desites it, but that all people 
desire it. Mill may not have sought this effect any more than the 
one of which Stevenson acquits him, but these are the ultimate 
elements to which his argument reduces itself, and the one form 
in which it is open to legitimate attack.
Bedford College, London.
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By Pépita H aezrahi, M.A.
SOME ARG UM ENTS AGAINST  
G. E. MOORE'S V IEW  OF TH E FUNCTION OF
GOOD" IN ETHICS
B y  P é p it a  H a e z r a h i ,  M.A.
I n the preface to Prhicipia Ethica (edition of 1903, p. viii, lines 
4, 5) Moore divides the possible aims of Ethics into two main 
trends. The one seeks an answer to the question : “ What kind 
of things ought to exist for their o^vn sake ? ” ; the other to the 
query : “ AVhat kinds of actions ought we to perform ? ” For 
various reasons, which shall be examined in detail as they are of 
paramount importance for the general intent of Moore’s ethical 
thought, absolute primacy is given to the first query over the 
second. So much so that the answer to the former is regarded 
by Moore as the solution to our ethical problems, the answer to 
the latter following almost automatically and as a corollary from 
the material constitution of the answer to the first.
As all answers to the first question are commonly (and very 
roughly) qualified by the attribute “ good ” , wliilst those to the 
second are as commonly (and as roughly) qualified by the attribute 
“ right ” , Moore makes his stand on this matter even more 
explicit, by defining “ right ” as “ good-as-a-means ” . Whether 
this attitude is warranted by the facts of moral experience, or by 
stringent reasoning from these facts, will be our first preoccupa­
tion. V
In compliance with the demands of all methodical enquiry 
into Ethics, Moore starts his analysis with the initial datum of 
all such enquiries : the existence de facto of the act of moral 
judgment. In our experience, he says, we cannot but come 
across such sentences as “ This is good ” , “ This is bad ” , etc. 
Most of these assertions are obviously concerned with human 
conduct even where human conduct is not explicitly stated to be 
their subject. Therefore Ethics is undoubtedly concerned with 
the question of what good conduct is. But, Moore continues, good 
conduct (which we must remember is more closely and immedi­
ately associated with query number two : “ What kind of actions 
ought we to perform ? ” than with query number one) is a com­
plex notion. I t  contains the notion of “ good ” as well as the 
notion of “ conduct ” . For .(a) Conduct may be good, bad or 
indifferent, and (b) Other things besides conduct may be good. 
Hence all ethical enquiry, whose preoccupation is after all with
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“ good ” and “ bad ” (which are its own specific and constitutive 
notions) rather than with conduct, cannot limit itself into an 
analysis of the judgment of conduct. For, since “ good denotes 
a 'property that is common to conduct and other things ” (p. 2, 1. 7, 
a. /.) we might mistake the nature of this property by limiting 
our enquiry to one instance only (namely good conduct) of all 
possible good things. Thus we might take for the general nature 
of “ good ” something specific to conduct, and not shared by all 
those other things which might be called good. Moreover, by 
thus failing to grasp the nature of good in general, we are certain 
to mistake the nature of its particular : good conduct.
Therefore the first task of Ethics is to investigate the nature 
of “ good ” in general. This once grasped, the nature of “ good 
conduct " will automatically follow from it, as a corollary, im­
portant only in as much as it might furnish the means of attain­
ment of “ T h e Good By this argument Moore takes the 
primacy of query number one over query number two to be 
established irrevocably. Almost as a matter of logical conse­
quence, the task of Ethics is pronounced to consist in the deter­
mination and enunciation of the nature of “ the Good ” to which 
we all must aspire, rather than in the discovery and enunciation 
of a supreme law, to be followed and realised in our conduct.
“ The peculiarity of Ethics is not that it investigates assertions 
about human conduct but that it investigates that property of 
things which is denoted by the term good and the converse 
property denoted by the term bad. It must in order to establish 
its conclusions investigate the truth of all such assertions except 
those which assert the relation of this property only to a single 
existent ” (p. 36 & 23, 1. 2).
Another assertion of Moore’s that ought to be mentioned at 
this point occurs in the preface, p. viii, 1. 6, and runs “ . . . 
exactly what it is that we ask about a thing when we ask whether 
it ought to exist for its own sake, is good, or has intrinsic value 
At this point, several questions may be raised :—
(A) Whether the contention that, other things besides conduct 
may bé good, is true ? If so :—
(a) Does this imply that all instances of the application of 
good have but one meaning : not in the sense of deriva­
tive or primary meaning, but in the sense that they 
all possess moral significance ?
(j3) If all instances of the application of “ good ” are not 
ipso facto possessed of moral significance, what exactly 
can their meaning be, and in what relation do they 
stand to the specifically moral meaning of “ good ” ?
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(B) AVhether the contention that, the property, commonly 
denoted by “ good ” comes under the jurisdiction of Ethics, 
in all its applications, is true, and whether its truth neces­
sarily follows from the affirmation of (A) ?
Explanation : The property “ good ” as it appears in the 
complex notion “ good conduct”, possesses a specifically “ moral” 
meaning, which is drawn either from its intrinsic nature, or from 
its conjunction with a certain subject, namely human conduct, 
i.e. conduct which is motivated, willed, intended, and, at least for 
our purposes, under the control of a free and intelligent agent. 
I suggest that the moral significance of “ good ” in the complex 
notion “ good conduct ” is based on the later part (conduct) 
rather than on the former (good). For “ conduct ” even when 
lacking all further qualification but that of being the motivated 
conduct of a free and rational agent, preserves still some moral 
connotation, whereas for “ good ” this is an open question. To 
illustrate this point : the moral significance of statements like : 
“ Art is good ”, “ Modern sanitary installations are good ”, is by 
no means self-evident, unless we are carried away by the mere 
similarity of expression. In some cases, as for example in “ a 
good hiding ”, “ a good road ”, etc., this lack of obvious and self- 
evident moral implication is even more evident. On the other 
hand, these statements are not devoid of sense, nor do they give 
the impression of being merely examples of the misuse of the 
property “ good ” . Good, we might therefore conclude tenta­
tively for the moment may be employed to qualify other things 
besides conduct. But in what sense, whether moral or other­
wise, it is so employed must for the moment remain an open 
question.
In any case, even granted that (A) is true, it is premature to 
conclude from this one premiss, as Moore does, that (B) is true 
{i.e. to conclude from the fact that other things besides conduct 
may be good, that all such applications of good fall necessarily 
under the jurisdiction of Ethics). Indeed, it seems to me that 
(B) does not follow from (A) at all, as Moore would have it, but 
rather from (a). That is, only if it be proven that all applications 
of the property “ good ” ipso nomine convey an ethical significance, 
in other words, that all applications of good have but one mean­
ing and that meaning ethical, the contention that all applications 
of the property “ good ” fall under the jurisdiction of Ethics, 
will be true by implication. That is, Moore’s contention that the 
preoccupation of Ethics is with “ good ” and “ bad ” rather than 
with conduct will be justified. But as (a) seems at present to be 
a tacit and even imconscious assumption, rather than a sufficiently
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proven assertion, and as it is not self-evident enough to be 
accepted without proof, (a) seems hardly a strong enough basis 
for an edifice as vast as the Principia Ethica.
Moreover, the question seems precluded already in the sentence 
quoted above from the preface, where for all purposes what 
ought to exist for its own sake, is identified with intrinsic value 
and also with what is good in itself.
Now this is by no means necessarily or even generally true, 
unless we take nothing to have intrinsic value except moral 
goodness. But this is obviously not what Moore means, whose 
general striving is to widen the boundaries of Ethics rather than 
to annihilate the domain of Aesthetics. As an explanation let us 
take “ the Beautiful ” as an example of a thing possessed of 
intrinsic value. Is “ the Beautiful ” always and a priori identical 
with the good ? Or again, if we agree to say that “ The beautiful 
having intrinsic value is always good ”—is “ good ” in this sense 
always and a priori identical with the good in the moral sense 
which is the predicate of human conduct ? Suppose we had two 
instances of indiscriminate and unmotivated bombing. In one 
instance the old stained glass windows of a fourteenth-century 
church were destroyed. In the second case a house full of the 
most worthless possible of human beings, say incurable criminal 
lunatics. Which would be the morally worse action ? And which 
action would diminish the sum total of intrinsic value existent 
in the world to a greater degree ? Does not the fact that these 
two questions are not identical, that indeed the answers to them 
are of necessity opposite, prove that intrinsic value and moral 
goodness are not necessarily one and the same thing ? That they 
might even clash with each other in their respective appeal and 
attraction for us ?
Now, the special and specific preoccupation of Ethics it seems to 
me should be with moral goodness rather than with the beautiful, 
which after all comes mainly under the jurisdiction of Aesthetics. 
Granted even that moral goodness and the beautiful have this in 
common, that they both possess intrinsic value (the problem of 
intrinsic value is far too complicated and controversial to be 
pursued here) does this entitle the science of ethics to extend its 
boundaries in order to include all the domains of intrinsic value 
and incorporate them into its own system ? Would this not 
bring about a blurring of the specific mission and character of 
Ethics, an insensitivity to its particular principles ? Should we 
not, on the contrary, try to define the unique quality of Ethics 
as clearly as possible, and draw its boundaries as sharply as 
possible ? In short, is it not rather the task of Ethics to uphold
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the moral claims and safeguard itself against encroaching in­
fluences of kindred domains, rather than to seek to absorb these 
domains and lose its own soul ?
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  . *
However, before we can satisfactorily answer the question 
whether “ good ” holds moral significance in all its applications, 
we must discuss the notion of good as presented by Moore. We 
have seen that the question which Moore regards as the main 
aim of Ethics : “ What kind of things ought to exist for their 
own sake ? ” may according to his assumptions be simplified to 
the question : “ WTiat is good ? ” There are, says Moore, three 
possible answers to this question : (a) particular answers of the 
form “ This painting is good ” ; (b) general answers of the form 
“ Books are good “ Pleasure is good ” ; and (c) definitions as 
when we say “ Pleasure is good ” , not like in (6) meaning that 
pleasure is one of many possible good things, or even that pleasure 
alone is a good thing, i.e., p  c gov pis  comprised in g, but meaning 
that p =  g, pleasure is identical with good and good with pleasure. 
The particular answers, Moore argues, are of no interest to this 
enquiry. The definition is useless since “ good ” taken as a pre­
dicate is a simple unique and undefinable notion in the sense in 
which yellow is undefinable. The general answers are our clue 
to a possible definition of what “ the good ” (taken as a sub­
stantive, an embracing whole of many and variegated parts) 
might be. Hence our main task should be to examine all such 
general answers, and sound them as to the truth of their conten­
tion. In Moore’s case this meant a survey of such schools of 
thought as Hedonism, Utihtarianism, Evolutionism and the 
Ethics of H. Sidgwick. During this examination their solutions 
should be stripped of the pretension of being definitions of “ good ” . 
They should be subjected to a rigorous examination as to the 
truth of their contention, and when once found true, these various 
answers should be incorporated into the final idea of the good as its 
constitutive parts.
Here, too, several points may be raised in argument :—
(A) Is it really impossible to define “ good ” ?
(B) What justification is there for the assumption of the 
existence of such a comprehensive whole as “ the good ”, 
whether it be defined as an organic unity or not ?
(A) In so far as “ good ” denotes a certain simple and unique 
property of things it cannot be defined in the sense that it is irre­
placeable by another term, or by a string of terms, or by an 
enumeration of its constituent parts, i.e. a descriptive definition
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of the term is not possible. But, on the other hand, a definition 
in usu, in the sense in which x is defined in the equation
2æ +  3^ +  62; +  13 =  0 ^ ^
might be possible. For example “ yellow ” though indefinable in 
itself, might be defined as “ that colour which corresponds to the 
wavelength  ^ ; or alternatively as “ that colour which occupies
the intermediate place between red and green ”. This admittedly 
does not give us an accurate description of what the term contains, 
but furnishes us with a workable means of determining the 
position of this term in our general system of knowledge. Indeed, 
in many cases where the property is simple and unique and its 
content grasped immediately and directly either by the senses or 
by intuition, it is found useful in scientific investigations to 
ignore this and deal but with its definition iji usu. Thus though 
the significance of, say, the ordinal number 2 is grasped intui­
tively, analytical arithmetics finds it useful to define 2 as the 
immediate successor of 1, or the immediate predecessor of 3. 
Now a certain definition of good may be attempted on the same 
lines. “ Good ”, we might say, “ is the opposite of bad.” This 
is not so trivial as it might seem. For although our intuitive 
concept of good may vary considerably from one age to another, 
from one country to another, from one social class to another, 
from one individual to another, and even in the same individual 
from one time to another, one thing remains stable throughout 
these changes : its relation to “ bad ”. In other words, of good 
whatever we might mean by it, i.e. whatever its material content, 
we always approve ; of bad we disapprove. There seems to be 
a certain reflexive relation between “ good ” and “ approval ”, 
which exists of necessity—and in all cases. They correspond to 
each other as “ yellow ” corresponds to the “ wavelen^h f ”. 
Hence for our purpose we might define “ good ” as that property 
of a thing which calls forth our approval of that thing. To 
avoid misunderstanding it should be stated that by the use of the 
term “ calls forth ” we do not mean to imply any causal relation 
between good (as the cause) and approval (as the effect). We 
could have defined good with the same justification as that 
predicate of a thing which expresses our approval of that thing, 
in which case “ approval ” would have appeared to be the cause 
and ‘ good ’ the effect. But even as “ yellow ” can be said to be 
neither the cause of “  ^” nor “  ^” the cause of “ yellow ”, so 
neither is good the cause of approval, nor approval the cause of 
good, but each corresponds to the other in a certain reflexive
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relation. Again, as for many scientific analyses it is more 
useful and more fruitful to examine the relations and implica­
tions of the wavelength than those of “ yellow ”, so it might 
be more useful and fruitful in our enquiry to examine the im­
plications and relations of “ approval ” than those of “ good ”. 
Before we go any further there are two points which need clari­
fication : (a) What exactly do we mean by “ approval ” ? (b)
\Wiat are the reasons which might be adduced in justification for 
our reducing the enquiry into the nature of good to an enquiry 
into the implications of approval ?
(а) To approve of something is to think it desirable (in the sense 
that it should be desired, not in the sense that it is desired) in 
view of a certain object or end, or to think it suitable and fitting 
certain preconceived principles or criteria.
This definition seems at first sight to call forth a series ad 
infinitum, since obviously before we approve of anything we must 
first approve of the object or end for which it is deemed desirable, 
and before we approve of those objects or ends we must approve 
of other objects and ends in view of which the former seem 
desirable, etc. If we want to avoid this, we must assume that 
there are things we approve of in themselves, without reference 
to any ulterior object. But in this case our approval will be 
based on certain principles which we hold to be true, or on 
certain criteria which we bring to bear on the respective object 
or end. These criteria and principles, which we have termed 
“ preconceived ” open up the vista of yet another infinite series. 
For obviously before we examine whether a thing fits certain 
criteria and principles, we must first examine these criteria and 
principles in their own right, in view of higher criteria and prin­
ciples, and those again, and so on, ad infinitum. But this is not 
necessarily so. For in our investigation we might come upon a 
concept that is primary and self-evident, or which cannot be 
reduced to other concepts, and must either be accepted or rejected 
intuitively. That there is such a primary concept in Ethics, 
which is not identical with good, and therefore not dependent 
on approval I shall try to prove in another connexion. For the 
moment I should like to point out tentatively that not all the 
criteria and principles upon which approval is based are neces­
sarily of a moral character, and that by examining the nature of 
these criteria it might be possible to prove that not all instances 
of the attribute good necessarily represent instances of moral 
judgment.
(б) The reasons, then, for reducing the enquiry into the nature 
of “ good ” to an enquiry into the nature of “ approval ” will be :—
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(a) That by this reduction the appearance of the attribute 
“ good ” in an assertion will be seen to be insufficient to 
establish this assertion as a moral judgment.
(/3) That by this reduction the existence of absolute values 
independent of our reaction to them will be seen to be 
by no means so stringently and conclusively and rigorously 
proven as it would appear to Moore by taldng such state­
ments as “ This picture is good but I do not like it ” at 
their face value.
(y) That even the existence of values, whether absolute or 
not, will not have an automatic bearing on Ethics, since it 
will be seen that all values, even absolute values, are not 
necessarily moral values.
(B) That therefore as a corollary to a, /3 and y, no reasonable 
purpose of Ethics will be served by an enumeration of all things 
(whether in particular, general, or definition-like statements is of 
no importance here) that have been or are pronounced good. 
Nor would an examination of them in the light of what we our­
selves hold to be good serve such a purpose. Nor would it make 
any difference if we should find a common denominator and term 
it the highest good ; or if we should combine several of those 
things on an equal footing and call it an organic whole, a process 
which, by the way, might yield many different and variegated 
patterns of the “ good life ”. . . .
(a) Let us examine such diverse statements as: “ a good 
painting “ good roads ”, “ a good hiding ”, “ a good slaughter ”, 
“ a good time ”, “ good conduct ”, “ pleasure is good ”, “ art is 
good ”, “ virtue is good ”, “ justice is good ”. On the assumption 
that wherever terms like good ” and bad ” appear moral judg­
ment is given, these statements by including the term “ good ” 
have a spurious appearance of being moral judgments. That this 
appearance is spurious and entirely based on the external uni­
formity of the attribute good will be seen upon closer inspection.
What do we mean by calling a painting good ? Obviously 
that this particular painting calls forth a feeling of approval in 
us. This approval is easily seen to be based on the fact that we 
consider the painting, or that the painting strikes us as having 
artistic merit for one reason or another. (I have used both the 
term “ we consider ” as well as the term “ strikes us ” to em­
phasise the rational-refiective as well as the spontaneous-reaction 
elements that enter into the composition of “ approval ”.) Our 
approval of the painting is an instance of æsthetic judgment based 
upon certain æsthetic principles which we hold to be valid, as
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well as on a certain direct appeal that the painting in question 
exercises over our æsthetic susceptibility. This direct appeal is 
in most cases expressed by the term “ beautiful ”. Even a moral 
action can be called beautiful, when considered only in so far as 
it appeals directly to our emotional susceptibilities. Alexander 
in his book. Beauty and other for ins of Value, analyses the concept 
of beauty even further, and states that “ nothing is beautiful, 
whether in itself attractive or unattractive, save in so far as it is 
æsthetically good, or æsthetically right ” (p. 165). So that even 
that direct appeal to our susceptibility in order to be effective 
must accord with certain principles and criteria which render it 
(æsthetically) right. By calling a painting not only beautiful 
but good, we generally wish to emphasise that it so conforms 
to certain æsthetic criteria which we regard as having undoubted 
validity, as to make that painting worthy of our well-considered 
approval over and above any direct appeal it may have.
However we might regard such complex problems as those of 
the objective and general validity of æsthetic criteria and the 
admixture of subjective and objective elements in æsthetic 
judgments, one thmg is quite clear : In no way did any moral 
considerations enter into the process. We neither consider 
whether the picture will make us morally better men (which is 
not the same as an æsthetically enriched one), nor if it will have 
any beneficent effect on the standard of public health, or foster 
a social revolution. All these considerations might enter the 
mind of a spectator but they have nothing to do with his calling 
the painting a good one in the first place, i.e. with his approba­
tion or disapprobation of the picture as such. This sort of 
approval might be termed æsthetic approval, and the attribute 
“ good ” that corresponds to it is in no way identical with moral 
goodness.
But let us regard the more general forms of this statement : 
“ good painting ”, and “ painting is good ”. In an assertion like 
“ good painting ” the criteria which determine our approval of 
what constitutes painting that is good, are obviously again of a 
purely æsthetic order. Not so in an assertion like “ Painting is 
good ”. Here we almost automatically add in our mind “ good 
for what ? ” In this case, we do not approve of painting because 
of its inherent qualities as an art, but for some ulterior motive. 
Thus the difference between such statements as “ a good painting” 
and “ painting is good ’ , is not so much a difference of generality 
or particularity of statement, but lies in the fact that in one case 
the approval denoted by the attribute “ good ” was based on the 
inherent criteria of the concept so qualified, in the other on
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external criteria. It does not follow that such ulterior motives 
or external criteria are necessarily inoral ones, as might be con­
cluded from the impression that Moore’s discussion of such in­
stances gives. Painting ” for instance may be good ” for 
hiding the cracks in our wall, which is by no means a moral 
motive. Or, “ Painting ” may “ be good ” for distracting the at­
tention of a sovereign from the social injustice rampant in his 
domains, which might be a moral motive though not exactly a 
good one. Now the better the painting, the better it will dis­
tract the sovereign : “ Good painting ” will be “ bad ” which 
proves that the “ good ” in “ a good painting ” is by no means 
identical with the “ good ” in “ Painting is good ”. And even if 
our former example might be taken as a sophistry, in any case 
the differences of the set of motives (whether inherent or ulterior) 
in these different assertions may be clearly grasped from the 
fact that such a statement as “ Good painting is good ” is by 
no means a mere tautology.
These inherent or ulterior motives must not be confused with 
good-as-a-means, and good-as-an-end. For, although when we 
approve of something for reasons outside its inherent nature, we 
generally approve of it as a means, i.e. we consider it good-as-a- 
means : when we approve of something for inherent reasons this 
does not mean that we approve of it as an end, as something 
good-in-itself. Sometimes we do not even consider it good at all. 
Our approval in this case corresponds to what we might roughly 
deserve as a ‘ good ’ specimen of its kind ”, or the “ technically 
good ”.
To illustrate this point let us take the example of “ a good 
road ”. By a “ good road ” we mean a road that is well-kept, 
asphalt-covered, smooth, straight. Here again the term good 
does not signify moral approval, though it certainly signifies 
approval of some sort. For when we reflect on the criteria and 
principles on which we based our approval of the road, we see 
that no moral criteria have entered our consideration, but only 
such principles as were inherent in the concept of a road ”, and 
our criteria of what a road at its best, at the maximum realisation 
of its function as a road would be like. Hence the “ good ” in 
‘ good road ’ did not correspond to any moral approval, but to a 
certain other kind of approval that might be termed “ teclmical 
approval ”. In other words, though the attribute “ good ” in 
“ good roads ” is not devoid of meaning, it has no moral signifi­
cance whatsoever.
That the kind of approval signified by “ good ” in such com­
plexes as “ a good . . . ’’ is always determined by the prmciples
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and criteria of the domain of which the concept so qualified is an 
element can be seen even more clearly in such examples as : “ a 
good pleasure ”, “ a good hiding ” , “ a good slaughter ” . In the 
first example we must take good ” to mean intense, undisturbed 
and of long duration, i.e. we approve of this pleasure because of 
certain modifications which enhance its innermost nature, the 
nature of being pleasant. Much in the same manner a good 
slaughter ” means a slaughter which is big, extensive in scope 
and eflScient in its implementation, and therefore when judging 
of slaughters in general we find this one to be a good example of 
its kind. But no moral judgment is implied. The criteria we 
employed are the criteria of the efficiency of the slaughter, the 
maximum realisation of the potentialities implicit in the concept 
of the noim qualified by the attribute good.
Therefore when the noun is an element of, say, the æsthetic 
domain, the term good ” will signify an æsthetic judgment, for 
it will correspond to the kind of approval that is based on æsthetic 
criteria. MTien the noun is an element of the domain of science 
the attribute good ” when applied to it will signify an epistemo- 
logical judgment, for it will correspond to the kind of approval 
that is based on the principles and criteria of epistemology. 
Similarly when the noun qualified by the attribute good ” is 
an element of the domain of Ethics, the term “ good ” when 
applied to it, and only in that case will signify a moral judgment, 
for it will correspond to that kind of approval which is based on 
moral criteria and principles.
In other words, the term good ” will have a moral significance 
(in such complex notions as “ a good . . . ”) only when applied 
to concepts that are elements of the ethical domain (necessary 
condition). But it will not have this significance whenever it is 
so applied. (The condition is not sufficient.) For instance, 
“ cruelty ” , “ justice ” , “ virtue ” , “ vice ”, are certainly moral 
concepts. But it is plainly impossible to speak of “ a good 
cruelty ”, “ a good vice ”, “ a good virtue ” , or even “ good 
justice ” . For what reason ? Because though all of these may 
be carried to the highest peak of efficiency, it is not under the 
criteria of efficiency that we judge them but under those of ethics. 
And under the criteria of morality the issue has been decided 
already and is already embodied in the concept. Thus it is 
absurd to say a good virtue ”, for virtue itself means “ a morally 
good quality ” . Or to say with moral significance good 
cruelty” for cruelty is a vice and vice is a morally bad quality, 
and it is impossible to call a morally bad quality morally good. 
In the same way it is absurd to speak of “ good justice ”, for
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justice that is bad is ipso facto justice no longer. But in the 
moral domain there are many concepts which do not by definition 
contain the results of moral judgment, and which' we might 
term the plastic material ” of ethics. These are concepts like 
“ conduct “ will ” , motive ”, deed ”, etc. Let us consider 
good conduct ” . Here the issue is not precluded since conduct 
may be bad, good and indifferent. On the other hand, by “ good 
conduct ” we do not mean conduct carried to its highest efficiency, 
for such conduct may be bad as well as highly evolved or realised 
or organised or polished, or whatever it may be that we regard 
as the highest technical possibility of conduct. The good ” of 
good conduct ” is then specifically different from all other 
forms of good, it is moral goodness. Therefore good conduct 
does not share its property with other things and an examina­
tion of this property, denoted by good, in other things cannot 
help us at all to understand what good conduct is.
The problem becomes more complicated in assertions of the 
form “ . . .  is good ”. For example, “ Pleasure is good ” ;
Painting is good ” ; Roads are good ” ; “ Justice is good ”. 
In these cases the predicate “ good ” corresponds to that kind of 
approval, which is not based upon the criteria that govern the 
inner nature of the concept said to be good, but is based on some 
ulterior end, or ulterior reason not inherent in the coucept itself.
In that case we have instances of what is called good-as-a- 
means, and we plainly must first examine the things for which 
they are means, (a) as to their goodness, i.e. we must ask ourselves 
whether we approve of them, and (6) as to their moral goodness, 
i.e. we must ask ourselves if we approve of them on moral grounds. 
In this case, our preoccupation will be with those things, and 
wül follow the same lines. But in some cases this end may be 
seen to be not ulterior to the concept but inherent in it. Then 
our approval assumes the character of an intuitive acceptance of 
the concept. Concepts so accepted are usually termed ultimate 
values or intrinsic values. But as their acceptance, because of 
its instantaneous character, was not based on moral criteria, it is by 
no means a necessary attribute of intrinsic values as such, to be 
moral values. In other words, if an intrinsic value is a moral 
value, this is not an outcome of its formal nature as an intrinsic 
value, but the result of its particular, material determinations.
Let us take Painting is good ” as our first example. In this 
case we naturally ask “ good for what ? ” or “ good because of 
what ? ” The first extension is of no further interest to us here, 
the second might evoke the answer, “ Painting is good because 
it is an art ” . This means that we assert “.Art ” to be “ good ” .
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On what grounds ? Because it incarnates the beautiful. That 
means that we assert “ the Beautiful ” to be “ good ” . On what 
grounds ? Because it is beautiful. That is, the beautiful becomes 
the reason and the end for our approval of it. Saying that “ the 
beautiful” is “ good”, is really saying that it is “ beautiful”, 
i.e. that our approval of it has the character of an intuitive 
acceptance and affirmation of its nature as the beautiful. This 
means that saying that the “ beautiful is good ” is a mere 
tautology unless we specify “ good ” to mean “ morally good ”, 
in which case this assertion is plainly false, since not moral but 
æsthetic criteria have entered into the constitution of the beautiful. 
The two may coincide by chance, but are not necessarily identical. 
As a matter of fact they often clash in actual experience.
Let us examine the more difficult and problematic assertion : 
“ Pleasure is good ”. Let us assume that “ Pleasure is good ” 
really means something besides “ Pleasure is good because it is 
pleasant ”, which would be only another illustration of the case 
of intuitive approval. Let us assume that “ Pleasure is good ” 
is a moral judgment, i.e. that we judge “ pleasure ” to be 
“ morally good ”. Then its opposite “ pain ” would be “ morally 
evil ”. I suggest that it is not so, but that pain and pleasure are 
morally neutral concepts, and that whenever they enter moral 
judgments, they do so, and are proclaimed to be morally bad or 
good, in accordance with some other element, moral by its in­
trinsic nature, in combination with which they form the object of 
our moral judgment. I suggest this because I see no valid reason 
for attributing to pleasure (as against other values) a special 
standing as regards morality, and insisting in the face of all 
evidence to the contrary on its being good ; even in the restricted 
sense of its being prima facie good, i.e. holding that a complex 
situation in so far as it includes pleasure is in so far morally good. 
On the contrary, cruelty in so far as it holds pleasure is in so far 
morally worse, for example ; whilst if an operation has to be 
undergone in which some pain is unavoidable, the greater or 
lesser degree of pain does not change the moral standing of the 
whole situation at all. Illustrations can be multiplied ad lib. 
They all seem to me to point to one thing ; that since (a) no such 
thing as pure (uncaused and unconditioned) pleasure ever enters 
our moral judgment, and (6) the moral standing of such complex 
objects of our moral judgment in which pleasure is a part seem 
to be determined not so much by the fact of pleasure being 
present as by the nature of its cause, circumstances, and perhaps 
effects, it would be more plausible to hold that pleasure and pain 
are morally neutral and dependent in their moral worth upon
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the moral standing of the thing or the activity they accompany. 
This seems to me not only a plausible, logical and fairly-well- 
founded view to take, but also a very workable and useful 
hypothesis to hold when dealing with moral problems. Into 
what unnecessary mental acrobatics the contrary view leads us 
can be best illustrated by these extracts. They are taken from 
Susan Stebbing’s Hobhouse Lecture (Dec. 1943) and propound a 
thoroughly Moorian view of Ethics :—
‘ Moral evaluation is not confined to the evaluation and 
criticism of conduct, it is concerned with good and evil wherever 
they may be found . . . ’ (p. 12). ‘ Consider, for example, the
pair of ethical judgments : “ Pain is evil ”, “ Cruelty is evil ”. 
These are diverse types. “ Pain is evil ” I shall call a simple, or 
basic ethical judgment in the quite precise sense that the truth of 
the judgment is not based upon any other ethical judgment that 
is more logically simple, but is itself a basis for other ethical 
judgments. “ Cruelty is evil ” is not thus simple and basic, its 
truth is based upon the judgment “ Pain is evil ” and follows 
from this judgment, together with the intrinsic nature of cruelty 
as being enjoyment in witnessing or inflicting pain upon other 
sentient beings. I should myself say that it follows from the 
judgment “ cruelty is evil ” that under all circumstances and in 
all conditions to act cruelly is evil. This follows, however, from 
the total judgment, not merely from the fact that what is pre­
dicated of something is that it is evil. It does not follow from 
the judgment “ Pain is evil ” that deliberately to inflict pain is 
to act evilly, nor that a situation in which pain is present is 
naturally evil on the whole. The pairs of judgments I have 
cited as examples are clearly diverse in logical type.
‘ A judgment of a third type has been mentioned in what I 
have just said : To act cruelly is evil. This judgment could not 
be true unless the judgment “ Cruelty is evil ” were true. And 
cruelty could not be evil unless it were true that “ Pain is 
evil ” ’ (p. 13).
Now several fallacies may be pointed out in this argument : 
First, though “ Pain is evil ” is a logically basic judgment, in the 
sense that it is not based on other judgments, but as I have put 
it, is intuitively accepted, it is overhasty, and against the evidence 
adduced by herself (“ It does, however, not follow from the 
judgment “ Pain is evil ”, that deliberately to inflict pain is to 
act evilly, etc. . . .” Susan Stebbing, quoted above) to infer 
that it is also an ethical judgment, basic or otherwise. For, as 
we have seen, “ pain ” might enter into moral situations without 
prejudging their ethical standing in one way or another. This
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could not be so if “ pain ” in its intrinsic nature would hold an 
ethical meaning, an ethical value. Witness the case of “ cruelty ”. 
“ Cruelty ” is a moral concept, though not a simple or a basic one. 
But in so far as it is a moral concept, holding its moral value and 
worth in itself, the judgment “ Cruelty is morally evil ” is true 
in all cases, or whenever “ cruelty ” enters a moral situation, 
that situation is necessarily, irrevocably and unredeemably evil. 
But it would be hard to explain how, if “ Cruelty is evil ” is based 
and derived from “ Pain is evil ”, the derived judgment had more 
moral validity and force than the judgment from which it is 
derived. Therefore we must conclude that “ Cruelty is evil ” as 
a moral judgment is not based upon “ Pain is evil ” but draws its 
moral validity from some other element, or principle that enters 
its formation.
What are the elements that make up the concept of cruelty ? 
There is : Pain. The infliction of pain. The deliberate infliction 
of pain. The deliberate infliction of pain upon a sentient being 
to his detriment. The enjoyment, or pleasure taken at the 
deliberate infliction of pain upon a sentient being to his detriment. 
Explanation : The presence of pain though in itself unpleasant 
(bad) is not enough to constitute a moral evil, as we have seen. 
The infliction of it may be involuntary and therefore not morally 
bad. The deliberate infliction of it upon a sentient being may 
be for his ovm good (like an operation) and therefore morally good. 
Only when the infliction of pain is deliberate and to the detri­
ment of a sentient being we have a situation of unadulterated 
moral evil. WTien enjoyment, i.e. pleasure in this, is added, the 
evü of the situation increases or in any case does not decrease.
Hence we are forced to conclude that the basis of what is 
morally evil in the complex situation “ cruelty ” is not the pain 
involved but the “ harming of a sentient being ” and the enjoy­
ment of this harm. “ Cruelty is evil ” as a moral judgment is, 
therefore, not based upon the judgment “ Pain is evil ”, but on 
the contrary, in so far as pain may be said to be morally evil it is 
so as a possible ingredient of “ cruelty ”.
“ Pain ” and “ pleasure ” then, harbouring no moral elements 
in their intrinsic nature, are not moral values, and therefore the 
judgments “ Pain is evil ”, “ Pleasure is good ” being intuitive 
judgments cannot be ethical ones.
On the other hand, “ Justice is good ” is a moral judgment. 
“ Justice is good ” because it is intuitively approved, it is morally 
good because its material particular content is in accordance 
with certain basic moral criteria, i.e. our approval of it is morally 
determined and refers to a moral content.
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We may now conclude and say that the answer to the query 
“ What is good ? ” is so far from furnishing us with a solution of 
our ethical problem that the attributes “ good ” and “ bad ” in 
general do not even furnish us with the subject-matter of ethical 
enquiry. At most they might seem to serve as indicators, 
pointing the way to where in some cases ethical subject-matter 
may be found, depending on whether the approval to which 
“ good ” corresponds in each case, is based on moral criteria, or 
involves an intuitive acceptance of a moral concept. Hence, in 
our opinion, the peculiarity of ethics most certainly is its pre­
occupation with assertions about human conduct, and with the 
property of “ good ” or “ bad ” not wherever they may be found 
but only in so far as these terms are applied to human conduct.
(jS) In order to prove that “ good ” is not dependent on our 
approval (an association which we do not uphold in its causal 
but only in its correlative meaning, i.e. that where “ good ” 
appears there is also approval, and vice versa) but is the expression 
of an objective value, independent of our subjective reaction to 
it, Moore cites assertion of the form : “ This . . .  is good but I 
do not like it." He takes this to mean, that though subject­
ively we do not appreciate a painting—for example—yet we 
must bow to the objective manifestation of the intrinsic value of 
(in this case) beauty and call it “ good But we have seen that 
to call a painting “ good ", means to assert that it complies 
with certain æsthetic prmciples and rules, which we suppose to 
govern the art of painting, and to possess certain qualities that 
constitute the artistic merit of a painting. On the other hand, 
the assertion of such a relation between the particular painting 
and certain æsthetic principles, we have called “ the expression of 
approval ". For it would manifestly be absurd to call a painting 
good, when it neither appeals directly to our æsthetic suscept­
ibility (“ we do not like it ") nor conforms to our conception of 
what a picture should be, even though this conception came to us 
second-hand. On the other hand, what is the meaning of “ like " 
in this assertion ? There are two possibilities : Either it means 
that I approve of the picture for certain reasons and on certain 
principles which I yet do not regard as accepted and venerable 
enough in the hierarchy of æsthetic rules to warrant the decree 
of “ good " ; or it means that I have no better reason to approve 
of the picture than a sentimental attachment involving an 
emotional reaction that I choose to express by “ like ".
For example, if we say : “ This is a very bad painting but I 
like it because I inherited it from my great-grandmother or 
because I have seen it hanging over the mantelpiece ever since I
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was a child ", we do not make an æsthetic assertion, let alone a 
moral judgment, but recount a piece of biography for what it 
may be worth. Therefore this second meaning of “ like " is of no 
interest to us, and it was certainly not in this second meaning 
that Moore wanted it to be understood.
On the other hand, if we accept “ like " in its first meaning, 
there is no essential difference between the grounds of its asser­
tion, and the grounds and structure of the judgment expressed 
by “ good ".
The reason for this difference lies rather in the different amount 
of objective force and validity which we attribute to the two 
respective sets of criteria. This amoimt is not necessarily fixed, 
or unchangeable, and the proportional strength of the sets are 
variable in time so that what we might pronounce to-day “ Good 
but not to our liking " we might to-morrow pronounce to be 
“ to our liking but bad In other words what may be to-day 
the primary principles and criteria of æsthetic judgment may 
to-morrow become secondary. For example, we view a certain 
surrealist painting. It does not conform to our main precon­
ceived ideas and criteria of what a good painting should be ; on 
the other hand, something about it may strike us as being “ a 
good sense of colour ", which also is regarded as one of the criteria 
of a good painting. We should then pronounce judgment and 
say : “ It is not a good picture but there is something about it 
wkich I like ". Now suppose the same picture viewed by a 
second surrealist painter. He will in the main agree with the 
æsthetic principles of his rival’s work, but since his idea of im­
plementation of these principles will necessarily be different, he 
will pronounce the picture to be “ good " (because of its accord­
ance with his main artistic principles), but not to his liking 
(because of its deficiency in view of some other æsthetic criterion 
of secondary importance). In both cases judgment will be given 
in accordance with the same two sets of principles. The difference 
being that in the first case greater importance is ascribed to one 
set (what we might call the classical principle in painting) ; in 
the second case greater importance is given to the second set of 
principles (what we might term the surrealist principle of painting). 
Hence, as far as the nature of the grounds and the logical structure 
of the judgment is concerned, there is no essential difference 
between the assertion “ this is good " and “ I like this ’’. In 
the same way in which the “ good ’’ corresponds to “ approval ", 
“ like ", too, corresponds to approval. I t  seems also probable 
that there are just as many kinds of “ liking " as there are 
kinds of “ good ", and kinds of “ approval ". If so,“ like " and
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“ good " signify the difference of degree in the assurance of 
approval (the degree of assurance being dependent on the primary 
or secondary importance attributed to the grounds on which it is 
based). Though the relation between “ good ” and “ like " is 
"thereby irrevocably stated, the material contents of what we 
call “ good " or “ liked " are variable in direct proportion to the 
variable standards of different periods.
In the main, the same argument will apply to statements like 
“ The Useful is good but I do not like it ", where the “ Useful " 
will be seen to be “ good " because of our approval of, say, the 
principles of general prosperity, but will be seen to be not “ to 
our lildng " because of our approval of the æsthetic principles of 
art, with which the useful does not always comply. Sometimes 
moral principles may or may not form one of the sets ; and 
though it is never on moral grounds that one set is regarded as 
more important than-the other, it is an open question whether in 
the case mentioned above (when moral principles form one of the 
sets) preponderance is olw.iys given to this set. For example : 
“ Cruelty is bad but I like it " seems to imply this, and so does 
“ Justice and Equity are good but I do not like them ". In 
other words, it is an open question whether the appearance of a 
“ good " which is “ morally good " automatically degrades other 
kinds of good to “ like ", i.e. whether absolute primacy should be 
given to moral approval over any other kinds of approval.
Personally I am inclined to think so, and proof for this con­
tention might be found in an examination of our everyday moral 
experience.
(y) As to the existence of eternal intrinsic values, independent 
of our approval, all that can be proven is that there are things of 
which we approve for no ulterior reason but their inherent nature, 
but which not only are not independent of our approval, but 
whose only possible definition con tarns the concept of approval. 
We define value, or intrinsic value then, as that concept which 
generally corresponds to what we have termed “ intuitive 
approval ” . This relation between “ intrinsic value " and 
“ intuitive approval " is not causal in any respect but correlative, 
as we have seen the relation between “ yellow " and “ wavelength 
f " to be. But then “ intrinsic value " will have no meaning 
outside this definition, and for our plirjioses, in an ethical enquiry, 
we might find it useful to investigate the nature and peculiar­
ities of “ intuitive approval " rather than those of “ intrinsic 
value ". It will also be understood that “ intrinsic values " are 
not necessarily moral values, as the concept of “ intuitive ap­
proval " does not contain any reference to moral criteria. There
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might be a moral concept, which is also an intrinsic value, but this 
will be grasped directly in its material contents. It might also be 
that in any clash of values, the moral will prove the stronger, and 
aspire to primacy over all other values. But this also cannot 
be proven by an enumeration and survey of values, their exam­
ination and arrangement into patterns, but by an analysis of our 
moral experience, our actual moral judgments, their grounds, 
laws and validity.
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MAN WITHOUT CONSCIENCE?
S i n c e  the beginning of the seventeenth century men’s thought about 
themselves and society has come successively under the influence of which­
ever special science has occupied the main attention of the educated world. 
In the seventeenth century itself the principles of morality were often con­
ceived on the analogy of mathematical axioms. In the eighteenth the 
attempt was made to construct a “ moral science ” that could stand compari­
son with the physics of “ the incomparable Mr Newton.” In the nineteenth 
century the main influence was biology (though that had been influenced 
by the economics of Malthus), and “ Darwinism ” invaded social and moral 
theory. In the twentieth century the whole range of science has been so 
enormously extended that it is not possible to point to a single dominating 
one. But it is probable that psychology is the science that has attracted most 
attention and discussion outside the circle of scientific specialists them­
selves. Indeed, it seems possible that if judgements of such a nature are 
being made a hundred years hence, Freud may then be regarded as having 
an importance for twentieth-century thought comparable with Galileo’s for 
the seventeenth, Newton’s for the eighteenth, and Darwin’s for the nine­
teenth.
It can be seen, however, that in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nine­
teenth centuries men’s thinking about themselves and society was being 
influenced by their thinking about other things, such as numbers, planets 
and plants. Freud’s influence, however, is much more direct, since his 
accounts of the human mind claim to be scientifically based on observations 
of human minds themselves. It is true that a good deal of the evidence he 
made use of was derived from observation of unbalanced minds. But this, 
in itself, does not invalidate his general conclusions, for his claim is that
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unbalanced minds show, as it were in caricature, the operation of factors 
which are also present, in less exaggerated form, in normal people. This 
view is shared by psychologists who would differ from Freud in much else, 
so that the importance of such inquiries cannot justly be depreciated on the 
ground that their main conceptions were first suggested by the study of 
minds in disease.
It would have been strange indeed if nothing of relevance to our moral 
beliefs had emerged from such inquiries. For some of the main types of 
mental illness manifest themselves in what appear to be groundless feelings 
of unworthiness and guilt, while others involve the sufferers in conduct 
which, if they were fully sane, would be regarded as criminal. A general 
result of the spread of modern ideas about psychology has been to make 
people rather more cautious in their moral judgements about other people, 
less hasty to condemn and, perhaps, less ready to praise. If this were all, 
however, it could hardly be said that the effects of contemporary psychology 
on our moral thinking had been more than to render our moral judgement 
more sensitive by enabling us more readily to distinguish between moral 
appearances and moral realities, between the appearance of theft, for 
example, and the facts of kleptomania, or between the appearance of parental 
soHcitude and the fact of jealousy or domination.
The belief is current, however, that Freudian psychology has in some 
way undermined the authority that has commonly been attributed to the 
conscience. This belief is encouraged, in some degree, by the use of the 
technical term “ super-ego " which makes it appear that a new word is 
needed because there is nothing for the old word “ conscience " to stand for. 
It is known, furthermore, that Freud and his followers have attempted to 
explain how feelings of guilt first come to be experienced by very young 
children, and how the authority of parental wishes and requirements comes 
to be transferred to forces within the self, or to forces falsely regarded as 
existing outside the self in the guise of saints or gods. It is thus thought 
that Freud, in analysing the genesis of conscience, has shown that it is a 
relic of childishness and, in its most important aspects, a product of fantasy 
rather than of reason or revelation.
Some such vague impression is, I believe, pretty widespread. In what 
follows I shall endeavour to clarify one or two elements of the problem. 
(The problem of conscience, however, is a very large part, if not the whole, 
of moral philosophy, so that I cannot hope, in the space at my disposal, to 
do more than indicate some lines of inquiry that appear to me to be worth 
following. A philosophical inquiry into the Freudian theory of conscience 
is long overdue, but I cannot claim that what follows is any such thing.) It 
is necessary, in the first place, to say something about what we ordinarily 
take conscience to be. What is being said about people when it is said that 
they have consciences ? I have no doubt that a number of things are being 
said, and that we can best distinguish them if we ask what would be meant 
if it were said about someone that he had no conscience. One thing that 
might be meant would be that he was incapable of distinguishing right and 
wrong. Another thing would be that although he could distinguish right 
and wrong, he had no settled inclination to do what he believed to be right 
or to refrain from doing what he believed to be wrong. Thus a man withou, 
conscience could be either a man incapable of making moral distinctionst
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from the relation of, say, physical or biological hypotheses to their 
evidence.
{d) Some people believe that Freudian psychology is not only a 
“ scientific ” account of what morality is, but also provides the means 
for making our existing morality itself more “ scientific.” The idea 
appears to be that once the mechanisms of introjection, aggression, 
narcissism and the like have been brought to light, it will be possible 
for the enlightened individual to free himself from moral compulsions, 
i.e, from conscience. Henceforth, it is sometimes believed, he will be 
able to adopt a scientific attitude towards himself and other people, 
neither condemning them nor himself but seeking for the best means 
of achieving his goals and theirs. According to Freud, however, a 
morality without conscience in this sense is impossible, since the 
infantile situation and native characteristics of all human beings 
inevitably engender a super-ego. It has sometimes been hoped that, 
even if a wholly “ scientific ” morality is impossible, at least something 
more scientific could be substituted for what are regarded as the 
unscientific and barbarous practices of blame and punishment. As I 
understand them, however, psychologists who adopt the Freudian point 
of view are extremely doubtful of the possibility even of this, both 
because they recognise a deep desire to be punished on the part of many 
individuals and also because they do not think there could be a real 
desire on the part of other people to remit altogether the punishment of 
those who are regarded as offenders.  ^ Thus the view of the traditionalist 
or intuitionist that wrong-doing merits punishment and should receive 
it is reinforced by the psychological theory that punishment is so deeply 
rooted in human nature that its abolition (as distinct from its reform) 
is inconceivable.
(e) No one who theorises about morals is ever content merely to 
describe and explain. All, sooner or later, come to make moral recom­
mendations. Freudian psychologists are no exception. One of the 
recommendations most frequently made is that the ego-ideal (one of 
the more controllable elements of the super-ego) should be neither so 
high as to be impossible of achievement or discouragingly difficult nor 
so low as to make the task of living up to it too easy. This is not an 
exercise in Aristotelian mediocrity, but a practical rule allegedly derived 
from psychiatric experience and supported by the shrewd observation 
that people who demand markedly more, morally, from themselves 
then they do from others must somehow regard themselves very nauch 
more highly than they do other people. In its second aspect this 
Freudian observation calls attention to one of the “ ruses of Satan ” that 
may be most difficult to uncover, but which had already been dis­
cussed by Hegel in his account of “ the beautiful soul ” “ and by 
Bradley, in his references to “ star-gazing virgins with souls above 
their spheres, whose wish to be something in the world takes the 
form of wanting to do something with it, and in the end do badly 
what they might have done in the beginning well.”  ^ In its first aspect,
 ^ J. C. Flügcl, Man, Morals and Society, A  Psycho-analytical Study (London, 1945), Ch. XII.
“ Hegel. Phenomenology o f Mind. C. Ch. VI. C (c).
 ^Bradley. Ethical Sttidies. (2nd Ed. Oxford. 1927). pp. 201-202.
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ETHICS WITHOUT LAW ?
T h e r e  are some moral philosophers, particularly prominent in our own 
day, who take their stand on the unique nature of every actual moral dilemma 
and the ensuing singularity of the ethical decision it demands. They empha­
sise the changing, non-recurrent nature of actuality, and the consequent 
need for an extremely flexible and adaptable moral attitude. An attitude 
distinguished by an ever present readiness to do justice to changing cir­
cumstances, to consider every situation on its own merits, to solve it accord­
ing to its inherent needs and not according “ to a set o f rules to be applied 
like drugstore prescriptions.”  ^ In short, this intuitionist,- or, as it might 
be more precisely called, occasionalist school o f ethical thought demands a 
hu?nan approach to ethical problems, human in the Bergsonian and perhaps 
in the Montaignian sense of the word : “ Je peins pas Vêtre je  peins le passage.” 
At a time when all values give way to vitality and rigid laws to the
* John Dewey, Kecomtriictioti in ’Philosophy (1921), Ch. VII, p. 170.
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atomising impact of chance, when constant environments crumble, exposing 
the once sheltered consciousness to the demands of a society which daily 
encroaches more on private preserves, the appeal of the occasionalist theory 
is twofold : to instinct and to common sense. It seems to bear out what we 
experience when we actually try to reach a moral decision in unprecedented 
circumstances ; and how many these have become I It concurs with the 
feeling of loneliness and forlornness, the emotional residue of such deci­
sions, and accounts for the burden of a responsibility that lies daily heavier 
upon us. It increases our alertness, our efficiency in coping with new situa­
tions which is our greatest asset in a world where to keep up with the pace 
of events is the sine quâ non of survival. No wonder then that on the first 
impact and to a certain degree, the occasionalist theory seems acceptable 
enough. Yet, because its emotional appeal is so strong, and its arguments 
so seemingly plausible, a careful scrutiny of the grounds on which it is 
based and the conclusions it e^jiiils seems called for. For the former are 
more far-fetched and the latter far more dangerous than might be suspected. 
Indeed we would do well to be on our guard against the charm and promise 
of the occasionalist theory especially when put forward by so brilliant an 
exponent as E. F. Carritt, or with the prophetic ardour of a John Dewey.
It may seem surprising to find the names of Dewey, the empiricist, the 
believer in “ Scientific method in Philosophy " and of Carritt, the ration­
alist, thus unceremoniously yoked. My excuse is that, poles apart though 
these philosophers are, they yet meet in what I have called the Occasionalist 
Theory of Ethics, i.e. in the stress they put on the unique nature of every 
ethical dilemma, in their assertion of the need for equally unique ethical 
solutions and their refusal to accept any general and a priori ground of moral 
obligation. And though they have reached this position by different roads, 
and substantiated it with different reasons, it may yet not be entirely imper­
missible or useless to consider them jointly in an attempt to assess the 
theoretical implications and practical consequences of this position.
The main argument of the occasionalist school runs somewhat as fol­
lows : On every occasion on which our moral decision is required we are 
faced with a particular set of circumstances which presents a unique instance 
of the ethical problem. Each such occasion in the full complexity of its 
concrete reality and “ givenness,” involves besides its material elements 
a number of sometimes conflicting, sometimes competing, and sometimes 
downright incompatible obligations, satisfactions, desires, and pertinent 
general rules. It is therefore ultimately and basically by an intuitive choice 
that one decides what rules apply ; which obligation is overriding, in a 
given situation. That is, “ the right act,” “ the real duty ” is picked by 
intuition.
No number of moral rules will save us from exercising intuition, for a rule 
can only be general but an act must be particular, so it will always be necessary 
to satisfy ourselves that an act comes under the rule and for that no rule can be 
given.i
Moreover, it is very doubtful whether such general moral rules as are known 
represent the primary grounds of particular moral decision, or only sub­
sequent generalisations from the way in which particular instances have 
been solved.
 ^ E. F. Carritt, The Theory of Mora/s (1928), Ch. XIII, p. T14.
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But if we can judge an instance without general rules it might seem as Butler 
says, that the inquiry of them is merely an occupation not without some usefulness^  for 
“ men of leisure
Nor can such general rules be deduced from one supreme ground of 
obligation :
I have not satisfied myself that there is any quality common to all right acts 
which makes them right. I think that probably most right acts consist in bringing 
about the distribution of satisfaction which is due in the circumstances.^
This could be a possible explanation of a common ground of obligation in 
the sense in which John Dewey uses the concept of “ Melioration,” but 
Carritt attaches singularly little importance to it, and on returning to the 
discussion on a later occasion he writes :
Before trying to classify our obligations by asking whether they are all founded 
on one ground or on two or more, it is necessary to consider the greater nature 
of a ground of obligation. Unfortunately this is a pulling and not very interesting 
question. . . . The general question is whether our obligations and consequently 
our duties depend upon our actual situation including our capacities for affecting 
it and the consequences of what we may immediately bring about, or upon our 
belief about that situation or upon our moral estimate of what the supposed situa­
tion demands,^
Now this is as neat a way of side-tracking and precluding the issue of the 
second question (Is the ground of obligation transcendent and a priori to 
the given situation or not ?) as one may wish. It should be added that the 
first question (Are all obligations founded on one ground ?) is completely 
engulfed by the ensuing quibble about real and subjective and putative 
duties.
I have dwelt at such length on Carritt’s view because he finaUy puts the 
point and pleads the case for such philosophies as John Dewey’s with its 
stress on the singularity of instances and the duty of melioration ; concurs 
with Sir David Ross’ ethical theory on the need for an intuitive decision 
between the clamouring merits of different obligations and satisfactions 
inherent in one situation ; and even agrees on some very essential points 
with the ethical theories of existentialists like Sartre. The latter, however, 
argues in addition that what is the right action for one man is by no means 
right for another, though all objective circumstances remain the same. 
Thus, for one Frenchman, who under the German occupation had the choice 
of joining the Maquis or staying on to help an old widowed mother, to 
stay would have been the right decision (if he were a gallant young fellow 
whose every instinct drove him to fight) ; for another—to go (if he were a 
timid fellow whose dependence on his mother’s presence would have 
induced him to stay). A genuine and sincere moral decision according to 
Sartre must, under given circumstances, necessarily yield different results 
for different persons. By finally abandoning any objective view of duty, 
Sartre thus breaks the last hold of the intuitive theory of morals on an 
objective concept of right, and invalidates any claim it may put forward 
for the universal validity of the intuited content. Unredeemable relativity
1 Op. cit., p. 113.
2 op. cit.. Ch. X V I, p. 140.
3 E. F. Carritt, Ethical and Political Thinking (1947), Ch. IT, p. 14.
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and undifferentiated chaos are the final outcome. Our question can now be 
put as follows : Does a strict adherence to Carritt’s Theory of Morals 
logically and inevitably lead to chaos ; or do such safeguards as he provides 
by holding on to an objective view of duty and the entailed identity of 
intuited contents effectively circumvent this outcome ; and if so, are they 
justifiable inside the limits of his own theory ?
We must, however, first mention the curious inability or unwillingness 
noticeable amongst adherents of the occasionalist theory to differentiate 
between the entirely dissimilar processes of ethical analysis and moral 
deliberation. The aim we pursue and the method we employ in enquiring 
after the nature and validity of a ground of obligation is very different from 
the aim pursued and method used when we seek to make up our minds on 
how this obligation affects, applies, and in its turn is modified to meet the 
practical contingencies of an actual situation.^ The latter method is rather 
like that of a surgeon’s scalpel which isolates and lays bare a certain tendon. 
To lay bare the moral component of action, to reveal the moral law in its 
purity is the aim of analysis. The process may be roughly described as 
follows. After all practical considerations have been accounted for and 
deducted, be they particular obligations, material factors or personal inclina­
tions (and this we have all experienced when submitting any of our moral 
decisions to a careful scrutiny) there remains an unaccounted for residue, an 
inclination, be it ever so small, away from the result warranted by the known 
vectors of actual circumstances. Unless we seek to account for this residue, 
and discover the nature and the source of its influence we cannot claim to 
have understood the actual process o f taking a moral decision nor explain 
the fact of moral experience in a satisfactory manner. Now this cannot be 
done by going once again over the particular traits of a given situation 
since those have been accounted for already. The residue, we must therefore 
assume, could have been effected only by something outside and prior to 
the particular modifications of which situations are capable. A satisfactory 
explanation would have to depend on an analysis of general principles. 
An inquiry concerning the nature of general principles would therefore, 
far from being “ an occupation not without some usefulness for ‘ men of 
leisure,’ ” appear to be the main task of the ethical analyst. However weary 
and seemingly unprofitable, this inquiry must not be neglected on pain of 
invalidating the results of a moral theory.
To sum up : if Carritt wishes to point out that moral decisions are, ulti­
mately, the sole responsibility of the agent, i.e. that each man must decide 
for himself whether and how far to admit a reverence for the moral law as 
a decisive factor in his practical deliberations—we have no quarrel with him. 
For indeed situations are unique, identical instances of moral problems do 
not recur ; their solution requires alertness and moral sensitivity. An 
appeal to “ cut and dried recipes ” will be of no avail, as in any case one 
would have to decide which recipe to apply. One cannot even shift one’s 
responsibility by asking the advice of some person one respects. This pro­
cedure, which de Burgh thinks possible though it deprives the decision 
of the moral value which it would otherwise have, is shown up as an unavail-
1 Compare Professor A. E. Murphy’s “ Who are we ? ” A  discussion o f Carritt’s Ethical and 
Political Theory, in the Philosophical Review, May, 1949 ; which deals with Carritt’s intuitionism 
(We think . . .) when establishing and vindicating moral axioms.
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ing strategem by Sartre. For Sartre very cleverly points out that one is 
responsible for the choice o f  one’s advisers : i . e .  one chooses to ask Brown’s 
advice because one knows beforehand what sort o f person Brown is and 
what sort o f advice he is likely to give. But to say that a moral decision is 
unique and particular in each particular instance and ultimately the sole 
and unshirkable responsibility o f  the agent, is one thing ; to claim that it is 
reached by an ever renewed and ever changing intuition {i.e. an intuition 
whose content differs with every given problem) is another. Nor does it 
seem justifiable to infer on this evidence that such decisions are not taken in 
respect o f a transcendent ground o f obligation. Nor can it be taken to 
eliminate the possibility that such a ground not derived from the practical 
circumstances o f a particular occasion, does determine (in a way and to a 
certain degree) all decisions taken on all occasions.^
How indeed does Carritt vindicate his denial o f the existence o f such a 
single universally valid ground o f obligation ? On what reasons does he 
base his assumption that all obhgations are obligations ad hoc ; that there 
are many kinds o f obligation ; and that they are all abstracted from par­
ticular instances ? Surely a failure to inquire into their nature and one or 
two asides about the “ puzzling and uninteresting ” qualities o f this problem 
are not enough to settle it off-hand in favour o f the occasionalists ?
The stand taken by Carritt on this question can only be explained by his 
refusal to discriminate between the nature o f such numerous though 
general maxims as “ thou shalt not kill ” ; “ one ought not to lie ” ; “ one 
ought to keep promises ” and the common ground o f their validity which 
alone can be cMled the moral law. In other words, the moral law is not as 
Carritt takes it to be the sum, or outcome o f the obligations inherent in a 
situation but something beyond them, something which is both the ground 
for the initial validity o f those obligations and the arbiter regulating and 
assigning their respective and rival claims. This moral law it seems to me, 
we apprehend by intuition, and at the same time we apprehend it as applying 
to all and any o f our actions. We have no need o f  additional intuitions to 
tell us which instances fall or do not fall under its sway, since we know that 
all instances, inasmuch as they are instances o f the decisions and actions of 
a human agent, come under its jurisdiction. What is open to question is 
the degree to which we are able to realise the moral law in our actual deci­
sions and the forms it takes when modified to meet practical contingencies. 
These are indeed determined by the mind, the temperament and the attitude 
o f a particular agent at a particular time. As for the moral law, it is best 
described in terms o f  the respect we owe unconditionally and under all 
circumstances to the person in every man qua man. All general maxims can 
be reduced to this final law, and all draw their validity from the initial 
interdict against misusing (or lacking reverence for) another man’s person. ^
N ow  it seems to me that we refer back to this law in every single decision
 ^ The strongest arguments against this aspect o f  intuitionism are to be found in Paton’s Can 
Reason be Practical ?, the H . Hertz Lecture o f  1943, pp. 30-3, where intuition in the absence of 
an ultimate principle is characterised as a “ groundless opinion ” and the existence o f  such a 
principle reaffirmed : “ The grounds o f  rightness may be different and yet the principle o f  right­
ness be the same.”
2 See Kant’s second formula o f  the categorical imperative cited in Heinemann’s “ Autonomy 
o r  Orthonomy ? ”, H ib b e r t  J o u r n a l ,  July, 1949. I am indebted to D r Heinemann for a 
num ber o f  useful suggestions in the course o f  the discussion on my paper.
AUTONOMOUS ETHI CS 45
we take, and that we measure the value o f our decisions by its norm. This 
is by no means so far fetched as it sounds : we have only to observe what 
anyone does when deliberating on a moral decision or pronouncing a moral 
judgement in order to furnish the required proof. Let us recall for a moment 
how we actually reach a moral decision, in a given instance. We weigh the 
claims our nearest and dearest have on us, the obligations under which we 
labour, our own desires in the matter, our estimate o f the facts and the 
possible consequences. But after we have done all this we still have to pose 
the moral question : Am I acting equitably (towards all men) in doing this, 
or am I abasing the dignity o f any man ? Whatever our actual decision may 
finally turn out to be, the moral verdict remains unchanged. We might for 
instance decide that under the circumstances we are prepared to take the 
guilt o f infringement o f the moral law upon ourselves for the sake o f other 
things. We permit killing in war, lying under certain circumstances, and 
the breaking o f a promise to one man in order to benefit many others. But 
we must be fully aware what we are doing, and we must be clear about our 
responsibilities. We might claim alleviating circumstance. We might even 
argue that because o f the ad hoc nature o f all human activities it is conceivable 
that never in the course o f human history has a deed been performed which 
was absolutely and perfectly moral. Nevertheless we seem to be held 
responsible for every failure to implement the moral law in its fullness : 
for is not this the ground on which we judge even the bravest o f Nazi 
soldier morally both responsible and guilty ? He obeyed orders. He satisfied 
the claims o f country, family, position and honour. His only fault was his 
refusal to accept what the late Master o f Balliol terms “ the challenge to 
perfection.” He failed to satisfy the claims o f the universally binding, uni­
versally valid moral law, which prior to all situations is the unconditional 
duty o f all men. For this he is personally responsible, and o f this respon­
sibility no one can free him. I can therefore not agree with Carritt’s defini­
tion o f putative duty : what a man thinks his duty to be under certain cir­
cumstances, since what we really hold him responsible for is whether or 
not, and to what degree, he is prepared to make the upholding o f the moral 
law his paramount duty under all circumstances. This seems to me a reason­
ably accurate description o f what actually happens when we pronounce 
moral judgements on people. O f course, being human, we allow for human 
failings. O f course we temper the wind to the shorn lamb. But in order to 
do this effectively we need to consider not only the bare condition o f  the 
lamb’s skin but also the fury o f the wind. To compromise is one thing ; to 
mistake this compromise for the principle, the circumstantial modification 
for the essential, the occasional for the law is another. Besides, there is our 
practical need to rid ourselves o f the bewildering multitude o f inessential 
minutiæ. In order to do this effectively we must have a stable point o f  
reference beyond them. Morally we stand therefore in great need o f having 
our belief in the absolute validity o f this point o f reference strengthened. 
Therefore a moral theory which does its best to blur the outlines o f the moral 
law, and render indistinct the extent, mode, and nature o f its influence on 
practical decisions ; a theory which in contradiction and disregard o f the 
pertinent facts o f moral experience (both as decision and as judgement) 
neglects to examine the distinctive function o f the moral component o f  
action errs on two different levels. It errs as a theory o f morals by unaccount­
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ably neglecting some o f the weightier points o f its problem. And it errs 
as a theory o f morals in that by denying the existence o f the moral law, it 
tends to weaken the influence of that law on future practical decisions.
Admittedly Carritt does not expose his theory to the relativity inherent 
in the occasionalist attitude without an attempt to assure it o f a certain 
modicum of objectivity. He provides this by assuming that every morally 
problematical situation determines only one or at any rate only a few 
objectively right solutions, and that any sincere unbiased man when con­
fronted with the same situation will intuit the same solution or the same 
limited set o f solutions. Since obligations are inherent in the situation and 
may be discoverable by our examination o f that situation in all its implica­
tions, one’s first duty is to acquaint oneself with all the pertinent facts. This 
as has been repeatedly pointed out is a condition impossible to fulfil since 
no finite being can know all the facts or survey all the consequences o f even 
the simplest o f decisions. But even were this possible it seems an unwar­
ranted over-simplification o f moral facts to assume that ; {a) every situation 
determines one single objective duty, or a limited number o f objectively 
right solutions, and {b) that all entirely sincere intuitions would hit on the 
same decisions ; unless we assume, as Carritt most emphatically does not, 
a transcendent universal and simple ground for all moral obligations. 
Inside the limits o f the occasionahst theory we have every reason to believe 
that different acts would be right for different people. Moreover, it seems 
unduly optimistic to assume that all sincerely good-willed people would 
intuit the same right act if left to do so on the basis o f particular instances. 
Indeed I should think that different persons would o f necessity, even if 
cognisant o f all the pertinent facts, plump for different duties, since different 
people have different axiological attitudes : they differ in the evaluation of 
facts. A  moral problem is therefore not to be solved by quibbhng about the 
facts o f a situation unless the persons in question already possess the same 
or nearly the same set o f values in an identical hierarchical order. Nor does 
an agreement on “ facts ” necessarily entail moral agreement. It is not 
around facts but around the relative merits o f the values represented by 
those facts that moral disputes rage, and it is in an agreement on the relative 
merits o f these values that a solution must be sought. Thus, Dewey postu­
lates the melioration o f  a situation, i.e. progress, to be the value which gives 
the right moral direction to particular decisions. Carritt though he mentions 
at one point the general duty to give “ the satisfactions which are due in a 
given situation to whom they are due,” does not press the point. However, 
with Dewey as with Carritt the sense in which we are to take “ melioration,” 
or “ satisfaction ” remains a moot point. In the given situation o f a witch 
trial, for instance, the intuitive decision o f the inquisitor would be to burn 
the witch, thereby cleansing the community o f her evil but temporal influ­
ence, and at the same time possibly saving her soul from eternal perdition ; 
a more meliorating act than this could hardly be conceived under the cir­
cumstances. A painter present at the time would probably intuit his chief 
meliorative duty to be the production o f an impressive pictorial account of 
the flames and the folds o f the hangman’s mask. A humanist would prob­
ably protest and get himself burnt as a fellow-sorcerer which could hardly 
be counted a noteworthy “ melioration ” o f the situation from his own 
point o f view, though quite possibly the inquisitor might think it so. In
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any case the quarrel o f whether melioration and satisfaction mean more 
beauty, more truth, more progress or more equity cannot be decided without 
recurrence to an outside arbiter as values are not commensurable and the 
attitudes which determine their choice cannot be altered or influenced by 
proof of fact. The attitude which postulates the primacy o f the moral law, 
and the value of morality, fulfils the function of such an arbiter. It proclaims 
• the supreme binding power of the Moral Law and its prerogative to regulate 
and check all actions induced by the pursuit o f other values. Above all it 
expresses our determination to accord such power to the moral law. This our 
determination is the only conceivable reason for the existing consensus, 
as far as it does exist, on ethical judgements and the one hypothesis which 
accounts for all the implications of moral experience.
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This attempt led him in two divergent directions. On the one hand he 
insisted that a citizen could be morally autonomous in a state only if  he 
made the laws under which he lived. This led him to his defence of direct 
democracy or popular sovereignty as the only legitimate form of govern­
ment. It led him to reject representative forms of democracy and to 
insist that every law must be the expression of the active wills o f the 
citizens.
Rousseau was, however, well aware of the difficulties o f this view. In 
the first place no law is likely to be passed unanimously. Popular sovereignty 
means majority sovereignty. Then again majorities do not necessarily make 
good laws. Majority sovereignty may be majority tyranny. What of the 
minority ? They at any rate do not make the laws under which they live. 
There is also the practical difficulty that, particularly in a large and complex 
state, a referendum on every law would be impossible and legislation would 
be a full-time job. Rousseau tried to forestall this objection by insisting 
that states should be small ; but he had to leave unsolved the problems 
resulting from the need of federation into larger units. He also seems to 
have believed that the laws should be completely general in form and could 
therefore be few in number, and the task of applying them could then be 
left to an executive body (the “ government ”) which need not necessarily 
be democratic in its working.
All these difficulties gave rise to another line of development. This is 
indicated in many passages in Rousseau but never pulled together and 
clearly stated by him. It is the line which is of most importance for our 
present purpose, because it developed through Kant to Hegel and is repre­
sented in Enghsh in the works of Bradley and Bosanquet, where it links 
together the ideas o f moral autonomy and political obligation.
On this view I must distinguish between my actual desires and my true 
interest, which is indicated by reason. Besides my temporary and fleeting 
impulses I have a rational will which is my real will, my higher or true self. 
The achievement of this higher self is the harmonisation of my desires. So 
long as these desires remain merely external to each other I am a battle­
ground and not an individual. But I find myself in a world of other indivi­
duals. So long as these individuals remain merely external to each other, 
human relationships are a battleground and not a community. Reason 
requires a unity higher than the individual will, a self wider than the personal 
self, a harmony in which private interests are not destroyed but unified. 
Thus the rational wiU becomes the general will, my true interest the common 
interest, my real self the corporate self. In the state alone can all these 
demands for harmony and rationality be satisfied. Other associations serve 
particular purposes. Each of them is just one desire writ large and not the 
whole individual made complete and perfect. As Hegel puts it, “ a single 
person is something subordinate and as such he must dedicate himself to the 
ethical whole. . . . Hence if  the state claims his life the individual must 
surrender it.”i
By this argument moral freedom or moral autonomy is identified with 
obedience to law or service of the state. The law is the voice of the general 
will, which is my real or rational will. A drug addict is a slave to his habit 
and attains freedom only when he masters it. A criminal is a slave to his 
1 Philosophy of Right, section 70. Addition. English translation, T. M. Knox, p. 241.
